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ABSTRACT

An abstract of the dissertation of Minzi Su for the Doctor of Philosophy in Public
Administration and Policy presented May 1st, 2008.

Title: Representation Without Taxation: China's Rural Development Initiatives for a
New Millennium

The purpose of this research is to assess the prospects for China's rural
revitalization programs now in their initial stages of formulation and implementation.
The study seeks to discover, primarily on the basis of field research in several different
rural locations, what capacities and political-economic conditions seem to hold the
greatest promise for success. The research was occasioned primarily by two key
factors: First, China's party and government are now engaged in a massive program to
create nothing less than a harmonious society, a key element of which is a "new
socialist countryside." The second factor is that despite numerous previous attempts
to close the economic, political and social gaps - a pronounced and institutionalized

class structure that divides rural Chinese from urban - the gap is larger today than at
any time in the last 60 years, and is still expanding. These two factors lead to the
obvious question: What evidence is there that this time the party and government will
succeed?
The research explores policy implementation and international development
literatures and China's recent history for explanations of both successes and failures of
rural development policies, and attributes a part of the problem to Beijing's persistent
reliance upon mass programs, which have helped many, but which have bypassed
hundreds of millions of farm households. China is a large country with extreme
variations in climate and topography, and China's farm communities can therefore not
be managed in the same way. This dissertation proposes town by town development
capacity assessment as a means of determining what resources are available and what
kind of capacity building will be appropriate as a development plan is prepared. It
also aids in determining whether endogenous resources will be up to the task or
government leadership or investment will be necessary.
The ability to understand and make use of capacity as a development research tool
evolved during this research as a hypothesis worthy of further exploration and testing,
as it seems to hold important considerations for those planning future development
projects.
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PREFACE

The work that follows is an effort to shed light on the question of whether living
conditions will improve in rural communities as a result of China's "new socialist
countryside" initiatives. The research has its roots in six years of service as a midlevel official in a Chinese city with all the day-to-day work at the intersection of
government and party influence, local government actions and behaviors, and a
developing civil society. While some of the combined achievements of our
government were impressive, some goals were frustratingly elusive. There was a gap
between the good news visible in the national propaganda machine and the difficult
times facing many of our rural poor. From one period to another and from one region
to another, reports of significant successes have alternated with reports of extreme
hardship.
While the details of China's new rural development plans are still unfolding as
this is written, it was never the intent to examine those plans. The project was
initiated by looking in another direction. I elected to examine conditions in China's

ix

local towns and villages because I could see "great walls" between China's peasants
and the seat of power and influence in Beijing. Those walls deflected the goals, plans,
information, resources and programs that were flowing from the center to the
periphery; and importantly also affected the reports and statistics that were flowing
from rural society back to the planners and decision makers in the party and the
government. I also chose to look at local communities because I wanted to remain
independent of the theoretical perspectives that could bias (as opposed to guiding) my
research. At the local level, it isn't economic theory that is visible, but
implementation (or lack of it); and it is only at this level that results stand naked and
still for close examination.
Because there are such extremes among China's rural communities in terms of
prosperity, I chose to visit four different Chinese provinces, Liaoning, Jiangsu,
Sichuan and Gansu. I worked within two towns and at least two villages in each
province, and in addition to selecting them on the basis that their household income
was close to average in each province, I was also careful to include both level
farmland and more remote villages in the hills and mountains. One of the remote
villages I visited in Sichuan province has no roads and was at the end of a muddy trail
about fifteen kilometers in length. Another village displayed peasant housing, parks,
architecture and an infrastructure worthy of any modern western city. I visited in the
cold of January-February and in the heat of August-September. In my travels, I spoke

with more than 175 people, including peasants, local businessmen and officials from
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every level of government including China's ministries in Beijing, though my
interviewees were overwhelmingly peasant farm families.
What I saw and heard during my field research told me I was working at a valueladen level of analysis, first because not much scholarly work has been accomplished
at this level, and statistics are both sparse and suspect. Secondly, the truth about rural
China isn't readily available in the media. The Chinese media tends to focus on good
news, and the western media is often drawn to the bad. Interest in China's rural
conditions is high, but information is scanty and biased. Third, it should be noted that
research in rural China isn't easy. As is always true, interviews are filtered through a
complex web of local interests and "official" translations and restrictions. Peasants
tend to overplay their misery in the hopes of improving the flow of government
largesse, and depending on the circumstances, cadres and officials tend to overstate
their accomplishments to attract the kind of favorable attention that can affect
promotions, or to exaggerate their problems for the same reasons as the peasants.
This was not an ethnographic study in which I could become assimilated into
these communities over a lengthy period of time to build trust. I was therefore
grateful that I was usually able to converse in my native language, and was able
through many interviews to hunt for confirmation and nuance.
I am very grateful to my family and my friends who helped make arrangements
for my travels in China. When I began my research in early 2006, rural development
had been singled by Beijing for special treatment. Apparently as a consequence of bad
xi

press, the entire issue of rural development was placed off limits to all outsiders, and
my requests for interviews were regularly refused, despite my guarantee of anonymity.
Thanks to the assistance of my friends and family, I was able to meet people from
every walk of life in highly informal settings that were very conducive to free-flowing
and uninhibited information, including access to public records that would improve
my understanding of the forces at play in their jurisdictions. Thanks to my friends and
their networks, I didn't need to worry about lodging or meals, local dialects, official
taboos or local suspicions. My notes came from informal conversations with new
friends. In exploratory grounded research, triangulation of information and data points
is part of the process, as each conversation tests the previous ones and becomes a
milestone for the next. Without help, this is a project that would not have been
possible.
It, was also heartwarming that many who participated in the project, whether as
my guides or as my new acquaintances, believed they were participating in something
worthwhile; and some of the new acquaintances became sympathetic and enthusiastic
friends. It was apparent that China's farm families enjoyed being heard. Some of my
friends and family had not previously had much opportunity for such deep and
personal exchanges with people from classes other than their own, an example of the
urban-rural gap that was one of the prime motivators for this research. It appears a
universal human trait that we underestimate people we do not know. Many Chinese

have a low regard for China's farmers, and the feeling is mutual. Familiarity is a
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wonderful cure for problems of that sort.
I make no claims about the universality of the conditions I describe in this
research. I was drawn to multiple cases because I wished to capture some of the wide
variation evident in China's rural sector, and the amount of variation I unearthed is a
clue that I have made real progress in that direction, but as with all case studies with a
small n, this research must be considered exploratory.
What remains to be done is more of the kind of research represented by this
project. I have no illusions that China's leaders are awaiting this report to decide what
to do next. What I can hope for without being ambitious beyond my means, however,
is that the work behind this study can guide similar research, not necessarily by
interested academics, but by those who must evaluate capacity as part of their
implementation planning.
Minzi Su
May, 2008
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Chapter One
Rural Development Policy in 21st Century China:
Introduction

The purpose of the study
For millennia, the Chinese rural population paid their taxes, served as corvee
labor for the nation and tended their crops for themselves and their families, and some
for the landlords or warlords or whoever happened to be running things at any given
time. Many took produce or meats to small local markets. They were left alone by the
government except when they could not afford to pay their taxes or perform their
assigned corvee work for one reason or another. This was the traditional Chinese
smallholder farming life. This role changed when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
took control of China, and the country was officially proclaimed a dictatorship of the
proletariat. Farmers were herded into military-like organizations called communes
1

under a unified system that controlled everything from their farming activities to their
households and family lives. In this way, hundreds of millions of peasants called
"poor and blank" by Mao Zedong were organized, worked, educated, cared for and fed
in return for their feeding a hungry nation and fueling industrialization. The rural
population, roughly two thirds of China's total, has been the primary resource for
China's modernization until just recently.
After some initial enthusiasm, China's farmers gradually became disenchanted
with commune life, however. They had become exhausted by political-ideological
rhetoric that was used more to bludgeon than to inform, and that had fostered reticence
and conformity among the majority.1 In the late 1970s, the peasants finally became
sufficiently disenchanted and cynical about their lot to begin challenging the
regimentation. In the process, they took liberties with their labor that had been
unthinkable during the Mao regime; and they pushed the state to overhaul communist
policy and overturn decades of communist conformity. The collective rural economy
was replaced by a smallholder farm economy nationwide by the early 1980s. After a
spurt of early successes, a range of central policies restructured the tax system and redirected the economy to an all out effort at marketization, industrialization and
urbanization, and China's farmers saw an erosion of their ability to make a living.
Their chances of transforming their lives from subsistence farming to a family
business diminished. They had lost all the benefits of commune life (food security,

1

Anita Chan et al., Chen Village: The Recent History of a Peasant Community in Mao's China
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
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education, health care and pension benefits), and gained none of the advantages of
individual household farming. China's rural condition was described in a muchpublicized letter to Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji: "Farmers are really suffering, the
rural villages are really poor, and agriculture is really in danger."2
Rural development took a left turn as a key element of the government's
economic strategy with its 10th Five-Year Plan covering the period from 2001 to 2005.
Where previous planning called for increases in farm income and grain production,
this new plan aimed at xiaokang shehui, an overall prosperous rural society
characterized by a comfortable living standard. China's 11th Five-Year Plan (20062010) continued rural transformation both in form and content, largely focused on
growth as the key objective. The new plan proceeded along two strategic lines: a
scientific approach to development, and the goal of building a "harmonious society."
As a keystone of the program, and as a strategic guidepost, the concept of "building a
new socialist countryside" was introduced. The program calls for a multi-faceted set
of solutions incorporating rural construction, social undertakings and grass-roots
democracy. Importantly and symbolically, the agriculture tax that had been imposed
on China's farmers for more than 2,600 years was eliminated; and all legal and illegal
2

Li Changping, wo xiang zongli shuo shihua (Speak Truth to the Premier), {Beijing: guangmin ribao
(Guangming Daily Press), 2001). Li Changping was a party secretary of a township government in
Hubei Province of China when he wrote the letter to Premier Zhu on March 2nd, 2000. The letter was
reported by Nanfang zhoumo (Southern Weekend), a newspaper famous for its openness to sensitive
issues in the Chinese society in August at the same year. The serious rural situation described in the
letter shocked the Chinese top decision-makers. All seven members of the Politburo of the Chinese
central government twice added their signatures and called for action for its provisions. The letter was
published as a book with more details from Li's experience at grassroots level of China in early 2001.

3

fees tied to the tax system were removed. The central leadership continuously
trumpets the profound and fundamental value of such planned changes for the nation
and especially for the oppressed farm family. These and other new policies are
intended to lead to unprecedented changes in the Chinese countryside, with "the
ultimate solution entailing a full-scale eradication of structural bias against the
peasantry."3
The sudden high-level emphasis on farmers' rights, equal opportunity and social
justice provides a foundation of hope for a significant transformation. Some
optimistic students of comparative studies who see a parallel with the development
history of Japan and South Korea have begun numbering the days until the realization
of Chinese rural rejuvenation plans. This paper is constructed upon the hopes of a
Chinese citizen and the perspective of an international scholar. The reality of China's
current situation is this: the task of recasting China's rural society is a formidable one
and the last 60 years of fits and starts in attempting this very transformation have
provided little reason for optimism.
The purpose for this research is to assess the prospects for China's successful
rural revitalization programs now under development and in their initial stages.
A statement of the problems
The state-centered policy approach adopts a broad perspective in which "the state

3

Ray Yep, "Can "Tax-for-Free" Reform Reduce Rural Tension in China? The Process, Progress and
Limitations," The China Quarterly 177 (2004). p. 42.

4

appears to have some autonomy in defining the nature of public problems and
developing solutions to them."4 There is a persistent myth or perhaps naive
assumption that politicians make policy and public servants implement it rationally "as
if implementation was something utterly simple and automatic."5 The reality is that
implementation is frequently a highly political process.6 The intensity of participation
by an actor will depend on a range of factors including the strength of interest in the
policy and the organizational capacity.
The Chinese experience during its transition from a planned economy to a market
economy provides ample evidence that the hard lessons about state-centered policy
approaches had not been learned, as new policy reforms incorporated many debatable
features. Those problems are visible in three levels of analysis: central policy, local
implementation and rural engagement.
From the central policy perspective, a salient characteristic was its strong statecentered policy flavor and approach. Whether "bounded rationality"7 or "muddling
through"8 or bureaucratic politics9 or state interests,10 one line of debate about how to

4

M.S. Grindle and J.W. Thomas, "Policy Makers, Policy Choices and Policy Outcomes: The Political
Economy of Reform in Developing Countries," Policy Sciences 22, no. 3 (1989).
5
Jan-Erik Lane, The Public Sector: Concepts, Models and Approaches (London: Sage, 1993). p.93.
6
M.S. Grindle, "Policy Content and Context in Implementation," in Politics and Policy Implementation
in the Third World, ed. M. S. Grindle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).
7
Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior, 2nd ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1965).
8
C.E. Lindblom, "The Science of Muddling Through," Public Administration Review 19, no. 2 (1959),
C.E. Lindblom, "Still Muddling, Not yet Through," Public Administration Review 39, no. 6 (1979).
9
Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision; Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, 1971),
E.J. Clay and B.B. Schaffer, Room for Maneuver: An Explanation of Public Policy in Agriculture and
Rural Development (London: Heinemann, 1984).
10
Grindle and Thomas, "Policy Makers, Policy Choices and Policy Outcomes: The Political Economy

5

handle the situation for the peasants was the issue of a paternalist versus a populist
approach, and the government simply went from one extreme (paternalistic, highly
regimented communes) to the other (entirely laissez faire).
The decentralization essential to a market-oriented economy creates troublesome
conditions for the policy process. Central government elites are reluctant to cede
power; central bureaucracies resist the delegation of authority; and when
responsibilities are transferred there is rarely a corresponding transfer of resources.
Those resources that are available at the local level are often poorly deployed by
inexperienced, ill-trained and underpaid field staff.
New policy approaches seem to retain elements of the patriarchy habit, because
in addition to exhorting local bureaucrats to comply with the new policies, it is also
necessary to make arrangements for direct farm support in a way that is strongly
reminiscent of the patriarchal tendency to micromanage. The elimination of the
agriculture tax has taken away most rural local government revenues, making it
necessary to shrink local staffs; but at the same time, local governments are also
tasked to build new performance-orientedservice systems to replace the old
bureaucratic organs. How to handle these conflicting priorities is a problem still
awaiting either further central policy refinement or local innovation. For now, the
issue adds another layer of complexity to the outcome of rural development progress.

of Reform in Developing Countries." E.A. Nordlinger, "Taking the State Seriously," in
Understanding Political Development, ed. M. Weiner and S.P. Huntington (Boston: Little Brown,
1987).

6

Because of regional disparities, any Five-Year Plan can only represent broad
guidance for those attempting to develop policies for rural development. At the
central policy level, there is a desirable element of policy consistency, particularly
with respect to goals. At the same time, it is inevitable that local implementation
needs, conditions and actions will conflict with such consistency, adding uncertainty to
the outcomes.
Secondly, from a local implementation perspective, it is evident that during the
last three decades greater decentralization does not necessarily equate to greater
democracy or "power to the people" - it all depends on the local circumstances under
which decentralization occurs.

n

In China, policy implementation is intended to begin with orders that descend
from the provincial level to city, county (district), township, and village levels. The
central ministries and commissions supervise, manage, distribute resources and
provide regulatory guidance for local levels. The quantity and quality of policy
instruments and the discretionary power allocated to each province have always been
variables that work against uniformity. In addition to imbalances cause by natural
regional differences, policy implementation and resource distribution from above are
also skewed by imbalances that arise from the amount of influence local governments
can bring to bear as provinces negotiate with the central level. As long as "black box"
decision-making exists, policy matters are often significantly adjusted at this

11

K. Griffin, "Economic Development in a Changing World," World Development 9, no. 3 (1981).

7

provincial level.
Below the provincial level, each jurisdiction can make adjustments based on the
local policy environment. This is a natural outcome of whatever extent of
decentralization is achieved in each area. China's government does not extend to the
village level, and village leaders are not considered part of the government hierarchy;
but there is a party organization that plays a supervisory political role, which means
that policy adjustments are often made even at this lowest level.
Any policy that originates at the central level must negotiate all these layers of
local filters to touch its target population. Overall, Chinese policymaking is a dynamic
process that extends from Beijing to the Chinese people, adding to the difficulty of
studying policy implementation. At which point the process should be examined is
always subject to personal preference and the goal of the study. In order to understand
development as it is unfolding in rural China, the best place to watch is the village
level, because that is where the end product of all intermediate filtering becomes
visible. It is also at this level that conflicts or constraints between governments,
between government and business, and between state and society become available for
study and for evaluation.
Selective policy implementation was the norm in China during the days before
the latest reforms. This was due to centralized micromanagement of the cadre
administrative system and the reduced share of taxes at the local level. Current policy
is delivering additional resources for local government in the form of transfer
8

payments, leading to expectations that policy can be implemented correctly. How fast
and to what extent new central policy can help local governments is still an open
question, though results in some areas provide reasons for optimism. Current central
policy seeks local comprehensive administrative reform as a first step to break through
the mountain of rural development challenges. In particular, it is considered essential
to begin with centralized local financial management. At this early stage, resistance
from local levels, especially from local governments in prosperous regions of China,
makes it clear that central interference in local finances is not welcome, and has been
difficult to force. Thus, it is not yet possible to predict the final results.
It is no mystery that illegal land seizures, illegal fees and taxes, and deterioration
of local schools and health facilities all combined to create a pervasive and enduring
dissatisfaction with and mistrust of local governments, even though central policy was
the root cause of the problems. It is politically expedient to fix blame for those
problems at the local levels, but it is also prudent for higher levels to take control of
town and village finances, as conditions during the 1990s certainly led to bad habits
with respect to private-regarding behavior on the part of local cadres. It also appears
necessary for the central government to "clear the air" by admitting that local financial
crises were the end result of systemic, institutionalized discrimination against farmers
in central policy.
This issue also calls attention to the notion of local autonomy, which despite
official policy that encourages village elections seems never to have reached desirable

9

levels in China. The crux of the issue can be seen from two perspectives: first, how to
carry out strong central political will for rural revitalization while simultaneously
strengthening local administrative capacity; and second, how to integrate the power of
the local party organization with an autonomous villager organization to drive local
prosperity. These are critical issues, yet to be resolved, that will undoubtedly
influence the trajectory of local development.
Additionally, farmers' participation in the policy process has not been worked out
in current policy. While reforms may have the best interest of the farmers at heart,
they still suffer from the weaknesses inherent in top-down approaches to development.
Two decades ago, when the communes were disbanded in favor of household farming,
agricultural productivity increased very quickly.12 However, the disadvantage of the
majority of Chinese farmers with a guerrilla-style approach to the market became
more and more visible in the face of stronger and stronger pressure from the global
economy. Without the organization and knowhow of the communes, farmers were
unprepared to deal with the local bureaucracy and with the market. They either bowed
their heads and became fatalists, or unleashed their entrepreneurial flair in an everyman-for-himself approach to rural life.
After the national fiscal policy reforms of the mid-1990s, local governments were
forced into increasingly aggressive taxation and collection practices and ultimately to

12

J.C. Oi, Rural China Takes Off: Institutional Foundations of Economic Reform (Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1999), Kate Xiao Zhou, How the Farmers Changed China: Power of
the People (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996).
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illegal predatory practices that fractured any reasonable relationship they may have
had with the farmers. Mistrust between local officials and villagers has remained the
norm, predictably adversely affecting local capacity required for economic progress.
Mending these fences therefore has become a high priority, but since the problems
have never been officially acknowledged, repairs are not easy to effect. Improvements
seemingly are expected to happen if everyone pretends the abuses never happened.
Much will depend on various local situations and the people involved, and will
represent some level of challenge to local bureaucrats now in power, whether they
were involved in past transgressions or not.
In this reform project, among the three levels of problem analysis, central policy
represents a precondition from which all other aspects of China's rural transformation
flow. Without a strong foundation of political will it is difficult to imagine the
possibility of transforming the deeply rooted, institutionalized socio-cultural, political
and economic habits of this particular state-centered nation. And yet no matter the
degree of central political will, local engagement is the one indispensable ingredient
for economic and social breakthrough. Local initiative succeeded admirably in many
places in China when the curtain of central influence was simply lifted out of the way,
but in no instance has central will yielded significant progress without significant local
engagement.
Chinese history has repeatedly reminded us about the humbling effects of peasant
power. Hundreds of millions of farmers are the policy target population in the set of

11

policies that form the Chinese government's current five year plan. The flexibility that
is woven into the policy combined with the endless variety and complexity of local
conditions make it clear there are too many independent variables to even recognize,
let alone attempt to regulate, in this vast socio-economic experiment. Without
farmers' agreement with the spirit of the policy goals and wholehearted participation
and cooperation driven by their own self-interests, local officials cannot hope to carry
out central policy, especially given the limiting condition of traditional leadership
approaches through the power of slogans and exhortation. One of the weaknesses of
past attempts at rural reform was the limited financial condition of local treasuries, but
even under the new policy environment with central financial support, central farm
support remains a critical element for success.
The central problem that is the core of this research project is that even with the
solid synergy that can develop from a partnership of central and local governments
and the rural population, the barriers to success are still formidable. This thesis
identifies these barriers and demonstrates their significance as part of an overall
assessment of the likelihood of success in China's current ambitious socio-economic
revolution.
The research question and method
A gap exists in the planning and theoretical grounding for China's rural
transformation project. The critical question addressed here is this heretofore
neglected issue: How to assess, strengthen and tap into local capacities that hold the
12

greatest promise for rural revitalization in China?
This research is focused where the end product of policy becomes visible - the
Chinese towns and villages where local governments and peasants meet at the nexus
of deployed policy, power and rural tradition, and where the situation had not
improved for hundreds of millions of Chinese farm families. There have been
spectacular successes in rural China, along with the many failures. This fact, coupled
with the timing of this research at the earliest stages of China's rural reform, suggested
that the best research approach was exploratory - intending to uncover plausible
connections and possible causal relationships between successes and failures among
neighboring towns and villages. The selected approach was to reach directly into local
social, economic and political processes and to probe economic and political links to
identify the sources of local developmental capacity. Because there were visible and
strong geographic and topographic vectors associated with success and failure, this
project was planned to embrace multiple case studies in four provinces in China that
were selected for having both unique and typical economic variation, thus providing a
reasonable level of representativeness.
The importance of the study
This thesis has collated all of the visible factors identified from comparative case
studies under the broad and inclusive heading of Capacity. In addition to the product
of direct field research, the listed factors have been gleaned and/or sharpened from
previous research, both in China and from international development experiences.
13

The information assembled here is offered for its value both as a starting point for
academic inquiry into local foundations for rural recovery, and for its practical value
for local and higher officials and administrators who wish to plan and lead rural
development.
Policy implementation theory has been debated for 40 years, and recent research
tends to favor combined top-down and bottom-up approaches to policy
implementation. The problem with attempting a scholarly corroboration of this
hypothesis is that an analysis of the activities and perspectives of central authorities,
local implementing officials, and target groups is usually precluded due to the limited
availability of resources for research.13 This project is intended to partially fill that gap
through grounded field work.
There were important studies into integrated rural development in the developing
world during the 1970s-1980s. However, international development efforts did not
produce the desired results and so became the subject of noisy controversies. The
enthusiasm of both scholars and international organizations faded away. Although
many organizations like the UN and the World Bank continue their efforts, success has
been elusive. In a February, 2008 lecture at Portland State University, Nobel Prizewinning economist Douglass North hypothesized that the present shape of third world
countries is a "natural" outcome of local conditions, and that the transformation of its
institutions to a modern prosperous society requires unforeseen levels and types of
13

Daniel A. Mazmanian and Paul A. Sabatier, Implementation and Public Policy: With a New Postscript
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1989) p.13.
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intervention coupled with essential endogenous contributions. This research takes a
step beyond Dr. North's ruminations by identifying the conditions and local
contributions that matter most. Clearly, the size of China's rural society and the wide
variation in local conditions mandate humility in claims about the generalizability of
these findings, but to the extent the research looks at areas not previously examined in
this way, the lessons are expected to hold value not only for the Chinese, but also in a
more general way for the international community.
Perhaps the most important contributions of this research come from three
features. First, this project provides a useful framework for implementation study.
Mainstream implementation theory research is generally descriptive-explanatory,
though both epistemological and normative stances may vary. Ahead of that stream
must be contributions designed to accumulate knowledge, develop hypotheses and
perform empirical research in as systematic a way as possible.
This research reveals the "backward mapping" strategy that provides rich
perspectives for research, both in a descriptive and a prescriptive sense. Capacity
assessment and planning take Elmore's work one step further by proposing capacity as
a starting point for both researchers and practitioners before they get involved in the
complex depths of the policy process which is usually where they start, whether it is a
top-down or bottom-up approach. With this starting point, the implementation study
can be simplified to focus on those actors and relations involved in capacity essentials.
By defining strong assets and weak assets, a useful perspective of the source and flow
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of power in a policy-implementation process becomes available.
Secondly, this research identified links between practice and theory in the Chinese
context, and also revealed connections between China's rural development and other
places in the world. Finally, the dissertation really captures the essence of rural
development in China as it looks from the perspective of a rural Chinese village. The
synergistic approach to policy implementation revealed in this "bottom-up" empirical
study can help create an improved map for the Chinese "top."
A significant contribution of this research comes from its establishment of
development capacity as not a local social or economic trait, but a multifaceted
interdisciplinary approach to the identification of local strengths and limitations that
will undoubtedly affect development progress. Those who argued top-down vs.
bottom-up or who encouraged participative community development approaches
appeared to believe in a universal strategy that can be deployed to solve rural
development problems. Economists, for example, are good at that - identifying fiscal
policy that can explain and predict, and therefore regulate an economy, like some kind
of all-powerful auto-pilot. The devil is in the details, however. Chinese society, as
well as other societies around the world, are clearly too complex for one-dimensional
solutions. Certainly China's mass movements worked, and in some cases they even
worked well, but they simply couldn't work everywhere. In China they failed for
hundreds of millions of people. This is the one overriding condition of China's rural
development, by the way — the reality that this thesis is about the lives of hundreds of
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millions of families.
Having concluded that a clearer understanding of the development project in rural
China was a complex, inter-disciplinary undertaking, this thesis focused on capacity as
a combined measure of the tendency to succeed or fail in development efforts. Here is
an example from past efforts to improve conditions in rural China: the grain subsidies
that were touted as an important helping hand for China's farmers. With bad soil, no
water, and no roads, grain subsidies couldn't make much of a difference for many
rural households. With good soil, a benign climate and a large urban market nearby,
grain subsidies weren't needed. Although grain subsidies were widely regarded as a
key dimension of rural reform, it made a real difference to a relatively few households,
increased the wealth of many who were already prosperous, and completely bypassed
those who were most in need of assistance. If a government agency evaluates the
capacity of a rural town, it may well decide that grain subsidies would help achieve
both local prosperity and help meet national goals for food security. But it may not.
The agency may decide instead that leadership and expertise are the missing
ingredients, or infrastructure such as roads or irrigation projects. In order to have a
chance at making the right decisions, local participation may not be enough; it may be
necessary to provide for additional local autonomy. These few examples are included
to demonstrate what seems pretty simple, that different rural towns and villages need
different development plans and support. It seems kind of obvious today, but had not
reached the policymakers in China as of last year, and still has not been written about.
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China stands out as a unique country where the communist party is leading a
transition to a market economy. And we know the combination of advanced and
backward economies in transition contains much information of unique value for
scholars in many different disciplines. This project was developed as a good
opportunity to observe and to understand the specifics and details of how China's
transition is being managed and how the relevant policy and development theories can
be interpreted through different lenses.
Obviously the research findings are important to China. Eight-hundred million
people are waiting and working for a better life. They really deserve to know whether
they've got a chance. What they believe will determine the future of China's food
security, the fate of hundreds of millions who have migrated to the cities or are
considering such a move, the basic structure of the Chinese family and Chinese society,
and all the people who are affected by food prices and crowded cities.
For other developing countries, the diversity and complexity of the Chinese
experience revealed from the findings of the research can yield lessons worthy of
comparison and study. Because of the wide variety of environments, it is likely that
both problems and successes will find ready parallels world-wide - other
environments and policies that can both inform and be informed by this research.
The Precis of the Study
This is a study of an integrated rural development policy embedded in a social
political and economic transition in Chinese society. To provide the reader with a
18

clearer sense of the logic of the research, the analysis is divided into four parts.
In the first part, Chapter 2 defines the theoretical context and methodology of the
field research. There are three literatures that provided most of the background
support: Implementation theory, policy instruments theory of choices, and
international practice of rural development. I've included the authors whose work
resonated with what was going on in rural China as I found it during my visits. I was
constantly testing the theory and the practice against each other. The glue that held
these different literatures together was the fact that they all helped to make sense of
local capacity.
Although the framework is a new application in the area of rural development, it
builds on the work of Chinese and international scholars from a broad range of
interdisciplinary fields including policy studies, development theory, political
economics and sociology.
Chapters 3 through 5 provide a broad look at existing problem conditions under
which China's latest round of development initiatives are taking place. Chapter 3
extracts from two significant bodies of literature — the collective era literature and the
household responsibility system literature - the salient features, achievements and
missteps of the government's previous attempts at restoring equity in Chinese society.
Chapter 4 examines rural town and village government to explore the lessons of
China's recent experience as an economy in transition and to understand the impact of
the development process on local governance as Beijing seeks to revitalize its
19

countryside. It asks whether local governments have demonstrated or developed the
capacity to manage their share of the work of development. Chapter 5 presents a
composite picture of China's peasantry through the eyes of sociologists and political
science theorists and scholars. It briefly explores the role of peasants in Chinese
history and the major causes of social inequity and inequality in Chinese society. It
describes rural life in contemporary China under the invisible hand of the market and
the very visible hand of government and limited conditions for rural engagement in
policy development.
Part three links the envisioned "new socialist countryside" with concrete plans
and policies. It consists of Chapter 6, which discusses China's current rural
development policies to bring the reader a solid understanding about the policy
environment that affected the research purpose, and Chapter 7, which introduces case
studies from field research in China's rural towns and villages.
Part four contains the project analysis and conclusions. It is in Chapters 8 and 9
that the value of "capacity" as an assessment and planning tool is demonstrated.
Chapter 8 delivers those essential factors assembled from the agreement of farmers
and local officials as foundational for rural development success. The relative success
or failure of local efforts as of the time of the research repeatedly and consistently
aligned well with those results. Chapter 9 discusses what is missing or undefined in
the current policy-making process, as well as possible deficiencies made visible by
past problems. It defines implementation capacity as a reliable predictor of integrated
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rural development in China and as a local ability, a co-production among partygovernment, businesses, farmers and other social institutions and organizations..
This study raises new questions that cannot be folly answered. The reader should
view all descriptions and generalizations as tentative findings that require further
testing and elaboration by future field research in different parts of China. It is well
known that the implementation of state policies and the local response vary
considerably by time and place. Ideally, it would have been possible to find a way to
measure "capacity" more precisely in the policy process. It seems arguable, however,
that this study identifies with reasonable accuracy the general patterns around which
the search for variation should be organized.
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Chapter Two
Theoretical Context and Methodology

This chapter is divided into two linked parts: the theoretical context of the study,
and the methods used in the research. The theoretical concepts that form the
foundation of this work include implementation theory from the works of scholars
who participated in its evolution; the theories of policy instruments that focus on
policy outcomes; and rural development theory in international practice. The
theoretical discussion defines the concepts and their characteristics, types and
frameworks. The purpose of these theoretical conceptualizations is to introduce
general principles available to the study of policy implementation and their links to
both historical and contemporary practices in China and the research that forms the
nucleus of this thesis. The methods section defines the research objectives, and
introduces the approach, structure, scope and process, along with the limitations of the
22

research.
Policy Implementation Theory
Implementation studies began in earnest in the 1970s when Erwin Hargrove wrote
of the "missing link" in studies of the policy process (1975), and Jeffrey Pressman and
Aaron Wildavsky wrote a highly influential book with the main title of
Implementation (1973). Most early studies of policy implementation focused on
questions of management and institutional design, which in the 1970s became known
as the top-down approach to the subject.14 This approach "assumes that we can
usefully view the policy process as a series of chains of command where policy
leaders articulate a clear policy preference which is then carried out with increasing
levels of specificity as it goes through the administrative machinery that serves the
government."15 This perspective clarified the administrative designs that could induce
an optimal fit between policy intent and administrative results. As Michael Clarke
observed, however, this work was flawed in its one-dimensional focus on senior
policymakers who "often play only a marginal role in day-to-day implementation
compared to lower-level officials and members of the public." 6
It is a matter of record that policy implementation has been mainly a top-down
process since the People's Republic of China was founded. Even the bottom-up
results in the self-reliant village of Dazhai became a top-down slogan exhorting people
14
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everywhere to "Learn from Dazhai!"

Another example of the top-down orientation

of China's rural revitalization program in the 1950s came from Mao's "Eight
characters of agriculture" (nongye bazifangzhen) that were to drive the transformation
of Chinese farming.18 Even in the stoutly hierarchical commune system where there
wasn't much overt resistance to policy, slogans and exhortations were not an adequate
substitute for informed and practical management and technology. Thus this top-down
policy approach from Beijing ultimately became one of the factors contributing to the
decline and eventual demise of the communes. People and their leaders became
increasingly frustrated over the endless slogans with little or no real support.
Criticism of the top-down approach with its neglect of lower-level officials and
communities led in the 1980s to the development of the so-called bottom-up or "streetlevel" approach to the study of public policy implementation.19 Studies conducted in
bottom-up fashion have shown that the success or failure of many programs depends

Dazhai was a production brigade in Shanxi Province with poor natural conditions, but through good
leadership and management, the people's spirited efforts lifted the brigade out of poverty, created
improved farming conditions and accomplished a good recovery with no help from the government.
The major incentive used by the local organization was called "work-point system" (gongfen zhi). For
a variety of reasons, however, the system often created problems when it was tried in other parts of
China.
The eight Chinese characters referred to are: tu, soil conservation; fei, fertilization; shui, water
conservation; zhong, seed selection; mi, dense planting; bao, plant protection; guan, tool
improvement; and gong, field management. Although many accomplishments have been claimed,
directives, criticisms and self-criticisms published in the Communist periodicals and newspapers
during the past few years revealed that none of these eight major measures had actually progressed as
successfully as had been expected. See Leslie T. C. Kuo, "Agricultural Mechanization in Communist
China," The China Quarterly 17 (1964).
Susan Barrett and Colin Fudge, Policy and Action: Essays on the Implementation of Public Policy
(London; New York: Methuen, 1981), Benny Hjern, "Implementation Research - the Link Gone
Missing," Journal of Public Policy 2, no. 3 (1982), Benny Hjern and David Porter, "Implementation
Structure: A New Unit of Administrative Analysis," in The Policy Process: A Reader, ed. Michael J.
Hill (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993).
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on the commitment and skills of the actors directly involved in implementing the
programs.20 The advantage of the bottom-up study is that it directs attention to the
relationships that link layers of government with resources that must be deployed in
making and implementing policy. Michael Lipsky is regarded as the originator of the
bottom-up perspective. His recognition of the critical role of the street-level
bureaucrat became instrumental in studies that examined implementation processes
and systems at that level instead of concentrating on the policy initiation level.
The application of Lipsky's perspective is very visible in works by Bernstein and
Lu and by O'Brien and Li,21 and forms a key part of chapters 3 through 5 of this thesis.
What must be remembered, however, is that the bottom-up policy approach is not a
solution to all of China's rural development problems. Without strong central policy
support, it simply is not realistic to expect any kind of simultaneous, integrated rural
reform in a land as populous as China. Three decades ago a very influential economic
reform took shape in the hands of poor peasants in the countryside.22 But without
strong central support in the form of resources and policy support, the household
responsibility system could easily have been stillborn. Instead, the quiet revolution
led to the dismantling of the communes in just three years, having been replaced by
(nongcunjiating lianchan chengbao zerenzhi), the farm household contract system of
2
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agricultural production.
Despite the messianic zeal of their proponents, it gradually became apparent that
neither bottom-up nor top-down approaches to rural development represented answers
to international rural development questions still in search of solutions. Paul Sabatier
was among those who bought early into the idea that these two approaches did not
have to be contradictory but should be made to be complementary.24 Policy
containing plans, goals, and timetables and supported by resources meets street-level
administrators who merge local conditions and resources to participate in an integrated
process. Michael Hill calls those who led the thought process down this road the
synthesizers.
Among the synthesizers, are several major contributors to this research. Richard
Elmore must be seen as the first of them because of his plea for the use of mixed
methods.26 Elmore stands out for his concern about how to study implementation
rather than offer rules about how to control implementation. In doing so he builds on
Lipsky's work in understanding what is happening at the bottom end of a policy
system. This is not a new field of study, he argues, but a neglected one that should
have been included in the overall field of policy development and implementation
right from the beginning.
23
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Elmore defines "backward mapping" as
. . . backward reasoning from the individual and organizational choices that are
the hub of the problem to which policy is addressed, to the rules, procedures and
structures that have the closest proximity to those choices, to the policy
instruments available to the affect those things, and hence to feasible policy
objectives.27

This view of implementation became prescriptive when Elmore suggested there
are times when policy is best left vague to be worked out in its details right at the
street level.28 China's current rural development policies do not represent original
initiatives on new ground, but are more focused on solving acknowledged problems
with old initiatives, which is more difficult for many reasons. Past implementation
efforts failed at the street level for reasons that are discussed in detail in the
background chapters of this research; but what is important is that grants and subsidies
and administrative measures now need to be coordinated in a way that assures
accountability, both to the policy sources and to the policy targets - China's farm
households. Once again China's rural population will be exposed to the risks
associated with problems in the street level bureaucracy. This is the reason that the
main body of this thesis focuses on the town and village levels of rural China. It is
here that policy works or fails, and it is being studied today because it has a long
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history of failure. It is the work of Hill and Hupe that enlightens a research trail
through the farms, villages and governments where this research was centered.
Malcolm Goggin proposed a third generation of implementation theory and
practice. While his appellation didn't really catch on, his ideas about studying
communications and coordination between layers of government was very helpful in
presenting what is going on in China. Goggin and his colleagues set up a
communications model that tracked the acceptance or rejection of messages between
layers of government. To help explicate their model and hypotheses, they presented
three case studies that explored the policy relationship between federal and state
agencies. Interestingly, they regarded national policy as federal messages to
underscore their belief that one should not assume that higher levels of government
have an inherent ability to command.29
The policy study in this thesis needs to stand on the shoulders of such a
systematic approach, especially considering the importance of intergovernmental
communication for past failures and for the probability of success of integrated rural
development in China. Moreover, the thought process that attempted to extrapolate
the experiences of this American study to China, a developing country whose
economy is in transition, led directly to the choice of the case study as the
methodology of choice for this research.
In order to account for the differences between China's unified, hierarchical
29
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system of government and the U.S. federal system, this research leans for its
comparative perspective on R.P. Stoker who focused on deriving implications about
the layers in a federal system in which the national government attempts to exert its
authority in a system that was designed to limit that authority. It is appropriate to ask
whether the research applies in China where the constitution was specifically designed
to place virtually no limits on the authority of the CCP. There are two factors that
make Stoker's work applicable: first, the emerging theories about integrated rural
development include a provision for decentralization - a Chinese-style federalism that
allows for local flexibility and autonomy. Second, even at the peak of its power, the
central government was never able to assure compliance with its policies. The path
for the new century, fully acknowledged in new policy, as will be explained in chapter
6, is for Beijing to adjust itself and all its agencies to this reality. The path for local
governments includes a requirement to adjust to new levels of freedom - the right to
display initiative, but with full accountability to the central government for making
real progress, and to the farmers for integrity and transparency in its machinery. These
are new directions for many Chinese and cannot be undertaken without the kind of
coordinated effort that only solid communications channels can engender.
Stoker adds a twist to the limitations of the central government in what he calls
"disabled by design."30 Under decentralized conditions, layers of government find a
way to get their work done through one of two possible alternatives described by
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Lindblom as a persuasive authority that comes from finding ways to remove barriers
to compliance or as an exchange constructed upon cooperation.31 While Stoker is
dealing quite explicitly with American government, the idea of creating a collaborative
environment with reluctant partners, whether from the top looking down or the bottom
looking up, applies to most forms of government.32 This is precisely what this
research found in widely scattered cases in China, and there is certainly a great deal of
supporting evidence in most of the rural development (as a policy administration
project) literature reviewed for this thesis.
It is important, for example, to note:
•

Many central/local government relationships in which the latter lays claim
to some measure of autonomy;

•

Policies that require collaboration between separate ministries or agencies;
and

•

Policy implementation is accomplished by street level workers under
difficult conditions33

While Stoker's contribution was intended to explain federalism, his work also
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frequent complaint about the officious behavior of bureaucrats. He concluded that street level workers
operate in an environment in which they have no control over their resources, which are often
inadequate, and no control of the material (clients) with which they work. The attitudes they manifest
in their work is a predictable (certainly frequent) response to those conditions. The end result of
Lipsky's research fits neatly into a picture of bureaucratism that Mao deplored.
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revealed truths about different forms of centralized, shared and diffused models of
public authority.
Other authors use the term co-production to refer to joint efforts of partners in a
system.34 This term captures the idea of citizen participation, such as through
neighborhood or village councils that support government service agencies.35
Within the Chinese context, an economy that has been mostly decentralized for
decades has created many parallels to American federalism, particularly with respect
to finance and other kinds of resource distribution between layers of government. The
diffused economic influence means local governments have more bargaining power in
working with higher levels. This allows for the recognition of inevitable conflicts of
interest while providing incentives to resolve those conflicts collaboratively. That
ability is an essential precondition for successful policy implementation, especially in
the presence of a hierarchical, centralized form of government and a powerful unitary
party. Furthermore, the expanded concept of co-production lends further legitimacy to
a partner relationship between local implementers and rural households in a way that
creates community development capacity, which is a central idea embodied in this
thesis.
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Policy Instruments Theory of Choice
The instrument-choice premise views policy implementation from the perspective
that the process of shaping a government policy always involves choosing one or more
tools from those available in the government implementation tool kit.36 The study of
policy instruments by scholars of public policy began with Harold Lasswell in his
1936 work, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How. What Lasswell argued was that
government used strategies that involved "the management of value assets in order to
influence outcomes."

Another way to look at policy instruments is that they are the

tools that history, culture, the economy and society have given governments to
accomplish their work. The selection of policy instruments is one of the tasks
associated with public policy-making; and policy analysis includes responsibility for
identifying public capabilities that might make a difference in the implementation
process.
In the 1970s, efforts were made to better understand the nature of the instruments
and tools available to governments. Anderson's suggestion that public policy
analysis shift from the study of policy problems and inputs to the study of policy
Christopher Hood, The Tools of Government (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1986), Stephen Linder
and B. Guy Peters, "The Logic of Public Policy Design: Linking Policy Actors and Plausible
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implementation and outputs was endorsed by scholars such as Bardach and
Salamon,40 both of whom suggested that policy studies had gotten off to a bad start by
defining policy in terms of "areas" or "fields" rather than in terms of tools. A simple
and powerful classification was offered by Christopher Hood,41 who proposed that all
policy tools used one of four broad categories of government resources: superior
access to information, their legal authority, their resources, and: the organizations
available to them.
It will not be difficult to recognize these tools in the chapters about Chinese rural
development that follow. Their use is part of the thread that holds this thesis together
despite the wide disparities in local conditions where the field research was conducted.
Because this research was focused on end results at local levels, the research parallels
the emphasis on outcomes that is found in works by Elmore, Schneider and Ingram.
Their body of work on this end of the policy cycle never received as much attention as
Hood's, but I argue it offers much practical value to those who are taxed with policy
implementation and administration.42
Policy Instruments theory of choices introduces policy tools or governing
instruments that governments use to put policies into effect. In addition to the four
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major kinds of policy tools addressed by Hood, other outcome-oriented tools are also
emphasized. Synthesized implementation highlights the ability to merge the need for
policy instruments into a local implementation context, and working with systematic
mechanisms that link different government levels, implementers and the target
population. Unlike the Hood taxonomy of policy instruments, McDonnell and Elmore
offered mandates, inducements, capacity-building and system-changing.43 Schneider
and Ingram proposed incentives, capacity building, symbolic and hortatory and
learning.44 In this research, capacity building is singled out for special attention, not
because of its abundance in China, but because it wasn't very visible in the field
research, and this thesis argues it should be central to development policy
implementation. Relating that work to Elmore's contribution leads to the conclusion
that control over implementation may be difficult or even impossible, but that is
acceptable because what is really needed is the development of endogenous power as
it is found in local environment and managing that power to the desired outcomes. It
is clear that the other policy instrument categories, such as incentives and inducements,
may be the most appropriate, depending upon local conditions. How to develop that
capacity is one of the research questions that has guided this research.
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Rural Development Theory in International Practice
Ward and White said "Rural development - like development in general - moves
forward, employs thousands of professionals around the world and influences billions
of dollars of public expenditures - all while operating without a generally accepted
and full codified body of formal theory."45 It was during the 1980s that many were
awakened to the reality that the outcomes of international development programs were
often the opposite of what was intended.46 What was attempted for decades was an
operationalization of the idea that transitioning to industrialization, based on western
capital, technology, expertise and management, would allow a developing country in
Africa, South America or Asia to quickly escape poverty and join the ranks of
developed nations. The results didn't support that belief. What happened was an
inappropriate skewing of the balance between urban and rural and industry and
agriculture, while the same few elites held their power and their wealth and stoutly
defended their right to both. This was what Douglass North labeled the natural
structure of a developing country.47 E.F. Schumacher, a British economist and a
leading representative of ecological, balanced-growth, and a people-centered approach,
in his major work Small is Beautiful,48 expressed the belief that, for genuine economic
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development to be achieved, "the central concept of wisdom is permanence
According to Schumacher, "an entirely new system of thought [was] needed, a system
based on attention to people, and not primarily attention to goods."50 In order to
realize the benefits of this approach, attention must be focused upon agricultural and
rural development, especially in developing countries where the majority of people
still live in rural areas, and where the largest share of the work force is engaged in
agricultural occupations.
What went wrong in previous rural development efforts in China was tangibly
related to all of the literatures thus far mentioned, and what is going on today under
the heading of building a new socialist countryside appears to build on the principles
of Schumacher's work51 using the policy instruments mentioned previously. The
following chapters reveal there is a long way to go to convert its paradigms, policies
and institutions into new shapes that are directed towards this new approach. It was
clear that new international development initiatives would provide essential elements
to which this research project should be attentive - both in the difficulties that marked
previous rural development attempts, as well as current initiatives that are intended to
succeed where others have failed. This research has consistently been planned as an
49
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exploratory project, but not a blind one, and it is the work in this field that provides the
clearest path along which this study should be proceeding.
Integrated Rural Development (IRD) is another framework for the study of this
topic that was popular among those working on international development assistance
during the 1970s. The resources dedicated to IRD projects increased rapidly in the
1970s and reached a peak early in the 1980s. Sadly, follow-on project evaluations
reported unsatisfactory performance of IRD efforts for the most part, contributing to a
shift toward poverty alleviation initiatives (such as the World Bank's Poverty
Reduction Strategies).52 In the meantime, numerous studies conducted by
international organizations and independent researchers revealed the main shortfalls of
IRD projects in different parts of the world.
In an early analysis, Uphoff et al. commented on the Asian rural development
experience, explicating both the paternalist and populist fallacies. The paternalist
fallacy refers to top-down development in which all the wisdom resides with the
educated elites. In this approach the people are assumed to be incapable of helping
themselves and are indifferent to development goals and must be led each step of the
way. In this operating model, everything must be done for the farmers (or to the
farmers) in a top-down, bureaucratic, hierarchical manner.

Obviously the Chinese

communes of the mid-1950s are the ultimate expression of the paternalist fallacy.
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The populist view, on the other hand, assumes that farm families are vitally
interested in progress and possess the capability of transforming their own
communities as soon as the politicians and bureaucrats get out of the way. Both of
these approaches are constructed around unrealistic stereotypes of both the farmers
and the government elites who are trying to help. Chinese peasants, on the whole, are
more capable and responsive than the paternalistic model holds, but there is a
fundamental flaw in the paternalistic approach that professes at the same time that
farmers are unable to manage their lives and farms but are wise enough to "learn from
Dazhai" to become active, productive farmers and responsible citizens. At the same
time, the populist approach is based on an unrealistic belief that farm families can
change their lives autonomously, as they were expected to do at the onset of the
household responsibility system. The populist approach provided responsibility relief
for government at all levels, but it neglected the reality that local interests could
dominate organizations at the community level without guiding policies from higher
levels. The populist approach also ignores the reality that farm households may well
lack the resources, technical know-how, organizations, and leadership to be selfsufficient.54 Add into the mix the reality that this was happening in China at precisely
the same time that local government plans, goals, resources and priorities were very
badly skewed by unrealistic industrialization goals and distorted tax policy. (These
problems and their effects are described in subsequent chapters).
"What should be developed is an institutionalized system which is neither just
54
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top-down nor bottom-up nor exclusively governmental."

This conclusion parallels

what was discussed in earlier sections of this chapter about policy implementation
theory in which top-down and bottom-up initiatives became fused in collaborative
combinations. Thus the logic of the several literatures takes this research inexorably
to similar conclusions about the desirability of integrating development efforts.
Uphoff et al. tested how the various approaches to rural development were
working in developing countries. What the research team found in several Asian case
analyses, was that there was more organization reaching down to the local level,
accountable to the local people, and involved with rural development functions - cases
that they identified as more organized and more successful at identifying available
resources than those with less reach into rural areas.56 Not surprisingly, they also
noted there were many independent variables affecting the extent and pace of
development, one of which calls attention to the ways local people make use of
available organizations in which they have developed some confidence. The
implication is that farm bureaus, research stations, extension services and other
agencies can serve a variety of needs and solve a wide range of problems. This is the
type of infrastructure support that brings the right kind of resources to bear on rural
development problems.57
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This body of work by Uphoff et al. takes us to the same conclusions as previously
mentioned literature. The work of rural development, they recommend, should be
undertaken first as a learning process, and then with planned "assisted self-reliance"
that are to be valued as both ends and means. What is to be learned in this "learning
process?" The core of this research is that development capacity must be understood
within its local context in order to proceed with some probability of success.58 This
philosophy of development is also the strategy that is the core of this thesis.
Local capacity is most effectively built in connection with meeting some
particular need that communities identify as pressing. But success is not to be
measured just by how well certain material or social needs are met. Rather, the aim is
to create local capabilities for mobilizing and managing resources so that needs can be
met on a sustainable and expanding basis. Such capacities are commonly extended or
extrapolated to solve still other problems that local people experience.59
So how do these several literatures identify development capacity? To begin, they
report a consistent theme related to process leadership - the talent, creativity and
dedication of people in the organizations charged with responsibility for helping
development along. The idea of a dedicated development cadre has been quite
regularly associated with leftist political literature, but this factor is particularly
pronounced in successful rural development programs. Successful cadres are
58
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regularly described as catalysts, supporting the notion of a collaborative effort as
opposed to an elite-led development.60 This adds depth and meaning to leadership as
a critical element of development capacity. Development leadership should focus first
on the farm families themselves, whose knowledge, ideas and efforts are being
mobilized. These ideas and commitments mean that the people themselves are a key
element in community development capacity, but become so only in the presence of
knowledge and resources, and when coordinated by their leaders. Systems of local
organization are needed that are appropriate to the task and to the capacities of rural
people. Strong program leaders from outside, whether from higher levels of
government, government agencies, NGOs or any outside source, make it impossible to
establish sustainable improvements in productivity, well-being and self-reliance when
they displace local leadership. At the same time, responsible leadership must relate
well to various agencies and actors from whom technology and resources may become
available. Technology and training represent advances in knowledge about sustainable
use of the world's resources - natural, physical, and human. Training is the means for
transmitting such knowledge and putting it to practical use. "Sustainable introduction
of technology for rural development involves local capacity and control, not just
invention and adoption as focal activities."61 When these elements are combined in a
local setting, perhaps the fine line between dominating or directing and coordinating is
best described as facilitating.
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Information is a special capacity resource that sets it apart from funds, personnel,
incentives, and materials, because information is not diminished by being given away.
Indeed, the value of information increases by sharing it more widely, except among
competitors. Information in use evolves and mutates and constantly increases in value.
Uphoff et al. also consider the case for external resources. Badly offered and
managed, external resources can adversely influence self-reliance and sustainability,
but in the case when internal resources are missing or inadequate, resources of all
kinds become a logical part of development capacity building and are not inconsistent
with self-reliance, provided the "aid relationship is appropriately conceived and
maintained."62
Turning to international development assistance, Rondinelli et al. summarized the
requirements for successful Integrated Rural Development:
•

A strong national political commitment

•

Pervasive administrative support

•

Complementary domestic and foreign trade policies

•

An integrated package of technical inputs

•

Investment in productive activities
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•

Local political support and administrative capacity

•

International financial and technical assistance

In his later work with Ingle, implementation is proposed as the core of
development strategy, a concept recognized by nearly all national development plans;
and "implementation capacity" was introduced as a concept to describe the readiness
or fitness of a country for international development assistance. The concept
incorporates crucial variables such as political will, bureaucratic attitudes and behavior,
cultural norms, economic structure and spatial and physical systems. Their work
highlights that there is always a "trust gap" between local officials and people - a gap
that can reduce implementation capacity. It was certainly true in nearly all of China's
rural communities that local cadre behaviors created resentment and hostility that
negated the government's attempts to build support for development policies and
created uncertainty about government intentions. Additionally, as can be seen in the
background chapters in this research, limited resources for development support
choked off or rendered meaningless all attempts at decentralization of functions.
Rural communities were reduced to subsistence farming and waiting for help to arrive
on a better day. Under these circumstances, any talk of participation or engagement is
rendered meaningless, since farmers recognized they had little or no control over any
resources with which to carry out their plans. In many of China's rural communities, a
lack of physical infrastructure and little in the way of access to transportation and
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communications are symptoms of larger problems that adversely affect decentralized
administration and implementation.
And finally Rondinelli and Ingle identified political affiliations, defined as stable
networks of communication and exchange between local decision makers and sources
of information and resources, as basic to successful development. In the absence of
these affiliations there is little opportunity for generating and implementing public
policy that responds to the needs of the population.64
The last of the writings that helped in the creation of the framework for this thesis
comes from Yujiro Hayami, a Japanese economist who studied and wrote about rural
development in Japan. Hayami believes his work to be relevant at least to all Asian
countries because they are tied together by very strong population pressure.65 In an
early work with Ruttan, Hayami introduced an "induced-development" model that
included five elements: Induced responses of farmers, Induced innovations in the
private sector, Induced innovations in the public sector, Induced institutional
innovation, and Dynamic growth sequence.66 He and Ruttan stressed the importance
of not only an economically viable, but importantly also an "ecologically adapted"
agriculture technology.67 They also warned that technical disruptions require a
corresponding institutional evolution, but there is invariably a time lag, which may be
64
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substantial, and the risk is that a too rapid pace or magnitude of technological
evolution may substantially increase the danger of conflicts between technology and
institutions. The implication is that while change is essential to progress, it must be
managed and not turned loose to run its own course.
Hay ami credits two kinds of technological change as major growth factors in
Japanese agriculture: progress in saving land, and progress in increasing land
productivity per unit of area. The keys to these two breakthroughs came in the form of
education of the farmers, public expenditures for agriculture research and extension
services, and improvements in land infrastructure. These initiatives do not necessarily
mean that the central government must take responsibility - rather it appears that local
governments are better agents for allocating resources because it is clear that the
effective use of resources is highly location specific and constrained by local
environments. If research, for example, is primarily for the benefit of local people it is
/TO

fair and effective for the local government to manage it.

Hayami thus places himself

in the camp which favors a decentralized system where agricultural scientists have a
better handle on the needs of farmers by virtue of working closely with them all the
time. Local adaptation of technology becomes more important than technology
diffusion.69
Hay ami's work contributed to this thesis in three important ways. First, it
identified the fundamental role of technology, the importance of agricultural
68
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infrastructure, agricultural research and the education of the farmers as elements of
development capacity. Secondly, he identifies markets as inadequate to the task of
mobilizing the kind of effort required to effect real development progress; and
therefore, making the role of public agencies critical to the adaptation and diffusion of
technology, research and education, all of which must respond to local conditions.
Although this thesis borrows from economics, sociology, and geography for
support, the clearest pathways that informed the planning and execution of this
research came from implementation theory, including policy instrument theory, and
rural development theory, including the results of international assisted rural
development case studies. These literatures provide the links that hold together the
logic, structure, process and outcomes of the research. China's leaders and their
advisors have been taking unprecedented steps in their determination to improve rural
conditions, and the extent of their successes and missteps, examined in the light of
what has gone before, is certain to help this exploratory research to enrich the
theoretical archives and facilitate further study.

Research Design and Methods
Research objective
The objective of this research is to answer the research question by conducting
research on social and political processes and connections in rural China. An
analytical retrospective study of central policy, local implementation and rural
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engagement are the subjects of the background chapters. But the study of historical
information and data is obviously limited in its ability to predict, explain or even
describe what is happening in China today, which is what really matters for current
policy implementation.
The primary value of this project is its focus on field research. I report on the
conversations and behaviors of people who are involved in the current rural
revitalization programs at different levels of the Chinese government, as well as the
policy target population at the grassroots level, formerly lumped together under the
heading of China's peasants but now classified as farmers, sideline workers, migrant
workers and rural entrepreneurs. By recording and comparing actions and results in
the selected case areas, the final objective of relating success and failure to local
development capacity can be realized.
Selection of Methods
The research method that best fits the circumstances is the comparative case study.
The case study approach facilitates an investigation of "a contemporary phenomenon
within its real-life context... when the boundaries between phenomenon and context
are not always clearly evident."70 Compared to a single case study, multiple,
comparative cases were explored and expected to add materially to the amount of
information that can be gained from research of this kind. While this research design
does not begin to solve the problem of "too many variables, too few cases," it takes
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long strides in the right direction, as does the ability to select interviewees from all
walks of rural life and many different levels of government.71
Scope of the Study
This research project covers the three most significant changes to Chinese rural
development policy since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949: the
period of the communes; the economic reform period which was characterized in rural
China by the household responsibility system; and the new socialist countryside,
which began in 2000 and has been gaining momentum ever since. Since the research
seeks to answer questions about the chances of success of the current rural reform, it is
this current period which is the primary focus of this research - the earlier studies
included by way of forming a contextual background. While generalizability is a
desirable outcome, the reality of China's geographical size and the size of its
population make it impractical to attempt in a detailed study, though a step in the right
direction was made through the selection of four case sites from China's thirty-one
provinces. These sites represent average or typical conditions in terms of development
levels, infrastructure condition, geographical location and product types. The sample
is described in greater detail a little later.
Operational Definitions
A challenge for this study is to operationalize the concept of development policy

71

Malcolm Goggin, "The "Too Few Cases/Too Many Variables" Problem in Implementation Research,"
Western Political Quarterly 39, no. 2 (1986).

48

implementation capacity in terms that are observable and measurable. Although there
are many possible taxonomies that were considered earlier in this chapter, such as the
concepts used by Uphoff and Rondinelli, a useful starting point for this project was the
selection of locations that operate with local governments that are similar in size and
organization and with similar villager organizations. The first task was to identify the
essentials for local prosperity under various local environments as key elements of
local capacity. This is not a mysterious process. Soil condition and proximity to
markets, for example, greatly simplify the task of estimating the relative ease or
difficulty of finding a development approach that can lead to prosperity. The
interrelationship between all of the identified capacity variables, however, means that
some elements are essential in one place but not in another. The number of interaction
possibilities makes it impractical to derive a quantitative measure of development
capacity for this study, though improved classifications may well lead to that
capability in future studies. For the purpose of this project, however, current
limitations mean that capacity is observed, recorded, and collated in a qualitative sense.
It is also noteworthy that policy implementation is properly studied years or
sometimes decades after its administration to understand the full meaning of its
consequences.72 The policy changes that are driving this research are only now being
developed, so it is not policy results that this research seeks or can hope to discover -
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it is the policy process itself.
Research Limitations
The case study approach carries inherent validity problems. Using eight cases
was an attempt to broaden the analysis beyond a single case. It is characteristic of
case studies to manifest a small n problem that reveals the universal conflict of depth
and width in studies of this kind. Nevertheless, the care in case selection and the
nature of this exploratory research served its purpose by yielding information that may
be of great value to both scholars and practitioners; and the presence or absence of key
capacity elements exhibited sufficient variation to permit a wide variety of China's
rural communities to identify with the reported cases.
There are regions in China where the results of a study such as this one would be
skewed by local ethnic, cultural, sociological, political, language and economic
conditions, and where psychological judgment could distort the intent and meaning of
interviews such as the ones upon which this research is based; and in those cases, it
would be easy to misinterpret the very complicated Chinese local social and political
conditions. The selected case villages, though remote, are not on the fringes of
Chinese rural society, however, but in the mainstream.
Site Selection
In order to compensate for research design limitations and to maximize the
reliability and utility of the information in this research, it was necessary to take some
basic precautions. As previously noted, case visit sites were selected in four different
50

provinces in China (Liaoning, Jiangsu, Gansu and Sichuan).
The case site selection criteria included peasant per capita income, economic
development model, and geographic and
topographic differentiation, which come
from chapter four and are the four main
aspects of China's regional disparity. In this
way, the uniqueness and representativeness
of those cases are both considered.
Liaoning Province is in the old

Figure 2-1 - Case site locations

industrial base of northeast China, and per
capita farmer's income there ranks at the high middle level. Jiangsu is in the
prosperous Yangtze River Delta on China's east coast, and the farmer's per capita
income ranks at the highest development level. Sichuan is one of China's most
populous provinces, and per capita farm income ranks at the low middle level; and
Gansu is considered a less-developed remote northwest region where per capita
farmer's income ranks in the lowest level. The selections included towns that
represent average levels of prosperity in each of the regions. Within each area cases
were selected from the plain areas, for example, and also from the hills and mountains.
Neighboring communities with very similar conditions but very different results were
chosen when possible, to expose key input variables.
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Table 2-1 Case Site Selection Variables
Per Capita
Peasant
Income

Economic
Development
Model

Geography

Topography

Jiangsu

>¥5,000

Fast growing

East Coast

Neighboring
plains towns

Liaoning

¥ 4,000 ¥5,000

Old Industry
base

North East

One plain
One hilly

Sichuan

¥2,000 ¥4,000

Most populous
agrarian

Southwest

One hilly
suburb
One hilly
remote site

Gansu

< ¥2,000

Less developed Northwest

One plains
town
One hilly

The key similarities among the chosen cases are: organization of government into
towns and villages; similar size, roughly ten thousand to fifteen thousand households;
and (in all but one of the cases) agriculture as main component of the economy.
Data Collection
This research aims at evaluating local capacity for implementation and the great
preponderance of the interviews accordingly take place, principally with peasants,
village leaders and town level leaders, and secondly with township industry heads,
migrants and NGOs' officials. At the same time, it was prudent to hear from higher
levels of government, and the cases and background materials include information
from interviews with county, city and provincial officials and agencies as well as the
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Beijing government Ministry of Agriculture. These interviews represented not only an
opportunity to gain important insights into the thinking of those who have
responsibilities for China's current rural revitalization program, but also provides a
means of testing the consistency of the results between different perspectives.
This research follows the Grounded Theory approach to the accumulation of
information. The basic idea of the grounded theory approach is exploratory - that is,
instead of beginning with a set number of answers and seeking many responses or data
points, the grounded theory project begins with a general question and the researcher
goes where the research takes him or her. Each interview builds upon the knowledge
gained in the previous one. The idea is not to pinpoint a truth but to gain an accurate
big picture. Information analysis in Grounded Theory means to read (and re-read) a
textual database (such as a corpus of field notes) and "discover" or label variables
(called categories, concepts and properties) and their interrelationships. The ability to
perceive variables and relationships is termed "theoretical sensitivity" and is affected
by a number of things including one's reading of the literature and one's use of
techniques designed to enhance sensitivity. Grounded theory takes a case rather than
variable perspective, although the distinction is often nearly impossible to draw. A
case-oriented perspective tends to assume that variables interact in complex ways, and
is suspicious of simple additive models.
The following example is included to demonstrate the approach and the
effectiveness of Grounded Theory. While waiting for a party leader in a town to finish
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his meeting, the interviewer had a fascinating conversation with a bright and curious
eight year-old girl who had a story to tell about the effects of rural-to-urban migration
on Chinese farm families. Her conversation, with all its hopes and doubts, shaped the
questions and discussions of subsequent interviews. One of the case villages was on a
remote hillside and could only be reached via a fifteen kilometers trail that had been
turned to mud by three days of rain. The author shared a bed with a discouraged farm
housewife who was a friend of a relative. Our conversations led to much more
information than I could have otherwise obtained. She was often in tears, talking
about the effects of China's family-planning policy and the sources and abuses of local
power. This particular conversation materially changed the interview I'd planned with
a party secretary in a nearby town. During the analysis process, comparing notes from
two of them reveals the significant differences in the way people in different walks of
life consider the same set of circumstances. Both of their perspectives are valuable in
themselves, and taken together they provide the ability to triangulate conversations for
reliability. It was not practical to return to China to deal with gaps and inconsistencies
in the data, but the cellular phone has become ubiquitous in China, and enabled
follow-up with eleven interviewees to resolve inconsistencies.
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Chapter Three
China's Rural Policy Development History

During the 1980s and 90s, interest in China's rural development and a new era of
gradually increasing openness by the government combined to stimulate two periods
of brisk research activity. The first responded to a world-wide curiosity about a
socialist society that had been shrouded in obscurity until the late 1970s. For the
public, China had been portrayed as a poor country with a pugnacious government.
China was best represented and best understood by watching Taiwan which had
become one of the "Asian Tigers" best known for its booming economy. For
academia, however, the opening of China's gates created an opportunity to understand
the results of a grand experiment with Maoist-Leninist-Marxist socialism, communes,
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and a "planned market economy."
The second wave of academic interest was occasioned by the seemingly sudden
shift in Beijing toward a decidedly western-flavored economic model, accompanied by
political, social and legal shifts of enormous portent. Development scholars wished to
understand what was to become of China's huge peasant-farmer population that had
paid most of the bills for industrialization during the first three decades following the
communist takeover. This group examined rural issues against the backdrop of
China's booming urban-industrial economy to understand the full meaning of the
"household responsibility system."74
Interest and academia are gearing up for a new round of scrutiny of China's rural
situation, and once again it is a central government shift in policy that is raising the
stakes for China's peasants and thereby increasing the level of interest in academic
circles. The environment for researchers is tantalizing because in addition to the
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previous two eras of already well-plowed data, China is more open than in the past,
the statistical data is improving in quality, and the developing world is still in the hunt
for development formulas that work.
This chapter briefly summarizes the recent history of the policy environment in
rural China. Chapter four follows by providing a similar treatment to help explain the
condition of local government, and chapter five similarly explains the current
condition of China's peasant population. Taken together, these chapters set the stage
for this thesis by explaining the current environment in rural China, and the historical
process and deployment of power that created this current set of conditions in which
our research question that the capacity of China's towns and villages can adequately
support a new drive for prosperity or can be raised to that purpose, or will fail once
again can be answered.
The impact of agriculture on China's economy has declined. In 2006, agriculture
generated less than 12 percent of China's GDP as compared with 48.7 percent
industry and 39.5 percent services.75 Still, it would be a mistake to conclude that
the peasants are no longer a critical issue for China. Rural China is home to about 800
million peasants, and agriculture provides about half of the employment for China's
huge population. These are realities that will continue to have economic, political and
social impact and the potential for political drama.
Chinese agriculture has been transformed from a tightly controlled system of
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socialized commune farming into a smallholder household farming system largely
driven by markets. It is true, however, that in some regions that are suited for it by
terrain, markets and growing conditions, farming has been modernized, which means
that small farms have been assimilated into large ones and mechanized farming has
become the norm. That combination of results is the rural situation today, and in some
locations, particularly along the east coast but also in many areas of China where
markets have been created by large population centers, these approaches to agriculture
are working well and have created a class of successful farming communities. In other
regions, many of China's peasants are engaged in subsistence farming, and depending
on whose definition is applied, somewhere between 26-150 million Chinese live
below the poverty line.76
It is the subsistence farming and poverty-stricken rural villages that China's
government now seeks to do something about. Here is where China's revolution is
still incomplete, and where the government plans to create a "new socialist
countryside" for the target population, the majority of the society. This chapter
extracts from the two significant bodies of literature—the collective era literature and
the household responsibility system literature—the salient features, achievements and
missteps of the government's previous attempts at restoring equity in Chinese society.
In so doing, this chapter creates a background against which new plans and policies
76
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can be examined.
The first 28 years after the communist revolution
Just prior to the CCP takeover of government in 1949, a long term development
policy and model were created. The following quote from Mao Zedong provides
insights:
The peasant's economy is scattered. According to the experiences of the Soviet
Union, it requires a very long time and careful work to attain the socialization of
agriculture. Without the socialization of agriculture, there will be no complete
and consolidated socialism. And to carry out the socialization of agriculture, a
powerful industry with state-owned enterprises as the main component must be
developed. The state of the people's democratic dictatorship must step by step
solve this problem of the industrialization of the country.77
During the three decades after this was written, Mao and the CCP never wavered
in their determination to see their vision become reality. Politically, socially,
economically, China's peasant society was brought into the main policy stream of
government, was tightly regulated within China's planned economy, and was treated
as the centerpiece of China's overall economic revitalization.
1949-1952 During the first three years following the CCP takeover, China's
agriculture sector was assimilated into the grand plan, made subject to central policy
and readied for implementing land reform and drive agricultural recovery. The Land
Reform Law was promulgated on June 30,1950. This law provided for the seizure of
land (other property, including homes, were not subject to seizure) from landlords, rich
77
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peasants and large leaseholders. There had been some land redistribution in China
prior to 1950, but no policy ever so deeply affected so many people (half a billion) as
the massive redistribution that followed land reform. An approach to agriculture that
had prevailed for centuries was swept away throughout all of China in one bold stroke.
The undertaking required massive political and administrative support and elaborate
propaganda preparations.
The results were encouraging. The total agriculture output saw a growth rate of
41 percent during the period 1949-1952. Total grain production rose from 113.2
million tons in 1949 to 163.9 million tons in 1952. Cotton production increased
from .44 million tons to 1.3 million tons in the same period for an annual growth rate
of 42 percent. These and other achievements represented great progress in a very
short time.
Agriculture remained the primary economic pump for the new China. In 1954,
only 33 percent of the national income was derived from modern industry, and more
than 80 percent of the population was living and working in rural China. Agricultural
productivity was not the only desired end of the agricultural reforms. The changes
served the political end of indoctrinating the masses with respect to Maoist-LeninistMarxist thought; as well as the political goal of organizing the previously
individualistic peasants to the service of the party and government. The traditional
Chinese village was changed from a society of individual peasant farmers into a highly
78
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organized community that was being prepared physically and psychologically for the
communes.79
1953-57 The next period was one of continued socialist reform and agricultural
growth. Farming was guided first to mutual aid groups then to primary cooperative
teams and then to advanced cooperative teams. It was the beginning of a planned,
collective economy which overcame some of the weaknesses of smallholder farming
and continued to increase productivity. Although the moves generally received good
marks from the hundreds and millions of poor and middle peasants and achieved
desired policy results, there were some critics, both contemporary and with the benefit
of hindsight who believed the transformation was attempted too quickly, without
adequate preparation, and often using rougher persuasion than would be healthy as a
foundation for a new nationwide way of life.
It was during this period that China developed its first five-year economic plan. It
called for increasing the amount of arable land, developing irrigation systems, creating
water-conserving facilities and improving seed research and technology. The results
of that first plan included 8.67 million mu (5,780 km ) being returned to farming and
an additional 218 million mu (145,333 km2) irrigated. The government invested ¥2.67
billion in water conservation.
Once again, the projects achieved laudable ends. Between 1952 and 1957, total
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agricultural output increased by 25 percent. Grain production reached 195 million
tons, an increase of 19 percent. Cotton increased 26 percent to 1.64 million tons.
Beef, pork and lamb production grew 18 percent to 3.985 million tons. While some
China scholars base their work on the supposition that communization is the ultimate
goal of the CCP plans and policies, others see such things as this increase in agrarian
productivity as the ultimate goal with collectives representing intermediate, enabling
objectives.81 Mao himself described the rapid changes with his own Utopian ideal
motivation:
The high tide of social transformation in the countryside, the high tide of cooperation, has already swept a number of places and will soon sweep the whole
country. It is a vast socialist revolutionary movement involving a rural population
of more than 500 million, and it has tremendous, world-wide, significance.82
Another benefit of the collectives was the ability to marshal the labor necessary
for major construction projects, and campaigns to build roads, water conservation
systems, land improvement, and other improvement projects became a regular feature
of off-season activity for China's farmers. Some of these projects were planned and
managed by the central government, while others addressed local needs.83 Many of
the facilities built this way are still working for rural communities while others have
fallen into disrepair.
Comparing to 1949, perhaps the most important gain for the CCP is more than
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what we address here. From learning Soviet's experiences to lessons drawn from it,
the nation's development policy started to draw its own blue-print which can be found
from Mao's own words "On the ten major relationships in socialist revolution and
socialist construction" in 1956:
There are now two possible approaches to our development of heavy industry:
one is to develop agriculture and light industry less, and the other is to develop
them more. In the long run, the first approach will lead to a smaller and slower
development of heavy industry, or at least will put it on a less solid foundation,
and when the over-all account is added up a few decades hence, it will not prove
to have paid. The second approach will lead to a greater and faster development
of heavy industry and, since it ensures the livelihood of the people, it will lay a
more solid foundation for the development of heavy industry.84
1958-1965 During this period, smaller collectives were combined and organized
into communes. In 1958 the CCP announced a new series of grand projects involving
irrigation, rural industries and roads. Because of the scale of some of these projects,
the demand for labor was more than the advanced cooperative teams could handle, and
it became necessary to collectivize on a grander scale. Within a short period virtually
all the farmers in China were organized into peoples' communes.
This was also the period in which the "Great Leap Forward,' the excesses of life
in the communes, the blind commands from all levels of the party, worsening relations
with the Soviet Union and a series of natural disasters tumbled China to the brink of
being a troubled state. From the heady years of progress until this time, food security
declined as a result of dropping grain production. Per capita grain consumption went
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down from 203 kg in 1957 to 163.6 kg in 1960. The population had grown by close to
one hundred million people. "China is more of an agrarian community today [the
mid-1960s] than she was at the start of the second five-year plan; yet she is less able to
feed the urban and industrial population from indigenous sources than she was then."85
Conservative estimates place the number of Chinese who died of starvation at
approximately thirty million.
Beginning in 1962 and the "new economic policy" turning away from backyard
foundries that came to symbolize the Great Leap Forward, the state redirected its
efforts toward "tiaozheng, zhengdun, gonggu, tigao" (adjustment, consolidation,
reinforcement and enhancement), and the "eight Chinese characters principles of
agriculture." The primary purpose was to reestablish the principle that agriculture is
the foundation for the national economy. Economic development was planned that
would balance industry and agriculture to achieve a comprehensive, balanced recovery.
Premier Zhou Enlai announced that China's new strategy would be known as the
"Agriculture First" policy - testimony to the party's concern for the welfare of the
masses.86
In accordance with one of the prime assumptions of this project, a full
understanding of the central government's agrarian programs is not possible by
looking only to economics for the answers or even for the questions. Chao credits
85
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social reforms such as mass education programs, political moves such as organizing
villagers for work on public projects, the removal of the landed gentry, and mass line
movements such as the Youth League, the Women's' Federation and the Children's
Corps for much of what had happened in China, both good and bad. These mass
movements became effective mechanisms for social engineering, communication,
indoctrination and persuasion.87
The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) - this period includes the ten chaotic
years of the Cultural Revolution and the following two years it took to restore order.
The excesses of the communes were exacerbated during the Cultural Revolution.
Additionally, the corrective measures that had been attempted in the early 1960s were
labeled as "right deviationist" and were discontinued. A small mountain village in
Shanxi Province became famous as the result of a Supreme Directive that instructed
peasants all over China to "learn from Dazhai." The management style that
characterized this period in China's history was management by exhortation, and
leadership through slogans. What Mao admired about Dazhai is that it transformed
itself through hard work and with no government backing into a prosperous farming
so

community.
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Among policy measures that were undertaken during this period were an
expansion of the scope of work teams and brigades and deployment of the egalitarian
distribution system of the Dazhai brigade, in which pay and food were distributed
according to strictly measured and democratically controlled work points. Sideline
work was prohibited, which stopped the practice of tending small household gardens.
The system spawned frustration and discontent and after a honeymoon period of
enthusiastic response, many commune members reacted to the lack of incentives by
slacking off on their work. Agricultural production increased, but slowly, and farm
produce became increasingly scarce. In an effort to meet quotas, commune leaders
had to push harder and harder, and other considerations were forgotten. As an
example, the environment was sacrificed to air and water pollution, deforestation,
over-farming and overgrazing, all in the name of economic progress.
During the twelve-year period of the Cultural Revolution, total agricultural
production grew only 5 percent. Grain production increased from 200 million tons to
300 million tons during that period, but the population grew faster and consumption
remained at 1957 levels. The agriculture sector continued to operate under the unified
purchase system until the end of the 1970s. This meant that prices for goods and
supplies were identical from one end of the country to the other - one of the few
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policies that made it possible to continue farming in many remote towns and villages.
Supplies and consumer goods were in scarce supply and distribution was tightly
controlled through a rationing system. Food security was nonexistent for about 250
million rural Chinese during this period.90
Agricultural policy assessment
There has been a perceived shift in attitudes among both Chinese and western
scholars about China's collectivist era. When it was finally abandoned, the peasants,
the officials and students of Chinese development breathed a sigh of relief. The
excesses of the Cultural Revolution had produced a cynicism about most government
and party-related people and systems, and it became fashionable to criticize all of the
economic, political, ideological and social mechanisms that had characterized the
period. As people gained experience in the household responsibility system, however,
some of the benefits of the collectives came into sharper focus.
The commune system guaranteed employment and managed social services such
as education, public health and retirement. Food was not an issue for most, regardless
of the ability to pay, and low wages were matched by low prices for the basic
consumer necessities. During the early years of the collectives, the leadership,
technology development, communication networks and tight control made it easy to
improve technology related to fertilizers, irrigation and seeds, and rural China
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managed a leap in productivity that easily matched a leap in the population that
needed to be fed.91 Compared to other developing countries, health standards and life
expectancies were high in China, despite low levels of income and consumption.92
According to the World Bank 3 A research, before 1970s, 90 percent of China's rural
population had been covered by rural medical cooperative system.93
In addition to significant benefits, China was able to avoid some of the problems
of other developing countries, such as unbalanced ownership and distribution of lands
and farm output, concentrated control over credit, class polarization and widespread
corruption.94 Another western observer concluded that China's leaders had
successfully institutionalized a balance between agriculture and industry and between
cities and the countryside. This meant, among other things, a significant expansion of
services in rural areas: public health, education, transportation, and
communications ,95
During the Cultural Revolution critical resources and programs were diverted
from urban to rural areas. Intellectuals, medical personnel and administrators were
"sent down" to rural villages to learn and to teach. High school graduates were
recruited to serve the people by creating and sustaining educational and medical
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facilities. Although these students knew little of farming, they furnished helpful labor
and were able to help with bookkeeping and other technical skills to some extent.96
State pricing policies tilted the balance of trade between agriculture and industry
in favor of the peasants. The prices of agricultural inputs including supplies and
machinery were reduced to levels that supported a rural economy.97 In some
developing countries, adding mechanization to an agriculture sector already beset with
idle labor created problems, but the Chinese succeeded in mechanizing systems to
complement rather than compete with rural labor. The goal was not so much to reduce
the cost of farm produce as it was to increase farm and labor productivity.98
Despite these positive effects of the commune system, there is no rush to return to
them, though cooperatives are showing signs of strength and collectives appear to be
making a comeback in some Chinese communities. Although the communes were
characterized by internal equity, there was a continued disparity between regions and
between urban and rural production, income and consumption that were not very
different from that found in other developing countries. Part of the problem stemmed
from a policy of local self-reliance on food despite enormous regional differences in
farming conditions. The quality of peasant diets had not substantially improved since
the 1950s and access to consumer goods such as radios and bicycles had not
significantly improved. There was only a two to three percent annual growth in
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peasant income during the 1960s and 70s. Farming costs were increasing slowly,
while state payments for grain quotas were stable so that over time real farm income
was steadily dropping until the peasants were losing money growing the grain and
99

cotton to meet quotas.
There were unpleasant side effects associated with communes, including such
things as the lack of incentives, the relentless regimentation and frequent problems
with favoritism and autocratic leadership that adversely affected relations and
therefore the productivity of the work units.100 There is no doubt the aggressively
extractive nature of China's agriculture policy created disincentives while creating
party monopolies of economic and political power, setting the stage for more serious
management problems. Those who resisted ran the risk of attack through class or
ideological labels.
Although the communes were launched with an egalitarian foundation, the
problems described above meant that participative and democratic governance
principles, never on the list of goals, but important to the changes that came next, were
compromised from the beginning. Regimentation was too rigid, the hierarchy too
uncompromising, and mass line campaigns too compelling to allow for initiative, selforganization, and creativity to achieve production breakthroughs. An example of
social control was the hukou or household registration system developed to strictly
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monitor and control the movement of citizens in China. More will be said about this
system in chapter five. Centralized planning, mass lines, propaganda, and a rigid
hierarchy help reduce organizational uncertainty, but also end up stifling the human
spirit and tend to generate and systematize their own mistakes and excesses.101
Second 28 years
Following Mao's death, it quickly became apparent that the Chinese had been
poised for big change. The peasants began agitating almost immediately, and the
central government soon picked up on the needs and wants of the people. The
communes had to go. Here's how Deng put it:
That was in 1980 we took real action [in reform]. We mainly focused on rural
reform in 1981, 1982 and 1983. After 1984, our reform was refocused on cities.
The economy had seen rapid development during 1984 to 1988. During those
five years, rural reform had brought lots of changes, such as a large growth of
agricultural products and peasants' income. Rural industry suddenly emerged as a
new force. Thanks to the increase in peasants' purchasing power, many new
houses were built, and bicycles, sewing machines, radios, and wrist watches ("the
four big things," si da jian) and other luxury consumption goods found their way
into peasant homes. Increased agricultural and sideline products, enlarged rural
markets and the transfer of rural labor surplus strongly propelled industry forward.
Agriculture and industry, rural and urban societies, just like this, influenced each
other and helped each other forward. That was a very vivid, very persuasive
development process.102
1979 ~ 1985 The commune system was abandoned in favor of the household
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responsibility system. The agrarian economy responded with a period of rapid growth.
The Third Plenary Session of the 11* Central Committee of the Communist Party
of China created a draft "Decision about several issues to speed up agricultural
development" and the "People's commune regulation" (also released as a draft).
These documents documented a realistic appraisal of China's agrarian economy,
summarized the experiences and lessons from the previous twenty years, and
concluded that regions should work to correct "left deviationist" excesses, protect
rural collectivism by distributing benefits in proportion to merit, and improve labor
management and foster production responsibility.
As a result of these two documents, there were many new variations of
agricultural production responsibility systems. The two that were most popular were
contracting labor to a group (baogong daozu), and contracting production to a group,
{baochan daozu). By the end of 1979, more than half the production brigades were
contracting labor to groups, and a quarter of the production brigades were contracting
production to groups. There were very few examples at that time of contracting
production to households {baochan daohu). Household responsibility had been
undergoing a period of evolution. At first the practice was strictly banned. Later it
was permitted, but only in exceptional circumstances. Still later it was permitted on a
small scale in poor regions, then finally it was officially encouraged.
In January, 1981 the CCP endorsed the contracting of production to the household
(baogan daohu). Under this system the individual household replaced the collective
72

as the basic farm management and production unit. By 1983 this system had spread
all over rural China, effectively removing the last of the support for the commune
system. Du Rongsheng credited this combination of peasant enthusiasm and
innovation along with high-level political support for the immediate success of the
household responsibility system in China's agrarian economy.103
In October 1983, the Central Committee of the CCP and the State Council
announced a substantial change in policy. It was termed "separating politics from the
communes." Since the communes were morphing into townships at the time, the task
seemed achievable as a natural part of reorganization. In theory, the township
governments were to assume responsibility for the administration of government
services, to include such functions as civil administration, judicial administration,
education, family planning, finance, and construction. Although township
organizations varied widely, a common organizational form placed responsibility for
economic activities with economic committees, jingji weiyuanhui that exercised
responsibility for economic production, development and planning, and which also
supervised the companies that managed agriculture, enterprises, commercial, real
estate and other such responsibilities. In the spirit of separating politics from
agriculture, these committees were to be administratively distinct from the township
government, but in reality most found themselves reporting to a township leader or
assistant. There is no known statistical data to assess the extent of this malfunction,
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between economics and government.

Similar attempts to separate the party from

government succumbed to the same deployment of party power.
Also in this same period, state policy was adjusted in several moves that greatly
benefited China's peasants and spurred agricultural production. First, the price of
grains and sideline products was greatly increased. In 1979 the average purchase price
of eighteen different kinds of produce was raised by 22.4 percent. Secondly, raw
materials were allocated to agriculture in greater volume. This included the direct
benefits of chemical fertilizers, but also such inputs as diesel oil and electricity. At the
same time, the state imported grains in large quantities and reduced peasant grain
quotas accordingly. This allowed for experimentation with different commodities
such as cash crops in vegetables and fruits, and also specialties such as teas, mulberry
bushes for the cultivation of the silkworm, and different herbs and spices. At the same
time, government agriculture research and services was helping the peasants identify
the best crops, crop rotation, simultaneous production, seeds, soil treatments and other
technical advances. In combination, these moves provided a significant boost to
China's agricultural output and had the important benefit of increasing peasant
incomes at the same time. When the pressure of grain quotas was lifted, the
alternative crops became part of the beginning of the long process of creating a market,
with its complex melding of consumer tastes, adequate handling and packaging and
cleanliness standards, storage and distribution networks and wholesale and distribution
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mechanisms.
Between 1979 and 1985 total grain production increased from 300 billion kg to
400 billion kg. Total agriculture output increased 68 percent and per capita peasant
net income increased 166 percent. The significant increase in peasant income came
mostly from household sideline businesses and multiple sources of income.105
During this same period, rural industry grew to more than ¥200 billion per year
and absorbed 60 million laborers, taking away much of the rural unemployment
pressure caused by shortages of land and capital and a surplus of labor. Wen Tiejun
observed that during this period the three factors of agricultural production— land,
labor and capital—were all cycling within the agriculture sector instead of tending
toward the cities and factories. As it increased peasant income, this boomlet also
fueled a general demand-driven increase in domestic consumption that was good for
the entire nation. He referred to it as a golden period for China's agriculture sector.106
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farmers, while
maintaining low prices for consumers. This move required government subsidies to
make up the difference between purchase and sales pricing. In 1987 the reform was
deepened to confirm that households had the right to decide which crops to farm. A
commitment was also made to continue the marketization of the agriculture sector,
leading to the government's eventual withdrawal from price controls.
Despite these moves, how far the government was willing to go was constrained
by a widely perceived need to continue to favor urban reform with lower priced goods.
There was also a general recognition that the easy work had been done, and further
progress would depend on much deeper and broader economic and political structural
changes. While there was broad recognition in government circles that something
would need to be done to improve peasant incomes, there was a hesitation to move too

quickly, and there was some uncertainty about what could be done. This was reflected
in the fact that after making agriculture its "No. One File" each year between 1982 and
76

1986, agriculture disappeared from the top of the government's priority and did not
reappear until 2004.107
In February 1993, the State Council took another step to " . . . speed up the reform
of the grain market..." and removed state price controls and production quotas. The
move released the state from the burden of its price support obligations, and pushed
grain into a commodity market. The move was short lived, however, because a good
harvest in 1993 kept prices too low, and the state was back in the grain business after
just a brief layoff. In 1994, the state strengthened its control to the extent that stateowned grain enterprises owned 70-80 percent of the supply. The state simultaneously
improved its central and local supply and storage facilities and manipulated supply to
help control prices, though the manipulation was of doubtful success and farming and
sales of grains continued to fluctuate.108
The rest of the agriculture market was not standing still. Large quantities of
agricultural products were no longer dependent on small local markets, but were
finding their way into nongovernmental wholesale markets, serving a growing variety
of retail outlets. As the marketplace increased in influence, those farming
communities within its reach experienced significant changes. Grain fields were
replaced by vegetable cash crops under plastic greenhouses. Later, with the growth of
rural industry, farming became a sideline for many as they increased their earnings in
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nearby enterprises. Some left farming to the elderly and the women, while others
leased their lands to large growers. Animal husbandry, fisheries, dairy farming,
poultry products and a host of related (feed, processing, waste handling) industries
sprouted nearby. During this period, grain output increased only 14.6 percent while
sales of meat products increased 211.2 percent and fish products grew by 306.6
percent. Thanks to these non-grain products, total agriculture output continued to
grow at 3.4 - 10.9 percent each year, while grain output experienced a slow climb but
with much fluctuation. Many consider the diversification away from grains as a result
of the relaxation of state control to have represented a healthy trend. As a result of
quotas, many farmers were attempting to grow grain in soil and on terrain not well
suited to grain farming, and the experimentation with different kinds of cash crops
created profits for farmers and introduced more variety for the consumers.109
Despite the beneficial effects of marketization for many of China's farmers,
average income rose very slowly during this period because many did not succeed in
finding a path to the market. Infrastructure construction lagged marketization in rural
areas, as the government continued to emphasize economic development for urban
areas and industries. Similarly, the decline of state investment in technology
development and diffusion contributed to stagnation. The ability to work through
droughts and floods and other natural adversities had not materially improved in most

' Data source comes from Yearbook of Ministry of Agriculture, also Yearbook of National Statistics of
Bureau online: http://www.stats.gov.cn, agriculture section.
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rural areas

; and although the selling price of farm output was climbing slowly, the

open market for farming equipment and supplies was also responding to market
demands, and prices were climbing, often more quickly than selling prices.111
Another factor that was affecting rural life was government policy that was
leading to the decline of Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs). State-owned
companies had a competitive advantage over the rural TVEs, as well as much better
access to credit and preferential treatment with respect to sources of supply. Nonagriculture income began to drop in rural communities where TVEs had provided an
outlet for idle labor, and as the TVEs closed their doors or moved to urban areas to
survive, many migrants or part time workers had to return to their farms.
In the early days of economic reform, rural cadres had been able to mesh their
own interests with those of local enterprises. They had the means to manipulate taxes,
lean on local banks for credit and otherwise control local political economics to suit
themselves. By the 1990s, however, the central government had regained control over
its fiscal policy and had begun taking a greater proportion of the local government's
shrinking revenues. In prosperous areas along the coast or near urban centers, the
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business-cadre symbiosis continued and many small businesses prospered; but in more
remote areas, many TVEs disappeared. Because local government revenues were
drying up, the peasant's burdens increased as those governments increased their
collection pressure and took every conceivable measure (e.g., fines, land seizures and
sales, new education fees) to meet their payroll obligations.112
The first fifteen years of China's economic reform featured an early boost for
agriculture, followed by years of rural neglect as state policy focused its benevolent
eye on urban and industrial development. Industrialization remained at the top of
government's agenda, driven by radical reform to speed up recovery in 1988, the
Tiananmen Square incident in the summer of 1989, and Deng's southern tour of 1992,
during which he sanctioned the burgeoning entrepreneurialism he found there and
launched a frenzy of industrialization, industrial parks, free trade zones and other
capitalist-flavored medicine for China's long somnolent economy.113
During the years after 1992, China was gripped by an economic, political and
social upheaval of enormous proportions as those people and governments who
understood profits positioned themselves to take advantage of the momentous
turnaround in China's ideological and political climates. More will be said about the
response of local governments to these changes in central policy in chapter four, but it
should be noted that the effect of this shift in direction had enormous consequences for
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all Chinese. Along the east coast, the economy boomed. The demand for energy,
water, infrastructure and other government-furnished commodities exploded, and
responsible agencies struggled to keep up. Concern for the environment, always a low
priority in a land where food security is in question, dropped even lower on the
government's agenda. Rarely has the "invisible hand" of the market been tested so
severely, and it is difficult to imagine how its response could have been more
encouraging.114 Modern cities grew out of the swamps. Highways, railroads, airports,
modern ports and harbors and electrical generating stations sprouted everywhere. The
market mobilized the mining industry to feed coal to its steel mills and generating
plants, and entrepreneurs made holes in the ground for coal and other minerals, and
hired unemployed workers in huge numbers.
With an economic dragon by the tail it is not surprising that some aspects of
governance didn't turn out so well. The economic reform created an environment in
which conflict of interests, self-interested behavior, abuse of power and neglect could
grow unchecked to reach the highest levels of government and the banking industry.
Water pollution created hazards for China's people, and air pollution affected its
neighbors and even distant countries such as the U.S. Importantly, the heady rush to
economic miracles bypassed large numbers of China's peasants who were still
subjected to aggressive extraction policies. Those not fortunate enough to live close to
the eastern seaboard or large urban areas received none of the gifts the market can
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Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed. Editor in Chief
Robert Maynard Hutchins, 54 vols., vol. 39, Great Books of the Western World {Chicago: William
Benton, 1952).

81

bestow, and in fact market forces were increasing their costs even as the government
was cutting back on public programs that had made rural life bearable if not pleasant.
As importantly, some early rural reforms like the thirty-year land contracts, the grain
distribution systems and other mechanisms to reduce peasant burdens had fallen into
disuse and disarray.
By the end of the 1990s, all three factors of agricultural production were fraying
as a result of central policy neglect. Because of urban expansion, infrastructure
construction, and industrial expansion, large amounts of land were converted to nonagrarian use. Farm laborers moved to urban enterprises, a constant source of cheap
labor. The flow of capital into the agrarian economy, already low, dried up completely
as the banks moved their money into profitable eastern, urban and industrial
investments. With the constant leaching of resources away from the agricultural sector,
peasant options were dwindling. The effects of these developments on peasant life are
described in chapter five but the end result of this combination of central policies and
actions was a drop in real peasant income and a dramatic increase in the income gaps,
one of several debilitating effects that were creating an increase in unrest and
"contentious politics."115 It also became possible for the first time since the days of
the communes to divide China into well-delineated regions - separating the rich from
the poor. It was a radical change from the aspirations the peasants had during the
opening scenes of China's economic reform.
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1998 ~ 2006 Agriculture and peasants became hot topics and drove new policy
initiatives.
In 1993, Wan Li, a vice Primer, argued that rural development had become a
critical issue for all Chinese. He argued that it was time to stop thinking of agriculture
in isolation and consider it as part of an integrated political, economic and social
system that encompassed all of China. Clearly this was an issue that required careful
consideration, detailed study, and planning at the highest levels of government.116 In
1998, China's communist party faced this issue in its third Plenary Session of the 15th
Central Committee with the "Decisions about several major issues on agriculture and
rural work." The directive stated that from then until 2010 a key objective for China
would be to build a "new socialist countryside with Chinese characteristics." In 2000,
the central government had launched an experiment in Anhui province which had been
one of the provinces hardest hit by the GLF and consequently the place of early
household-based agricultural experimentation as well as in counties in other provinces
to reduce rural taxes and fees.
Work began once again to address conditions in rural China, to increase peasant
income, to increase investment and to restore poverty relief measures. In 2003 at the
Agricultural Work Conference of the central government, the communist party
identified the three dimensions (agriculture, farmers and the countryside nongye,
nongmin, nongcuri) of the rural economy as a key priority for the CCP. The new
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slogan was "Give more, take less and don't interfere" duoyu, shaoqu, fanghuo. The
slogan constituted the goal, the strategy and the guiding beacon for central government
policy-making vis-a-vis rural China. Fortunately, the planning did not end there but
began stimulating real policy and investment.
In 2004, peasant income once again became the government's "No. 1 file,"
placing the plight of the peasants at the top of the priority list for the central
government and all its agencies. Clearly farm income was no longer simply an
economic concern but had also become a critical political issue. Shortly after the
release of that document, grain prices, agriculture taxes, investment in farm
technology and farm subsidies were modified to the benefit of farmers, all of which
rekindled peasant enthusiasm for farming as a way to make a living. In 2004, grain
output and per acre yield both rose sharply and peasant income reached double-digit
growth - the fastest rise in a decade.117
In early 2005 a new No. 1 file was issued confirming once again that closing the
income gap between urban and rural areas, strengthening the rural economy,
increasing the wealth of the peasants and generally creating a prosperous countryside
continued to dominate economic and social policy. The biggest surprise for China's
800 million peasants was the elimination of the agriculture tax which had been a
prominent part of rural life in China for all of recorded history.
From 2003 to 2005, the agricultural tax, "three contributions" (san tiliu), and
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"five unified plans" (wu titong)were gradually eliminated throughout rural China.118
In addition, the "special fees and taxes" that local governments had attached to the
basic national agriculture taxes were also eliminated. This tax reduction reduced
peasants' annual tax burden by ¥120 billion.119 Beginning in 2004, the state began
handing out direct grain subsidies as well as subsidies to encourage the use of
improved seeds, the purchase and use of newer equipment, and for reforestation
efforts. These were the core programs of China's eleventh Five Year Plan. Close on
the heels of that plan, the 2006 No. 1 Document confirmed the blueprint and
committed to funding and to supporting reforms.
The state took responsibility for compulsory rural education and for a revitalized,
well equipped mobile public health service. These changes were to be accompanied
by major investment in infrastructure development, including roads, rail facilities,
electrification and irrigation and water conservation.120
Policy assessment
To summarize the reform era results, we can see the state as a very powerful
presence in rural life - first by its very dramatic move to eliminate the communes, and
during the late 1980s and 1990s by a series of actions that were bound to make peasant
118

"Five Unified Plans" (wu Tongchou) - Township levies: education supplement tax, social expenses,
family planning, public (collective) transportation, and militia exercises expenses. "Three
Contributions (san tiliu) - Village levies: contributions to the public accumulation fund, the public
welfare fund and other administration fees. More will be said about taxes and the peasants in Chapter
Five.
"China to deepen rural tax reform by cutting administrative staff," Xinhua news, July 7th, 2004;
"China to hold meeting on rural tax reform," China Daily, June 2nd, 2005.
120
Data source comes from "The Outline of the 11th Five-Year Plan of National Economy and Social
Development of P.R.China." March 16th, 2006.

85

life worse than ever. Some believe that this was not a deliberate throwing of the
peasants to the wolves, but a hands-off policy with good intentions. As Du has stated,
" . . . at that time [early reform] many of us didn't consider the problem was the system
itself but thought it was mainly an issue of bad management, bad implementation and
bad cadre behavior."121 One line of debate about how to handle the situation for the
peasants was the issue of a paternalist versus a populist approach, and it looks as
though the government simply went from one extreme (paternalist - highly
regimented communes) to the other (populist - nothing: just get out of the way).
Shortly after the onset of reform, the government stepped in to encourage and
guide the peasant-initiated smallholder farm approach to agriculture management.
The abandonment of the communes in favor of the household responsibility system
took only three short years. The early results were good by whatever measure was
used, so it was natural for the central government to turn its attention back to the cities,
leaving the farmers to cope for themselves. This happened at the same time as fiscal
reform was transforming the flow of taxes and fees as the government worked to bring
its finances under control and to wrest enough money from local coffers to fund a
national government. The resulting vacuum left local governments scrambling to
support themselves, and it was years before the central government noticed that the
local governments had become predatory monsters in the Chinese countryside. In an
attempt to gradually allow the invisible hand of the market to replace the visible hand

of government planners, central policy unleashed the grabbing hand of local
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government.
Peasant life was adversely affected in other ways. In the early 1990s, the
government reduced its investment in agriculture research and in farm bureaus. Local
offices had performed a valuable service in agriculture research and in providing
training and information to local farmers. When funding dropped, these offices were
supposed to become self-supporting through fees, and the entire system fell apart.
Similarly, it was the communes that had supported social programs such as public
health and education, and although those functions had been taken over by local
governments, the cash squeeze was making it more and more difficult to support. The
principle of local government self-support stopped working because the local share of
tax revenues kept shrinking and there were fewer and fewer "unbudgeted" sources
except for illegal fees and illegal land grabs. And finally, as the full scope of China's
banking crisis came into view, money for local programs became tighter yet as banks
were reorganized under centralized control and removed from the influence of local
party heads. There were conflicts between levels of government, between different
agencies and between government and the peasants. These were some of the effects of
the central policy developments of the 1980s and 90s. More will be said about the
effect of policy on local governments and peasants in chapters four and five.
The rural reform that was to accompany China's economic reforms had two main
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thrusts. The first was to marketize farm outputs and the second was to do away with
the collectives.123 Although the market for secondary crops and livestock had been
opened soon after the December 1978 party plenum, grain trade continued to be
subjected to the heavy hand of government throughout this period. 1984 was the last
year of the Unified Purchase and Sales System, and in that year the total amount of
grain output that had been purchased by the state was about 87.3 percent of the total.
By 1990, the state's purchases were down to 37.1 percent, and in 2004, the state
backed out of the picture completely, and China's agricultural sector was completely
marketized.124
Decollectivization, on the other hand, was not so much managed by the
government as it was a spontaneous response to the changing policy environment. It
began as an experiment to reduce poverty in the poorest areas in certain provinces and
quickly spread throughout China. By 1983, peoples' communes and production teams
had ceased to exist in most of China. Smallholder family farms became the norm, and
the state issued policy declaring that land use contracts would be valid for fifteen years.
In 2003, the term of land contracts was extended another fifteen years. One of the
desirable end results of China's rural policy is that the state reached self-sufficiency in
grains in the 1990s and today shows a surplus in some years. Nationwide shortages
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have been replaced by periodic structural and regional surpluses. Food security
appears to have been permanently removed from China's crisis management list.125
Since 1978 and especially into the 1990s, China's rural employment picture has
seen significant change. In 1983, farm and related labor employment accounted for
316.4 million people. By 2004, that figure had dropped to 305.9 million, even as
China's population continued to grow. In a related perspective, in 1983 agriculture,
forestry, animal husbandry and fisheries employed 74 percent of China's labor force,
and by 2004 that number was down to 44.6 percent.126 Per capita peasant PPP income
grew from ¥133.6 in 1978 to ¥3,255 in 2005. Despite this real progress, the income
gap between urban and rural and between regions has continued to grow. It is this gap
that has drawn attention from academics, economists, and Chinese political figures.
Grain as a strategic issue
There is consensus in development theory that grain reserves are important for
developing countries, and there's no doubt about its strategic importance in China with
its huge population and relative paucity of arable land. Since taking power in 1949,
the CCP has never been able to relax its vigilance over grain production, and there
have been countless policy changes in an attempt to encourage production and manage
the distribution and storage systems to assure China's self-sufficiency and food
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security. Since 1978, the state has made attempts to hand the reins to the market, but
whether for unexpected problems or because of the resistance of government
institutions to change, the administrative habits were hard to break.
According to the UN standard, if a state maintains reserves in the range of 18
percent of total consumption of society, the grain markets will stabilize. Since the
economic reform, reserves in China have been above these recommended levels most
of the time, but fluctuations have never stopped and the results have always ratcheted
peasant income downwards. One of the problems appears to be related to quality.
During a slow production year, the state released large quantities of its reserves to
stabilize the prices. The 10 billiony'w of grains that were dumped into the market,
however, were not market purchased but came from administrative quotas and were
consequently of lower perceived quality. There were additional issues related to how
the reserves are managed: whether they are adequately cycled (first-in-first-out),
properly stored - and whether the inventory was to be stored or transported from
centralized or released from local storage and other questions of this type created
conflicts and a general lack of control. Prices were not affected by the government's
moves to increase supply.127 Part of this effect also comes from the old adage that
food sufficiency creates an inelastic supply-demand curve. If the price of bread drops,
demand doesn't necessarily go up.
An obvious conclusion that can be drawn from China's rural history is that there

Liu, Zhang, and Huo. p.206-207.

90

are no universal solutions because of the wide variety and diversity of local
environments. In the CCP where the word of a paramount leader was immediately
cast in gold, it should have been easy to predict trouble, as plans were executed where
they were not appropriate or not wanted. In another area of significant state
intervention into rural life, the state was slow to respond to problems associated with
the transition away from the communes. Difficulties arose when the commune
regimes gave way to the new town and village governments. In theory, township
governments were to have administrative and social program responsibilities, while
villages were to have considerable autonomy. However, it was village and township
government and party elites who had managed the economic life of the communes,
including the TVEs, so it was quite natural for them to continue doing so. As a result,
the party, the government and the economic institutions were interwoven, leaving no
dividing line between politics and the economy and between government and business.
Jean Oi called it a "corporatist" government that was little more than an extension of
the old communes. Government had inherited the power of Maoist communism
combined with the power of developmental capitalists.128 This state of affairs was
sure to create conflicts of interest and problems with abuse of power, and the failure of
the state to do something about it affected the effectiveness of grassroots governance
in the significant development and urbanization tasks that needed fair and impartial
administration. These problems created doubts and mistrust among those who had
initially held high hopes that the household responsibility system could carry them to
128
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new levels of prosperity.
The central government was also slow to respond to the general decline of social
programs following the demise of the commune. As stated earlier, public health,
education and other social programs were to be taken over by either governments or
private employers, but private employers didn't want to spend the money and local
governments found it increasingly difficult to afford. Rural mortality figures which
had fared well during the era of the communes began to climb, as school enrollments
dropped and infant mortality rates rose. Birth rates climbed as peasant families once
again looked at their children as sources of labor and income. Poverty struck many
families swiftly whenever there was an accident or illness that required medical
treatment, and many who needed medical treatment didn't get it. Some families chose
poverty if one of their children seemed to have the ability to go to college. Social
equity was replaced by prosperity as a core value on the part of China's leaders and
administrators; and income inequality, already an issue, continued a steady climb
creating local, urban-rural, industry-agriculture and east-west imbalance.130
The main theme of China's agricultural strategy has remained constant since the
early days following the communist party takeover in 1949. The strategy consists of
extracting food to feed a large population and taxes and raw materials to fund
industrialization as a part of China's overall development and modernization. Until
the 1980s, the agriculture sector also led the economy in exports, thus earning foreign
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exchange; but this role began fading after 1980 when industrial exports grew to
become the main engine of foreign exchange earnings. Importantly, the agriculture
sector has always been viewed as the primary means of employment for China's huge
rural population. In order to deploy these primary goals, the policy regime sought to
stabilize grain production, maintain adequate grain reserves, provide inexpensive food
for its large urban population and assure national food security. Until recently, the
goal of raising farm incomes has simply been overshadowed by these other national
imperatives.
Summary
Change will not come quickly. While urbanization is expected to create jobs for a
development economy in transition, China's seemingly inexhaustible supply of cheap
labor has kept wages low and working conditions often atrociously difficult and
unsafe. In some places, miners are pushed to their limits for three months then sent
home as physically and mentally debilitated wrecks. In the cities, oppressed workers
finally leave their bad jobs in disgust. In all these cases eager recruits arrive from the
farms in numbers that exceed demand because dependable low wages are preferable to
the risks and losses they face on the family farms.
Current reform plans include such vital changes as support for education and
public health. The elimination of taxes can help, but if China's recent past is a reliable
indicator of the future, it seems probable that agencies that have been deprived of tax
income could easily subvert the intent of the tax law changes by increasing their fees 93

similar to the moves that virtually killed rural education and medical care in rural
China. In order to assure real progress, the government will need to learnfromits
experiences in the early days of its economic reform and be more attentive to both the
direct and unanticipated consequences of its actions, and particularly to local reaction
to policy shifts. It will also be necessary to increase its investment in social spending,
agriculture technology and in supporting infrastructure.131
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Chapter Four
Local Government in Action

Chapter Three explored the policy environment and demonstrated the power that
emanates from Beijing over the daily lives of peasants. This is the first of the "power
grids" that blankets China's rural areas. A second source of significant influence
comes from local governments: village, township and county. Despite strong
centralization and a rigid hierarchy, many authors have observed that local
governments have the ability to work their own agendas in China's rural towns and
villages. James Anderson put it succinctly:."It must be kept in mind . . . that the
content of policy, and its impact on those affected, may be substantially modified,
elaborated, or even negated during the implementation state.!'132 Some of this freedom
comes from policy, some from policy deficiencies or ambiguity, and some from risk-
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takers who are willing to test the limits of their autonomy.

Jean Oi extended this

line of thought to identify local government as an important catalyst for rural
development because of the autonomy it has either inherited or has created for itself,
or that came about as a consequence of geographic and political isolation.
This chapter examines rural town and village government to explore the lessons
of China's recent experience as an economy in transition, and to understand the impact
of that process on local governance as Beijing seeks to develop its countryside. This
is obviously an important component in a description of community capacity. The
chapter asks whether local governments have demonstrated or developed the capacity
to manage their share of the work of development. The story begins with a brief
overview of the recent history of local governments in China.
After three decades of a highly structured planned "redistribution" economy and
rigid social constraints during the collective era, China has been gradually
transitioning to a market economy for the last three decades. This economic
environment pulls at the chains of old hierarchy habits that are difficult to break. In
the economic environment, the hand of government has been visible at the controls,
and often seen clashing with the "invisible hand" of the free market. In such an
environment rural communities are constantly witness to "conflicts and problems
between the superstructure and the economic base, between productive relations and
133
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production forces."

Rural China is not painted as a peaceful, bucolic scene, but as a

continuous skirmishing between central vs. local objectives, and market vs. planned
strategies.
The Cadre Administrative System
China's administrative system is credited with much that is good. This is a very
large bureaucratic population that has come a great distance in the last thirty years; but
there are also difficult questions about problems that have been created as a result of
the administrative system. There are mechanisms that lead cadres to ignore the public
good. Three dimensions of the system have been cited by many studies as problematic:
The first is the "one level-down management system," sometimes called "one rank
down" (xiaguan yiji zhidu) personnel appointments that replaced the "two-level-down
system"135 after 1984 in compliance with Deng's directive "to control better by
controlling less." Under this arrangement, officials at each level gained full authority
to appoint their subordinates without higher level review or oversight. County leaders
were empowered to decide who will serve as a township party secretary or head of
government without approval from a prefectural organization department. This reform
was intended to increase responsiveness and allow for greater leeway to accommodate
local circumstances. In practice, however, one-level-down management is better
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known for having encouraged cadres to be ultra-sensitive to their immediate superiors
at the expense of other priorities; and it has increased the ability of superiors to get
their underlings to carry out unpopular policies (this can be a strength or a failing) or
to apply pressure to deliver on less savory practices, including abusive illegal taxes
and land seizures to increase government revenues at all costs.136
The second problem springs from the "cadre responsibility system" (ganbu
gangwei mubiao zeren zhi). The system is a set of rules governing job assignments,
performance appraisals, and remuneration, the main purpose of which is to improve
implementation. In places where the cadre responsibility system operates as designed,
local government assigns a variety of targets to its subordinates when they assume
office. Typically, a responsibility commission (zeren zhuang) sees that objectives,
evaluation procedures, and remuneration are prepared for approval by the party
secretary and government head. Cadres must then sign on to that agenda. While this
system provides for clarity and transparency in promotions and assignments, it also
reinforces a self-serving mentality that often places personal interest ahead of the
public good. The rigidity of the system leads cadres to blind enforcement of policies
without regard to their effects on the populace, and even without consideration of their
rationality, legality or obsolescence. The times may change, but the system rules are
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cast in concrete.
The third set of problems is caused by "the cadre exchange system" (ganbu
jiaoliu zhidu), which some call the "top-down method of rotation." In order to control
regionalism, virtually all party first secretaries and government heads are periodically
rotated. They thus have a short and fixed term of office in one locality. While
frequent transfers may help reduce localism, it can also interfere with accountability
and often influences cadres to adopt a short-term view of their responsibilities.138
The system just described aligns with well-worn traditions of "management by
objectives" and other management schema that link incentives to achievements.
These tools carry with them a potential for abuse in the form of self-serving behavior,
short-term thinking, and blind allegiance to the party, the hierarchy and central
policies. These possibilities may be controlled through adequate supervision by
managers and executives, but the literature reported in this chapter and the field
studies indicate that supervision has not often been close enough to prevent abuses.
Beyond these three administrative systems, some believe the selection of leaders
of the Chinese Party and government - national, intermediate, and local - is perhaps
the most obvious source of political friction, even though the trend toward bettereducated, expert, and younger cadres was officially supported even down to the
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village level.

The selection and promotion system includes cadre recruitment, cadre

retirement and cadre grass roots elections. Among those three functions, cadre
recruitment and cadre retirement have one common "hard" standard: age. In China's
current regime, there is no aversion to age discrimination. This preoccupation with
age creates anxiety in the hearts of many officials as they scramble to gather enough
"points" to be promoted before they are sidelined for younger replacements. Section
level cadres, for example, cannot be much older than thirty. This is the lowest level of
cadre at the township level, the bottom of China's administrative hierarchy.140
From Totalization to Localization: Reorganization ofAdministrative Systems
Researchers Wing-shing Tang and Him Chung borrowed a Chinese metaphor to
explain the management transition that accompanied economic reform: they compared
the country to a chess board with white (urban) and black (rural) institutions that each
has their own roles, rules and controllers. During Mao's day, cities and towns
administered their spaces in accord with such conventions as the hukou system in the
cities and the communes in rural areas. Local governments manipulated their
resources around their territory and tended the social, economic and cultural gardens
in their respective areas in a web of party influence that included state-owned
enterprises and banks and was guided by intent to limit urbanization. With the onset
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of economic reform, cities and towns became the primary facilitators of economic
growth through such means as infrastructure development, construction, and the
recruiting of investors. The end products were simultaneous economic growth,
urbanization and the intensification of government.141 In their new roles as stewards
of economic growth, cadres added to their administrative functions such business
responsibilities as marketing and technology diffusion.
The state took several concrete steps to accelerate this localization process,
including an administrative system called "city-leading counties" (shi guan xian), and
in 1984 relaxed the criteria for an area to be designated a township, and created
county-level cities (xianji shi) two years later. These measures ceded more autonomy
to cities and towns and were expected to yield two important benefits: first, they
would provide closer (on site) monitoring and control of local communities; and
second, they would permit better correspondence between policy implementation and
local needs and conditions. From the state perspective, this autonomy did not come
from a liberal urge to increase community participation and freedom of action but was
acceptable because it brought a wider territory within the sphere of its control and thus
provided some assurance that autonomy would not lead to anarchy and chaos.142
While increased local autonomy is considered beneficial to the development
process, what happened in China didn't always work in that direction, and what
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happened as China began its economic reform was foreseen in 1964 by Fred Riggs. It
gradually became apparent in China that the central government did not cede
sufficient authority and revenue to permit the desired level of performance. The
system tended to generate unrealistic goals, and the locus of authority was often
cloaked in behind-the-scenes maneuvering to accumulate resources or to manipulate
reports to demonstrate achievement.143 The increased local autonomy did, however,
encourage local cadres to work for local interests, but that often backfired and caused
trouble because those interests were not compatible with the goals of the state.
An example of this was the cities stretching their charters to micro-manage the
counties and towns by intervening into planning, production, distribution and
consumption activities. Some went further and treated counties as a ready supply of
resources available for extraction in support of city or higher level goals and plans. In
most areas, the cities had a great deal of power over such factors as personnel
assignments, bank credit, budgets and taxation and could also steer or block
investment, construction projects, infrastructure development and other key measures
essential to economic progress. The high priority given to important projects such as
the three dimensions of agriculture issue created tensions for the controlling cities
from which rural development progress is expected but which were also still deeply
committed to their own urban and industrial development. The competition for scarce
resources was and remains real and is being played for high stakes. Progress is
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expected from Beijing on both ends of the urban-rural spectrum.
To understand what's going on, watch the money
Another frame of reference to aid the understanding of local capacity is the
finance perspective and the condition of local accounts. The story begins with the
principle of "simplifying administration and decentralization," and "offering
incentives to both the local and the central governments." In practice, this policy from
the early 1980s meant that each government was intended to be self-sufficient, that is,
able to "get the food from one's own kitchen."145 Local governments have five
sources of cash: tax revenues, non-tax revenues (e.g., license fees and fines), extrabudget revenues (e.g., income from town or village enterprises or collectives), illegal
revenues (e.g., illegal taxes and fees, illegal seizures), and borrowing.146
As local governments scrambled to shore up their budgets and meet expectations
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with respect to mandatory programs and projects that demanded investment (this was
a period of spending to attract foreign investment), they entered into every kind of
arrangement that could generate revenues, including shady deals with local industries
to conceal income from higher levels. This was managed by using their authority to
give tax breaks, but for a price. Tax breaks were paid for with revenues that went to
local government off the books. Businesses saved a little on their taxes: the central
government collected a bigger piece of a smaller pie, and local governments managed
to continue to meet their payrolls. That cycle led to a pronounced decline in central
revenues during most of the 1980s. The government had lost control of its revenues.
The problems at the local levels were exacerbated when administrators cashed in
wherever they could to fund automobiles, lavish furnishings, ever more beautiful
employee housing, and extravagant entertainment. These circumstances also
contributed to poverty by creating new opportunities for corruption. Public contracts
and staff jobs and promotions carried publicly known price tags (In many areas they
still do). Additionally, the disposition of public assets created enormous opportunities
for rent-seeking.
Communities compete for resources much as corporations do, and China's
communities developed ambitious goals to attract foreign investment. They competed
through their cadres with tax breaks, free or low-cost land, well-developed industrial
zones and office buildings, and offers of a beautiful community into which foreign
business persons wouldn't mind bringing their families. As part of this process, many
created broad, tree-lined avenues, elegant new office towers, parks and beautiful
104

industrial zones. This spurt in construction had the desired effect in some cities, but
also caused a rapid loss of arable land, adversely affecting both rural communities and
reducing arable land to the point of threatening food security.147 There was an endless
need for funding for these major projects. Joseph Stiglitz, then a Senior Vice
President and Chief Economist of the World Bank, said that "China has demonstrated
that a country can absorb enormous amounts of physical capital quickly."148 The push
for industrialization and urbanization and beautification absorbed most of the available
funds and more in the form of debt, leaving little for rural development for years to
come.
In others' interviews with local cadres, debt is a sensitive topic since it is frowned
upon at higher levels (even though higher level policy and behavior made it inevitable).
As a consequence of this sensitivity, cadre conversations about debt fell into three
categories during interviews: they blamed their predecessors; they took credit for
reducing it against impossible odds; or they compared themselves with other
jurisdictions with even bigger problems. In the Chinese version of pressure politics,
debt belongs in the debit column of the promote-ability calculations.149 According to
the statistics bureau, one third of the counties in Shanxi Province did not possess the
financial capacity to guarantee the salaries of their cadres in 2003. The accumulated
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debts for salaries in Shanxi's counties and towns reached ¥1.34 billion by 2000. The
counties and township governments accumulated debts of ¥22.5 billion. Seventy-six
counties experienced a deficit, accounting for 91.57 percent of the eighty-three
counties in the province.150
In 1978, China's central
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Bureau, the state was taking
more than 80 percent of the revenues, and its spending had dropped to less than 30
percent. (See Figure 4-1). This is not reported to claim that anything should have
been done differently, only to demonstrate that local governments were in quite a bind
as their revenues continued dropping during the several fiscal reforms while their
responsibilities continued to expand.151 In general, the towns and villages that
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survived the changes intact were those with favorable resources: good growing
conditions, proximity to cities or industry, or a robust rural industry. The predictable
consequence for the poor communities was a drastic decline in social services.
Township governments bear about 78 percent of the cost of compulsory education, for
example, while the county carries 9 percent and the province 11 percent. The state
carries about 2 percent.152
It is not clear how the latest fiscal changes will play out in local governments.
With the abolishment of agriculture taxes, rural governments without industries or
collectives have become entirely dependent upon a transfer mechanism that is yet
incomplete. There are early signs that local governments are up to their old tricks
(such as property seizures and sales, and new fees for services) as they struggle to
survive. What the central government gave away in headlines, the lower level
governments have begun taking away in the fine print. Fees for non-agriculture public
goods like education and health care are being raised again. The prices of farming
supplies, materials and equipment have also gone up, though recent news coverage
continues to trumpet free mandatory education in all of rural China by the end of 2007.
In the schools, peasant children are being charged for "water drinking expense,"
bicycle storage, and after-class study periods. In some areas, peasants are paying new
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fees for home use, anti-disaster, and common area maintenance.

These activities

tell us that the problems of supporting local government have yet to be solved. It also
tells us that higher level governments are failing to provide the supervision necessary
to prevent a repetition of the fee proliferation that began in the 1990s.
It should be noted that all of these means and outcomes have been necessary parts
of the plan to "Let some get rich first" and yet became controversial because of the
overheated enthusiasm of local officials. Despite officially being against wild
spending, the central government continued to apply the spurs by setting high GDP
goals and high foreign investment quotas. The undisciplined spending was also
encouraged as the leaders of areas that had succeeded in their ability to attract foreign
investment were rewarded with publicity and promotions. Officials simultaneously
officially deplored the big spending and rewarded it wherever it paid off. As local
governments worked to stay afloat, the central government angled to regain control of
the tax system, and ended with a radical reform of fiscal policy that was initiated in
1994 with a goal of establishing a "Socialist Market Economy."154
The core of that effort was a nationwide Tax Sharing System characterized by a
multi-level network of tax collection and distribution activities. That fiscal package
defined only the relationship between central and provincial fiscal agreements, so it
quickly led to a wide variety of sharing frameworks throughout the rest of the nation.
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Some provinces have simply extended the provincial-central formula while other
provinces compiled their own formulations. Some provinces set growth targets for tax
revenues to assure the continued funding of government. Unfortunately those targets
often created problems. For example a growth target of 20 percent was set for Puding
county in Guizhou Province. Puding is a nationally designated poor county. In order
to meet the target, the county had to impose 15 percent to 25 percent targets in its
townships, adding greatly to the pressure on local government officials. Those that
achieved their targets were rewarded, while those that failed were fined.155
The central government's share of revenues increased as a result of the 1994 Tax
Sharing System, but since budgets were not revised to reflect the altered revenue
stream, government was left with a large fiscal gap at the county and township
levels. 56 Additional trouble came as a result of a mismatch between a uniform tax
policy and a decidedly non-uniform state. Some towns and villages had found the
right resources and formulas for economic progress, had invested wisely and found
themselves with an adequate revenue stream, an adequate infrastructure, little debt and
a developed, manageable and growing local economy. For others, the new tax was a
disaster; and many were forced toward ever more aggressive fees and taxes and
toward debt, and ultimately to the cash value of peasant lands.157 Many also increased
the extra-budget funding means that still remained available to them, creating several
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additional problems: 1) It was wringing higher taxes out of the normal tax base,
adding to a burden the Tax Sharing System had attempted to bring under control; 2) In
some places the extra-budget funds made a shambles of spending discipline and
encouraged "there's-no-tomorrow" thinking; and 3) created opportunities for
widespread corruption which further heightened tensions between the government and
the people.
Since all land was state or collective owned, local governments had the authority
to seize land for any purpose,159 pay the peasants a very low price, then sell the use
rights to industries, investors or developers for very high prices. The relationship
between the government and the governed became hostile in many regions as a result
of these behaviors. The problems were quite clearly caused by bad policy, and
eventually property use rights were straightened out to make those seizures illegal,
though they continued for several years. The courts were dragged into the hostilities
but too often lost an opportunity to advance the cause of the rule of law by refusing to
hear the cases of peasants who had lost their homes or by ignoring China's
constitution and laws to rule in favor of party elites who had illegally seized property
or violated labor laws or tax codes.
Relief efforts
As the prosperity gap widened and it became more and more apparent that the
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poorest communities simply did not have the capacity to pull themselves out of trouble
unaided, there was an increase in transfer payments, intended to alleviate the
imbalance. Transfer payments are a conventional approach to development that works
by moving revenues from wealthy areas into the poor. In China, the transfer system is
currently under development. It is not without resources, having reported that as of
the end of 2006 there were thirty-seven departments involved in 239 transfer payment
projects. Of these, ¥15.6 billion are in process on forty-one different projects that
have been extended from past years. Another ¥70.6 billion is being applied to sixtyfive projects that are floating around the government with no published project
management system. There are seventy-one special projects divided into 44,149 subprojects that include many valued at under ¥100,000 but which add up to ¥54.6 billion
in total.160 One of the difficulties with transfer payments in China's poorest areas is the
lack of recipients who can put the money to work. With no organizations, no
infrastructure, uneducated cadres and little or no professional talent, to whom can a
government write a check? Clearly the first step before the poorest communities could
receive any kind of assistance is a period of capacity building.
There is a Ford Foundation sponsored research into poverty, public goods and
public finance in rural China that is providing data and strong support for the transfer
payment approach to poverty relief. One of its findings exposes the condition that
China's poorest communities cannot meet their obligations, but are prohibited by the

160

Li, Jinhua Said, There Are Three Problems in Central Governmental Subsidy for Local Expenditures
(Xinhua Net, June, 27 2006).

Ill

budget laws from operating at a deficit. The predictable result is that under-funded
local governments are inevitable, and the effects remain visible today. Towns and
villages are still "cooking the books" to avoid trouble with higher levels of
government.161
The transfer payment system in China was designed to facilitate the transition
process. It is a bottom-up and top-down "double flow" system, which means that the
taxes are paid and flow up the hierarchy where they are consolidated and apportioned
back to the lower levels in accordance with the transfer system formulae. The transfer
payments are composed of five parts,162 and it is in this formulation of the payments
that conflicting priorities cause difficulties. The largest part of the payment is based
on the growth of each of the provincial GDPs. This means that a large measure of the
payment is earmarked for the fastest growing provinces instead of the neediest, which
is similar to the pre-reform matching system that was designed to create incentives for
growth. In 1999, for example, Shanghai, Guangdong, Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces
collected ¥59.5 billion, which was 28 percent of the total of transfer payments for that
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year. The twelve western provinces received a total of only ¥47.2 billion.
By definition, the transfer payment is intended to balance the economy by
shifting funds from wealthy regions to poorer ones. The other elements of the
payment mechanism were designed to effect transfers based on need, but in practice,
the money is not getting where it is most needed. Much of it is used to support
technology innovation in the largest state-owned companies, thus increasing the
competitive strength of China's largest industries at the expense of the poorest. There
is enough maneuvering room in the system to allow influential officials to build homes
and office buildings for agency branches and their employees. In other words, funds
that should have been earmarked to help poor regions are often being treated as some
sort of political slush fund instead.164
Taxes and fees flow uphill, responsibilities flow down
The problem of financing government was particularly severe at the village level.
Village government has no constitutional standing as a part of government; and yet the
village committees are quasi-governmental as they perform many of the functions
normally performed by governments. The end product of these conditions in poor
villages is that cadres inherited more tasks even while their sources of income were
being pinched off. The situation became worse as higher levels of government,
including Beijing, transferred the work ("cast off the burdens") to the lower levels.
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Some transfers were in the form of work projects or improvements, others came in the
form of unfunded legislation or programs. There is no plan, law or policy governing
responsibility assignments for the various levels of the governing hierarchy in China,
and agencies and lower levels of government seek additional authority and less
responsibility at the same time.
As an example of this process in action, pressure on state-owned companies to
show a profit or close led to thousands of plant closures and massive layoffs in
China's industrial belt in Liaoning Province.165 Unemployed workers would normally
have received retirement or unemployment pay from their companies, but when they
closed, workers were left without a way to support their families and were competing
for work with millions of other workers as well as rural migrants. These unemployed
filed for their unemployment benefits with governments that simply didn't have the
cash to pay. Central government made unemployment compensation, a social security
benefit in China, a local government responsibility when the state-owned companies
defaulted on their debts or closed their doors. A cash-strapped city government
became the scene of continuous public demonstrations as workers agitated for help.
This action occurred in an urban setting, but similar pressures in rural towns and
villages increased the spiraling forces that propelled government toward illegal
sources of income and toward a burdensome indebtedness.
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In addition to delegating tasks down through the government hierarchy, Beijing
also "casts off a burden" within its bureaucracies. Agencies such as agriculture
stations, veterinary clinics, agricultural technology and research stations, public health
clinics were required to become self-supporting by selling their services. The farmers,
China's poorest citizens, once again were left holding the bills. Since many could not
afford to pay, the agencies withered. There was no official closure, but after months
or years without pay, employees just abandoned their posts.166 An obvious
consequence of these events was the making of lower levels of government entirely
dependent upon higher: a clear reinforcement of the government's institutional
hierarchy.
Grassroots democracy
Since the mid 1980s, village committee members have been elected into office,
and in the late 1990s this grassroots element of democracy was extended into township
government, so that elections have been institutionalized (but not universalized)
through the lowest two layers of China's hierarchy.

The logic of the Organic Law

that legitimized the autonomy of villages and the election of cadres included an
expectation or hope that the resulting government would be more transparent, more
honest and more likely to understand and respond to local conditions. The law says:
All affairs which relate to the interests of the people shall be decided by the people
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themselves.

It would be a mistake to conclude that the Organic Law has achieved

all its intended purposes, however. As a result of the Organic Law there are now three
centers of power in competition in villages: The village representative assembly,
which is in principle the highest decision-making body; the villagers' committee,
which is headed by the villagers' committee chairman; and the village party branch
headed by the village party secretary. In practice, however, the locus of power rests
with either the villagers' committee chairman or the party secretary. The choice seems
to hinge on the economic context in which the elections take place and which of the
two appears to be most effective in bringing evidence of economic benefit.169
Village committees were first mentioned in Article 11 of China's 1982
Constitution. The explanation in the constitution was that village committees were
organizations of "self-management" at the village level. The literal liberal and statist
camps are still debating the full meaning and intent of that clause. The institutional
map for village self-management was further defined in 1987 in the Organic Law on
Villages, but the debate about the direction and distance of the measure led to the law
being released on a trial basis. The debate continued, but the law was released in final
form in 1998, and again the more liberal interpretation was chosen. The debate
narrowed to a choice of words about whether the relationship between a village and a

168

Data source comes from the article 1 of the Organic Law of the Villagers Committees of the People's
Republic of China, revised and adopted by the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People's
Congress of the People's Republic of China at its 5th Meeting held on November 4,1998.
169
For a good discussion of village elections, government legitimacy and the distribution of power, see
Jean C. Oi and Scott Rozelle, "Elections and Power: The Locus of Decision-Making in Chinese
Villages," The China Quarterly 162 (2000), p.515, n 10.

116

town was one of "being guided" or "being led" by the town government and the party
branch. In a guidance relationship zhidao guanxi the town and the party must rely on
persuasion and assistance to carry the day.170
This intrusion into the power of the party was certain to cause tensions, and such
has been the case. Many official documents acknowledge the role of the party as the
"leadership core" in village organizations, and the Organic Law includes a reminder
that self-administration was not intended to signal the end of the party's claim to
leadership in the villages. In fact in an interesting choice of words, the party's
instructions admonish party leaders to "assure the proper functioning of selfadministrative organs."171 In a final note in the discussion of the Tax Sharing System,
a caution was included as a reminder that the autonomy seemingly granted therein was
not included out of a desire to improve villager participation, but as part of a system
designed to extend hierarchical control more deeply into village affairs. Similarly, the
Organic Law was seen as a way to revive state authority on the path to economic
development.
Institutional change is rarely easy, and while peasants in some villages have taken
advantage of the Organic Law to do some housekeeping by dumping corrupt and nonperforming cadres, party officials have resisted this intrusion into their domains. They
have often manipulated the results of elections in different ways, and have insisted that
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elections in rural China are premature considering the naive level of political
sophistication of the electorate. And because there have been "unhealthy" clan or
other influences that have dominated the process, party officials have replaced bad
leaders with worse ones. These "bad elements" have been given the ability to erode
the ultimate power of the party and reduce its ability to achieve its goals for China's
rural society.
In order to defend their turf, party leaders can influence the slate of candidates in
rural elections, and in fact some of the people who have been elected to their posts in
the newly established election process were party-approved incumbents. When
villagers attempt to wrest control of their villages from higher levels of government or
from the party, the party simply continues scheduling meetings until persuasion
works.174 In some places more direct manipulation takes place. For example, it is
known that in small group sessions, ostensibly to teach peasants how to use their
ballots, cadres identify specifically which candidates are to be voted for.
Despite these and other tactics, when voting is done through secret ballots, the
voters have been known to show their independence and vote for candidates other than

Wang Jingyao, "xiangcun beijingxia dezhengfuyu cunzhuangdeguanxi" (Relations between
Government and Villages under Background of Township and Village Homoorganicity) (cunmin zizhi
wang (www.chinarural.org / www.chinavillage.org, 2006); among other less savory means of
controlling elections, there have been instances of elected cadres or committee members being
replaced shortly after taking office, by intimidation and the use of public voting, etc.,White. p524
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those anointed by the party.

Other actions included the replacement of village

leaders after a brief period following the elections and adding additional people to a
villager-elected village committee. A powerful tool for assuring control is in the form
of official supervision. Any responsibility on the part of a village cadre can be labeled
as critical and subjected to critical oversight. Control over quotas and goals means the
towns can greatly influence the probability of cadre success or failure. Matters of selfadministration thus become official priorities subject to higher level monitoring and
control. Village leaders and village party secretaries are routinely criticized and
demoted through this process.176
Despite this outward "official" resistance to grassroots democracy, there is
evidence that the benefits of public participation and decision-making are gaining
increasing attention and influence. When the peasants have shown their discontent by
appealing to higher authority or by more dramatic means such as demonstrations or
uprisings, officials have occasionally made good use of public hearings to allow for
venting and debate and to provide opportunities for public participation in the
problem-solving process. Too often, peasants who find their way to Beijing or to an
office in provincial government are simply told to take their complaints to their local
officials, usually the same ones who caused the problems in the first place; but
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researchers report that interventions are becoming more common in these situations,
and in some locations town meetings and hearings are more frequent than they were
twenty years ago, allowing for better communications and public participation. Town
and village committees and even party branches have been reported to hand some
problems over to representative organizations for discussion and resolution.177
Government committees and academics are currently debating the state and
progress of democratization in China. Most officials and many of the Chinese people
themselves consider that China will continue to need a strong government, and they
cite economic and social progress as evidence of what centralized government can
accomplish.178 Side by side with this mainstream current, however, there is no doubt
that part of the environment in China's rural towns and villages includes an awakening
of the possibility that some degree of democratization is less of a threat than it had
been perceived, that it can lead to benefits not previously recognized, and that in many
instances the process has removed unsavory characters from public office, though
sometimes one "benefit" also can be found to the power holders, who see elections as
opportunities to legitimize incumbents' control.

Zhao Shuli, "Lishixing tiaozhan: Zhongguo nongcun de chongtuyu zhili" (Historical Challenge:
Chinese Rural Conflicts and Governance), www.china.com.cn 2004.
!
China's case is not the only economic success to come at the hands of powerful government
influence. The tight relationship between Japan's government and the Keiretsu and Korea's
government and the Chaebol are additional examples of heavy-handed government participation in
economic success.
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Regional Disparity
This section contains a picture of one of China's most serious and challenging
problems - regional disparity. The picture includes a large and growing income gap,
but also includes natural conditions, policy constraints and demographic
considerations that have combined to institutionalize poverty in most of China's
western regions. This disparity was a key factor in research site selection on the
assumption that where the disparity is so pronounced, capacity constraints will be
more readily seen and explained.
Regional differences in rural development
Until 1978, China's rural society fell into one of three roughly equivalent layers:
the well-off, the middle and the poor. The "three depends" (san yikao dui)
characterized these groups: food depends on grain sales, production depends on loans,
and living depends on government relief. The more prosperous group was typically
characterized as living in a benign climate, working with fertile soil and having a
dependable water supply. They also clustered along the eastern seaboard or close to
large population centers. Because these regions were more prosperous, they tended to
attract larger populations which meant smaller land holdings but with higher
productivity, and they had better developed transportation facilities.
Prosperity begets prosperity, so these regions also developed in diversified ways
with cash crops, animal husbandry, and local industries and businesses. In these areas,
diversity was viewed as naturally favorable to local economies. During China's
121

planned economy, however, these regions were squeezed to provide grains and other
foods to assure a ready supply of low-cost food in the nearby urban areas, which
meant that prices paid for the crops were intentionally depressed and peasant income
was kept at lower levels. The resulting economy really provided no incentives for
peasants to increase productivity, and neither did the system encourage the middle and
poorer levels to aspire to increased prosperity. There wasn't much of an income gap
dividing the more prosperous from the poorest commune teams.179
Another feature of government strategy in those days came from Mao's insistence
on balancing the regional economies. This really meant that the east was helping
support the west. The uniform price system, for example, meant that farming supplies
sold at the same price whether your farm was next door to the factory or in the
remotest hillside in Sichuan province. The reforms that began in the late 1970s
represented a shedding of the "golden hoop" on the eastern region - not only
permitting but actually encouraging rapid unbalanced development and developing
policies and assigning resources to support it.180
Consequently, after 1978 the regional picture changed quickly and radically.
With many types of rural reforms, including such measures as raising the prices paid
for grain, huge numbers of peasants were raised above the poverty level; but the
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transition did not affect all geographic regions equally. Rural prosperity came quickly
to the coastal area, but has yet to arrive in the remote rural west. Between 1978 and
2001, the rural poor population decreased by 220 million, mostly in the eastern
provinces. Of China's 2,109 counties, 592 are officially designated as poor, roughly
28 percent of the total. Only 13 percent of eastern counties are so designated, 20
percent of the central counties and more than 40 percent of western counties. These
poor counties are typically mountainous, characterized as having poor growing
conditions and weak infrastructures and an endless cause-effect poverty cycle.181
It is worth noting that after implementing "help-poverty in development"
measures (kaifashifupin), peasants' income in western China has increased, and some
peasants have been raised out of poverty, which stimulates the growth of population in
the west, and has begun creating a market. On the other hand seven of the twelve
western provinces had a higher population growth rate than the average level for the
country in 1998. The population growth has worsened the fragile local ecoenvironment, so the situation is viewed as a serious problem in which some peasants
once lifted out of poverty are falling back into it. In Qingba mountainous area, a
World Bank poverty alleviation program raised 8 percent of the peasant households
out of the poverty level while at the same time 11 and a half percent were dropping

Kong Xiangzhi, ed., "Zhongguo sannong wenti baogao," (2005 Report of the Prospects of China's
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Some researchers have categorized rural China in three regional divisions: First,
China's northeast provinces including Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning. Liaoning
draws special attention for having long been the industrial hub of China. This
uniqueness was not lost on the Japanese occupation forces or the new Communist
regime in China, both of which left the region relatively intact, dominated by heavy
industry and geared toward the large scale extraction of raw materials and the
production of industrial goods and materials. Liaoning's development model parallels
the Russian and Eastern European path and was hardest hit by the massive
restructuring occasioned by China's economic reform when state-owned companies
were reorganized to become more efficient during the late 1990s.
The second region includes the seven coastal provinces: Hebei, Shandong,
Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Fujian, Guangdong and Hainan. Rural incomes in this region are
well above the national average and have been rising since the reform. The
development model most in evidence in this region includes rural industry as its
centerpiece, which has become a significant factor in the region's and China's
exploding economy, and thus a primary cause of the rising income gap that is now
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creating problems for China's government.

The industrialization that has been so

successful in this region has been observed to be often rooted in local markets, linked
backwards to agriculture and forward to nearby final users in the major population
centers around Hong Kong and Shanghai.

This observation does not bode well for

the western region where much of agriculture is basic and where there are few traces
of a real market except immediately surrounding the large population centers.
It should also be noted that the costal region benefits from another factor, its
proximity to China's major ports, which places it within reach of neighboring as well
as global markets. And finally, the eastern region benefits from incoming foreign
investment which was congregating near the finance centers and developing a critical
mass of networked suppliers. The benefits to this region's peasantry follow several
discernible patterns: rural economic knowledge diffusion, industry development,
cooperatives, and participative decision-making, as well as business contributions to
society. This model works equally well for small farms that can achieve commercial
success in niches (e.g., chickens and fish ponds) and in using alternative sources of
income in the nearby cities and factories, in their village industries or in their own
businesses. When they lose interest in their lands, the lands can be successfully
183
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merged into large-scale, mechanized farms, either by town or village enterprises or by
hiring managers and work teams.185
The third economic region includes six central and twelve western provinces, and
it is in these provinces that poverty is more widespread and more resistant to
improvement. Secondary and tertiary sectors employ between 30 and 40 percent of
the population, which is good, but not enough to handle the excess rural labor that
attends poor farming conditions. Investment in this region was favored during two
periods, the first four five-year
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well linked to the agriculture economy. The projects consisted mostly of enormous
infrastructure projects which created temporary jobs and improved transportation, but
although they may ultimately benefit the region, they have not yet touched the poor
villages. Rural tax reform begun in 2004 is showing early signs of making a
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difference, assuming the gains are not lost elsewhere as earlier discussed.
There is a systematic institutionalization of poverty in the west: no investment
because there is no market therefore investment in rural industry is risky, therefore the
transportation network hasn't been developed, therefore . . . etc. This goes on and on
to such endless "cause-effect" circles. In classical economic terms, except for very
small niches, it has thus far been impossible to either discover or develop a
comparative advantage in these regions. Rural western China has consequently been
an inhospitable place to invest and live.187 And we should keep in mind our four cases
among eight came from the west, one in Sichuan (Southwest) and another in Gansu
(Northwest). Although some parts of the area are rich in mineral deposits, exploration
and mining are risky and expensive and transportation is expensive, so although the
western region has mineral wealth, it has been out of reach of local governments or
businesses and has remained a state- explored, developed and managed resource that is
not substantially helping the local economies. For most of the last almost 60 years,
western mines have been subject to state extraction to favor industrialization on the
east coast. The poverty cycle is as pervasive and institutionalized as the prosperity
cycle has become in China's coastal rural regions.
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Underlying causes of regional differences
One of the most frequently raised questions in regional research concerns the
causal factors for regional disparities. Some scholars argue that the main
characteristic of Chinese regional disparity is that it condenses regional and rural
development in the same context. "By and large, poor regions are rural, while
prosperous regions are more urbanized and have a high proportion of industry and
service sectors."188 Since the increasing development gap between east and west is
now viewed as one of the Chinese government's most serious challenges, much
research is in progress on various aspects of this issue, and several themes are
emerging from the literature. First, many studies emphasize the role of the economic
structure and policies, and especially the concentration of state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) and the openness of the provinces to external trade."189 Secondly, studies have
correlated the obvious geographical and geophysical factors (such as distance to
seaports, difficult terrain, altitude, and climate) as affecting regional development
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disparities.
Many of China's rural areas are land-locked, such as the large agricultural basin
of Sichuan and the agricultural areas at the upper and middle reaches of the Yellow
River. They are far from potential markets. Many rural areas in China are
characterized by arid or semi-arid climates or are at very high altitudes. Some argue
that these natural factors can explain most of the regional development disparities in
China. A third line of inquiry explores demographic and social driving factors such as
the rural population structure, as well as studies of migration and migration networks.
The basic idea of this line of argument is that human resources in lagging rural regions
are usually not well developed and thus perpetuate underdevelopment. In the end,
Gerhard Heiling condenses the disparity issue as a problem of distance, not only
geographic, but cultural, social, economic and political distance.191
Finally, it is not possible to overlook China's development policy as a major
contributor to regional development disparity. This includes policy on state
investment, industrial development and distribution, and political-economic decisions
regarding extraction to support urbanization and industrialization, primarily along
China's east coast. There were differences in fiscal management (taxation and tax
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holidays), and key differences, as previously discussed in investment in social
programs such as education and public health.192 Such disparities were anticipated by
Deng when kaifang zhengce (opening-up policy) began.193
Regional Development policy
Before the 1980s there was an egalitarian drive to limit the regional income gap,
and the timing, sequence and direction of state policy was mainly focused on
balancing provincial economies. After the first four five-year plans the share of
central and western regional economies had grown considerably and the gap between
east central and west had dropped somewhat. For example, in 1952, the per capita
income in the east was 2.19 times of that in the west, but in 1978, the gap was reduced
to 1.95 times.194 In real income terms, the gap narrowed even further. With the onset
of economic reform this strategy gave way to a goal of rapid economic growth and
economic and fiscal policy shifted to favor the eastern region.195 In the third five-year
plan (1958-1963) the eastern region's share of investment in fixed assets was 26.9
percent of the total, but in the eighth five year plan (1990-1995), that investment had
risen to 54.2 percent - the highest share of any region in any period. In the meantime,
investment in fixed assets in the western region fell from 34.0 percent down to 14.7
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percent, the lowest since the communist takeover.
As a draw for investment, both SOEs and non-state enterprises do significantly
better along the coast than in the center or west in terms of profit to investment ratios
and asset to liability ratios. These translate to higher value added in production. With
other important advantages, (proximity to markets and ports and so forth), it is not
surprising that the eastern economy grew quickly. An additional boost came in the
form of trade zones where the east had the highest number of open cities and industrial
zones. The resulting liberalization of trade and investment created opportunities for
international trade and cooperation. It remains to be seen whether the economic
fortunes of the different regions are path dependent, driven toward different steady
states already set in concrete, or whether the patterns of development can be guided
toward some degree of national convergence. However, the considerable investment
in the rapidly maturing eastern economic zone continues to fatten the income gap and
shows few signs of reversing itself.
In 1980, the average peasant income in the west was ¥47 below the eastern region.
By 1995, the difference had grown to ¥954, and by 2005 was ¥2,713.198 As an
example if we look at Guizhou (W) as representing the lower income, Hubei (C) as
middle level income and Shanghai (E) as the highest income, the ratio of per capita
peasant income in 1985 was 1:1.46: 2.80. In 1998, it became 1:1.63: 4.05; and in
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2005 the ratio increased still more to 1:1.65:4.39.

In February, 2007, a

spokesperson from the National Development and Reform Commission announced
that the gap widened again in 2006 despite government attempts to reverse the
trend.200
The development formulas that worked in some places simply could not work in
others. Some towns and villages spent heavily to attract investment and industries into
areas that did not have the market to support them. In many cases the spending
created massive debt burdens. These localities ended up totally dependent upon extrabudgetary revenues, which led inexorably to the illegal taxes and fees and land
seizures and speculation over which the peasants increasingly expressed their anger in
the streets. The staging of fiscal and market reforms were not well coordinated. At
the same time as tax reforms were making life difficult in many towns and villages,
state-owned companies were cut off from government support, either to become
profitable or close. Thousands closed, leaving millions looking for work. The
government was going ahead with marketization and "eating from one's own kitchen,"
and in rural areas this meant that central support for schools, public health and social
security dwindled and ultimately dried up. It was another occasion for the towns and
villages to begin charging fees to those least able to afford them.
China's banking industry was involved in the thick of these reform problems. At
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the beginning of reform, local banks were subject to the control of the party. Bad
loans were routinely made to state-owned companies that were not profitable, and also
to help the poorer towns and villages meet their obligations. By the time the banking
system was reorganized, the threat of collapse was very real as the system was loaded
with non-performing loans.
It should be said that much of what happened during this economic reform was
probably inevitable, given the circumstances. In a socialist planned economy, a
factory has no profit responsibility, but it must be responsible for creating jobs and for
furnishing homes, education, medical care and retirement benefits. Factory managers
were responsible not to a profit-seeking board of directors but to the party, which took
cradle-to-grave responsibility for all its citizens, including their gainful employment.
Factories were routinely required to hire above their needs. Banks also carried not
only financial but social responsibility, which meant that helping to keep factories and
towns afloat was a reasonable request from a party secretary. As understandable as
these conditions seemed, the end result created problems for everyone in rural areas
except in those regions where rural industry and marketization delivered the money
and jobs necessary to fund the beginnings of a generalized prosperity while keeping
local jurisdictions afloat.
The most important contributor to the problems confronting China at the end of
the 20th century was regional disparity and the unacknowledged capacity differences
of towns and villages as they tried to cope with the changing political-economic
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environment, though unequal development was a conscious political decision to jumpstart the new economy.201 The productivity of the land, the climate, and the market
combined to create large differences in economic growth and the tax base. The
development formula that worked well in some regions didn't have a chance in others.
The situation was made worse because few faulted the plan or the system but instead
blamed the lower levels of government or the lazy northern (western) peasants.202 In a
plan to push local governments to higher levels of achievement, incentives and
rewards went to those who accomplished the most instead of to those who needed it
the most, assuring a widening gap between the haves and have nots. Unrealistic
quotas heaped insult on injury, requiring additional spending. The symptoms were
appearing in poor remote rural regions and the assumption was made that the problems
were being initiated there also. When the tax sharing system tunneled increasing
resources upstairs, the transfer system had not been developed to move money where
it was needed most but was based on rewarding local revenue growth as described
earlier. The cost of local incentives for prosperous communities was paid by China's
poorest communities and people.
Differences in social programs
Borrowing the theme of Cannikin Law or bucket effect of American management
to match with the focus of the current policy mainly on reforms, rural development
capacity will not be decided by the situation in the east coast and prosperous areas
201
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close to big cities but will be limited by the situation in less developed and remote
areas. For such reason, we give much attention to the west region.
Although the Chinese government has paid attention to the development of
human resources in the western region, where the improvement rate of indices of
human resources is generally higher than that of the national average, the large
disparity of human resource development before the party took control of the
government, and the other social economic factors before and after the launch of
economic reform, mean that there are still large differences in the social development
of the western region compared to the nation as a whole. For instance, the population
of the western region represents 27 percent of the national total, but it has
approximately 54 percent of all illiterate.203 As previously discussed, after gains
during the Mao era, this condition took a turn for the worse when local governments
lost the income to fund education and public health programs. These are now in the
process of being restored.
The western region is also underdeveloped in scientific and technological
capabilities. The development of education, and particularly with capabilities in
science and technology, enhance human resource development. Improvements in the
quality of the labor force are essential elements for the development of the western
region. A World Bank Report on Gansu province pointed out that "Increased labour
mobility and rapid change in the structure of employment in Gansu will depend
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greatly on improvements in basic education ... Most important of all, however, is the
need to improve the qualification of teachers.. ."204 This comment is valid not only for
Gansu province, but also to other provinces and autonomous areas of the western
region.
There are cultural issues that are affecting western development as well. Western
peasants still place a higher value on male children because of the harsh farming
conditions and weak social security support. There is a resulting gender imbalance in
western regions. Peasants also equate larger families with happiness, duozi duofu.
The large and still growing population of China is one of its most serious problems,
making tensions between the people and the environment more acute in many
different ways: taxing the productive capability of the land, stressing the environment,
adding to water and air pollution, and taxing energy and other living resources. Eager
for a share of China's prosperity, many have over-farmed, converted wetlands to farms,
clear cut forests and mismanaged resources and wastes. These are not theoretical
forecasts but grim reality, making life worse today in many poor areas. And finally,
many peasants are still locked into their ancestral homes, ways and superstitions that
prevent them from understanding or consenting to improvement measures. Many are
ill-equipped for the modern business world and markets, which means that even the
poverty-assistance loans become useless in their hands. Some Chinese scholars sadly
conclude that perhaps many of the poor western peasants are giving about as much as
they can. In terms of development theory, peasants work as hard as necessary to
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assure survival, but no harder because the work is difficult, the conditions harsh, and
the rewards meager. These conditions drastically affect what local cadres can do and
how they work.
The Changing Nature of Local Government
Overview
With the advent of the household responsibility system, town and village
organizations were originally intended to just carry out administrative functions, but it
did not work out that way. The leaders of the collectives became the leaders of
economic life under the new system.205 Households did not get the freedoms they were
intended to get - the collective elites became the new political elites and maintained
control of grain and cotton production quotas, birth control, taxes, and state
monopolies of supplies and services. They also had great influence with rural
entrepreneurs in non-agricultural businesses by virtue of their connections and power
over most aspects of community life.
New economic elites needed support from local cadres and therefore developed
relationships to assure that support. At the same time, new cadres stayed close to
wealthy farmers and private business persons. The relationships so cultivated
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facilitated the work of government and improved the environment for business.
Unfortunately the environment also created conflicts of interest. Many town and
village cadres become managers of enterprises, and depending on the fate of the
businesses, many left government to become entrepreneurs, the new economic elites.
As a result of these behaviors, it is not always possible to know where cadre loyalties
lie. They walk a fine line, conscientious about their duties as agents of the central
government at times, as agents of the population at other times, and sometimes as
aggressive guardians of their personal interests, always testing the changing directions
and limits of policy. This is the rural implementation environment described for us in
the 1980s.206
Beginning in the 1990s, more research focused on Chinese local administration
and policy implementation. Among the findings are that some cadres conscientiously
enforce unpopular policies while refusing to carry out other measures that villagers
would welcome. Rural leaders sometimes even warp a well-liked central policy, such
as economic growth, into a harmful "local" policy that justifies wasteful investment
and increased extraction. The center has structured the implementation environment
deftly in some respects by establishing inducements and sanctions that spur grassroots
cadres to go to the wall for certain policies; but on other occasions an inability to
foresee the local reaction to central plans has left street-level bureaucrats with enough
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discretion to distort policy and bend the law.
The role of the party
It would be tempting to say that during the half century since the communist
party assumed control of China's government, the role of local government has been
evolving. In reality that role has not so much evolved as it has frequently and with
difficulty shifted in the hunt for a moving target. The one constant is the party, a
ubiquitous presence that is a source of both inspiration and frustration. The party is
not easily understood when it is filtered through a western paradigm, but it should be
recognized not as a separate organization with its own agenda, but as an integral part
of government that extends leadership, teaching, support and monitoring throughout
the government's hierarchy. China's agenda is determined by the party. Many
government officials are also party members, including virtually all the key leaders;
and there is an internal division of labor characteristic of mature organizations. The
party is not a voluntary club with more influence than it should have, but a carefully
vetted membership indoctrinated for loyalty and trained for leadership. Westerners
may believe that local governments will never achieve autonomy because of the
ubiquitous presence of the omnipotent communist party.208 Chinese believe that if
their local party secretary is well connected, his influence brings autonomy to the town
or village in his or her stewardship.
Mao was accustomed to referring to China's population as a blank sheet of paper.
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On that paper, the "party of the people" would write China's destiny. One of the
problems with that metaphor is the pressure it applies to party elites who must always
know what to do. The early reliance on Marxist-Leninist-Maoist models of societal
engineering came to a fitful end with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, though
China's early experiments with communes gave the party a glimpse of what was
coming. Socialism appears to work, but it is not yet known whether communism can
work.
The significance of that reality is that except for the European model of socialism,
China's communist party doesn't have much of a roadmap; and China's current
government is consequently still engaged in a grand social experiment. Communism
as a socio-economic theory today looks more like a treasure map of dubious origin
than a workable plan. The party leadership has been working for almost sixty years to
find the right path to communist nirvana, but the trail has often seemed to peter out;
and it is local government, at the front lines of the struggle, that has found the going
roughest as the party gropes for the one best way. Local cadres are always tied to the
goals of the party-government on the one hand, and constrained from achieving those
goals by their own socio-economic conditions on the other. The party has never
disavowed its goal of creating a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist communism, but for the last
three decades, the term socialist has more frequently been used in speaking of grand
strategy in China than has communism.
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The changing face of rural China
During the collective era, the production team was the owner of the land and all
its output. The production team leader was the ultimate authority in a system that
scheduled the work of team members, determined their compensation, allocated task
quotas, controlled farm supplies and distributed the revenues. Jean Oi called them the
"gatekeepers of opportunities and resources for the team and all its members."209 The
team leader was almost always a member of the Communist Party. There were
sometimes elections, but there was only one candidate who was picked by the next
higher levels. Their loyalty was assured because their fortunes were tied to the party
and to the collectives.

Even though village cadres are not on the government

payroll and are not government employees, they are key street-level administrators
and leaders, important for the dissemination and enforcement of policy. They receive
small salaries from their villages, but they are expected to perform gainful work on
their farms or in other endeavors as the primary source of their family's income.
As the trappings of the planned economy dwindled, the need for marketing savvy
increased, and it was the town and village cadres who had the organizational skills and
networks to nurture the developing market system. Except in local markets there was
no way for households to sell their produce into mass markets individually. It required
some degree of amalgamation and sales planning. The diffusion of technology and the
209
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availability of mechanization also required organization and knowledge beyond the
ken of the average peasant. These skills and resources were already well established
among the town and village cadres.212
On the other hand, as the market matured, the heavy hand of local government
became less and less relevant to the economic life of rural China in some ways.
County governments had been extending their organizations to grassroots levels
through administrative and institutional functions such as technology bureaus, further
diminishing the relevance of township government. The Organic Law of Village
Committees provided additional impetus for change as many administrative functions
became the responsibility of the village assembly and the village committee.213
The management of lands became an important study in cadre leadership that
showcased both their abilities and shortcomings during the two decades following
reform. The first change arrived on the wings of the Household Responsibility
Contract System (HRCS) which took root and gained momentum in the poor
agricultural provinces of Anhui, Sichuan, Guizhou and Inner Mongolia. Many credit
China's farmers with the creation of that approach to farming, but few recall the vital
role played by local governments in the institutional change the household
responsibility system represented. Cadres took significant political risks by going
along with peasant initiatives in that direction, closely analogous to the black market
in a socialist world where property ownership is considered a source of evil. They
2,2
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began by keeping this underground movement in the shadows, then gradually began
negotiating with higher levels for more maneuvering room.214
From the cadre perspective, this was not an altruistic plan to set the peasants free,
but the result of a cost-benefits analysis. In the poorer regions especially, meeting
quotas was a challenge, the threat of natural calamities was always present, and the
risk of famine was always just over the horizon. Cadres were desperate to find new
approaches, and they came up with several. The household responsibility system
boosted grain supplies by increasing the productivity of the land. Much to the credit
of the central government, this was not an initiative that resulted in disgrace for the
innovators, but quickly became central policy as the benefits became apparent.
As the collectives were disbanded, the original plan to dispose of the collective
lands was to distribute them equitably to the members of the collectives who would
then take responsibility for their productive use. The plan also called for periodic redistribution as families grew or shrank - a requirement that soon proved unwieldy
beyond reason. The changing rural economy created land management issues that
continued to test the abilities of local cadres.
One of the problems that needed a solution was the issue of abandoned lands.
Because of such conditions as low prices, poor soil, and bad weather, peasants in some
areas had found farming increasingly unreliable as a way to support their families.
Many left their fields to find work in the factories or mines. In some cases the women,
214
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elders and children tried to keep the farms working. In other cases the lands were
simply abandoned. The expenses and taxes associated with farming (recall the extra
taxes and fees that became popular during this period) left little to support a family.
Despite these conditions, cadres were still responsible for attaining town and village
quotas, so they needed to keep all the arable lands in production. As an example, one
solution to this problem was known as the "two field system." A certain amount of
property was designated as "grain ration" fields and the rest as "responsibility fields."
Together these fields represented all of the local arable land, but were treated
differently in the administrative system. The grain ration fields were allocated to food
security and farmers paid only the agriculture tax. The responsibility fields were
placed into production under contract, which meant the fields could go to anyone
willing to pay the fees which included all taxes and village fees. This meant that lands
could be combined into large-scale farms suitable for mechanization, usually
professionally managed and run with contract labor. By 1994,43 percent of all of
China's arable lands were being managed under the two field system.
As with many such systems in China, there were those cadres who saw an
opportunity in the system and who began to increase the percentage of land that was
designated as responsibility fields. In so doing, town and village governments
increased their income from fees at the expense of peasants whose land use rights
were constantly diminishing. The system was eventually abolished. There were other
215

Chen Tianbao, Xu Huiyuan, and Pang Shoulin, "nongcu tudi zhidu biange zhong de difang zhengfu
xingweifenxi "(Analysis for Local Governance in Transformation of Rural Land Regulation), nongye
jingji wenti (Issues in Agriculture Economy) 25, No. 1 (2005).

144

such systems that rose and fell during this period, depending upon conditions in each
region. The relevance of these cases lies in what they say about local cadres. Most
people are aware of the illegal taxes and land seizures at the hands of town and village
cadres, but few know of the initiatives, innovations and administrative skills that were
part of the daily lives of local communities; and fewer ponder the relevance of the
central government's willingness to investigate, negotiate and experiment with grass
roots solutions.
Funding local governments: history of trouble
At the beginning of economic reform, the slate was clean in China's towns and
villages. The collectives, TVEs and state-owned industries had either made money or
had received subsidies. Urban and rural areas, though separately managed, were
roughly equal, as were east and west. The flow of revenues was a well-developed part
of the system that was the planned economy. There were many abuses of power in the
form of favoritism, but the rural community was relatively free of major acts of
corruption. The dissolution of the collectives shook loose most of the controls and
moral webbing that had kept people largely honest during the Mao era, however; and
as the new economic institutions began to take shape, the tug-of-war between central
government and locals over tax revenues led to the institutionalization of new kinds of
official dishonesty. Furthermore, the upward flow of taxes and the downward flow of
work in the hierarchy created extremes of pressure on cadres who were required to
fund their own operations, as we have seen.
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The Mao era was characterized by false reporting as cadres at all levels strove to
stand out and to outdo each other. This was a habit that was difficult to shed as China
worked itself away from the planned economy.216 Stressing the importance of quotas
can stimulate motivation to perform. A zealous approach to unrealistic quotas, upon
which are dangling incentives and bonuses, however, creates an irresistible urge to
doctor the reports. This problem became an everyday reality in China and remains so
to this day. In February, 2007, a rural official was asked to explain a discrepancy
between locally-derived statistics about rural residency and official reports from the
National Bureau of Standards. The official replied that any resemblance between the
truth and their reports was coincidental.217 Townships are not asked to report their
numbers, they are told what numbers to report.
Township governments have tripled in size since the mid 1980s, even though they
were initially seen as expendable. The increases have come at the hands of higher
level requirements, still adding costs without generating revenues. In some townships
these conditions have become sufficiently severe as to create serious motivation
problems among township cadres. There is no visible solution to the poverty issue, to
the large debts and to the bloated bureaucracies with which they must grapple. They
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face pressure from above and resistance from below, and many have made personal
survival their highest priority. While they profess to have faith in and admiration for
China's economic recovery, they see no tangible reasons for hope for themselves and
for the citizens they represent.218
With the implementation of new socialist countryside plans, local salaries and
education and part of public health expenses are being picked up by higher levels.
The agriculture tax has been abolished, at least for the present, as have most fees the
peasants have been paying, as previously discussed. Property rights have been
strengthened, and well publicized to make it more difficult for cadres to take property
illegally. Subsidies to peasants to alleviate poverty are no longer distributed through
the hierarchy where the funds could be diverted to other purposes, but are now going
directly to peasant accounts. All these changes are making a difference, and peasant
incomes took a leap in 2006. The peasants are still losing ground in the income-gap
battle, though the rate of income increase has been growing.219
The work in the towns and villages
In addition to the general responsibilities for the political economy, township
cadres have three major tasks: the first is kou zi, being in charge of a specific area of
responsibility such as agriculture, forestry, water resources, education and public

Data from the2007 yearbook of National Statistics Bureau: for three years during 2004 to 2006, per
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health, etc. The second is in the nature of special projects, such as eliminating
illiteracy, supervision of critical projects, such as institutionalizing compulsory
education, periodic census, and emergency management, and the third task is related
to the supervision of the town's villages (baocun gongzuo). Each village is assigned
one or two township cadres to assist party leaders and the village committees in the
overall management of each village. They help supervise and manage the "hard" tasks
of the village cadres, such as the family planning quotas; and they help villagers
identify and apply for special project funding. They are also active in dispute
resolution. One popular saying that describes township officials' work states, "there
are many departments that can make policies, but there is only one that implements all
of them at the bottom" (shang you qianqian xian, xiayouyigen zhen).
Salaries for township cadres are low: it is not unusual for a college-graduated
public servant with twenty years on the job to be earning only ¥500 per month with
eligibility for another ¥100-¥200 in bonuses. Nor is it unusual for cadres to receive no
pay during the last three or four months at the end of each year. Out of this meager
income, cadres have mandatory "donations" that can total up to two months' pay.
Typical donations include support for a laid-off worker fund, support for a party
school, support for infrastructure construction and maintenance. They are often
required to pay their own way to mandatory conferences or training. There is required
reading in newspapers and magazines for which they are billed, and they must also

cover the price of the subscriptions for the village cadres for which they have
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responsibility. They have also regularly been required to contribute when their
organizations cannot meet their revenue quotas. 21
Under these circumstances it is not surprising that for many township officials, a
county job or salaried position with other agencies is the most desirable career
outcome. These higher level and agency jobs come with lighter and less frustrating
duties, higher salaries and bonuses, and better working conditions and other job
benefits. Another escape hatch is to affiliate with or turn to private business or explore
new business ventures of their own. "While necessary for proper implementation,
attention to basic requisites is not sufficient to ensure proper policy outcomes. An
additional problem must be taken into consideration: the way the bureaucratic
environment surrounding the policy process affects how officials carry out their
tasks."222
The village organization is the cornerstone of grassroots political power - it links
upward to the government, downward to the villagers. State and party policies are
carried out at the village level. The quality of the village organization directly impacts
consolidation of grassroots political power and rural stability and development, and
the furtherance of state goals of stability and prosperity. In the early years of
economic reform, village cadres still retained control over the allocation of some key
inputs, such as fertilizer, insecticides, farm services and land. But as input and service
markets have gradually matured in China, this control has waned in influence. The
221
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major exception is land, as previously discussed.
Eighty percent of the daily work of village leaders is taken up in tasks assigned
by the township. The balance of cadre work is taken up in production management,
conflict resolution, and offering technical advice and services to the villagers. Some
rural villages have reached higher levels of autonomy than others, and the difference
appears to lie in the degree of local industrialization. Local governments that are
sustained mostly on agricultural output have largely remained poor. Those villages
that are better funded have attained that status because of the tax revenues and other
benefits of local industries. The industries consequently have bargaining power, as do
the villages in which they work. The difference has affected the condition of the
infrastructure, including roads, schools, mechanization, irrigation and other public
goods as well as public services such as social welfare (public health and education
et.).224 Town and village cadres are rarely credited with the sweeping changes that
have propelled China into the ranks of the superpowers, but are usually blamed for the
shortcomings and missteps that have attended China's economic transformation.
Policies regularly fail in China, and it is local governments that are faulted, though
very little attention is paid to the fact that unrealistic quotas, unfunded projects and
programs, insufficient time and the absence of capable personnel were the real
culprits.225
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Because of harsh penalties associated with complaints from villagers to higher
levels of government, cadres are afraid to offend anyone, and it is clear that the higher
levels take no responsibility for the conflicting priorities and demands that caused the
hard feelings and mistrust in the first place. Local cadres are summoned to training
classes and must pay their own expenses. When higher level officials arrive for
inspection visits, cadres must entertain them. If the peasants are suspicious and not
inclined to try new seeds, fertilizers or different crops, it is the cadres who must take
the gamble on their own plots. As is true with township cadres, most village cadres
and party heads are financially involved in making up shortages or funding different
projects, despite the fact they often are denied part of their salaries. In a survey of
village heads, many were found to have covered expenses totaling more than ten
thousand yuan, some much more.226 And finally, village cadres report they spend
much time researching and preparing many different kinds of reports and evaluations
as well as publicizing the latest propaganda by putting up posters or slogans. The
work is considered menial and meaningless, but it seems to fit with the low pay and
the thankless conditions under which they work.227
Under such conditions, one may wonder why anyone would want to be a village
cadre. The answer lies in their guan benwei, or "bureaucracy standard." There is
prestige in the position, social status and the opportunity to meet with higher level
officials and business persons who may be in a position to help them advance socially,
226
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politically and financially. They are apparently permitted to reduce their family taxes
by the amounts they are owed, so they expect to eventually recoup their contributions.
There is no doubt some newly-elected cadres arrive in their positions ignorant of the
problems and frustrations and led by ambition. Much is also made of the attraction of
special bonuses attached to the achievement of higher levels of assigned tasks and
quotas. However, the village cadre position no longer holds much allure for the young
in the villages. Those who succeed in developing marketable skills or talents are eager
to migrate to the cities in search of work or to open their own businesses. It has
accordingly become more difficult to attract quality talent, and there is a
correspondingly higher reliance on township guidance.228
The meaning of grass roots democracy
Village cadres and party heads run the day-to-day activities of the village
organization. During recent decades, the reforms have made it necessary for village
cadres to exercise their power in more indirect and subtle ways. Some villages remain
almost exclusively agricultural while others are primarily industrial. The tasks of
village cadres in these different environments vary widely. The variation and change
in the work and resulting power of village cadres stem from the three institutional
reforms: decollectivization; the rise of markets and opportunities to move out of
agriculture and beyond the village boundaries; and the emergence of elections and
other village participatory bodies. Each of these has had an effect on the bases of
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power in China's village.
The village organization includes the village party branch and the village
committee. The latest version of the Organic Law of Village Committees, revised in
1998, describes the village committee as an autonomous grassroots organization in
which villagers are given the right to self-management, self-education and self-service.
Scholars have debated how much autonomy really exists in the villages, arguing that
the rules governing everyday life are still written by the township governments, which
handle village finances, cadre wages and bonuses, work achievement evaluations, and
229

expense accounts.
Because the pay is low, and because village cadres often take office as the result
of higher level appointments, the cadres live in continuous tension between their duty
and their loyalty to their superiors. But because of the elections, village cadres are no
longer always the docile servants of their township masters and have become
increasingly independent stewards of their communities. Village party secretaries
have even begun to complain that village cadres have become a threat to the
supremacy of the Chinese Communist Party, while cadres view party heads as
attempting to subvert the Organic Law of Village Elections. Once again,
organizational structure affects the motivations of those involved. Village cadres are
not government officials, are not on government payrolls, and are not eligible for
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promotion. Sometimes village cadres are not paid even their meager salaries, and
financial difficulties have made it difficult to gain their small bonuses, further
tarnishing any sense of loyalty they may have felt toward the town governments.
There is no doubt this slate of factors has been leading village cadres to increasingly
cast their lot with their citizens' interests when they clash with the township
governments.
Judging the capacity of leadership in the towns and villages.
While the picture of village leadership painted in this section is a bleak one, there
is no doubt that some cadres are able to effect real change and to make a significant
contribution to their villages. By virtue of their family, clan, or political connections,
some are able to arrange for grants or subsidies for favored projects. Success in small
ventures leads to influence and connections with more powerful sponsors and support
agencies, and villagers are quick to note and appreciate cadres who show those kinds
of talents, connections and political instincts.231
The end product of all the reported forces at work on township and village cadres
is a frustrating challenge for anyone acceding to public office. The best qualified and
educated young people in rural villages are much more likely to seek careers in private
enterprise or higher levels of government, while those who do end up in positions of
public responsibility are much more likely to be too close to private enterprises for the
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public good. In their instinctive drive to improve their own lot, they are not likely to
become responsible and capable agents of the central government.232
Under the conditions described in this chapter, it is clear that local governments
can be a source of inspiration and drive, a drain of valuable resources or a neutral
presence that takes little but produces nothing. Impacted by their higher levels of
government through direction and policy and from below through meetings and
complaints, capable cadres in target-rich environments have demonstrated the ability
to drive rural development while some have demonstrated only that they have learned
how to live high on public money. O'Brien and Li put it well when they reported that
"Many Chinese officials . . . both work very hard and shirk very ably."

In some

cases Beijing has implemented systems of incentives and controls that achieve desired
goals, even unpopular ones. For those who argue that successful development
requires the wholehearted engagement of the population, however, top-down policy
has proven mostly ineffective and capacity building will likely begin with changes in
the cadre systems or people.
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Chapter Five
Rural Life

The principal actor in the endless saga of rural China is not the government with
all its resources and influence. The leading role is played by the Chinese peasant. The
purpose of this chapter is to present a composite picture of China's peasantry through
the eyes of sociologists, economists and political science scholars. It is necessary to
clearly define and characterize our use of the term "peasant" because different
perspectives reveal different aspects of this segment of China's population.234
Economic peasant
The economics perspective reveals a group of smallholder farm families that
work within factor (e.g., land, credit and labor) and product markets that are not fully
234
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developed. This economic environment has important implications both for the
peasants' limitations as agricultural producers and also for the kinds of economic
choices they make. This definition also distinguishes peasants both from capitalist
farm enterprises (that hire wage labor) and from commercial family farmers operating
in the context of fully formed factor and output markets. The economic definition also
contributes a strategic dimension to agricultural policies that are formulated with the
objective of raising peasant livelihoods from subsistence levels or worse to
commercially viable family farms. The definition suggests that policy needs to
address the factors that influence agricultural markets, to include inputs (land, labor,
equipment, machinery and supplies), and markets for agricultural output. Commercial
agriculture also needs education (agriculture, animal husbandry, agri-business); it
functions well when farmers are organized (cooperatives, marketing), and rural policy
should therefore attend to rural social services that affect those conditions.235
The economics perspective is further characterized along several different
frameworks that purport to explain and predict peasant behavior. Among these we
find Alexander Chayanov's "Survival Peasant;"236 Marx's "Exploited Peasant;"237
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Schultz's "Rational Peasant;"238 and Huang Zongzhi's "Commodity Peasant."23* Xu
and Deng describe what adds up to a fifth category of peasant, "the Socialized
Peasant," and argue this version better explains the current situation in rural China. In
a 2005 article, these authors observed that China's peasants have become more fully
assimilated into Chinese society than has been characteristic of their past isolation. As
a group, they are also closer and more openly involved in local and international
markets than in the past. As a result of these changes, the traditional characterizations
no longer apply, and the time is right to build a new theoretical model of farming in
China. This evolving peasant is still characterized by smallholder farming, but
marketization is creating farm communities that participate together in specialized
niches. There are, for example, entire communities dedicated to poultry and eggs,
others that specialize in garlic, and still others that make shoes (in township industry).
Lifestyles and consumption patterns are changing to reflect these changes, leading
peasants to become part of the larger market. A critical factor for rural China remains
employment, because of the size of the population and the changes in labor conditions.
Xu and Deng also predict that current conditions are not evolving naturally to some
commercialized farming end condition, but are restricted by land allocations and
237
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therefore are likely to remain small in scale.

As a result of these factors, other

aspects of Chinese farming are not likely to change. The farms are too small to afford
a high degree of mechanization, for example, except as may be gained through
cooperatives, provided the terrain is suitable. It should also be noted that these
conditions are not uniform throughout China, but it is arguable that as rural China
evolves, this picture described by Xu and Deng is a convincing end state.
Keister and Nee extended our understanding of rural China and its people by
describing the evolution that accompanied the collapse of the collectives. For the first
time in decades farmers could make their own decisions about labor, and the result
was the rapid collapse of the household registration (hukou) system and the mass
movement of rural labor into non-farm work. Labor turned to non-farm, commercial
agrarian employment, private business, and industry, near farmers' homes when
possible, but often in China's rapidly developing urban areas.241 This evolution wasn't
initiated or even sanctioned by the government, but was driven by both desperation
and opportunity, and was unstoppable by the government.
The anthropological view of the peasant
Anthropologists refer to a rural-urban continuum and consider the peasant to be
near the rural end of this continuum. Peasant society and the broader rural society
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extend through the spectrum to get very close to the urban end of the continuum.
This definition comes closest to the traditional "dictionary" meaning of peasant that
evokes the image of a person or family that owns or rents a small plot of land on
which they farm or keep animals and who typically have a low income and a low
social position. The second meaning has a derogatory context, referring to a person of
low education and crude behavior. Some scholars use "ruralites" to replace "peasant"
or "peasantry" to avoid the negative tone. There are two reasons for this: the first is
that the term "peasantry" or "peasant" (nongmin) has derogatory connotations in
China. The second is that migrant workers from rural areas are no longer peasants.
For the same reason, it is not appropriate to use the term "rural residents" with migrant
workers of rural background who do not reside in the countryside and therefore do not
fit the common definitions. Thus, "ruralites" refers to all those who do not have urban
resident status, regardless of what they do and where they work.243
One way to achieve consistency for this analysis is to stay with the categories
"agricultural" and "non-agricultural" as defined in the Chinese household registration
system (HRS) which categorizes Chinese geographically, occupationally and to some
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extent politically, based on their place of birth.

The Chinese peasant population

contains two variables: based on hukou statistics, China has a rural population of 940
million; but when actual residence is used as the basis for counting, the rural
population is only 750 million.245 Because peasant is so commonly used in much of
the research and literature, it will be used in this report, but clearly with no derogatory
intent. It will be helpful to consider all the definitions as describing the end product of
policy implementation and the market on peasant society, but especially the term
"socialized peasant" which aligns itself very well with both the descriptive literature
and the observed conditions and practices reported herein.

Role of peasants in Chinese history
In all of Chinese history, agriculture has been the bedrock of the state. Peasants'
taxes fund government and wars, their vast numbers populate armies, and they feed
the nation. Yet peasants have always been marginalized in political culture in terms of
power centralization and unification. Although contemporary China bears a surface
resemblance to other modern developing states, its governance structure has remained
locked in a traditional model. There are two extremes existing in parallel in China:
one is the vertical hierarchy in which political power has been highly centralized
244
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(zhongyang); the second is China's social structure in which power has been highly
decentralized through all the village communities. Limited by economic and technical
conditions, the central government has not been able to extend much influence over
the countryside, except during the totalitarian era of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist
collectives. A governance system has evolved to separate the state's centralized,
hierarchical power from rural autonomy, the two now existing rather comfortably in
parallel. This condition is not new. Traditionally, central power did not extend to the
level of the county {huangquan bu xia xiari). This means that the formal power of the
state system did not extend to the villages, long before 1949. The countryside was
dependent upon the rural gentry, clan elders, warlords, and tribal chiefs for leadership.
The peasants furnished resources to the state in the form of taxes or grains and corvee
labor, and received very little in return.246
To the Chinese, even if one dislikes a regime, it has usually been expedient to
yield than to resist since in yielding the chance of change is preserved. Laotze teaches
that the soft is stronger than the hard, that yielding is better than resisting. In the past,
even barbarous nomadic rulers have been absorbed by the Chinese culture. This line
of thought persists in contemporary Chinese daily life. Little opposition is offered to
the rulers; acceptance is customary. The traditional lack of interest in politics is
expressed as follows:
I begin to work on the farm at sunrise; I rest at sunset. Heaven is high, the Emperor is far
246
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away, I drill my own well to get my drink; I plow myfieldto get my food. What has the
Emperor's power to do with me?247
Leon Stover tells us that one of the principal tasks of high culture is to rationalize
the gap between elite and non-elite status. Intellectuals achieve that purpose by
pointing to the division of labor as a natural boundary between parts of society. For
Stover, the Sacred Edict was taken as a logical approach: "The upper and lower classes
form one body." (XIV: 6). This body consists of four parts: At the top are scholars.
Next are the farmers and others in the "primary" occupations. The third layer consists
of artisans, and the fourth layer consists of merchants.248 The scholars speak for the
ruling class, and thus sit astride the boundary between the upper and lower classes that
are headed by the peasants, the fundamental producers in a harmonious society.249 In
reality, farmers are treated with no less contempt than any other members of the lower
classes, all of whom are regarded as so much "meat and fish" who exist to meet the
needs of the governing class.250
The following proverb is a garbled version, filtered down to the peasantry from
high culture, of the thoughts of Mencius:
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Inequalities are in the nature of things. There is the business of superior men and there is
the business of little men. Hence there is a saying, "Some work with their head; they
govern others. Some work with their hands; they are the governed. Those who are
governed feed the others; those who govern are the fed." This is a just arrangement.
[MengTzu, III: i:4] 251
Peasant power is recognized as the fundamental force that prodded Chinese
history from one dynasty to the next through their rebellions - "Oppressive
government drives the people toward rebellion, people have to rebel" (guanbi minfan;
min bude bufari). As Mao put it in 1939, "The ruthless economic exploitation and
political oppression of the Chinese peasants forced them into ... hundreds of uprisings,
great and small, all of them peasant revolts or peasant revolutionary wars." 252 It is
therefore no small matter that there were majority of 87,000 uprisings reported in
2005

, adding urgency to the important goals of rural reform.
Looking back to the Kuomintang's rule in the "Nanjing Decade" (1927-1937),

the government attempted to wrest control of local governments (below the county
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starved local governments yielded to a limited and uneasy alliance. In practice, power
among local elites came as a result of access to education and because of their wealth.
Many also had access to local militias. Wealth came from rents, usury and commerce,
as well as "fees" they pulled from the local population along with taxes and other
government revenues. This was not a benevolent elite. Known as "evil gentry" and
bullies, they had a lock on local bureaucracies including the holding of many key
government positions.254 In all of Chinese history, the Chinese peasantry was not
included in the national political system until the founding of the Chinese Communist
Party.255
The bottom-up communist revolution changed China's ruling structure in
fundamental ways. The peasants were the most significant source of power for the
CCP, and the promise of land reform was the key to harnessing peasant power for the
CCP regime. This power was deployed to cleanse a broad spectrum of old forces and
anti-revolution thinking from rural Chinese society. "The peasants earn the land and
the party earns the peasants."256 Because of its links to the peasantry, the CCP
became a formidable presence during the anti-Japanese war in the years leading up to
and including WWII. The well-developed and well-led peasantry that emerged from
254
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WWII was well positioned to win the civil war and found a new China. It was
proclaimed as the arrival of the dictatorship of the proletariat.257 In the early days of
the CCP regime, peasants were categorized as to ideological purity, and only the poor
peasants qualified as the highest, most loyal and most dependable of China's citizens.
Land reform created a new poor and lower-middle class peasant economy and society,
giving most peasants a means of making a living. These early moves cemented
peasant loyalty to Mao and the new government. The future was clouded, however,
because as it turned out, peasants had been liberated from the chains of local landlords,
merchants and money-lenders but increased their dependence upon local political
elites, China's newly formed party power structure.258
There were debates over agricultural policy right from the beginning, debates
which continue to this day. Taking land from the landlords and turning it over to the
peasants was a logical move for the grateful party, but was later determined to violate
a basic tenet of communist ideology which holds that land ownership is a main cause
of oppression. Mao's agenda followed naturally from his belief that ideological appeal
accompanied by controlled and manipulated grass roots organizations would allow the
party to move Chinese society to an egalitarian and collectivist rural society.259
In the decades that led up to Mao's death in 1976, peasant society was
257
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characterized by both significant successes and dramatic excesses, most catastrophic
of which were the well-known Great Leap Forward, and the ill-fated Cultural
Revolution. One author characterized what was going on in China this way: "As the
state became more adept at harnessing and steering peasant proclivities, peasants
became the objects rather than the subjects of rural transformation."260
"Peasants reap the grain and pile it on the village threshing floor. It is up to the state to
wrest the harvest from the peasants. The state needs the farm product to feed the cities, to
earn foreign exchange, to accumulate capital, and to supply industry with raw
materials."261
With zeal and the trust of the peasantry, the CCP and paramount leader Mao
pushed a military style of management that was honed in Yanan during the antiJapanese effort. The prime initiative was collectivization, development of rural
communes. Mao convinced China's leadership that with a few years of hard work and
with mass movements like the Great Leap forward, China would propel itself to the
leading ranks among world states, politically, socially and economically. The peasants
worked assiduously on infrastructure projects like irrigation works, many of which are
still in use today. At the same time, the peasants were subjected to high pressure
politico-ideological movements including anti-rightist indoctrination. The peasants
were the recipients of new education opportunities which were also raising young
people thoroughly oriented to the advantages of the collectives. The propaganda and
indoctrination programs were made a prime responsibility of local cadres who were

260

Daniel Roy Kelliher, Peasant Power in China: The Era of Rural Reform, 1979-1989, Yale Agrarian
Studies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), p.24.
261
Ibid, p.26.

167

under constant surveillance by zealous party members. Du called the resulting society
a case of peasants having made a choice of powerlessness, the flock of sheep
following the lead sheep (lingtou yang). The movement turned into a new form of
exploitation, but this time with a national purpose in the form of extraction to support
industrialization. Most peasants accepted their fate passively, but many also resisted
by shirking their duties or by dedicating themselves to their small family plots instead
of their primary responsibilities. As conditions worsened for remote peasant
communities, many struggled for their very survival. By the early 1960s all manner of
private endeavors were developing and spreading throughout the country.262
Between 1954 and 1978, the state extracted more than ¥600 billion of capital
from agriculture while investing only ¥157 billion during the same period. On
average agriculture contributed ¥15.5 billion annually toward industrialization.263 At
the same time, the state mobilized 20-30 percent of the rural labor to build reservoirs,
dams and irrigation networks. The full force of China's agricultural capacity did not
reach fruition until the collectives gave way to individual farms under the household
responsibility system.264 During the nearly three decades of the collectives the
peasants were not able to get one jin of grain per day, and during 1958 to 1978 the
average annual income growth was ¥1. That was the scene at the beginning of China's
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economic reform that began at the end of the 1970s.
There is a plentiful literature covering the first decade of China's economic
reform and particularly the role of the peasants leading up to the government's
recognition and acceptance of the family farm concept embodied in the household
responsibility system.

Some see this as an exhibition of peasant power - wielding

the influence that comes with sheer numbers as well as a grip on the state's food
resources, coupled with a weary desperation over the harsh life of subsistence
farming.

This view undoubtedly carries elements of truth, but the most apt

description came from authors like Kelliher and Zweig who noted a natural evolution
of millions of households seeking ways to reduce their burden and improve their lives
by finding ways to cut corners here and defy policy there, gradually developing an
ability to alter rural policy in fundamental ways.268
Under Deng Xiaoping, peasants found a sympathetic leadership and continued to
exercise their influence to alter Chinese life in ways that China's leadership had not
previously considered. Although they existed at the lowest levels of official influence
and were not directly represented in the government, peasants managed to manipulate
the state's reform package, shifting benefits from the state and back to those who work
the land. The procurement and marketing systems are vivid examples of their abilities,
265
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as rigid production controls and sales channels gave way to farmer choices about crops
and methods and the beginnings of a market. The hukou system fell into disuse as
hundreds of millions of farm laborers moved out of the countryside and into job
markets previously barred to them. These and similar policies were stretched and
pulled much further than they were intended to go, forcing officials at all levels of
government to re-organize, re-think and re-write policy to accommodate the evolution
of rural reform. The changes were evident first in the demise of the collectives and
reorganization of the rural labor, and later in the reform of land use policy and credit
markets.269 An interesting issue for future research is the way these forces developed
in parallel all over rural China. Was it a natural or logical progression that could be
predicted by sociologists, or were the local governments or peasants themselves so
well connected through their networks that diffusion effects could account for the
rapid spread of new approaches to the factors of agricultural production? It is
apparent that China's central government coordinated many rural policies while the
government was in Deng's hands. The farmers had a powerful advocate in Deng, who
single-mindedly pursued economic gain and did not shy away from policy that rattled
collectivist hard-liners because of its semblance to capitalist methods.
The financial problems of local governments created new crises for China's
peasants beginning in the mid-1990s. While some communities prospered because of
fortuitous climate, topography or geography, poorer communities became hotbeds of
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plundering. Peasants in those communities were once again plunged into poverty and
desperation. As we have seen in previous chapters, it was the peasants who paid the
price for government missteps - losing their lands to illegal seizures, paying rapacious
levels of ad hoc fees and taxes, enduring brutal collection methods, and gradually
losing all social services.270 On combination, these outrages would transform
desperation and passivity to a rising level of public protests.271
Under these circumstances in many developing states, the legitimacy of
government could be called into question, but China's government and ruling party
have shown little concern. Bernstein and Lu argue that "A true challenge to the
regime's existence from below . . . can only arise if there is a political opening from
above which would provide for cross-societal mobilization."272 The party and
government appear secure in their positions of power, and in fact the peasantry has not
blamed Beijing for their lot, but instead has blamed local governments, which is where
the symptoms of fiscal problems were at their worst. In the meantime, Beijing has
never stopped looking for ways to improve rural conditions, though the end results
were sometimes disastrous. One example is the Organic Law of Village Committees
which was issued as a draft in 1987 and revised in 1998. It was intended to expand
grass-roots level political power, and improve the deployment of mass organization
and transparency in village affairs. Peasants earn "the right to vote, the right to know
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the facts of a case, the right to participate, and the right to supervise."273 Many at all
levels of government, but particularly in local governments, treat this new grassroots
democracy as largely a paper exercise, but the peasants themselves are learning about
their rights and pushing their way into higher levels of influence with increasing
confidence.274
Peasants have worked their influence into economic victories as well. A 2,600
year old agriculture tax has been erased from the books. "Shadow" taxes (sanluanfei)
have been banned, and the peasants are well-enough informed about the law to resist
attempts to impose illegal taxes. In addition to tangible increases in influence with
both the government and the party, peasants have discovered self-organization in many
areas, creating cooperatives and self-organized collective enterprises that can help
with marketing, technology development and diffusion and with access to policymakers. It cannot be ignored that this increasing influence is meeting stiffening
resistance in some places, has not developed uniformly or in all areas, and in many
places hasn't yet made much progress; but there is undeniable progress in peasant life
and in the impact upon government, and China's central government has been

Zeng Qinghong, "A Programmatic Document for Strengthening the Party's Ability to Govern: Study
and Implement the Spirit of the Fourth Plenum of the 16th Party Committee, Strengthen the Party's
Ability to Govern," China Report 41 (2005). Zeng is the current vice chairman of the People's
Republic of China.
*Yu Jianrong, "dangdai Zhongguo nongmin weiquan zuzhi defayu yu chengzhang (Development and
Growth of Peasants' Rights Organizations in Contemporary China)," Zhongguo nongcun guancha
(Observation of Rural China) 2 (2005). This paper is a part of Ford Foundation program, "Political
participation, institutional construction and social stability in rural China."

172

increasingly supportive.

What remain as significant obstacles includes limits

imposed by China's political culture and socio-economic realities.
Beyond equity and equality
Chapter Two traced the history of state rural policy during the last almost sixty
years. The agrarian economy was transformed from household farming to a collective
economy during the first half of that period, and back to household farming during the
last three decades. There have been notable successes and failures under both systems.
Initially concerned with building an egalitarian society, early CCP activity included
caring for the peasants in their land reforms. Though the land was quickly turned back
over to the state and the collectives, the communes and other official actions, such as
the uniform pricing policy was still attempting to work toward an egalitarian society
with balanced regional development. Later, China's leaders began to realize that
approach was making painfully slow progress and was becoming increasingly difficult
to sustain, and they therefore opted for changes that could be expected to stimulate the
economy and increase the pace of economic recovery. Extraction was intended to
support industrialization and urbanization. It was a deliberate move to "let some get
rich first" along the east coast and in the cities and factories. The two thirds of its
population that lived and worked in rural China were sacrificing for the national
interest. It was not the first time, but it was certainly one of the most trying, leaving
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many without land and with no way to feed their families. The peasants did not live
much like the "dictators" of Chinese society.
The World Bank 2006 Equity and Development Report defines equity in terms of
two basic principles: equal opportunity, and avoidance of absolute deprivation. Equal
opportunity means that the outcome of a person's life, in its many dimensions, should
reflect mostly his or her efforts and talents, not his or her social background.
Predetermined circumstances - gender, race, place of birth, family origins - and the
social groups into which a person is born should not determine whether people
succeed economically, socially, and politically. The second principle suggests that
societies may decide to intervene to protect the livelihoods of its neediest members
(who exist below some absolute threshold of need) even if the equal opportunity
principle has been upheld. The path from opportunity to end result can be tortuous.
Outcomes may be poor because of bad luck, or even because of a person's own
failings. Societies may decide, for insurance or for compassion, that members will not
be allowed to starve, even if they enjoyed their fair share of the opportunity pie,
because things somehow turned out badly for them.276
In China's 2005 Human Development Report to the United Nations, inequity is
viewed as the inequality of basic rights and opportunities. It surfaces as the nexus of
selective disenfranchisement that includes institutionalized differences between
regions, areas, groups in terms of income, property ownership, employment
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opportunities and wages, education, health care, social security, and government fiscal
expenditure.277 There are two enabling objectives on the road to equity in China's
vision: the first is equality in fundamental human rights and opportunities. These
include political rights such as the right to participate in public affairs, and to vote; and
social and economic rights. The second objective is the universal ability of people to
improve their capabilities. This assumes every citizen is guaranteed a basic standard
of income, medical care, and access to education. 278
Inequality is determined by many factors which can combine and interact in
different ways. Institutions, economic policy and government carry the most weight
in determining whether a society's systems are fair. Development progress generally
has several consequences that affect inequality: government tends to become more
open and important, the rule of law achieves a foothold, and social norms become less
important as they fade into a middle class background. These factors combine to
reduce the effects of inequality and the maldistribution of wealth. The claimed
dichotomy between fairness and economic growth is argued by Tanzi to be nonexistent.
Opportunity and economic growth are determined in parallel and by the same policy
direction. What matters, according to Tanzi, is the "overall package and the fairness of
the underlying [policy] process"
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The peasants were the immediate beneficiaries of the household responsibility
system at the onset of reform. Rising peasant fortunes helped to reinforce equity and
at the same time drove entrepreneurial fervor and agricultural productivity. China's
economy has grown nearly 10 percent each year for the last three decades, and the
number of peasants living in absolute poverty has dropped from 250 million to 26
million. The share of agriculture of GDP dropped from 33 percent in 1982 to 12.6
percent in 2005.280 "Let some get rich first" policies had positive outcomes.
More recently, however, income growth for the peasants has stagnated.
Excluding price as a factor, there was an annual growth rate of 15.2 percent between
1978 and 1985. Between 1986 and 1991, income growth dropped to 2.7 percent
annually, rose to 5.6 percent until 1996, then leveled off slightly lower at 4.6 percent
until 2005. This peasant income, while representing a pattern of continued growth,
was 4.3 percent lower than the growth of GDP and 3.5 percent lower than the income
of urban citizens.281
The most serious issue, however, is the share of peasant income from agriculture.
In the 1980s, the peasants' share was 70 percent. It dropped to 50 percent in the 1990s,
and to 33 percent after 2000. The peasants whose life depends purely on agriculture
have become the low income group in the countryside. As in much of the rest of the
world, an increasing share of agrarian profits is being siphoned off by the expanding
280
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array of farm-related services: transportation, wholesalers, processors, distributors,
exporters and retailers. There is also a pronounced regional component to this effect,
leaving farmers in the west at only 29.3 percent compared to 51.2 percent in the east
where markets are more fully developed, transportation costs are lower, and exports
are becoming more important.282 This regional effect contributes to the regional
disparity reported in Chapter three.
Significantly, the gap between peasants and urban citizens has been growing and
shows no signs of slowing. In 1978, the ratio of urban to peasant income was 2.6:1.
By 2005, the gap had increased to 3.22:1. The gap is also growing within the
peasantry. The wealth of the highest 10 percent of the peasants reached 7.3 times the
wealth of the poorest 10 percent. Farm labor that has migrated to the cities and
factories has fared no better. For performing similar jobs, immigrant workers in China
earn much less than their local counterparts.283 The expanding human development
gap between rural and urban areas, especially since 1997 has been caused by the
growing income inequality between these areas. The World Bank estimates that
China's national Gini coefficient for income distribution rose from .30 in 1982 to 0.45
in 2002. It represents a 50 percent increase in two reporting periods which is an
exceptional rate of change and considered to represent a serious and growing problem.
The rural poor, rural migrants in cities, and land-deprived farmers, as well as the urban
poor are categorized together as the group most vulnerable to the inequities of
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contemporary China.
The roots of social inequity
The Hukou system
Beginning fifty years ago, Chinese peasants rushed to the cities in a migration
that was common among developing states. In terms of numbers, however, it was
unmatched in contemporary world history, involving as it did hundreds of millions of
people in search of steady work and higher incomes. The movement represented the
only remaining solution for peasants desperate to feed their families. At the same time,
it created significant problems for the government. Urban resources, including the
demand for energy, food, water and housing were strained. Migrant workers were
competing for jobs with urban poor. The crowding and harsh conditions made a rising
crime rate inevitable. Migrant workers had no access to the unemployment
subsistence assistance that was available to urban residents, nor to medical care, and
schooling was not available for children who accompanied their parents to the cities.
The government worried over food security as peasant lands lay fallow, no longer
generating sufficient income for the basic needs of families.

The government response was embedded in the household registration system
(HRS) which formalized the difference between the people who lived and worked in
the cities and were responsible for nonagricultural production and the peasants who
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lived in the countryside and had primary responsibility for China's vital food supply.
The peasants all over China were forbidden by law to leave the land. The household
registration documents were required as the bureaucratic basis for finding work and
for access to all social services, and were harsh and effective control measures that
bound the peasant and the land together.

Potter and Potter described the overall

impact of the policy as a "system of birth-ascribed stratification which, considered as a
whole, displays caste-like features."286 The power "grid" which interlocked the HRS
with the collectives and the unified purchase system exerted tremendous control over
the daily lives of peasants. Under Mao and the collectives, everyone was under
continuous surveillance, legally bound to their homes. Had they attempted to find
work, or even buy food or basic necessities away from their homes, they were subject
to arrest. Even food basics required ration coupons. The residents of overcrowded
communities in areas with depleted soils were trapped on their farms, unable to make
a living, and unable to leave.287 These conditions opened a gap in living standards
between poor and better-off rural districts, despite Mao's continuous quest for
egalitarianism.288
Because the income distribution mechanism in the people's communes differs
' More detail about HRS can be seen in chapter 3.
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from the income distribution in urban areas, it had the capacity and could guarantee
only a limited attempt at equality with villages and communes. In its pursuit of rapid
industrialization, the government invested substantial funds in urban areas and treated
rural areas as already-developed sources of funds, resources and the grain supply. The
prices of grain and other farm products were deliberately suppressed to keep prices for
food in the cities low and to accumulate additional funds for industrialization. This
differentiated circulation of money created jobs, consumer markets and other benefits
in the cities, but increased gaps in income and living standards between urban and
rural areas. In 1978, urban per capita income was 2.6 times rural per capita income.
Egalitarianism figured prominently in income distribution planning in cities, but this
did not affect rural conditions. This meant China's reform and transition did not begin
from an egalitarian pattern of distribution; rather, today's widening income inequality
is rooted in past income distribution policy decisions.289
On October 1,2001, the Chinese central government officially eliminated the
hukou system below county levels, and some provincial cities, e.g., Shijiazhuang
(capital city of Hebei Province), opened their doors to peasant migrant workers. By
2004, the number of rural migrants reached 140 million, representing the largest
population movement in China's history. After moving into the cities, migrant
workers faced many forms of "official" discrimination. Even though rural migrant
workers have the same employment opportunities as urban employees, they do not get

the same wages and welfare benefits. Over the past decade, in areas such as
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Guangdong and Fujian, where migrants were plentiful, the nominal wages of rural
migrant workers have risen by a small margin while real wages remained constant or
declined. Migrant workers also face a harsher working environment.290
Pricing system
Between 1979 and the early 1990s, the "production responsibility system" linking
remuneration with output was introduced for agricultural production. A "dual-track"
pricing system was adopted for industrial and agricultural products, though it also
induced rent-seeking activities. Fanners and private firms that took the lead in
assuming market risks saw their income rise significantly. Although gains varied
from person to person, and income gaps widened within rural areas, within urban areas
and nationwide, the level of inequality was an acceptable price for most Chinese who
glimpsed the benefits of prosperity for the first time in generations.
Beginning in the mid-1990s, prices of most products, including grain and coal,
were determined by the market as the "dual track" system was dismantled. In 19941995, the government substantially raised the price of agricultural produce, resulting
in rapid income growth in rural China. From 1997 onwards, however, a steady decline
in grain prices slowed income growth for rural households. It seems that government
intervention in the grain market doesn't always work to the benefit of farm income.
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The grain issue has been handled as a policy and political issue instead of a market.
As a result of that, grain yields doubled but the distributed income stagnated, as did
the net production team income during the same period.291 The widening urban-rural
income gap emerged as the leading factor contributing to China's growing
inequality.292
Social services — education
The status of education and medical care are the primary indicators to measure
social equity. According to the fifth census, rural laborers in 2002 had 7.3 years of
schooling on average, 2.9 years fewer than laborers in urban areas. In the countryside,
only 8.5 percent were educated beyond high school, 35 percentage points lower than
in the cities. By 2002, 15 percent of counties had failed to achieve universal nine-year
compulsory education. This failure affected 108 million people in poor and remote
rural areas, roughly 9 percent of the total population.293 Problems with financing rural
education were fully described in earlier chapters, but it should be noted that even with
recent changes, spending on education remains much higher in the cities and in the
east than in central and western China.294
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Rural-urban gaps are further reflected in the quality of teachers. In urban primary
schools, 57 percent of the teachers have been educated to above junior college level,
while in the rural areas, the proportion is only 25 percent. In urban junior high schools,
43 percent of teachers have at least a college education, while in the countryside the
proportion is only 11 percent. Rural primary schools rely on a large number of
substitute and part-time teachers and a lower proportion of students proceed into
higher level studies.295
Access to Health Care
People in rural areas also are less likely to get access to medical services.
According to the third national health care survey in 2003, 82 percent of the residents
of urban areas could reach the nearest medical institution in ten minutes or less. In
rural areas, only 67 percent can make that claim. Seven percent of rural citizens are
more than thirty minutes away from adequate medical care. Rural people also have
fewer doctors to look after them: in the cities there are 5.2 medical personnel per 1,000
residents, whereas in the countryside there are only 2.4. Roughly half of all rural
clinics are run by one person, and some villages have no clinic at all. The basic
system of rural medical care built during the Mao era has collapsed since reform,
mostly because rural communities had to be self supporting and could no longer afford
their systems. Most health resources are concentrated in large and medium-sized
cities because the bulk of the available funds are used for hospitals. Of China's total
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health expenditures in 2002,67.7 percent went to hospitals, 50.5 percent went to urban
hospitals, and just 7.3 percent to rural health centers.296
There are also significant disparities between regions, and again, the western
region fares the worst. Some poor and mountainous areas have no medical clinics, so
farmers must go to hospitals in townships or county sites. Social research done by
Nanjing University Professor Zhang Yulin and his team in May 2006 in "Nanjie
Village and Sanzhu Village" of Henan province (Central China) reveal that the former,
a so-called "small community of communism" began to give its villagers public
medical care in 1996 and the villagers can be reimbursed for treatment and medicines
based on their standard village rating system. For medical problems beyond the
means of village clinics, villagers are moved to county, city, provincial or Beijing
hospitals. In nearby Sanzhu Village, the medical clinic has poor facilities and
equipment and very limited capabilities. Villagers requiring more extensive treatment
must pay for the services themselves.
Medical insurance is the core of adequate medical care. Coverage in the cities
dropped from 56.6 percent in 1993 to 34.2 percent in 2003, but still remains higher

' Ibid. p.58.
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than in rural areas.

Because of their lower incomes, the proportion of medical

expenses to total income is much higher for rural residents. Additionally, migrants
from rural areas lack access to medical insurance in the cities. In 2002, the State
Council introduced rural cooperative medical care and higher insurance coverage for
serious illnesses. There is nevertheless a significant gap between access to medical
services for peasants compared with urban residents for whom insurance and facilities
are within reach of all workers. 2 "
Social security
Inequity in China's social security system is rooted in older policies. Medical
care, unemployment insurance and retirement pay in rural areas was formerly
administered through the collectives; similar services in urban areas were administered
through work units, whether state-owned factories or government organizations.
Social security expenditures and services in urban areas have been constantly
expanding, while farmers and employees of rural township enterprises have been
virtually excluded from any system of social security since the dismantling of the
collectives. There was no attempt to replace the coverage that was lost with the
collectives. The average government per capita expenditure for social services in
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cities is ten times that of rural areas. The Ministry of Civil Affairs began piloting a
rural social security system that included a minimum living standard program in some
areas in 1994. That coverage, however, was tied to local economic development and
fiscal capacity, which assured that the poorest communities would get the least
assistance. Only a few well developed regions have implemented the universal
minimum standard for both rural and urban areas. Zhejiang Province, for example,
has created a rural social security system for peasants that is intended to provide equal
access to all citizens, but funding problems have prevented universal coverage. 30°
Visible and invisible hands
In China, government controls were implemented as fast as the infrastructure
could be developed, and it took many forms: persuasion, military intervention,
surveillance, manipulation, indoctrination and propaganda. Power was deployed for
social, economic and political purposes. Power became habitual and has been a
difficult habit to break, particularly since many in leadership positions have disagreed
on how much control is sufficient. Routine controls consisted of reports and
inspections by local cadres, and more forceful measures have often included
inspection by outside teams and direct intervention. Administrative reports represent
the first line of defense against shirking and waste, and are originated at the team level
then collated and moved up through the hierarchy for careful scrutiny by staffs and
their managers. Despite this formidable array of supervisory tools, however, Jean Oi
300
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argued that peasants and cadres quickly learned how to manipulate the reports so they
could cheat the state and pursue their own interests, both organizational and
personal.301
From tax struggle to protecting land rights
After fifty years of research in a village in Zhejiang Province, Zhang Zhaoshu
chronicled the means by which peasants used their "weapons of powerlessness" to
expand their living space. Government was forced to reduce or eliminate sanctions,
acquiesce to faits accompli, and even to regularly make concessions in their political
and economic practices. The state hierarchy exerts a powerful influence at all levels,
but there is no doubt that the peasants have been successful at increasing their
influence through indirect means while always giving an impression of passivity and
helplessness.302 This section demonstrates the interaction between the government
and the market and the impact of this interaction on peasant life.
In addition to the social services gap between rural and urban areas of China,
there is also a great discrepancy in other public services. The discrepancy is due to
causes related to government revenues, already explored in Chapter three. The
differences in revenues led to differences in government expenditures, and in the
amount and quality of public services. Before rural tax reforms that were initiated in
2000, farmers bore a disproportionate share of the tax burden. The rural taxes were
301
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known as the "four agricultural taxes," which included an agricultural tax, agricultural
specialty duties, animal slaughter tax, and a deed tax. Rural residents were also
required to contribute to five types of township pooling funds and three types of
village levies (santi wutong), as well as many unofficial fees and assessments
"levy

(sanluan).
As stipulated by the central government, the contribution to township pooling
funds and village levies was not to exceed 5 percent of local farmers' net income in
the previous year. A number of surveys revealed, however, that the restrictions were
not taken seriously by local governments, and many such fees actually resulted from
higher levels of government, though it was a common practice for lower levels to add
their own "markup" to taxes and fees imposed from above.304 In 1985, farmers in
Songhuajiang prefecture in Heilongjiang Province paid ninety five different fees: fiftyeight to provincial units, ten to the prefecture, and twenty-seven to county and
township departments. In Hebei in the mid 1990s, 18 provincial-level agencies issued
fifty-six documents authorizing eighty-three different fees. The nineteen counties of
Shijiazhuang city issued 125 such documents on the basis of which 852 fees or fines
could be charged, assessments imposed or fund drives initiated. Projects launched by
central government agencies often entailed the setting of targets (dabiao) which
cascaded down to local authorities, setting off competition and leading to an endless
303
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demand for goods, cash or labor from the peasants. Research into fiscal practices in
three agrarian counties by the State Council's Development Research Center revealed
that the per-capita fee and tax burden was twelve percent, with one county showing a
twenty-eight percent rate in 1997.
Between August, 2003 and June 2004, the Institute of Rural Development at the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) conducted a study of the dynamics of
Chinese rural society. Among other revelations, the study showed that the focus on
the struggle for peasant rights had shifted. The study relied on many sources, but the
primary source was the Chinese media. Researchers discovered that out of 60,000
articles during the period of the study, the "three dimensions of rural issues" (sannong
wenti) was the number-one topic, and land disputes were the most common problem.
This revealed a marked departure from previous beliefs about peasant taxes, which
accounted for only 1.9 percent of the stories.

Most of the land disputes arose from

illegal seizures by local governments or similarly from seizures otherwise legal, but
for which peasants argued for higher compensation. After studying 130 reported rural
disturbances, eighty-seven (two thirds) were rooted in land disputes.

The research

team leader Yu Jianrong pointed out that in 2002 land disputes had already risen to
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become the most serious problems for peasants' rights.
With respect to land disputes, some additional information provides important
background. Villager and peasant interests usually coincide, and the defendants in
disputes that reach the courts are usually from city and country governments.
Disparities are concentrated near urban and coastal areas, where land conversions can
generate significant wealth for developers, real estate companies, development zone
organizations, local governments, and for individuals as well. Since the east's
economy is more developed, its land is more valuable than land in the center. Eastern
land can be sold immediately, and this makes it particularly desirable to local
governments.309 As a result of the land disputes, villagers, village groups and village
political organizations have become the important leaders of land reform movements
in which men and women, young and old have become involved.310
Peasant tax activism had the unambiguous support of the central government, so
the rallying cry was "Carry out the central government's policy, lighten the burden on
the peasants." Land issues have been equally troublesome and even more directly
related to peasant welfare, and the catch phrase for that movement is "Without land,
how can we exist?" There has also been an increase in exogenous activity and
pressure. Peasants who have lost their fields or suffered other damages have become
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quite adept at finding sympathetic channels to publicize and support their cause.
Despite an oft-heard complaint about the undeveloped status of the rule of law in
China, that situation is changing and legal experts have been a small but growing part
of peasant land activism. Out of 837 written appeals to authorities on land problems,
lawyers were involved in forty-nine.311
There is a trend in peasant troubles. Beginning in the mid 1980s, it was tax
problems that created the most trouble for the peasants. After 2001, tax and fee
reforms began to take effect, and the tax burden lightened. For many, however, land
problems became more devastating even while tax reforms were under consideration.
With an overall economic growth and increasing urbanization, combined with several
rounds of tax reforms that depleted local treasuries, lands became the main source of
operating funds for local governments. This was a lucrative source of funds near well
developed areas in coastal regions and close to large population centers. Seized lands
were converted to non-agricultural use, and since industry and development required a
great deal of land, and since peasant farms were small, seizures took many peasants
off their farms. Between 1990 and 2002, non-agricultural construction claimed 471.3
million mu of arable lands. Since the average farm size was .7 mu of land per person,
each mu transferred to non-agricultural use resulted in 1.4 people becoming landless.
It is estimated that in 13 years, 66.3 million farmers were dispossessed of their
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primary means of making a living.
Many believe that the "three dimensions of the agriculture issues" can only be
solved through industrialization and urbanization, reducing the total number of people
who are dependent upon farming. This is a conventional approach often seen in
developing states. But China's urbanization has been constructed upon the ambiguous
status of urban and rural rights and mobility and under the black cloud of uncertain
land rights and vague laws that were enforceable only for the convenience of political
and economic elites. Current Chinese law states that rural lands belong to peasant
collectives - a term that is now without meaning. The law permits the taking of lands
for the public good and with just compensation, but none of the terms is defined, and
in practice China's governments have defined "public good" and "just compensation"
to suit themselves. Peasants lack the power to decide whether, when and to whom
their land use rights may be sold, much less to negotiate prices.313
In January, 2003, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao spoke in a work meeting of
agriculture agency officials about land confiscation and warned: "this endangers rural
stability and even the stability of the whole country."314 This was peasant advocacy at
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the highest levels of China's leadership.

The policies of the new generation top

leaders have excited rights activists and earned the trust of the peasantry. Rights
movements

, such as, in January 2006, hundreds or thousands of protesters clashed

with police over inadequate compensation for farmland taken for industrial use in
Panlong village, Sanjiao township, Guangdong province; in December 2005, a dispute
over the construction of an electricity generating plant and related property seizures
culminated in a violent clash in Dongzhou village near Shanwei city, Guangdong
province, etc., in turn, have influenced the government, helping it to understand the
full measure of peasant problems as well as the chain of conditions and effects which
have led to trouble. The government's position with respect to peasant tax burdens
evolved from a "complication to be eliminated," to "a political problem," to a "very
pressing political responsibility," and finally to "the most important issue facing
China's government." As of today, China's peasants have obtained political
experience through their efforts to protect their legal rights, and have broadened their
political appeal.
A series of official documents had been issued by the central Party Committee and State Council to
reduce peasants' burden during those years. The relative contents can be seen in Zhang Jingsong,
"jianqing nongmin fudan de gonggong zhengce fenxi" (Public Policy Analysis on Reducing Peasants'
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Market challenges and peasants 'cooperatives
Collectives, state-owned enterprises and a "planned" economy left several
generations of Chinese without marketing skills. Throughout recorded Chinese history,
merchants were not respected in Chinese culture. "Red hat merchants" (hongding
shangren) means that money must be linked to politics to create usable power. In the
first three decades of the new China, peasants were universally assigned to communes
that carried on agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, side occupations and fisheries,
and also merged industrial workers, traders, culture, the education system and military
into one egalitarian presence.317 There was no individual commercial activity.
Agricultural output was traded under a unified purchase and sales system at set prices
and assigned deliveries. Land and Labor were assigned and controlled. By the 1960s,
there were limited sales of consumer goods, but tightly controlled, and rural trade fairs
and markets were permitted before 1978, but were also controlled.318 These
conditions created an entire nation of people with little or no marketing experience or
knowledge.
A free-market economy and decollectivization gave a new generation of farmers
an unprecedented opportunity to look for sales opportunities and to bargain for
supplies and equipment. The first tentative steps revealed to the peasants' surprise that
the market was to become a constant presence in their lives. "Socialized peasant"
317
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means that the current peasants are not only rural producers but also consumers.319
Before planting, farmers must choose crops and supplies and negotiate prices that will
allow them to survive in an uncertain market. After the harvest, farmers found
themselves negotiating with buyers with a new presence in the wings - competitors.
Farmers soon discovered that there were opportunists who were not very
particular about the quality of the materials they were selling to the farmers. There
has been a continuous problem, not yet completely controlled, with bogus and tainted
materials as suppliers eagerly sought ways to cut costs and increase profits. In a report
from the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine,
there were approximately 25,000 cases of fake agricultural materials, valued at ¥300
million in 2004. Out of 21,902 fertilizer samples taken from producers and sales
outlets, 29 percent were determined to be fake. With increased inspection over a
wider area and using larger samples, 30,000 cases were discovered in 2005.32°
Another significant issue for China's farmers is agriculture education. Crop
management requires not only experience but enough education and training to
understand farm technology. With their limited education, many of China's peasants
lacked the ability to grasp new technology, materials and methods for soil
replenishment, insect and disease control, crop rotation practices and other critical
information. The predictable result was low productivity, poor quality output, higher
319
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costs and greater risks - a poor competitive posture.
Today the peasants' fate is determined almost completely by the market for their
goods. They tend to plant the same crops which hit the market at the same time, and
therefore draw low prices and face transportation and storage problems, often losing
profits to spoilage. Lacking market information at planting time, they guess about
crops, based on previous experience. Lacking information at harvest time, they are
unable to connect with buyers as they get lost in the rush to sell. What was needed in
order to help peasants created a sustainable farm living was market information,
technology diffusion, available credit, reliable sources of reasonably priced materials
and supplies, and the availability of labor on an irregular basis.
Partial answers, at least, seemed to arrive on the wings of new institutions, selforganized cooperatives and collectives, and timely assistance from the government.
Group actions have increased the efficiency of farming operations, such as plowing,
planting, the application of fertilizers and insecticides and harvesting. These
associations differ from the old collectives by being genuinely voluntary. They pool
their resources, exchange critical information, and maintain networks that can help
with marketing knowledge and technology adaptation. Thus organized they are
finding new markets, such as institutional buyers (e.g., companies, factories) that can
buy in bulk. They have negotiated advance payments in some cases, alleviating cash
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flow problems and providing for quality input materials and higher quality output.
Although the greatest progress has been visible along coastal China, research is
revealing that peasant organization is becoming more pervasive throughout the nation,
wherever conditions are favorable. The benefits of peasant organizations are said to
spring from "five unifications:" goods, production plans, purchases, sales, and
technology. Thus it is evident that China's peasants are becoming increasingly
comfortable being assimilated into their markets and into society as a whole. The
results are increased output, higher quality, lower risks and improved efficiencies.323
For example, in a village in Yushu City, Jilin Province, villagers organized an
agricultural tools cooperative that negotiated for and purchased farm equipment and
tools and made them available to cooperative members. From a marginal farming
existence, this village reached ¥110 million in revenues in 2003 for ¥860,000 net
collective accumulation. In recent years, this community has increased its abilities
and reached prosperous levels of profitability. According to the Rural Economic
Committee in Liaoning Province, there are currently 1,880 peasant cooperative
organizations that number more than 200,000 member households that are involved in
farming, aquaculture, breeding, processing and handling industries.
An episode in southern coastal China demonstrated that the value of peasant
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organizations was not restricted to marketing and technology. In August 2006, a
powerful typhoon came ashore in rural southern Zhejiang Province. 2100 mu of
aquatic product breeding facilities were ravaged with direct losses estimated at ¥5.2
million. In previous incidents of this type, peasants were completely dependent upon
government and military resources for a recovery that would take at least three months;
but thanks to their cooperative, the facility re-opened and resumed production in only
seven days.325
The government reports that there are more than 150,000 peasant economic
cooperatives in China representing 23.6 million peasant households, which is 9.8
percent of the total peasant population. It is likely that the actual participation in
cooperatives is under-reported because there was no law requiring these organizations
to be registered, and because many of them are small, informal organizations formed
as part of families, clans or similar ties. The Peasant Professional Cooperation (PPC)
Law, which was released in October 2006 by the National People's Congress and
became law on July 1, 2007, gives peasant economic cooperatives their legitimacy.
Although work remains to fully recognize and make use of peasant economic
organizations, this law has provided a legal platform upon which to continue the
improvement of peasant society.326
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Qiu Junhui, "nongmin baotuan chuang shijie hezuo youle dingxinwan " (Peasant Cooperation Is
Reassured), People's Daily, Nov. 13rd 2006.
3
Ji Tan, "chutai nongmin xinyong hezuoshe zhengce weishi shangzao" (It is Still Too Early to Issue
Peasant Credit Cooperation Policy), diyi caijing ribao (No. 1 Financial and Economic Daily), Nov.
14th 2006.
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WTO and problems without easy solutions
China's accession to the World Trade Organization helped accelerate China's
marketization by creating a foundation for increased international trade. At the same
time, however, some of the policy changes required as part of the WTO qualification
process would adversely impact China's peasants. Imports and exports of agricultural
products have an important effect on the prices that can be obtained for domestic
agricultural products. It is also impacting China's grain and food security, and is
impinging on government measures intended to raise the living standards for its
hundreds of millions of peasants.327 China has scarce land resources. Due to
industrialization, urbanization, and population growth, the natural degradation of the
soil dropped per capita arable land from 1.59 to 1.40 in just ten years. That is 40
percent of the world average.328 China has a serious water shortage and uneven
distribution of available water supplies. In northern China, per capita arable land is
20.2 percent higher than the national average, but available water is only 23.6 percent
of the state average.329 As a result of these conditions, China does not have a
comparative advantage in land-intensive agricultural products like grain and cotton.
Both are resource dependent and operate at high risk levels, susceptible to variable

Zhang Yixuan, "Zhongguo nongyeyingdui WTO heyi biaoxian busu? "(How Could China's
Agriculture React WTO Well?,) (www.people.com.cn, Jan. 5th 2007).
5
Source is from the investigation result of land changes of Ministry of Land and Resources published
in April 2006. See www.mlr.gov.cn.
' See "land resource management" of Ministry of Land and Resources from www.mlr.gov.cn.
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supply markets, the climate, and other conditions beyond peasant control.
After years of forcing and
controlling production, state
control over grain production has
gradually been replaced by new
markets. As soon as the state
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Figure 5-1 Source, China Yearbook 2004
diets and the previously mentioned imports, grain use is limited and prices are unlikely
to increase. The government continues to provide farm assistance in the form of seeds,
research, chemistry and infrastructure development, but the net result of market
conditions has reduced farmer enthusiasm for the production of grains and they have
increasingly turned to the cash crops: vegetables, fruits, dairy, poultry, fish and other
higher margin products.331 An old well-known aphorism "big grain-producing county
= small industrial county = poor financial county" has led experts to conclude that
amelioration of the peasant lot is not likely to succeed on the basis of grain farming.
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liangshi zhiliangjianguan shishi banfa (shixing) (Implementation Measures of Quality Supervision
of Grains (Experiment), (Jan. 1st, 2005).
1
See Veeck and Wang.
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The area dedicated to the production of grains has been steadily dropping, and was
down to less than 100 million hectares by 2003.332
Total grain flows for the fourteen years between 1990 and 2003 netted a net
import balance. In 2004, the government encouraged peasants to produce more grains,
and production reached 470 million tons, an increase of 38.8 million tons over the
previous year. The cost was high, however. Direct subsidies for grain farmers and
bonuses for adopting improved strains of seed stocks cost ¥15 billion. The end result
is that costs for the additional 38.8 tons rose by ¥400 per ton, unacceptably high
marginal costs.333 The selling price of grain products is relatively inelastic, meaning
that if the price of grains goes down, people do not suddenly begin eating more bread.
Official grain policy runs a gauntlet between high costs, WTO restrictions, poor
farmers, food security and reasonably priced food products for its vast population.334
Another factor that compounds the complexity of Chinese agricultural production
is the significant presence of international firms in China. Cargill, ADM, Bunge and
Louis Dreyfus have built sixty-four wholly-owned or joint venture companies for the
production of edible oils. These companies own and control about two thirds of oil
producing companies and 85 percent of the market in China. This presence represents
a significant force in the market for supplies and raw materials. In addition to
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Zhu Xigang, "Zhongguo liangshi gongxu pinghengfenxi"(Analysis of China's Grains SupplyDemand Balance) jingji cankao (Economic Reference), March 31st 2005. The data of the chart comes
from the yearbook of China's National Statistics Bureau website: http://www.stats.gov.cn/
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Ibid.
334
Veeck and Wang.
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controlling the markets, each time one of these organizations merges with a Chinese
company, the Chinese presence disappears. Not only is a Chinese firm taken out of
production, but peasant interests are harmed at the same time - "one shot, two
holes."335
Preferential policy for foreign investment was a significant part of China's
economic recovery, but has caused significant harm to domestic firms. The policy is
changing. In March 2007, the Fifth Conference of the Tenth National Party Congress
passed a new tax law that standardizes taxes between domestic and international
companies. The law takes effect on January 1, 2008. Chinese companies currently
pay an income tax at a nominal rate of 33 percent, while their foreign competitors pay
an average of 15 percent. When the new law takes effect, both will pay a tax rate of
25 percent. Other incentives such as pre-tax deductions, refunds for re-investment and
special date preferential treatments will also be standardized between domestic and
foreign firms.336
Heilongjiang province is China's main bean-grown region, and is thousands miles
from its market. Farmers have been discontinuing beans in favor of other crops or
other land use for years. Imported beans, high material costs, and high transportation
and storage costs are having a severe impact on bean farming. The cost per ton of
beans in Hebei is ¥200 higher than imported beans. Farmers are hoping for financial
335

Zhang Guiying, "Heilongjiang dadou shou rushi chongji, zhengfujie tiaokong zuoqiang chanye
yoush " (Bean in Heilongjiang Attacked by Entering into WTO and Government Supports the
Industry Strength by Macro-Control) (Zhongguo nongcun faxian (Rural China Discovery), Feb. 15th
2007).
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Corporate Income Taxation Bill, (Jan. 1st, 2008).
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support to help with costs and for policy support to give preferential treatment for
domestic bean producers and processors.337
In addition to the non-competitive beans, the prices of other staple crops such as
wheat, corn and cotton are higher than those in the world market too, which means
more and more foreign products are finding their way into China, and there doesn't
seem to be any acceptable way to reverse that trend. At the same time, excess
supplies have created a buyers' market. This effect becomes more pronounced the
farther a rural village is from its markets. The most serious problems and the most
expensive and elusive solutions are all in central and western rural China.
Non-grain agricultural production (e.g., vegetables, fruit, fish, and animal
breeding) can make full use of the comparative advantage of rural China's labor;
however, while it increases productivity and efficiency for the peasants, it is
accompanied by higher market risks due to pricing fluctuations in local markets and
because of all kinds of institutional limitations for individual peasant households
facing a market with incomplete information.338 At present, there are three distinct
market segments in China for peasant's fruit and vegetables: (1) traditional markets,
which still constitute over 90 percent of the volume of production, (2) emerging
modern domestic urban markets, and (3) high-standard export markets (See Table 5-1).

Zhang, Ibid.
Veeck and Wang. p70
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Table 5-1 Characteristics of three production and market segments 339

Food safety awareness,
compliance
Supply-chain organization
Price, value added,
standardization

Traditional
local

Modern urban

Export

Low

Emerging

High

Scattered,
supply driven

Efforts to control by
processor, retailer

Demand driven,
control by
exporter

Low

Increasing

High

Participation of small-scale
producers

No constraint

Constrained by still
underdeveloped
producer organization

Almost
excluded; need
for producer
Organizations

Competitiveness depends on:

Low cost

Sufficient quantity,
consistency

Quality, volume,
flexibility,
innovation

Trust between buyers and
sellers

Not so
important

Emerging role

Crucial factor

Since China's access into WTO, agricultural exports have seen an average annual
growth of 14 percent, and China now is the fifth largest exporter of agricultural
products. The labor-intensive agricultural product (non-grain) exports have accounted
for more than 70 percent of the total. During 2001-2006, China's tariff of agricultural
products has reduced from 23.2 percent to 15.23 percent. It is only 1/4 of the world
average level of 62 percent, and far lower than that in the United State, Japan and EU.
China's agricultural imports have increased by 25 percent annually, and China has
become a net importer of agricultural products, largely in lower-priced grains and
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"China's Compliance with Food Safety Requirements for Fruits and Vegetables," (World Bank,
2006).
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feedstocks from countries where conditions are better suited to large-scale mechanized
farming.340
International economics and trade conditions also affect China's farmers.
Technological trade barriers exert powerful dampening forces on China's agricultural
exports. European markets have long been suspicious about the quality of imported
agricultural products, while North American and Japanese farming, among others,
have long been protected. These countries increase quarantines and raise inspection
standards, and Chinese exports have been found with problems often enough to
provide support for those who have kept tariffs high and quarantines in place.341
Whether the sanctions are legitimate and reasonable or an unwarranted form of
protectionism is a matter of conjecture and debate, but in either case, the international
agricultural trade system is a complex and formidable one for China's farmers and in
international trade negotiations is frequently accused of political overtones, not-toohidden agendas, and violations of international trade treaties and institutions.
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Zhang Yixuan, "Zhongguo nongye yingdui WTO heyi biaoxian busu? "(How Could China's
Agriculture React WTO Well?) (www.people.com.cn, Jan. 5th 2007). The data can be found in the
yearbook of China's National Statistic Bureau website: http://www.stats.gov.cn.
341
In a recent incident, it was discovered that at least two Chinese firms had bypassed Chinese food
inspection procedures for products that contained melamine and that ended up in pet foods in US
markets. .David Barboza, "Chinese Firm Dodged Inspection of Pet Food, U.S. Says," International
Herald Tribune, May 2,2007; Yu Weijun, "Zhongguo nongchanpin chukou zaoyujishuxing maoyi
Mez'"(China's Agricultural Product Export Is Blocked by Technological Trade Barrier), Zhongguo
maoyi bao (China Trade), Sept. 9th 2005. Similarly, pharmaceutical products all over the world have
been manufactured with low cost Chinese raw materials in which ethylene glycol, a highly toxic
substance that is the primary component of automotive anti-freeze. Deaths have been reported world
wide in large numbers. Walt Bogdanich and Jane Hooker, "From China to Panama, a Trail of
Poisoned Medicine," New York Times, May 6,2007.
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Summary
In contemporary China's decentralized agrarian economy, it is an accepted reality
that quality, technology and information management systems are undeveloped at best;
and it is apparent that peasants in those areas lack the contacts, organization and
knowledge to be active in those international trade negotiations. On the other hand,
the increasing volume of agriculture product imports keeps inventories high and
depresses prices - the very forces that lead other developed nations to adopt
protectionist measures, but which have been denied to China since its accession to the
World Trade Organization. State policy needs to coordinate and integrate domestic
and international political and economic forces at a macro level, while peasant farms
remain one of the few significant "buffers" that must constantly adjust to international
markets.
The picture is further complicated by regional issues. Farmers along the east
coast, thanks to their access to international and large domestic markets, have had
significant opportunities to improve technology, production methods, crop and
productivity improvements, and to organize themselves to capitalize on these
opportunities and to develop their management and marketing skills. Every advantage
that is visible along China's developed east is matched by a corresponding limitation
in the central and western regions. Since these conditions are not likely to change
spontaneously, it has become evident that government intervention in the form of
policies and investments will be required to alter the situation. Although opportunities
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may be limited by trade agreements, some key development factors can be influenced
in important ways. Remoteness can be alleviated with infrastructure, productivity can
be enhanced with improved soil treatments and seeds, with technology and in some
cases with mechanization; and irrigation and conservation projects can make arid
lands productive. However, the utmost part would be what the role Chinese peasants
like to play and can play in the dramatic changing world.

207

Chapter Six
China's New Rural Development Strategies

Three decades of reform have changed the economic landscape and development
trajectory in China. Agricultural productivity has increased; many farmers have
shifted into higher valued crops, making crop and breeding decisions increasingly on
market-oriented principles; and the nation has by the far the most sophisticated
agricultural biotechnology program in the developing world. Many of its scientific
breakthroughs are of global importance. Rising food exports demonstrate that China's
farmers are now able to compete on international markets, though infrequent but
serious incidents have triggered international and domestic concern and legal and
quality assurance activity. More than 40 percent of rural residents have found
employment off the farm; and more than 100 million of them have moved to urban
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areas for employment. Rural incomes have risen significantly and hundreds of
millions of people have escaped poverty during this time. Growth in agriculture, nonfarm employment and rural industry, and the transformation of domestic and
international markets have changed the face of rural China and are playing key roles in
the nation's modernization. There are concerns, however, within China's government
about air and water pollution, erosion, deforestation, and strained water and energy
resources, among other problems. On the rural policy side, dramatic changes have
taken place over the last ten years. China has entered the World Trade Organization
(WTO); shifted its policy orientation from pure growth to overall well-being (a
xiaokang society in a "new socialist countryside"); and made a switch from net
taxation of agriculture to net subsidization.342
Rural development policy was updated as a key element of the government's
economic strategy with its 10th Five-Year Plan covering the period from 2001 to 2005.
Where previous planning called for increases in farm income and grain production,
this new plan aimed at xiaokang, an overall prosperous rural society and comfortable
lifestyle. The new language of sustainability found its way into the plan, and the old
ideal of growth at any price was replaced with a strategy that made use of modern
science. Environmental sustainability and modern technology were the cornerstones
of a plan to raise productivity and the quality of life at the same time. The plan raised
to the level of a nationwide objective the reduction of China's large economic,
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"The World Bank's Rural Sector Strategy for China" (New York: World Bank - East Asia and Pacific
Region Rural Development and Natural Resources Sector Unit, 2006).
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political and social gaps. Common to every part of the strategy was an emphasis on an
urgent need to address rural economic conditions in the west and to revitalize the
sagging economy in the northeast where traditional heavy industries had been
struggling with outdated equipment and technology.
The strategy acknowledged great challenges within the rural economy. Arable
land was limited and had been shrinking against the forces of urbanization,
industrialization and commercial land development. Farms were smaller than ever.
The unrest on the part of the peasants had increasingly boiled over into the streets
during the 1990s, threatening stability. Progress, it was recognized, would need to
include transformations of major proportions: from rural to urban and from agriculture
to industry. Modernization was to be a comprehensive, long-term project, but there
was an urgent need to reverse the trends in inequality. This meant that farm income
and well-being would remain as urgent, high-priority needs. At the same time, it was
clear that a robust rural economy that provided work and food security would continue
to represent a vital part of China's economy during a development project that would
take decades.
China's 11th Five-Year Plan
Part of the 10th Five Year Plan was taken up in research and planning for the next
five year plan. China's 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-2010) separates itself from
previous ones both in form and content that largely focused on growth as the key
objective. The new plan proceeded along two strategic lines, a scientific concept of
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development and the goal of building a harmonious society. The goals include
economic projects, and other objectives concerning people's lives, social development,
and environment. As a strategic guidance, the concept of building a new socialist
countryside differs from the previous two area-specific documents which addressed
particular issues, such as grain production, farmers' income, and agricultural
production capability, by prescribing a multi-faceted solution incorporating rural
construction, social undertakings and democracy.
Goals and principles for building a new socialist countryside
Building a new socialist countryside is a long term task and a huge project.
According to CCP planning documents, a new socialist countryside is described with
20 Chinese characters — shengchan fazhan, shenghuo fuyu, xiangfen wenming,
cunrong zhengjie, guanli minzhu — which means enhanced production, higher living
standards, a healthy and stable lifestyle, neat and clean villages and democratic town
and village management.343
"Enhanced production " - material base of a new countryside
The most important task in building a new socialist countryside is enhanced rural
productivity. In addition to its contribution to food security and as a source of jobs in
a state with a huge population and frequent natural calamities, a stable and productive
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"Zhonggong zhongyang Guowuyuan Guanyu Tuijin Shehuizhuyi Xinnongcun Jianshe De Ruogan
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agriculture is still obviously the keystone of the rural economy. Moreover, although
agriculture's contribution to exports has become smaller, it is still a significant part of
China's trade picture. Agriculture is also the base for rural industry.
Enhanced production first means agricultural modernization and enhancement of
productive output centered on grain production. During the 11th Five Year Plan period,
the plan is to streamline and modernize both industry and the agriculture sectors.
China's push for technology advances is clearly not restricted to space, computers and
biotechnology, but is also intended to fortify and enhance agriculture. Neither
industry nor agriculture are proceeding along independent lines, but are progressing
together.
Significant fixed asset investment is planned to alleviate water shortages in
chronically dry regions of China. Where water has not been a major problem, existing
supplies may still be strained by increasing population and industrialization. This
aspect of rural development is noteworthy because it includes not only the movement
of large quantities of water from one area to another, but also because it places equal
emphasis on water conservation in every aspect of treatment and use.
Another aspect of farm productivity is tied to wotu gongchen which is
scientifically engineered soil treatments making full use of both natural organic
fertilizers and chemical treatment as required. Soils will be analyzed and treatments
will no longer be applied using a generic formulation, but used after testing makes it
possible to prescribe specific treatment conditions and requirements.
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The productivity improvement plan also includes such "green" considerations as
returning farmland to forest and returning grazing lands to grass. New plans also
include consideration of topics not previously covered, such as mountainous terrain.
Industrial planning now includes local considerations like land, infrastructure, and
labor and is no longer left as a product of tax deals between municipalities and
businesses. Pollution sources such as pesticides, fertilizers, and plastic mulch film
will be regulated in their use and controlled in their effects on the environment.
Breeding sites will be carefully controlled with respect to such issues as sanitation, air
and water pollution, use of antibiotics and hormones, and disease prevention.
The major focus of infrastructure development in both state and local budgets
will continue to be directed toward agriculture and the countryside. Investment,
banking and fiscal policy will be better coordinated to assure capital flows where it is
intended and where it can have the most favorable impact on agriculture. Rural
households and small and medium enterprises will have improved access to
collateralized loans. Micro-banking and other small loan credit will be developed and
encouraged in support of development goals. A successful pilot project for policybased agricultural insurance will be expanded to help farmers recover from natural
disasters.
In China's emerging rural market economy, smallholder farms are competitively
very weak because of their dispersion and lack of timely and accurate market
information. For this reason, professional farm cooperatives, once banned by the
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communist party, are now encouraged and even supported and often led by local party
members. The cooperatives give the farmers the benefit of a more influential voice, a
source of accurate and timely market information, the ability to purchase equipment
and supplies in large quantities and thus negotiate for price advantage, and an
opportunity to improve their knowledge of crop and technology advances. Other
organizations are beginning to take root, specifically to identify and capitalize upon
opportunities related to rural industry. With these new networks, farmers can create
opportunities for manufacturing, commerce and even trade where none previously
existed. They benefit not only from the farming knowledge they gain, but with official
support, they are kept aware of policy changes, regulatory activity, public health issues
and financing opportunities.
The new plan recognizes and has been developed to encourage and work with the
market for agricultural goods. The market stimulates thinking about upgrading the
quality and broadening the variety of farm output. Wancun qianxiang shichang
gongcheng (the thousands of villages and towns market project) is to be developed to
energize the rapid transport along the "green channel" of clean and fresh products to
the consumers, free of intra-provincial restrictions and tolls.
With subsistence levels of farming, markets dawdle and there is insufficient
capital or material available to support rural industry. As farm productivity increases,
agriculture-related rural industry, and eventually non-agricultural industry can develop,
lengthening the supply chain from urban and industrial markets into the countryside.
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This is not new, "rural diversification and industrialization is an enduring theme in
Mao's economic thought."344 This is a cycle in which increased income translates into
increased spending and increased demand for consumer goods and services. An
economy with a better balance between rural and urban income also continues to
absorb rural labor, continuing a cycle of prosperity, not only for a favored and bolder
few, but for all those willing to work.
Much of this development plan rests on the ability of the state to develop and
enforce the rule of law. There are myriad varieties of fake and unhealthy or dangerous
products in circulation in China, and because they are counterfeit, they are cheap to
produce, and because the peasantry cannot afford higher quality goods and have been
unaware of the extent to which many of the products they buy are not fit for use, the
market remains brisk. Because the products are cheaply made, the profits are high,
and the taxes and jobs created in their production means the producers have long been
protected by the very people whose job it is to detect and put a stop to their illegal
activities.
The development plan recognizes human capital as the engine that will drive
productivity increases in the countryside. After years of official neglect, education
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and health services are key to the improvement of China's rural human capital. All of
the planning and investment comes to nothing if farmers are not capable of
understanding their training or the communications from their cooperatives. The
generations of peasants that had little or no education opportunities will receive
training and closer support until the next generation of farmers masters the technology
and principles of modern farming and agriculture as a business. Along the way, it is
hoped that the negative image of farming as a mind-numbing drudgery punctuated by
frequent natural disasters and very harsh conditions that drive young people away can
be replaced by a healthy and profitable lifestyle, outdoors and away from the pollution
and noise of the cities. China needs its farmers, lots of them.
Well-off living standards
The core objective of the new socialist countryside plans is nothing short of
significant improvements in lifestyle. The solutions are complex and require careful
coordination of goals and plans and wholehearted cooperation of every branch at
every level of China's government. At the macro level of analysis, officials work with
macro-economics and sweeping regulatory and fiscal policy design. They recognize
that with hundreds of millions of peasants in the population, an increase of peasant
income can unleash a consumption potential of enormous proportions, stirring demand
that can dramatically stimulate the national economy.
There are two ways to increase rural income, both of which have been developing
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with significant success.

The first is to raise the productivity of the farms while

promoting the quality of the delivered goods. It is no mystery that capitalizing on
local strengths and identifying key market niches have led to the most gratifying
success stories, (e.g., garlic in Gansu, silk worms in Jiangsu and eggs in Liaoning in
my case studies). While competition between farms and villages tends to depress
prices, cooperation can lead to specialization and the kind of promotion that can lead
to brand recognition, increased demand and higher prices. The second approach to
increasing income is to encourage the movement of rural labor. Those left behind will
find themselves with larger plots that can be farmed more efficiently, and those who
leave can find higher-paying work they can bring back to the farms. Supporting labor
migration means encouragement and support for TVEs through an industrialization
policy that intentionally reaches into the countryside. New labor laws that take effect
in January 2008 creates better working conditions and higher wages for migrant labor.
Taken in combination, there have been plenty of setbacks to rural migration and TVEs.
Current policy seems to be working with the market instead of demonstrating
heavy-handed attempts to control it. The market takes longer to reach a state of
equilibrium, but the new policy recognizes the end result is expected to lead to
reasonable prices and a flow of goods that balances well with a reasonably stable
demand. The central dictum to "give more, take less, and stop interfering" is resulting
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in reduced taxes, increased subsidies to encourage growth in certain directions, and a
gradual shift of conditions inside China to stop penalizing people who choose to stay
on their farms and in some cases even offering incentives346 to do so.
New development policies recognize the need to adjust social security programs.
Rural citizens account today for about 60 percent of China's population but 20 percent
of the medical care resources. In addition to the previously discussed changes in
education financing, China's new development policy includes provisions for
cooperative medical care, rural pensions, and social relief programs such as
unemployment insurance. Budgets for social programs are forecast to increase
dramatically as a result of the new socialist countryside initiative, and the bulk of the
increases are planned for rural development.
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Social infrastructure construction plan
Rural compulsory education - Students included in the rural compulsory
education system in western areas is exempted from tuition. Those born in poor
families get free textbooks and lodging allowance. Beginning in 2007, the policy is
extended to all rural areas across the country. Starting in 2009 lodging will be free for
all rural students attending boarding schools. Funding is shared between central and
local government, and other resources, such as university intellectual support, teacher
development and distance education are the responsibility of the providing
organizations.
Rural health care and sanitation - Governments at all levels take responsibility
for keeping increasing input into the rural public health infrastructure which consists
of clinics in towns and villages, and into the system of basic health care service and
aid. Five year expenditures of ¥21.6 billion are planned to create an integrated
medical care network of facilities linking counties, towns and villages. Rural medical
staffs receive training and urban facilities no longer are permitted to turn away rural
patients. Rural family planning medical support as well as "shaosheng kuaifu" lower
birth rate incentives are extended.
Rural social security system - a system will be developed to provide a safety net
for rural residents similar to that now available in urban areas. These include a
guaranteed subsistence allowance, special subsidies for the poor and relief and
recovery aid for the victims of natural disasters.
Healthy and civilized lifestyle
This dimension of the new socialist countryside aims at tending such areas as
Chinese rural culture, norms and public security. While many farmers enjoy a simple
life, too much simplicity can become tedious. A community without a strong and
healthy cultural framework can easily give root to unhealthy social trends such as
gangs, modern counterparts of the warlords of a previous era.
Among the unhealthy manifestations of a negative culture are cited above such
things as an unhealthy preoccupation with competing with neighbors in the appearance
of homes and even in the beauty of tombs and monuments for those still living. There
is a widespread perception among China's youth that urban life offers wealth without
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effort, and that the values and traditions of respect for the elderly are barriers to a
better life. The proliferation of Mahjongg parlors attests to the existence of a segment
of the rural population that relies heavily on luck for their futures. While such issues
are left as a matter for individual responsibility, morality and choice in western nations,
these "unhealthy" cultural manifestations are fair game for those who write culture
policy for China's government.
An idea that was floated and became part of rural development policy came in the
form of an "Opinion on further strengthening rural cultural development" from the
Central Committee of the CCP and the State Council. It includes plans for culture
centers in every rural village by 2010, facilities where social activities and facilities,
exercise opportunities, and books and information centers where grassroots programs
can be launched and nurtured. The work and information of these centers is to be
closely coordinated with the elementary and middle schools, with the education
'l AH

network, with distance education, and with televised cultural programs.
Between 2006 and 2008, the central government has been investing ¥20 million
each year to send five million books to the libraries in poor counties and to the
township culture centers. Beginning in 2006, the government budgeted ¥50 million to
purchase, equip and staff "cultural trucks" in a project to serve rural communities sort of a "culture on wheels" program. The project began in twelve provinces and
autonomous regions in 2005. Cultural workers are being instructed to get to the most
347
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remote villages in China's countryside to attend to their needs. They provide for
cultural programs and activities, nutrition, exercise and financial guidance and
encourage the formation of grass roots activities from within the villages. The
program attempts to replace medical and nutritional myths with knowledge and to
develop a foundation of basic life skills among those whose isolation has left them
lacking this basic knowledge. One of key work rural township government has been
focusing on is to eliminating illiteracy rate, especially rural women's during decades.
The current improvement of rural education system (Box 1) certainly can help with
this too.
Neat and clean villages
This objective aims at transforming dirty, run-down and inadequate houses,
streets and farms into desirable homes and places in which to live and work. Many
rural villages still make use of open-pit toilets, muddy streets with unsanitary runoff,
dirty wells and springs, and with large numbers of ducks and chickens roaming the
yards and streets. There has never been any form of village planning, so there is no
logical separation between industries and homes, no logic to the layout of streets and
roads, and large amounts of wasted land. Trash collection is nonexistent and is
generally dropped where it is created or along the roads or trails or behind the houses.
Where there is rural industry there is predictable air, water and noise pollution.
Correcting these conditions will be expensive and slow and made more
complicated because they will involve resources from every corner of society and
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government, will require corvee labor348, and will at the same time require sensitivity
to cultural issues, religious facilities, antiquities, ethnic uniqueness, and archeological
valuables. Clearly these transformations cannot take place without the willing
involvement of the residents themselves.
At present, more than half the villages in China have no running water. About
100 million people's lives are supposed to be improved with the addition of running
water during the four years between 2006 and 2010.
About 40,000 villages do not have any roads, while another 300,000 have roads
and streets but they are unpaved.349 The eleventh Five Year Plan provides for ¥100
billion for road construction. By 2010, all of the towns and all the villages in eastern
and central China are supposed to have paved roads and streets. Roads are planned for
all villages in the west, though paving will come later.
The plan calls for new energy sources to supply the needs of rural China.
Methane generation, straw gasification, small hydroelectric generators, solar energy
and wind farms will become the options of choice for these new projects. Rural
As a part of former tax system, simply a village committee can assign a farmer 20 days unpaid work
per year to work on rural public affairs, such as construction on rural schools, building roads, field
infrastructure, rural residents & animals drinking water projects and small-patterned rural irrigation
projects. Now, the central policy requires local governments to convert farmers' wages into such work,
but often in reality, due to such unpaid work benefits local farmers, there have not been many
disputes. See more from "yigong daizhen zhengce ruheyu guoji jiegui" (How the Chinese Work
Relief Policy Merges into International Standard) Zhongguo gaige bao (China Reform), May 31st
2006.
' Without additional statement, the data source all came from interviewing Chen Xiwen, the deputy
director of the Office of the Leading Group of Rural Work of the Central Committee of the CCP. See
Cheng Gang, guanzhu: "shiyiwu"guojia dasuan hua duoshao qianjianshexin nongcun" (Attention:
How Much Will Be Spent in Building a New Socialist Countryside during the 11th Five-Year Plan
Period?), Renmin wang (www.people.com.cn), March 1st 2006.
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methane projects began in earnest in 2006 and will accelerate in importance during the
next couple of years. Methane generation involves the construction of methane pools
which can drive the improvement of animal pens, toilet facilities and reduce waste and
generate clean and useable household energy in the process.
The plan calls for virtually complete rural electrification with the completion of
power distribution grids by 2015. In the same timeframe, telephone and postal
services are supposed to be reaching virtually all rural households. The plan
acknowledges that the expenses associated with all these projects are formidable and
essentially out of reach without the willing participation of rural residents.
Policy, regulations and training have begun to stress the importance and
technology of village planning, including land management, zoning, home siting,
infrastructure provisions, and other projects and systems that reflect a "people first"
orientation. Efficient and "green" designs for housing and other buildings can be
made available to all at no charge with efforts. Basic health and sanitation principles,
such as maintaining a healthy distance between the people and the farm animals can
be gradually taught. Plans, techniques and facilities are supposed to be developed to
properly treat raw sewage and to dispose of solid waste in a sanitary and non-polluting
way. A common practice of the illegal dumping of urban waste in sparsely populated
rural areas has been made illegal and enforcement measures have been implemented.
Democratic management
China's government has been experimenting with elections since the 1980s and
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the results have been sufficiently positive that more democracy is planned for the
future of towns and villages. As reported earlier, however, there have been problems
in addition to successes, so the new development plan calls for more detailed rules, a
continuing effort to inform and educate both the voters and the administrators, and
additional monitoring to assure acceptable processes and fair results. These measures
are seen as key to holding township governments responsible for creating conditions
for local economic development and for delivering public goods and managing the
social and cultural environment for the good of the population. The clearest path to
this condition is an engaged and knowledgeable citizenry.
In the spring of 2007, government estimates revealed that if the government were
to fund only the basic projects for creating roads, making suitable drinking water
available to everyone, electrification, and basic household needs the cost would
OCA

approach ¥5 trillion.

The cost of labor and materials is prohibitive, and the length

of time it would take to manage the effort at the state level is unacceptable. Corvee
(donated or conscripted) labor is seen as the answer, and considering the number of
people available, this approach seems reasonable and is part of the plan. At the same
time, it is recognized that a hostile labor force is the least desirable approach to a long
list of massive construction projects. This is the reason that the rural culture, the
integrity of local government, the quality of the leadership and the focus on genuine
350

Chen Fang, "Quanmian lijie shehui zhuyi xin nongcun jianshe de ershi zifangzhen -fang zhongyang
nongcun gongzuo lingdao xiaozu banggongshi fuzeren" (Fully Understanding the 20 Characters of
Building New Socialist Countryside - Interviewing the Head of the Office of Rural Work Leading
Group of the Central Committee of the CCP) Xinhua wang (Xinhua Net), Feb.Hth 2006); available
from http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-02/14/content_4179516.htm.
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peasant needs and participation have become such important parts of the new socialist
countryside plan.
Characteristics of the new policy approach
First - the plan contains both short and long-term goals
The government's current approach to rural development is characterized by
three key differences from previous attempts: First, the impatience to show quick
results has been replaced by a plan that shows both ongoing measures that can bring
immediate relief, and long term goals, plans and actions that recognize that
transforming the lives of 800 million people is a large and expensive undertaking with
final results still distant, and still part hope. At present, agriculture and rural
development are still in their infancy in many parts of China. The agricultural
infrastructure is weak, social development lags urban progress, and tensions over the
intensifying urban-rural gaps have become an urgent matter.
The first (short-term) measures have been taken: agriculture taxes have been
eliminated and the tab for social services including education and public health
services has been picked up by the government; investment in agriculture and
agricultural subsidies are increasing farm income; financial pressure on the lowest
levels of government that caused so much mischief has been eased; and public
services are being delivered in the form of tighter financial control, infrastructure
development, training, guidance and expertise. These short-term actions have brought
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quick relief, and the evidence indicates positive results that are becoming more
significant. In 2004, reductions in taxes and fees alone translated into direct benefits
for farmers of ¥45.1 billion. In 2005, the benefits had increased to ¥70.2 billion, and
in 2006, to ¥125 billion.351 In 2006 the total reached ¥125 billion.352
The second (long-term) part of the plan acknowledges that agricultural and rural
development in China is still facing an uphill climb. This part of the plan includes
such measures to ease sannong wenti as production development, infrastructure
construction, improvement of public services, training and education for farmers and
their families, grassroots political and cultural development, and environmental
sustainability, all of which take longer to accomplish and longer yet to show a
return.353
Second - The plan contains top-down leadership and incremental change
The second characteristic of current development plans is that it is an undertaking
that is still dependent upon top-down leadership and resources. Despite global level
criticism of top-down, imposed development and a call for bottom-up, locally-inspired
and led programs, the truth in China is that peasants are neither naive people to be led
through every step, nor sophisticated and capable decision makers who will
351

Chen Xiwen, "Tuijin Shehuizhuyi Xinnongcun Jianshe " (Promote Building Socialist New
Countryside) Xinhua wang (http:www.xinhuawz.com), 2006).
352
Chen Erhou, Yao Rongfeng, and Dong Jun, "Xinnongcun jianshe kaiju zhinian: jiuyi nongmin
shouhuo chendiandian de shehui" (In the Beginning Year of Building a New Socialist Countryside:
900 Million Peasants Harvest Heavy Benefits) (Xinhuanet, Dec.21st 2006).
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Chen Yuchuan and Zheng Xing, "Qicaozhe jiedu yihao wenjian: fazhan xiandai nongye
zhengdangshi" (A Drafter of No.l Document Interpreting It's Just Time Develop Modern Agriculture)
Renmin wang (www.people.com.cn), 2007).
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accomplish great things if they are only left alone. The more recent approach in China
was to "take less, give more and don't interfere"354 which worked in the most
favorable locations along the east coast and near cities and industrialized areas, but
leaving them alone won't work in more isolated regions where generations of peasants
have been neglected in their education, bypassed in infrastructure development,
subjected to corrosive corruption and illegal land and property seizures, victims of a
massive migration that took their strength and youth and leadership and then left to
their subsistence farming with no capacity for change. Without top-down leadership,
guidance, education and training, resources and technology, capacity for progress will
never develop.
Third -flexibility and local empowerment
The third welcome change in current development planning is a visible flexibility
and local empowerment. Gone are the mass movements with which the party
attempted to transform China overnight through mass programs like the Great Leap
Forward. Capacity has been recognized as made up of different levels of a variety of
human, natural and man-made assets in an infinite set of combinations. Given this
fundamental fact, progress planning requires a customized approach in which central
resources are combined with local knowledge to create capacity where there is none.
The new plan incorporates local discretion and flexibility, local elections, and the
fiscal and policy reforms previously discussed.
354

No. 1 central document in 2004 pointed out such principle to guide local government to increase
income of rural population.
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Flexibility does not extend in all directions, however. There are five "insists"355
in the new plan that local governments are not permitted to ignore:
1) Development of the rural economy is the core requirement. This is to be
accomplished by developing rural productivity, promoting stable development
of grain production, and continually increasing farmers' income
2) The basic rural administration system must conform to the Chinese
constitution. This means respecting farmers as the main target of rural
development and continually improving the rural administration program
3) The highest priority of this plan is the resolution of the most significant
problems China's farmers are experiencing.
4) Success will require plans and actions that are fitted to local circumstances and
guiding farmers with full recognition of these local circumstances.
5) Recognition that the enthusiastic involvement and hard work of everyone in
Chinese society, the farmers, the state and society as a whole will be required
for real progress - this program must represent the common will and basis for
action of the CCP and the entire society.

Considering the variety of conditions in different regions, policy initiatives were
set up with different start and completion schedules, and with different goals for the
extent and quality of objectives. As an example, the main grain producing areas were
required to expand direct subsidies to more than 50 percent of their risk funds, while
in other areas, increases are dependent upon local conditions356 In another example,
the policy goal with respect to road construction was to create paved roads in all rural

355

Chen Xiwen, the deputy director of the Office of the Leading Group of Rural Work of the Central
Committee of the CCP, "Tuijin Shehuizhuyi Xinnongcun Jianshe" (Promote Building Socialist New
Countryside) Xinhua wang (http:www.xinhuawz.com), 2006).
356
The grain risk fund is a specialized fund to help the government maintain macro-level control of the
grain market. The account is funded by shared contributions from central and provincial
governments. Provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities use the funds under the supervision
of the State Council. See the official document, "Regulations on improving management of grain risk
fund" issued by Ministry of Finance and Agricultural Development Bank of China, May 11, 1998.
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towns and in all eastern and central villages by the end of the 11 Five-Year Plan.
Western villages, meanwhile, are all to have roads, but the materials of construction
are left open for the time being. With respect to education, all students in the western
regions were given free tuition, and those from poor families received free textbooks
and lodging subsidies beginning in 2006, while the rest of the country receive the full
benefit of those programs a year later. And finally, the social security program
contains a great deal of flexibility, requiring local governments to assess the scope and
standards for their programs based on local economic conditions; but the central
government pledged to provide extra subsidies for those communities with poor
financial conditions.
Why a new socialist countryside, and why now?
Although the concept ofanew countryside dates back to the early days of the
communist revolution in the 1930s, the idea has proven difficult to put into practice,
and the truth of the matter is that at the turn of the new millennium, many of China's
farmers were living in conditions nearly as bad as at any time in China's long history.
Still, previous attempts to revitalize rural China have not been entirely in vain. They
have provided the many lessons learned that are now finding their way into practice;
and it is with those lessons in mind that China's leadership has developed both a longterm vision and plan and a menu of many urgent goals and immediate tasks. From a
historical perspective, the time is right for a national shifting of the gears of China's
economy. The nation is economically much stronger, and its leadership is
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significantly better informed, politically more competent and on much more solid
economic footing than at any time in the last two hundred years. The activism of the
peasantry and their sheer numbers have jolted the leadership from its single-purpose
drive toward economic vitality and reminded it that egalitarianism is a goal and a
promise of long standing in Chinese society. For Wen Jiabao, Chinese Premier, the
issue was a simple one - that adjustments were required that would push Chinese
development in a new—"the right"—direction.357
The choice to rely on extraction from the vast rural economy to drive
modernization was also a conventional one, justified neatly as simply a decision to
allow some Chinese to get rich first. The peasants would need to be patient. The
peasantry has been patient. The decisions made during the reform period assured that
there would be a serious and growing income gap between the peasants who were
paying the bills for progress and the industries and urban residents who were the
anointed ones who would get rich first. What had not been decided ahead of time was
how rich the rich ones should be before a change of course would be appropriate.
Socially, economically and politically, the gap between China's rich and poor was
likely to reach unhealthy levels at some point, and errors about the turning point could
easily lead to either insufficient resources to extend prosperity in a new direction, or to
a gap of such proportions that social stability and the very legitimacy of government
357

China Sets Goals for Building New Socialist Countryside (Xinhuanet, Dec. 29 2005), available from
www.chinaview.cn. A central work meeting on rural development attended by Chinese Premier Wen
Jiabao and Vice Premier Huang Ju, the participants reached a common ground on the development of
agriculture and rural areas in the next five years, as well as on how to stabilize grain production and
promote the sustained increase of farmers' income.
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was threatened. It is widely known that this turning point issue has led to the failure
of many international development projects, as wealth was funneled only to a
fortunate few among the wealthy, the military, and the political elites. Those who
benefited most from China's rapid economic rise have also been gaining influence and
it is not unthinkable that they would be reluctant to part with the advantages they have
accrued over the good years.
Fortunately, China's leadership was prepared for this eventuality, and the
peasantry was not forgotten. Today, representation for China's 800 million peasants
appears to be seated at the highest levels of the party and the government. Such
representation is an integrated concept, which means the state can speak and act for
rural society in all political, economic and social aspects, though it is still too early to
see. In light of all these considerations, the following five reasons have driven China's
party and government once again to the goal of building a new socialist countryside.358
First, agriculture is not a sufficiently solid foundation for meeting the
requirements (food products and food security, employment, social and political
development) of a robust and growing rural economy and thus the needs of China's
huge population. China's agrarian economy is an engine that requires investment in
the form of new technology, research, land management and education that can
improve productivity and production conditions.
358

Cheng Gang, "Chen Xiwen chanshi zhongyang tichu 'jianshe xin Nongcun' wufangmian yuanyin "
(Chen Xiwen Explains the Five Reasons for the Central Government to Put Forward to "Construction
of Socialist New Countryside"), www.china.com.cn, Feb. 22nd 2006); available from
http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/kuaixun/1131327.htm.
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Second, the widening gap between urban and rural areas is no longer just an
economic issue, but has become a politically-charged matter as well. While it is
recognized that the size of the rural population will make balancing the economy a
lengthy process, the condition has continued to accelerate in the wrong direction, and
arresting it has become an urgent matter affecting the credibility of China's leadership.
In 2005, urban income was 3.2 times higher than rural, on average, and at the extremes
(richest vs. poorest), much more aggravated, and the gap grows faster (3.28 in
2006).

An even more serious gap is evident in infrastructure and social

development. The difference in lifestyles is no longer a political inconvenience but
has become a national embarrassment. In a state with some of the most beautiful and
modern homes, offices, factories and highways, that so many of its citizens still live in
poor shacks with dirt floors, no electricity and no running water is a condition that
cannot continue, particularly in China, where the leadership still makes such wide use
of the word socialist in so many of its policies, slogans and directives.
Third, the conditions are now present for urban and industrial support for
agriculture. China's GDP has risen from ¥8.95 trillion to 18.2 trillion between 2000
and 2005. Fiscal revenues climbed from ¥1.08 trillion to 2.25 trillion at the same time,
and fixed asset investment rose from ¥3.3 trillion to ¥8.86 trillion. These indicators of
fiscal health all more than doubled between 2000 and 2005,360
Fourth, a new socialist countryside is an essential requirement for expanding
359
360

Data source Yearbook of National Statistics Bureau of P.R.China.
Data source: National Bureau of Statistics yearbook.
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domestic demand. A low rural purchasing power has adversely affected consumption
and therefore China's markets for many different kinds of goods and services, adding
to the forces that make unemployment an issue. Although rural China has 60 percent
of the population, rural consumer spending accounted for only 33 percent of the total
retail sales in 2005.361
Fifth, as alluded to earlier, a government that professes to want a harmonious
socialist society must achieve social justice and social fairness, making it possible for
all its people to share the fruits of the hard work that have brought China to its present
advanced state of economic development.
What is currently in play?
Although many pieces of the new development strategy have been experimented
with and in some cases widely deployed for months or in some cases years, the full
spectrum of plan policies and actions has only been in effect for just two years. While
it is still early to begin counting chickens, an early progress report may be worthwhile.
After all, the strategy may be long term, but there are short-term goals and needs that
both the government and scholars will be watching for signs of progress or problems.
Certainly China's past history of implementation trouble in rural administration makes
it prudent to keep a watchful eye on key indicators so that course changes can be made
before problems become institutionalized.
We can see a three-pronged direction to the early efforts. First, in addition to
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exemptions from taxes, there have been increases in direct subsidies. Further,
mechanisms, indoctrination and monitoring have been emplaced to assure that the
spirit of this program is not being defeated anywhere along the administrative chain.
In the past, new taxes and fees sprouted quickly in local governments to replace
prohibited ones, and increases were emplaced to offset reductions in other areas.
Further, local governments have a history of grabbing parts of entire subsidies as they
worked their way down from higher levels, resulting in funds that never reached their
intended destinations. These behaviors had to be arrested. Secondly, the central
government has exerted more effort in the form of training to improve rural human
capital. The intent is to increase living, farming and business skills among those who
were left behind when the education system collapsed during the 80s and 90s. And
third, financial controls are being emplaced all over China to ensure an appropriate use
of public money and to verify and supplement if necessary the funds required to
extend support for rural compulsory education and other social programs.
Financial support — In line with the "three highest priorities"362 addressed in the
Rural Work Conference of the Central Committee of the CPC in 2005, ¥339.7 billion
was spent in the countryside, a ¥44.2 billion increase over 2005. It represented 21.4
percent of total state fiscal spending in 2006. In the ¥53 billion spent on rural
construction, ¥31.4 billion was used directly for rural productivity and living

362 ujjjg fljjgg highest priorities" 1) Fiscal spending on rural development should rise by a larger margin
than the previous year. 2) A higher proportion of treasury bonds and budgetary funds should go to the
rural development. 3) In particular, place a high priority on investing in improvements of the
production and living conditions in rural areas through sound fiscal management.
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conditions, another significant increase over the previous year. In addition to state
spending, provincial and local government spending on the countryside also rose by an
average of 20 percent over the previous year.

At the same time, the central

government increased its support for local governments by ¥78.2 billion in order to
assure the payment of salaries and the funding of mandated social programs.
That same year, grain subsidies were ¥14.2 billion, and additional subsidies to
encourage the use of new varieties of seeds and to support the use of new machines
and tools added up to ¥5.3 billion.364 In addition to these subsidies, farmers received
direct subsidies to offset the rising costs of materials such as diesel fuel, fertilizers and
pesticides. Those subsidies added another ¥12.5 billion to the national budget, and
unlike past years when farmers received vouchers or saw long delays in receiving their
grants, all had received their subsidies by mid-year. The most important change is that
such direct subsidies for farmers are distributed to each province at one time and then
through the "zhibu wang" (direct subsidies website), such direct subsidies go straightly
to farmers' bank accounts or bank card, called "yika tong" (one-card through).365
Again in 2006, the central government spent about ¥10.2 billion for mandatory
education, and local spending also increased by ¥3.8 billion. Rural cooperative
363

Yao Chen and Dong, "xinnongcun jianshe kaiju zhinian: jittyi nongmin shouhuo chendiandian de
shihui" (In the Beginning Year of Building a New Socialist Countryside: 900 Million Peasants
Harvest Heavy Benefits).
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Zhang Shuying, "2006: Nongye Yu Nongcun Jingji Fazhan Yinrenzhumu" (2006: Agricultural and
Rural Economic Development Are Visible), Zhongguo xinxi bao (China Information), March 2,2007.
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"Caizhengbu Youguan Fuzeren Jiu 2008 nian dui zhongliang nongmin nongzi zonghe zhibu zhengce
dajizhe wen" (Top Leader in Ministry of Finance Responding to the Press in Regard to the Central
Comprehensive Direct Subsidy Policy for Farmers' Agricultural Materials), Xinhua wang (Xinhua
Net), Feb. 25th, 2008. Available from Zhongguo nongye xinxi wang (http://ac.agri.gov.cn).
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medical care was extended to 40 percent of China's counties at a cost of ¥4.7 billion.
Central treasury bonds in the amount of ¥30 billion were sold to improve rural
conditions, and this fund was supplemented by an additional ¥10.5 billion from the
central government. There are additional revealing statistics that show progress:366
•

A ¥4 billion bond sale led to safe drinking water for 20 million rural
residents.

•

The sale of ¥2.5 billion in treasury bonds funded rural methane projects
creating clean energy for two and a half million people.

•

Central spending of ¥17.5 billion on infrastructure projects means that
work has begun on planned road construction in many towns and villages.

•

The state spent ¥1.2 billion and is at work on expanding the power grid in
central and western areas as part of its rural electrification program.

•

Expenditures have begun of ¥8.97 billion earmarked for rural compulsory
education in western China in 2007.

•

Funded by ¥4.73 billion from the central government, 50 percent of
China's counties had established cooperative medical care facilities, and
406 million peasants had joined the program. The program will soon
expand to cover 80 percent of all Chinese counties in the near future.

Zhang Shuying, "2006: Nongye Yu Nongcun Jingji Fazhan Yinrenzhumu" (2006: Agricultural and
Rural Economic Development Are Visible), Zhongguo xinxi bao (China Information), March 2,2007.
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Overall training - It is believed that when China's counties can be brought under
complete control, the world will be safe for rural Chinese. Between April 2006 and
January 2007, the Chinese central government conducted 50 training courses for 5,474
county party secretaries, government heads throughout China, and political
commissars and regimental commanders from Xinjiang Production and Construction
Corps in the country's major political training centers. The goal was a leadership core
with a clear set of priorities, a stronger calling to the important service they provide,
and a strong sense of responsibility for the important work to be done. In contrast to
the unified policies and principles in play at the state level, local officials were primed
to understand and work with a wide variety of conditions and needs and an
understanding that although a new socialist countryside is the goal, there are many
ways to get there. As minimum, such training can unify mind of policy implementers
to understand better what the central policy directs them to focus on than they sit in
their office to read the "red-heading files," and also can help the participants from
different regions to exchange mind, diffuse knowledge and experiences.
Liaoning Province trained 34,745 officials and cadres in 515 different courses in
2006.367 Twenty public officials from Dalian were sent to South Korea to learn about
the neighbor's approaches to rural development, and an additional 70 township and
village officials went to Japan for the same purpose. These trips were expensive, and
there were fears that the boondoggle habit was once again rearing its ugly head in city
367

"Liaoning sheng shehuizhuyi xin nongcun jianshe qude chubu chengxiao " (Liaoning Province Has
Had Primary Achievement in Building a New Socialist Countryside), Xinhua wang (Xinhuanet), Dec.
22nd 2006.

237

and county politics.
Jiangsu province used its own resources to train 1,000 township level party
secretaries and 18,000 village party secretaries in various aspects of the rural
countryside development project. The training was centered on two models, a close
look at the experience of 100 model towns and 1000 model villages, and how to
support 100 poor towns and 1000 weak villages in the province. Using this approach,
it is expected that party secretaries will have gained a flexible approach and valuable
tools, techniques and principles that can be applied to the development task.369
Cultural development aiming to improve local culture is not being ignored in this
process. The Jiangsu provincial Party Propaganda Department and the Cultural
Department have provided training for 1,104 heads of the culture centers and began in
2007 to art and literary activity directors from 106 county centers.370
In Gansu Province, 200,000 villager leaders are being trained each year by the
grass roots party cadre training project. All elementary and junior high school
teachers under the age of forty five are receiving training that will lead to their
certification within five years. Public health workers are receiving training aimed at

Xu Guiyuan, "pan xinnongcun xiangzhen ganbu yeyao jingwaipeixun"? (To Build a New
Countryside, Do Township Level Cadres Also Need to Go Abroad to Have Training?), Dalian Daily,
May 21,2006.
"shuangxue " zheng chengwei wosheng tuijin xinnongcun jianshe de qiangda de dongli" ("Double
Studies" Are Becoming Strong Force to Push the Construction of a New Countryside in Our
Province), Jiangsu shengwei zuzhibu (The Organization Department of Jiangsu Provincial Party
Committee, www.jszzb.gov.cn), Feb.2nd 2007).
"sheng jiang yong sannian shijian lunxun quansheng xiangzhen wenhua zhanzhang (Provincial
Departments Will Spend Three Years to Train the Heads of Township Cultural Stations in Rotation),"
Jiangsu wenhua z/zow;t««(Jiangsu Week Cultural Information, www.jslib.org.cn), July 18th, 2007.

238

qualifying more than 60 percent of them as assistant doctors or higher by 2010.
These kinds of training projects started later in the western provinces than in the east,
so many are still in the planning stages.
In addition to the extensive training programs for administrators and support
organizations and people, the government is also experimenting with many kinds of
direct training for the farmers themselves. In 2006, ¥600 million was spent to train 3.5
million migrant workers in an effort to qualify them for better and higher paying jobs.
This may not be a cure in general but certainly can help local migrant workers to be
more competitive than others. It is estimated that at the beginning of 2007 there were
roughly 150 million surplus laborers, and it is planned to train about six million more
each year. The program reports that a trained laborer earns about ¥800 per month on
average, while untrained migrant workers earn less than ¥600.372
Gansu has a program to teach practical rural skills, and actually certifies those
who have completed this training. The plan is to train 1.6 million peasants in practical
technology, and by 2010, about 6 percent of the rural population should have received
this qualification. Every peasant household is expected to have developed one or two
of these practical skills and every woman who can do so is required to qualify in at
least one. The basic skills involved include such things as rural sanitation, irrigation,
"Gansu xinnongcun jianshe rencai gongchen qidong meinian peixun ershi wan cun ganbu "(Gansu
Operating Rural Talented Person Construction Project to Train 200,000 Village Cadres Each Year),
Zhongguo nongcun rencai wang (Rural talented person net of China, www.agrihr.gov.cn), April 9th
2007.
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Ren Fang, "jinnian zhongyangzhengfuJiang touzi liuyiyuan peixun nongmingong" (This Year the
Central Government Will Spend 600 Million Yuan on Training Migrant Workers), Xinhua wang
(Xinhuanet), April 29th 2006).
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crop rotation, food preservation, equipment maintenance and similar very practical
skills.373
Sichuan province is one of China's major rural labor export centers and began
training workers in 2004 to help them qualify for better jobs and decent wages.
Sichuan has already trained ten million farm workers and has an ambitious plan to
train ten million more. In 800 villages, 300,000 farmers will receive training that
includes the ability to train others and thus multiply the value of the training by
extending it to 100 million people before the project is complete.374
Comprehensive rural reform - From the foregoing, it must be apparent that
China's leadership is regarding comprehensive rural reform as the institutional
guarantee for the establishment of a new socialist countryside and a harmonious
society. Without reform, all the government spending cannot, and indeed has already
demonstrated that it will not, benefit farmers at all. It is tempting to call this the third
wave in a series of reforms intended to achieve a balanced development in China, but
the first two waves can also be argued to have represented incompletely thought out
and administered programs that didn't have much chance of success. The first wave
came with the household responsibility system in which crop planning was de373

"Gansu xinnongcun jianshe rencai gongchen qidong meinian peixun ershi wan cun ganbu "(Gansu
Operating Rural Talented Person Construction Project to Train 200,000 Village Cadres Each Year),
Zhongguo nongcun rencai wang (Rural talented person net of China, www.agrihr.gov.cn), April 9th
2007.
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qianwan butie" (Peasant Migrant Worker Training Project Works and Peasant Trainees Get 60
Million Subsidies), Sichuan ribao (Sichuan Daily), June 15th 2004, "Shiyiwu qijian Sichuan huinong
zhengce gangyao" (Outline of Beneficial Arrangements for Peasants in Sichuan During the Eleventh
Five-Year Plan), Sichuan xinwen (Sichuan News), Feb. 25th 2007), available from www.sc.gov.cn.
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collectivized. This approach was unable to gain any headway because of continued
market intervention, a continued heavy extraction policy, and desperately weak
infrastructures. The only communities that benefited from this change in direction
were those where capacity was high due to a generous basket of endowments. The
second wave consisted of tax reforms intended to ease the farm burden, but
accompanying fiscal policy change decimated local budgets and led to widespread
abuses in the form of illegal taxes and illegal farmland seizures and conversion to
industrial or development use. An accompanying phenomenon that threatened to
overwhelm China's development efforts during the first two "waves" was widespread
corruption in which political elites and the new business elites treated state and public
assets as their own. The conditions that accompanied the first and second waves of
rural development reform needed to be corrected if the third wave is to succeed, and it
is for this reason that this five-year strategy and plan is constructed upon a
comprehensive platform of economic, social, cultural and political principles. The
problems that engulfed the previous attempts at improving conditions in rural China
are so serious and so pervasive that they can lead to the failure of this new project, but
current conditions no longer allow for the flexibility of failure. Fortunately, current
conditions are also more favorable in terms of resources, leadership, approaches and
attitudes than in the previous attempts.
In recognition of the importance of local government to the previous

development problems and to the probability of success of present development plans,
township governments are the target of intensive repair projects. Program controls are
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being tightened; and financial controls are being assumed by higher levels of
government (xiangcai xianguan, township budget managed by county level; and
cuncai xianguan, village organization expenditures are managed at the township level).
The objectives of these moves are to strengthen the management of township-level
personnel, standardize financial management, downsize township staffs, and prevent
the creation of new debts while beginning to clean up the existing debt. This is
viewed as critical to change, since existing systems look from Beijing as infinitely
deep holes just waiting to be filled with money from the central government. The
policy is rather flexible, in that some prosperous towns are permitted to manage their
own finances, but in reality, county oversight will still be present. Wealthy towns in
the east have been resisting this policy while the poorer local governments especially
in places like Gansu, welcome the opportunity to receive upper-level help so they can
finally get paid.375
These county and township financial management reforms may make it possible
to restore a balance between rural and urban social programs. Every Chinese child
may have the opportunity to attend school for the first time since the days of Mao, and
rural teachers may be as well qualified as urban. Every Chinese may have access to
better medical care. Every Chinese man and woman may be provided a "safety net"
minimum wage to assure no family can be abandoned to starve because of
unemployment. These are wonderful goals; but the costs and political obstacles need

to be mentioned again
375

Information from interviews.
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The new programs and controls accompanied by better trained leaders and in the
presence of additional oversight are intended to deliver a much needed boost to morale
and to raise the energy level and volunteer spirit that has worked for China before, and
that will be needed to complete the transformation from a developing to a developed
country. Local response to this national strategy is still expected to vary, and
sometimes in inappropriate ways. To better understand how historical experiences
were tied to the new initiatives and drove the field research, Figure 5-1 (next page)
connects the themes of those relevant chapters. What's missing (bottom flow diagram)
leads to a call for "local development capacity."
The next chapter in this thesis is intended to probe widely separated towns and
villages and to glean from government research and the work of other authors in an
attempt to assess the progress and local reaction to China's new paradigm.
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Figure 6-1 Linking China's history to the research
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Chapter Seven
Case Studies

In previous chapters, the China rural development literature was summarized
with respect to those factors that have been claimed to affect the capacity of rural
Chinese villages to participate in China's accelerating prosperity. In the last chapter,
the most recent CCP and government development plans have been examined as they
have been revealed as of Spring 2007. This chapter takes the next step by detailing the
results of field research in four Chinese provinces conducted specifically to observe
current conditions. Capacity factors run the gamut from the very obvious, such as
land productivity and proximity to markets, to the very ethereal, like trust and
integrity.376 As has been previously argued, there are many places in China where
rural development was not much of a challenge - not because there was not a great

376

This chapter uses the case studies to identify development capacity factors.

245

deal of effort involved, but rather because local capacity yielded real results and made
success more likely. The real-life difficulty with this (and most problems) is that there
is no algorithm that guarantees success (or failure); what matters is propensity. A brief
geographical introduction is included in each of the sections of this chapter.

Liaoning Province
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Much of industrial Liaoning

Fig 7-1 Liaoning Province Map
Source: Wikipedia

was occupied by the Japanese prior to World War II, and they built an extensive
transportation system to facilitate the plundering of goods, produce and natural
resources. The transportation system remains as a key resource for much of the
province. Almost every town in this region is characterized by mineral deposits (e.g.,

iron, oil, coal or limestone) and farmlands. Research for this project was conducted in
one county in central Liaoning and two of its towns (one on the west plain and the
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second in the eastern hills). The visit included research in two villages in each of the
two towns. Interviews were held in February and August, 2006.
Since 2003, a series of beneficial policies have been implemented in the area.
The agricultural tax was eliminated in 2005. Farmers now are subsidized for growing
certain specified crops such as rice, wheat, corn, cotton and beans, and subsidies are
also available for the purchase of tools. The Fertile Soil Project (wotu gongcheng)
was launched to upgrade soil quality. One result was that about 18,000 mu (about
'inn

3,000 acres)

of marginal lands became available for farm use in the county. In 2005

the government began extending its policies to encourage "green" development. The
state helped finance a ¥1 million testing station so that soil replenishment can be
matched to the condition of the soil and the demands of the planned crop rotations. In
2006 the provincial government invested ¥3.6 billion for a biohazard warning system
for the county's atmosphere and waterways.378
An agricultural technology promotion system had been developed in this area
during the collectives era to link various levels of government experts and
experimental stations to the communes. When the communes began to disappear in
favor of household and commercial farming, some private companies (joint-ventures)
created their own experimental farms to assure continuing research and the advance of
technology. Peasant associations and cooperatives also promoted technology
advances and served other purposes such as timely reports about market conditions.
377
378

1 mu is approximately equal to .165 acres.
Source: Interview with an executive in the agricultural department in a local city.
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The associations and cooperatives, though they began quite informally and in a small
way represented a key factor in community capacity, and one that required local
initiative, local leadership and a relaxation of old party rules against non-party
organization. In fact the party and government provided leadership and resources to
help and guide these organizations in their process of institutionalization.
The state-sponsored agricultural technology organizations, qisuo bazhan, fell into
disuse when they lost in competition for funding.379 The employees tried for a while
to keep them active, but their expenses, such as visiting the farms to do their work,
were no longer budgeted, so they were required to try charging fees for their services.
The peasants were unwilling or unable to pay. As their funding declined, so did the
quality of their work, and the peasants lost confidence in the centers as a source of
sound advice. Employees' salaries were left unpaid for months at a time. Gradually
the experimental fields were sold off and the technology centers became little more
than outlets for some supplies such as seeds and pesticides, and even those were
substandard in quality and over-priced. Gradually the employees wandered away to
pursue their own interests. The embarrassing condition of the once robust and
productive system was described by those local professionals as "The chain is severed,
the net is broken and peoples' hearts have dispersed" (xianduan, wangpo,

Township-level organizations (excluding education and public health) include seven departments and
eight stations: Finance, judicial, police, transportation, agricultural technology, agricultural machinery,
seed technology, water conservancy, aquatic products, veterinary clinics, forestry, culture,
broadcasting, operations, family planning, land management, housing administration, and labor.
While this was typical of township organization shortly after the dissolution of the communes,
diminished revenues caused reductions and consolidations in many towns that exist to this day.
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renxinsan).

In 2005, an attempt was launched to resuscitate the system, and the

county became one of twelve that was targeted by the Ministry of Agriculture for
development. A number of the previous technology stations were combined into
regional centers. Salaries were paid by the government and the project continues to
this day. Because current financial conditions are still tight, it is expected that
restoring the centers to their former status and value will take more time.381
Liaoning Province - Town L
Setting
Town L is located on the delta plain formed by two major rivers. It has a semihumid warm temperate climate because of its location on the west plain. It is hot in
the summer and cold in winter. The average annual rainfall (600-800 mm.), is
concentrated in the crop producing season between May and October. The average
annual temperature is 8°- 9° C. The frost-free season lasts 160-180 days. Under
these natural conditions it is possible to produce only one grain crop each year. The
main crops are rice, wheat, corn and sorghum.
The town is close to cities that have heavy industry (formed steel products such
as rolled steel plate, sheet, bar, tubing and billets) and a strong synthetic fiber industry.
The town currently has a population of more than 90,000 people including 50,000
farmers and 20,000 migrant workers. In area, the town boundaries contain 119.6 km2
380
381

Source: Interview with a leader of the agricultural investigation team of the local Statistics Bureau.
Source: Interview with a director of the local Rural Work Committee.
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and 126,000 mu arable land (approximately 84 km2). The town has twenty-two
villages. The highway approaches to Town L are jammed with every manner of truck,
car and pushcart almost around the clock. Drivers stop their cars and trucks in the
streets to buy produce or goods from roadside vendors, and the restaurants and
businesses along the streets compete for attention - the overall impression is that the
town is busy, noisy and in apparent disarray, but ordered by a concentration of
commerce of all kinds. These factors, even including the entrepreneurial impulse to
hawk goods to passersby, all lend credibility to an image of development readiness of
the townspeople, and the number of established businesses enhances that image.
History
Although the area was historically sparsely populated, about 300 years ago it was
peopled by a migration from "guanli," which means literally from the already settled
area of China "inside the Great Wall." We can tell from the names of the villages, like
"Henan, Hebai, and Shandong," where the incoming migrants were from. In addition
to their farming tradition, they arrived with important skills in handcrafted goods and
light industries, such as the making of shoes and clothing. The people regard
themselves as diligent, smart and open to new ideas. They have an entrepreneurial
tradition that was subdued during the collectivization that followed the communist
takeover of China in 1949, so this area was 100-percent dedicated to agriculture, as the
Chinese desperately worked to become self-sufficient in their food supply.
In 1978, the average peasant annual income was about ¥100, supplemented by in250

kind payment of meals, produce, living quarters and some goods for their work in the
collectives. They also received medical care and social security in the form of
unemployment insurance and retirement pay, all administered by the collectives. In
the 1980s, as the collectives were replaced with family farms under the "household
responsibility system," the peasants were able to make their own decisions about what
to produce, as long as they met their government-specified grain quotas. By the end of
the 1980s, private businesses began to appear, taking advantage of local
manufacturing traditions and know-how. Their development was aided by the town's
close proximity to large state-owned industries for which they became suppliers and
contractors. The growth of these small production enterprises became known as rural
industries, and in Town L, this kind of business proved to be a key factor in the
increasing prosperity of the community, adding to the general tax revenues and
creating badly needed jobs.
In 1992, Town L was approved as a provincial level special economic zone (SEZ),
which meant it was supported in industrialization and privatization by official
government policy and assistance. Capital accumulation and a surplus of rural labor
supported its growing economy. The area produced garments, textiles, and shoes, and
developed breeding farms and agriculture that increased its exports. Beginning in
1996, however, the government adjusted its national industrial policy and inaugurated
deep fiscal and bank reforms, which led to unpleasant consequences in this area.

Facing a more competitive market, it became increasingly difficult for some TVEs and
small private manufacturing firms to survive. Some of them were able to move their
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accumulated capital to larger cities to create new businesses, but many of them simply
closed. All the villages and the town itself had to fall back on agriculture and
traditional handcraft businesses. For an extended period of adjustment, finances in
town L were exceedingly difficult, including tax revenues. Local officials received no
salaries, sometimes for years. Officials continued to work without pay, living off a
spouse's salary, or sometimes supplemented by small sidelines such as driving taxis
after work hours. They continued to work because they expected at least some of the
back pay due them, and they wanted to keep their jobs for when times were better.
As the economy began to recover, the local government resumed its investment
in agricultural infrastructure and technology. As productivity increased, their goods
made it to the open markets and soon brought about an increase in living income,
labor salaries and a growing number of support industries. Some people farmed, some
worked in handcraft industries, and many did both, depending on the seasons and
availability of and demand for labor.
Beginning in the late 1990s, many of the largest state-owned industries were
required to vacate their urban facilities in a strategic program to curb pollution and
improve control over energy distribution. Consequently, large plots of land that had
been set aside for industrial development in the provincial economic zone began to be
occupied. Town L also benefited from a central government plan to revitalize its "Old
Northeast Industrial Base." Private industries worked their way back into the
landscape and Town L became more prosperous than ever. It continues its dynamic
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pattern of growth today.
Town Government
Town L had tax revenues of approximately ¥ 65 million (US$ 8 million) in 2005.
This placed it third highest among the eighteen towns in the county. The county
revenues are about average for Liaoning province (which is about thirty percent lower
than China's southern coastal provinces but about twice the average in China's far
west). The annual revenue available to the town government is about ten percent of its
total tax revenues - a percentage that town officials complain is too low. The balance
is forwarded to and controlled by higher levels of government. The portion that the
towns receive from their higher levels of government is called "returned revenues."
Since the central government tightened its controls over fiscal policy and spending in
1994 and 1996, total expenditures have been regulated from above. There are three
fixed budget expenditures out of the returned revenues. First, about ¥1.26 million were
allocated in 2005 to the payment of village leaders in compensation for time spent on
village duties. (Village leaders are not considered government employees and are
therefore not salaried, but are reimbursed by the township for time spent in their cadre
duties). Second, about ¥ 1.3 million are allocated for civic welfare, which includes
such expenses as subsidies for retired soldiers, benefits for disabled, orphaned, and
widowed people. Third, about ¥ 2.1 million go to the salaries of town officials. The
remainder, about 28 percent of the total, is all that is available for public affairs.
As state fiscal policy was evolving to assure that the central government had the
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ability to govern, town and village budgets were constantly shrinking, and Town L was
no exception. In some villages, cadres began charging fees for education, which led
directly to a reduction in school attendance and then to worsening conditions in the
schools as the facilities fell into disrepair. Teachers were lucky to be paid with grain,
vegetables or chickens. In 2004, however, the county began rebounding and assumed
responsibility for teachers' salaries. There was resentment about the pace of the
recovery since local residents knew that mandatory education was funded in the cities
while China's poorest people were paying these extra fees.
One bright spot in town L came on the news of Deng's Southern Tour in 1992.
Town L began offering preferential polices and tax holidays to attract outside investors.
Those moves were important to the local economy, to an extent even greater than the
additions to tax revenues and employment. The mocxves gained the support and
loyalty of the businesses and created a government-business partnership that endures
to this day. Today the town government is able to ask companies for assistance. They
sometimes ask businesses to pay their taxes in advance, for example, in order to meet
quotas and deadlines. They are often the beneficiaries of donations that help with
public services, and they are happy to assist with contacts and expansions that help
meet quotas for foreign investment, trade, domestic investment and GDP growth.
Having learned from its own history and from the experiences of other towns, the
government of town L continues its efforts to expand its rural industry base. This
effort creates opportunities and choices for peasants and entrepreneurs. Town leaders
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say the people are prospering but the town is poor. Despite their efforts, town officials
have benefited little from their increased revenues because of the Tax Sharing System
in which the fruits of their work is siphoned upwards in the government hierarchy.
Local cadres also complain that they could do more if the government followed the
official policy of returning a greater percentage of the revenues to the towns that
increase their income. The Chinese government, faced with its own tax collection
problems, was guiding tax reform with the slogan, duoyu shaoqufanghuo, which
means "Give more, take less, and leave them alone." Local officials, facing problems
meeting their own budgets, have found it difficult to do give more if they take less.
While town officials complain about their tax revenues, the local peasants earned
¥4,710 on average in 2005, which was significantly higher than the provincial average
of ¥3,370 and the national average of ¥3,325.
As was evident in many towns that were studied from the literature, the Town L
government and village leaders are active in the economies of their communities,
including guiding peasants into new opportunities. As an example, the Town L
government led the peasants to a healthy increase in income through the breeding of
loaches in their rice paddies. The loach is a long, slender fish that resembles a catfish
that is found throughout Eurasia and Africa. The idea came from a neighboring city
where peasants had significantly increased their earnings. Local peasants were taken
to visit the paddies to learn the benefits and methods firsthand. In this way, rice

paddies can generate two incomes. As the peasants came on board with this idea, the
town and county governments arranged for supplies and subsidies of ¥50 per mu to
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start their fish farms. Peasants who tried this innovation found themselves earning as
much as five times the income they earned with just their rice crops. In this region,
rice typically earns the peasants about ¥400 to ¥500 per mu per year, and about ¥200
to ¥300 per mu if they plant corn. With the success of these projects, more and more
peasants took to breeding loaches, and today such double-yield paddies cover more
than 4,000 mu. Among other successful projects, the town government brokered a
deal to market locally produced milk as the number of dairy cattle increased.
Simultaneously, dairy and other waste products were successfully harvested through
an innovative piped collection system that treated the waste to produce methane gas
while also controlling pollution and reducing the risk of fire.
Evaluation of town government
The county party committee evaluates the town party committees annually for the
purpose of assessing performance. The factors under consideration include economic
achievement, social programs, and the condition of the local party. The prime
consideration has been economic development. Several town and village leaders
expressed the notion that income has become an overwhelming obsession for officials
at all levels. The evaluation is a rigid process employing both written and oral reports
that must include schedules and budgets for improvement projects. The county party
committee publishes its results with opinions and suggestions for improvement. The
final results are linked to a reward system for the jurisdictions that can help fund
future projects, and are also important to the cadres' chances for promotions and
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transfers.
In addition to the visit and official evaluation, the county government adheres to
the "xinfang yipiao fujuezhi "(system that penalizes town governments that cannot deal
with local conditions in a manner that prevents complaints to higher levels of
government). Thus, if a government or any of its officials is criticized three times for
not correcting conditions, and those complaints lead to the filing of a complaint with
higher authorities; or if any such meeting between local people and higher officials
takes place in any three month period; or if there are three meetings between locals
and county officials, or two meetings with city officials, or one meeting with
provincial officials, then a town government cannot be given an excellent rating. This
kind of pressure keeps town and village level leaders busy. They must resolve peasant
issues, continually improve the economy and continuously tend to social programs.
Many live in fear because trying to keep everyone happy is an obvious impossibility.
The government further attaches great importance to the maintenance of stability as an
essential precondition for economic growth, another condition that is dependent upon
many factors over which local officials have little or no control. This evaluation
approach to the management of China's government hierarchy creates both successes
and problems.
Rural development
Town L had a very respectable total productive value of ¥4.1 billion in 2005.
Agriculture only contributed 5 percent of that total. Within the ¥210 million attributed
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to agriculture, 65 percent came from livestock, 10 percent from vegetable crops, and
the remaining 25 percent came from grains. It was during the last decade that
agriculture in this region changed from the farming of traditional crops toward the
livestock industry. This was naturally accompanied by the growth of food and feed
processing industries as well as many other support products and services. The
growth of livestock farming followed several different development models: a
commercial firm with associated farm suppliers; large-scale mechanized farming, and
self-organized farm cooperatives. The choice of development models was influenced
by such things as the local soil, terrain and climate conditions, farmer preferences, and
policies and guidance from local governments. There were 500 households from three
different villages that signed land use transfer contracts with a commercial agricultural
firm to create a large area of 7,000 mu dedicated to the large-scale (and therefore
economical) production of vegetables, edible oil crops, seedlings and other kinds of
crop rotations. The farmers receive some income from the lands they have ceded and
are freed to participate in local rural industries or in their traditional handcraft
industries.
In some of these villages, there has developed a division of labor such that
residents in each village produce one part or handle one stage of production, so that
the goods move from one village to another as on an assembly line. About 3,000 local
residents, a small number, are working outside the area, while more than 20,000

outside workers have found employment in Town L. Those peasants who have leased
their land use rights to commercial enterprises earn a small income from those leases
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and they typically earn more than twice as much income from their sideline businesses
than they did from their farms. Livestock and dairy farming have become increasingly
popular as the tax is lower, the risks are lower, and it is possible to start small with a
low investment. The free market has found these dairy, cattle and chicken farms and
the goods are flowing freely into large urban markets.
In summary, the overall picture of Town L is that it has a healthy development
capacity that has been transformed from potential to realized capacity. When town
officials as well as higher level government representatives who were interviewed for
this research were asked such questions as whether they were satisfied with their
progress, they exhibited a sense of pride in the statistics and a sense of confidence
about their continued progress. Except for expressing some frustration at their small
share of tax revenues, they were satisfied that programs and policies were headed in
the right direction. When asked which factors they considered most important to the
development of their town, they credited themselves with being alert to opportunities
and they credited the peasants with their willingness to take some risks to try new
ventures, like the fish farms and animal husbandry and a level of trust between people
and government that allows for the deployment of leadership which in turn supports
innovation.
These officials often mentioned the cooperatives as being vital to the diffusion of
technology and market intelligence. They consider the town and cadre management
and evaluation systems as detracting from the government's capacity with its endless
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profusion of unfunded initiatives and quotas, its persistent one-dimensional view of
governance as conditioned only by revenues, and by the administrative bloating that
creates unreasonable levels of duplicated effort, expense and needless layers of
bureaucratic intervention and reporting. After a little prodding, several interviewees
acknowledged the market benefit of nearby industries, urban markets and their welldeveloped transportation network, but their response indicated they viewed these as
givens that wouldn't have helped without stouthearted peasants and good leadership.
Village M
Setting
On a cold day in February 2006, Village M and its leaders and peasants were
visited for interviews and general impressions. The village is four kilometers from
Town L. It is as large as a brigade under the previous commune system, larger than
most of the villages in the town with its 1,000 households and a population of more
than 4,000. Per capita land use is about 1.9 mu, including a 0.6 mu rice paddy and 1.3
mu of dry field. This is a little above the average allocation of land for this region.
Rice paddies are efficient from an output standpoint, but since it's necessary to pump
water into the pools, the cost of irrigation and energy is higher than for dry farming,
and there are additional fees for wells that must be paid to the state. Several peasants
recalled that when the original wells were dug about twenty years ago, it was a county
leader from the village who budgeted county funds to accomplish the digging in his
home village. It was justified on the basis that the village was sufficiently advanced to
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be able to take advantage of the improved irrigation and provide quick results. People
today are still reaping the benefits of his generosity.
Recent History
Peasants in Village M revealed that in 2000 they lost their enthusiasm for farming
because of high agriculture taxes and fees, and cadre corruption. Among the payments
were an agricultural tax of ¥20, a per capita tax of ¥17, and education fees of ¥15,
along with a variable collection of miscellaneous fees charged by local governments.
The total usually added up to more than ¥100 each year. When the peasants had a
good harvest, the cadres came for more. As an example, contracted land fees rose
from ¥80 to ¥100. The mathematics just didn't work. If a mu of land produces 1200
jin382 of corn in a year, it can be sold for about ¥700. Supplies like seeds and
fertilizers cost more than ¥100. The use of plow animals and farm labor typically cost
another ¥200, and after taxes and fees, net income was only about ¥200. In village M
where the peasants have about 1.9 mu of land, after deducting household-use foods the
annual income for a peasant family would be less than ¥300 per person, or less than
¥1,000 of income for a family of three. It was normal to pay elementary education
tuition fees of ¥200 per year and a simple cold could cost a family upwards of ¥100
for a doctor's visit and medicines.383
Beginning in 2003, all agriculture taxes were abolished and farmers actually
began receiving a small subsidy that was based on the crops. They could earn ¥15 per
382
383

I jin is approximately equal to 1.1 lbs.
In addition to several villagers, one of the interviewees was a former accountant in the area.
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mil for planting corn, and ¥20 per mu for farming rice or edible oils. This year the
subsidy for planting corn was raised to ¥24. Interestingly, the subsidy is deposited
directly into peasant accounts, and villagers told me the purpose for this approach to
distributing the funds is a history of such subsidies being diverted or withheld by local
governments. The central government no longer trusts local governments with those
kinds of disbursements.

Such is the state of trust between peasants, the higher

levels of government and the local governments. It is a dominant characteristic of
Town M, affecting communications, planning, and all forms of coexistence between
the town government and its people. Compulsory education is now free for the
students and cooperative medical care has been restored. Although the peasants still
complain that these benefits have been partially offset by the climbing prices of farm
supplies, they still appreciate that central policy is creating increasing prosperity that
their area has never before experienced. (Throughout the interviews in all four
provinces, villagers tended to express trust toward the CCP and the central
government and to blame local governments for mismanagement, corruption and
abuse of their powers. As previously discussed, this view coincided with central
government's view of local government). Local governments agree their actions were
aggressive, but blamed higher government for taking too much of the tax revenues and
pushing too much of the work to local levels in the form of unfunded initiatives and
mandates.
In Village M, most people raise chickens and pigs in addition to farming their
384
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land. Some who are engaged in other than farming have leased their lands to others at
a price of ¥150 to ¥300 per mu per year, depending on land quality and its location.
Part of the research time was spent in a chicken hatchery in this village. Because of
the bird flu, thousands of chickens had been destroyed not long before the visit. A few
of the breeders who had some advance notice of the impending inspections sold their
chickens for any price they could get and bought healthy eggs or chicks so they would
be ready for the coming shortage. The government public health organizations
produced a chicken vaccine, and the current farms are considered safe. It was not
clear from the interviews, for obvious reasons, whether any laws were violated or
safety policies circumvented in the advance notice, nor was it clear how it came to
pass that only a few breeders had enough notice to avoid the losses associated with the
disease.
Market and self-organization
The chicken farming in Village M began early in China's economic reform, in
1984. Farming began with flocks roaming free in the farmyards. The peasants
learned from southern Chinese about the foreign practice of caging the chickens to
make it easy to feed, clean and harvest the eggs. Since there is no tax on this industry,
farmers caught on quickly, and the industry grew rapidly and was discovered and
encouraged by the market. Soon the support industries such as feed and other supplies
and processing plants began to sprout nearby. The purchasing and distribution
network has been well developed, and includes a widely-used commodity pricing
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mechanism with which the peasants have become very familiar. Every by-product has
found a use as jobbers arrive daily or weekly to collect such things as the feathers
from the processors, the feed containers and the droppings and other waste from the
breeders which go to fertilizer plants.
Kin and clan relationships in voluntary cooperation have created and sustained
the vital links in the main industry (chickens) in this village. The people remain close
on the job and socially, and the topic of every conversation inevitably revolves around
feed, veterinary services, selling prices, and poultry health issues. Rural Cooperative
Credit organizations (RCCs) are willing to loan farmers up to ¥3,000; but the villagers
don't often deal with the banks because they believe the credit union procedures are
too complicated for the small size of the loans and also believe someone would need
to be bribed. Thanks to their developing self organization, they find it easier to
borrow from each other or to buy on credit, and very few run into credit problems.
Although the bird flu hurt many in the village, the interviewees were stoic about the
situation - they believe it's inevitable in any market that there will be ups and downs.
What they learned is the importance of their information networks. The CCTV 7 pm
news is a "must watch" event for these farmers.385 There they become aware of
policies and health issues that can affect their industry and are now better prepared
than ever to weather the occasional crisis.

Source: Villager interviews.
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Village management
When the agricultural tax was dropped in 2003, the formerly self-sustaining
village government lost its primary source of income. Accordingly, the town
government was forced to cover village leaders' salaries. For most, the salary is about
twice the average income of peasants, so the cadre job is a desirable one from that
perspective. Salaries are adjusted each year in accordance with the growth of the local
economy. In 2006 the village party secretary earned about ¥10,000. The town also
provides a small amount of expense money to help cover administrative costs
associated with required reports. The village controlled about 470 mu of land that was
leased to some of the villagers or outside users, and each mu could earn ¥420 to ¥440
each year. This money could be distributed among the villagers, the real owners, but
there was a general agreement that it should be kept in village accounts to cover
common expenses such as repairs to irrigation systems.
During the last two decades, village leaders arranged for the construction of roads
and a new village hall, and also invested in village industry. Meals and entertainment
for the village leaders became a significant expense. Since they were outrunning their
income, the leadership borrowed ¥3 million from the villagers at 30 percent interest.
Village tax revenues were also depressed because some of the villagers owed back
taxes and fees. Since current policy prohibits the withholding of land use rights, the
governments could not lease the lands to generate alternate sources of income. The
accumulated capital from the days of the collectives and village enterprises has been
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steadily eroding and there is no mechanism for replacing it through the smallholder
farms that remain. Since all taxes and fees have been eliminated, there is no way for
the village to repay its debts.
Some of the villagers who had loaned money to the cadres sued in the Chinese
courts, but the courts are unable to force a satisfactory conclusion. Some sought to
recover their money by leasing the collective lands, but they were stopped by other
villagers who are indifferent to the debt. Village leaders organized a meeting of
representatives from each household to discuss the matter further. The decision was to
continue using the income from the leases to cover village expenses and not to service
the debt. During the meeting the villagers imposed their will over cadre spending.
When village leaders need funds for other than the stated primary purpose of
infrastructure maintenance, they must get approval from the peasants first. This
includes such expenses as hosting outside visitors which was once a freely accepted
expenditure. If agreement isn't reached with the peasants, the money cannot be used
for that purpose. Every expenditure must be discussed yishiyiyi, which means "one
discussion, one expenditure." For the time being there will be no regularly advanced
approvals or budgets for this kind of spending. In village M, village leaders rarely
offer to host or entertain anyone.
Villagers in this area appear to understand their rights and responsibilities under
the new climate of grassroots democracy, and are willing to risk a firm stand on issues
such as this. In another development, the villagers refused to vote for a new village
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head until there was an accounting of the condition of village finances. This
contentious move came as a result of the previous head's corruption and lavish
spending. It augurs well that this spontaneous push for transparency has been
appended to secret ballots as an enhancement to local democracy. The CCP secretary
who is also the acting village head was elected to his position in 2004. He is sixty two
years old and was a brigade head in the day of China's communes. He acknowledged
that he is in an awkward position because of the condition of village finances. He also
feels pressure from the villagers, who like to compare their leaders with those in other
nearby villages. He is graded the same way from below as above, on his ability to
raise funds - only instead of collecting taxes, they want him to successfully petition
higher levels of government for project money. His current agenda includes
requesting funds from the town government to build a greenhouse where peasants can
supplement their income by growing vegetables.
Leadership and public goods
During a series of local interviews in Village M, a clear picture emerged that the
peasants believe themselves to be enjoying a life free from local government
interference and content to take their chances with the market for their goods. I
initiated several conversations intended to confirm this impression or correct it. The
conversation led first to an example from one of the villagers: He stated that he and
his neighbors believe that if they need a road, they can get together and build a road
with little or no support from government at any level. The problem, he said, was that
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with the first rains the road would become unusable and there would be an increased
danger of flooding. Thus a simple road project becomes a more complicated issue, in
all likelihood beyond the means of a cooperating neighborhood. Furthermore, those
who live on high ground would be reluctant to provide either labor or money to the
solution. This is an example of a problem for government, and government has
alternative paths to a solution: e.g., to organize the peasants, to manage the project or
to turn to higher levels for assistance. The conversation then turned to what kind of
local government would work best for their community. The answer came in the form
of a story about a neighboring village within Town L.
A villager persuaded his village to guarantee a loan of ¥200,000 to build a steel
mill twenty years ago. His timing was right and he became very wealthy. In gratitude
to his neighbors, he created jobs, provided social security for villagers over sixty
(women over fifty five), built a road and a park and supported village children who
had the grades to go to college, among other generous public works. Later, when
factories were being closed to protect the environment from air and water pollution,
villagers went on a sit-down strike to protect this man and his factory from
government intervention. While other similar industries were forced to relocate or
close, his factory continued operations as before. That's the ideal leader that village M
is seeking - someone who has the resources and the will to help the community.
It became clear during the interviews that one of the key capacity-enhancing

Source: Villager interviews
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characteristics of Village M is the kin and clan relationships that led to shared
information, help in getting each other started, and even became the source of loans in
a community where the farm banks cannot lend more than ¥3,000. This unity also
created the means to oppose village cadres and created a strong sense of obligation
among the party leadership. This community is also a good example of a location
where the market became a critical part of development capacity. Beginning with one
small farm that produced eggs, the chicken and egg industry exploded as buyers from
nearby markets encouraged the untapped strength of their productive capacity. This
niche market developed its own technology, a network of suppliers, and a brisk
processing industry. After twenty years, it has become a village that is covered in
feathers, flies, sounds and smells of chicken and chicken waste, and within which
every conversation revolves around the care and feeding of chickens, the price of eggs
or the cost of veterinary services. In an area within which the weather permits only
one growing season, chickens live and grow and produce eggs all year long. The
people feel free in their work and personal lives in a community where government is
a remote force, mostly about family planning. Villagers find today's freedom of
movement to be liberating after the regimentation of the communes.

Village H
Setting
Village H was enticing as a source of information because of a news report that
the village had gained prosperity through collectives, which had become quite rare by
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2006. The village was visited in August and included interviews with the village
leaders and many of its people. It is only a fifteen minute drive from village M. It has
1,800 households and a total population of about 6,000. The village is also host to
about 2,400 farm workers - quite a small number for a village this size.
During the early 1990s, many of the peasants stopped farming because of high
costs and low returns, and many fields were idled. Some of the villagers turned their
lands over to the village collective so they would not be forced to pay the taxes and
fees. The village leaders didn't have much choice except to find ways to put the land
to work, so they invested in mechanization with help from higher level government
subsidies and established three collective farms with 4,500 mu of arable fields, leaving
about a half of a mu to each household to maintain small kitchen gardens. The village
invested ¥1.6 million and created a very successful corn farming industry. There were
sufficient profits from the collectives to pay taxes and fees for the villagers and to
subsidize veteran's survivors and other poor and sick peasants in the village.
Land use and benefits
The collectives also generated enough revenues to qualify for matching town and
city funded projects to build roads, erect schools and improve other village facilities.
Between 1992 and 2003, the total of these investments had reached more than ¥16
million. Despite their important successes, the collectives were closed at the end of
2003. When the government lifted the taxes and fees and began subsidizing farming,
peasants insisted on their right to get their lands back. The official policy now in
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effect says that when land is allocated to a household, it cannot be changed for thirty
years. Although village leaders petitioned higher government for the right to enforce
the contracts and to hold on to the properties that had been abandoned, town, county
and city officials agreed it was an unacceptable political risk to refuse to restore the
lands to the peasants who wanted them. The collectives were disbanded and the
equipment that could be sold was let go, though some of the larger items are still
sitting idle in village storage barns, of no practical use now that the small farms are
back.
The controversy is disheartening to the village leaders. They view the collectives
as enormously productive and successful, and credit their success with the general
prosperity and freedom from debt of the village. The accumulated profits generated
significant matching funds from higher levels of government which have disappeared
with the end of the collectives. Peasants have gained the right to maximize their
income, whether through leasing or farming, and have been indifferent to the need for
government-funded public works.
Land disputes are inevitable throughout this area because as policies change,
peasants are quick to adjust their actions to their own best advantages. They are quick
to run to higher levels of government with their complaints, and local officials finally
grow weary of trying to deal with them and let the villagers decide what to do for
themselves. In spite of all the changes, it is apparent that this village benefited greatly
from its modern collectives. The village has no debt, which is a rarity in this area, and

271

its infrastructure is in excellent condition because of the collective financial and social
resources. Other nearby villages have large debts, as seen in village M, and it is said
that Town L has a total indebtedness of more than ¥50 million. Some of the debt came
from investment in rural industry during the early years of reform, and some came
from the construction of roads and highways they could not afford. The villagers
believe that these expensive projects were often pushed because higher level officials
need the achievements to earn their bonuses and promotions. This affirmation was
often repeated during interviews, but was not confirmed at higher levels.
There are three keys to the prosperity of village H. First, peasants were able to
find alternate employment and so were able to abandon their lands or restore them to
the village collective. Secondly, the village leaders found themselves with sufficiently
large parcels of land to permit mechanized farming, which became very efficient and
profitable. And third, the peasants were not required to live with the consequences of
their actions. When they demanded the return of their lands, the three collectives were
promptly dismantled, and smallholder farming regained its place as the normal peasant
approach to making a living. As often as these interviews have revealed
mismanagement and claims of malfeasance in public offices, so have they frequently
uncovered peasant behavior that looks irrational to the cadres. From the peasant
perspective, of course, it was not fair that the government could tax farms into poverty
and then change the rules. The changes are recent, so it is not yet known whether the

smallholder farming will help or hurt the local economy. But one thing is clear: with
no tax revenues, the process of infrastructure decay has already begun.
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In this village we find an issue of choosing the development model that is most
likely to benefit a community - small, independent farms that are commercially viable
because of government largesse, or collectivized tracts that permit mechanized
farming. In question are such factors as land productivity and efficiency, rural
employment, and the funding of the government. These are long-term issues that do
not appear to have received the benefit of long-term planning but have been
mortgaged in the name of individual property rights.
Liaoning Province - Town H
Setting
Town H is located in a mountainous terrain southeast of the central plain that is
home to Town L. It has a good supply of very clean water because it is in a humid,
monsoon-fed region of high altitude. Precipitation averages 800-900 mm per year
where moist air currents rise over the hills and mountains, causing condensation and
precipitation. The area is frost free about 140-160 days each year. Winters are longer
and the weather colder than in the nearby plains. The average annual temperature is
6°-8° C. The major crops are corn and wheat and the seasons permit only one harvest
each year. The mountains are rich in mineral deposits, including iron, limestone,
copper and gold. Similar to Town L, flatter regions are favorable to and contain rural
industries, but roads in this region are always in bad condition due to a combination of
bad weather and large trucks ferrying ores and other minerals through the area. The
town's iron mines are said to hold more than five million tons of high grade ore, and
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the limestone mines are expected to produce a hundred million tons.
This is one of many Chinese towns in which an attempt has been made at
reducing the size and expense of its considerable bureaucracy. It was created by the
merger of two smaller towns in 2001. It contains within its borders about 420 km2 of
which about 40,000 mu are dedicated to dry farming and 5,000 mu are used as rice
paddies. There are about 485,000 mu of forest lands. The town is roughly twice the
size of most towns in this area. The per capita arable land is about 1.8 mu. The town
has 16 villages and has a population of about 25,000, of which 24,000 are farm
households.
History, culture and economy
The town claims a history of 3,000 years. In addition to corn and rice, the local
farmers raise goats, plant fruit trees and raise mulberry bushes for silkworms on the
hillsides. A bellwether export for this town is marriage-minded young women who
prefer life on the plains - a stark commentary about the state of farming life in this
community. The traffic exists because the young ladies on the plains prefer to marry
into urban or suburban households. One of the byproducts of China's one-child policy
is a shortage of females which means the ladies command a sellers' market and can
afford to look for homes where the living is a little easier. This tradition has been
institutionalized and has created problems for young men in the mountain villages, and
one of the prices to be paid for the one-child policy is additional expenses to care for
solitary senior men who have no families to which they can turn for help. Senior care
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facilities in this town are planning for 300 such men who are approaching senior status.
A second unplanned consequence of the one-child policy and the resulting migration
of marriage age women is frequent intermarriages between related families. The
region has a high number (1 percent) of people with mental health problems, another
public health concern which was claimed by several villagers to be caused by the onechild policy, the shortage of marriage-age women, and the resulting marriages between
relatives.387
The town government is working on a development model in these hilly regions
that is different from the town in the central plains area: At the urging of higher levels,
the town has been training local people for jobs in industry and other crafts and
occupations, and after years of restricted travel, are now encouraging peasants to find
better jobs, including moving to the cities if necessary. This is a model that was used
with good results in the city of Wenzhou in Zhejiang Province. The people of
Wenzhou began by working for pennies, making small items that did not turn a large
profit, but for which there was a demand. The companies merged, grew, spawned new
chains of suppliers and eventually grew into the kind of prosperity that is associated
with huge real estate transactions, private airplanes and the large-scale exploration and
exploitation of mines. Some of those small businesses now command 70-80 percent
of the world market of such inconsequential little items as cigarette lighters and
flashlights.
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Source: Villager and village leader interviews. This claim was not corroborated with public health
officials but was repeated by several cadres in response to questions about it.
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The people of Town H were not ready to work for pennies, however, so the
training produced no tangible results. In the words of one disappointed leader, "The
people here would rather lie down all day and eat soup than work a little so they could
afford a real meal."

Fortunately, the reluctance to invest a little time was not

universal. Several villagers tried raising goats that live happily on the hillsides. The
harvest is a fine hair that is going to a well known Chinese company that manufactures
top-shelf Cashmere woolen goods. One of the breeders claimed a household can earn
¥20,000 annually from their goats. The practice is spreading.
Among the eighteen towns in this particular county, Town H has the lowest per
capita income at ¥2,800, much lower than the ¥4,000 reported county-wide. What was
surprising was a muttered complaint that even the ¥2,800 represents an exaggeration.
"We report what our higher level governments want us to report."389 This kind of
numerical game is widely known, but is not normally spoken out loud with outsiders.
Without much to attract rural industry, the town has little to fall back on except its
mines, but the mines are not permitted to operate because of the town's location
upstream of an important source of drinking water for nearby cities. Local leaders
complain about being forbidden to make use of their only real resource, particularly
since they are able to see the prosperity of nearby mining communities. Apparently
the complaints are beginning to bear fruit. A piping system has been designed to carry
away polluted waste if the town can find the funds to build it. This system will permit
388
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Source: Interview with town official
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the opening of a high-content iron mine. As with many such construction projects in
China, corruption was claimed by several interviewees to be diluting the available
resources. Guanxi (influence peddling) is expensive when the stakes include large
construction projects.
Town government
On a work day in August 2006, officials from the city Office for County and
Town Financial Resources hosted a visit and interviews for officials from the country
peoples' congress. The visitors heard reports from key town officials, and were then
presented a package of local fish as a parting gift. The Finance Department offices of
the town government were furnished with visibly higher quality furniture, computers
and other equipment than the head of the town government. Interviewees said these
expenditures were supported by the city Office for County and Town Financial
Resources. The furnishings are part of the preparation for coming reform when town
finances will be managed by county-level officials employing xiangcai xianguan,
xiangyong (township level finance is managed by county level).390 The town
government is already managing village expenditures, and now its own expenditures
must be approved by the county. This is all part of a general move in this province to
require control of budgets and spending by the next higher level of government along
with greater financial transparency.
There are three kinds of financial support managed through this system: shared
390

Interviews with town financial leaders.
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taxes returned from the province to the counties and towns (¥4.08 million in 2004;
¥11.8 million in 2005 for the county, ranking 26 and 24 among the 44 counties of the
province); rewards instead of subsidies for counties and towns based on the
comprehensive evaluation of their financial achievement (¥2.48 million in 2004; ¥2.88
million in 2005 for the county, ranking no. sixteen and twelve among the 44 counties);
and a reward for introducing large investment projects (¥10 million or larger). The
county received ¥700,000 yuan in 2004 and ¥600,000 yuan in 2005. The county
government usually follows the same rule as the province for distributing these
391

incentives among its towns.
Transportation and support industries have been recommended to help raise local
incomes, but without significant rural industry, the town government tax revenues are
quite low. The net revenues are about ¥170,000 - ¥180,000 each year. In order to
achieve goals set by higher levels of government to gain the rewards and incentives
explained above, the town government needs to "buy tax revenues." This means they
obtain business taxes from companies, turn them in as their own, and when they obtain
their share of returned taxes, they add funds to repay the original taxpayer. In this way,
the town is credited with revenues that count for earning incentives, but obviously the
town nets little or nothing from such transactions, even after receiving the rewards.392
Tax revenues reached ¥420,000 in 2005, but the expenditures were more than ¥4
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Source: Provincial and country government files about township level financial resource
construction in 2006
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Source: Town finance officials Town finance officials. Although the towns do not net a profit as a
result of this practice, the habit of achieving goals and receiving incentives for performance enhances
promotion opportunities.
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million. The difference is made up by government transfer payments. The province
spent ¥1.98 billion on those payments in 2005.393
As stated earlier, Town H was created by the merger of two smaller towns. It was
the government's intention to shrink the bloated bureaucracy, but the improvements
have been slow in coming. As in most of China, the newly merged government
employed all of the employees of the two previously independent governments. In all
of China, the number of town governments was reduced from 50,000 to 36,000, but
the actual savings didn't match that drop. In Town H, for example, the "official" table
of organization allows for fifty one employees, including active and retired, but the
town is paying 123 officials, including seventy four active and forty nine retired.
These salaries cost the town about ¥2 million each year. In 1998, a village office
building was destroyed by fire, and since it carried insufficient insurance, funds from
other accounts had to be diverted to its replacement. As a consequence, officials
received no salaries for a two-year period. Salaries resumed in 2002 when the county
began carrying officials' salaries.
Because the villages in Town H had limited prospects, they were unable to
borrow. The resulting conservative management meant the town and its villages are
relatively free of debt. When a village needs emergency funds, village leaders can
lease hilly lands, sell fruit trees or in some other way manage to cover the expenses.
Forest lands are treated differently under Chinese law than arable land. While there

Source: Town finance officials
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are strict limits and controls over the use, transfer and conversion of arable lands, it is
still relatively easy for local governments to make money from their forest lands,
which are still treated as public-owned.394
Like those villages in Town L, the residents of Village G can decide who will be
their village head. Their previous leader was rejected by the voters because he spent
all his time tending to his restaurant instead of working for the benefit of the village.
Although the villagers said they didn't know the other two candidates for his office,
they were ready to take a chance with a new leader. Two years later they had become
quite fatalistic about their chances of ever finding someone who can make a difference.
In all fairness, several villagers pointed out that it is likely that conditions are so
difficult that leaders find it hard to achieve anything of significance. After his first
two years in office, some villagers said they had yet to see the new leader. Some
opined that he was tending to his own interests while others felt he was just keeping a
low profile because he couldn't generate any improvements.
Conditions in Town H and its villages are generally bleak and both the officials
and the people expressed doubts that things could get much better, although some
villages will benefit if the town is ever successful at commencing operations in the
iron mines. Some villages find capacity in their forest lands, selling lumber and other
forestry products, though this resource has been treated more like a non-renewable
savings account than a source of regular income. Their hilly lands are not suitable for
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Source: Township party secretary
280

mechani2ed farming, and although there are a few in each village who can eke a living
out of hilly orchards and some who are profiting from their goats, many are left on the
sidelines. The market may well find its way to the building of steel mills if and when
the iron begins flowing from the mines, and if the past is a reliable indicator for this
area, the support industries and processes that follow would create a generalized
prosperity. In the meantime most of the villages in this town have development
capacity that is still best characterized as potential. Those who have relatively flat
lands have succeeded with their crops because the area is highly populated and not too
far from major population centers, creating a brisk market for cash crops as well as
some limited rural industry. Mining in nearby towns has created unpleasant
externalities in Town H, as the mines generate income for the people and tax revenues
for their governments but the transportation of the output damages the roads and
environment of Town H without
S H A N D O N G

generating any benefits.
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Jiangsu Province
Jiangsu is the most prosperous
and well-developed farming area of
China and has long been so. During
the Qing Dynasty its taxes amounted
to 50 percent of the entire country's
Figure 7-2 Map of Jiangsu Province
Source: Wikipedia
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tax revenues. More recently it has seen very rapid growth of its economy because of
the strength of its rural industries. It took eighteen years from the beginning of
China's economic reform to reach a per capita income of US $1,016, but it only took
another 6 years to surpass US $2,000 and another two years to pass US $3,000.
Unlike the situation in Liaoning Province, Jiangsu had no foundation of large stateowned industries. It had less arable land and had a larger rural population before
economic reform.
Fei Xiaotong is a well known Chinese sociologist who devoted his life to his
interest in rural Jiangsu, and from the very beginning of his academic life, Fei's
writings on the Chinese rural areas had implications for policy.395 He reported three
different kinds of development in Jiangsu in the mid 1980s. Southern Jiangsu
committed itself to the Su Nan model in its rural industry and developed very
rapidly.396 The further north one travels in Jiangsu, the further one is from the
industrialized south and the greater the dependence on agriculture. Both the central
and the northern areas were treated more like the western regions in terms of policy
support and financial help; and central Jiangsu, which was visited for this project, had
benefited from government assistance. Since the area was favored with good soil and
growing conditions, the support from government created added to an already
favorable capacity, and the towns were on a fast tract to prosperity. Fei's work in
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See Hsiao-tung Fei, Peasant Life in China : A Field Study of Country Life in the Yangtze Valley (New
York: AMS Press, 1976), Xiaotong Fei, Rural Development in China: Prospect and Retrospect
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).
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The Su Nan model refers to a highly focused attention on the development of private business. It has
become one of the fastest growing areas in China.
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Jiangsu provides a useful guide for understanding economic policies and possible
development models for China's rural areas.397 Considering the average level of
development of Jiangsu, two towns and villages in central Jiangsu were visited in
February and August as part of this research project.
Town Z
Setting
Town Z is located in central Jiangsu. It contains about 84.5 km2, and has a
northern subtropical humid climate influenced by its proximity to the Yellow Sea. The
average year round temperature is 15° Celsius, annually has about 2300 hours of
sunshine, and its frost-free period lasts 227 days which allows for two grain crop
harvests each year. Just ten years ago, Town Z was a small town with a one lane road
bordered by two rows of tile-roofed homes. It sits astride waterlogged lowland subject
to frequent flooding. The area is crisscrossed by numerous rivers, channels and canals,
and there was not even a road to the county seat. Except for its fertile soil and a
plentiful water supply, the town had no significant resources.
By February 2006 the town was full of housing tracts with western-styled homes,
flower gardens, small ponds and attractive streams. The town was zoned in accordance
with modern western practices, separating homes from businesses, industries, and
farming. The building and landscape architecture had been laid out with help from
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See his "Four Essays on Small Towns" published in Chinese in 1985, revisited in Fei, Rural
Development in China : Prospect and Retrospect.
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students and faculty from Tongji University which is reputed to host the best
architecture education program in all of China. The town's development plan includes
provisions for the next twenty years' population growth and commercial expansion.
Its population was 64,798 in 2005. A sixth of the population does business all over
China. About a third live within the town and half live within its 24 villages. Town Z
was the first in China to be certified as having met the requirements of ISO 14001, an
international standard for environmental protection.398 Town Z had "gone green." I
learned later that the town had been fined more than ¥10 million for violations of
China's land management laws. It is characteristic of this region that its leaders find it
easier to ask for forgiveness than to ask for permission, as the saying goes. In a later
conversation, a Ministry of Land and Resources department head opined that it was in
this character trait that southern Chinese have an advantage over their northern
neighbors. Northerners seem to need advance approval for everything, so nothing gets
done easily. The southerners take risks in full confidence that the final results will
justify their actions and make it difficult for their actions to be undone.399
History
The local civilization can be traced back about 4,000 years to small clans of
farmers and fishermen. Before the Northern Song Dynasty (1300 AD) local people
fished, made salt, and created baskets using cattail stems in which to pack their salt.
They shipped their salt all over China, which had the additional effect of stimulating
398
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The information from my interviewees also can be found on the local website.
Source: interview with government official - ministry of Land and Resources
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its river transportation industry. Beginning in the Northern Song Dynasty and until the
Ming Dynasty locals developed a rice industry with the encouragement of the
government and in support of a growing shipping industry and expanding port cities.
The land was not well suited to the growing of rice: the plots were small, the elevation
was too low, making the land susceptible to flooding, and the soil was not very fertile.
As demand increased, so did the need for labor and improvements in technology to
increase the yield of the crops. After 1949, state policy formally pushed the
production of grains and other sources of income, such as the transportation industry,
and the planting of other crops lost their legitimacy. When the commune system
periodically ran short of cash, the state began once again to advocate rural industry. It
was the disadvantage in natural resources, less comparative advantage in its economy
and the rapid growth of its population that gradually drove many to get away from the
land to survive.400
In 1978 a strong farmer could earn ¥6 each month according to the work points
system. That same farmer could earn ¥8-¥10 in a township level factory. Farming
also entailed long months of waiting for the harvest, totally dependent on commodity
pricing at that time, while factory work paid promptly each month.401 There were not
enough rural factory jobs to handle the labor surplus, however, so most had to seek
alternate ways to make a living. They used local skills at crafts, their talent for
innovation and their industry to work for others, selling, performing odd jobs, or as
400

For a more detailed account of local development during this period, refer to Fei Xiaotong, Rural
Development in China: Prospect and Retrospect.
401
Source: Interview with board chairman, privately owned steel factory.
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common laborers. This was a neighborhood of industrious entrepreneurs and workers.
Rural development: from agriculture to business
Jiangsu maintained its rural collective economic system longer than most regions
of China in spite of its proximity to China's pioneer areas where the household
responsibility system had begun supplanting the collectives. Like many other areas,
Town Z worked hard to build its economy around agriculture, but the end result was
usually losses, no matter what they planted, and no matter whether they were
organized into collectives or the agriculture was managed by smallholder farmers. In
fact, the collectives incurred heavy debts in their efforts to find the right path to
successful farming. Until the mid-1990s, many rural factories still belonged to the
town or village collectives, but by that time ten of the fourteen collective enterprises in
Town Z were operating at a loss, and eight of the ten had liabilities of ¥50 million
above their assets. The town was on the brink of becoming a failed government. Out
of this desperation, a plan emerged in which peasants were encouraged to emulate
their more successful neighbors and go into private business.
A local resident described his family's story. His parents were poor peasants who
lived most of their lives in a planned economy. They lived in a small and shabby
home all their lives. His two brothers developed skills to help them leave the land, but
prosperity eluded them also, despite the fact that they made their attempt right at the
beginning of China's economic reform. For the interviewee who was watching and
learning from the experiences of his parents and siblings, a conviction grew in him
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that business was the single best way to slip the bonds of poverty and find happiness.
"I realized farming or selling craft skills could not bring me happiness and decided I
wanted to get into business."402 Farming had become for him a road to drudgery,
boredom, harsh living conditions and poverty. Today he travels for his company about
200 days each year, managing a marketing department and earning an annual salary of
¥200,000. He owns a well-furnished modern town home near a beautiful man-made
lake. His nine year old son is in a private school in a nearby city, the carrier and
beneficiary of his father's dreams, gambles, abilities and ambitions.
The chairman of the board and majority owner of this interviewee's company
still had the outward appearance of a peasant life, deeply tanned and lined face and a
farmer's rugged constitution, but he comported himself with a poise and selfconfidence that belied his lowly beginnings. During a three-hour interview, he spoke
of his very humble roots and the self-made rise to the head of a company that now has
assets of more than ¥100 million and annual sales of more than ¥200 million.
The chairman believed the story of his company is typical for many of the more
successful and prosperous companies of its kind in this area. The factory was
originally built as a collective asset in 1977 to make horseshoes. It took four years and
a product-line expansion to include simple tools to raise the annual income from
¥20,000 to ¥1 million. The chairman rose from apprentice to general manager during
this period because of his diligence and the fact that his junior high school education
402

My interviewee is only about 30 years old and works in one of the largest local private-owned steel
factories.
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was higher than anyone else's in the factory and because of his capable leadership.
Thanks to some technical assistance from a customer company in Shanghai and a
small loan arranged with the support of central policy, revenues increased from one to
three million yuan in just three years following his promotion. The factory began to
produce its own products on which it earned higher margins, and despite some
financial ups and downs, the latter particularly related to the purchase of new and
more sophisticated equipment for which qualified operators could not be found, the
company managed to stay on solid footing in a growing market. The chairman
considers two resources as having been critical to the company's success: talent at the
top of the organization, and talent among the workforce. When the factory was a
collective company, there was no incentive system to attract and retain top people.
When things went well, local officials all wanted to be involved, but when things went
badly, there was no one around who would accept responsibility. He blames this
tendency for the failure of more than eighty percent of rural collective enterprises
during the early years of economic reform.
In 1998 the company was privatized and the chairman became its owner. He
carried all of the debt and full responsibility for all of its employees. By 2005 the
company's sales reached more than ¥200 million on assets of ¥80 million, an increase
of eleven times the 1997 figures. The company paid state and local taxes of more than
ten million yuan each year. Today there are more than 800 employees, including 200

local people and the rest from outside.
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Getting larger and stronger is the goal of the company and its chairman and
owner. This is not only a matter of wanting to grow a business, but also recognition of
a basic fact of doing business in China. The government pays closer attention to large
companies and is more likely to favor it with its policies. As an example of such
policies, there is currently in effect a "five-five" policy which means that if a company
can reach sales of ¥500 million within five years, it will receive a refund of 50 percent
of its local taxes. Such an enterprise also is entitled to bank loans with subsidized
interest for technological improvement projects.
From business returns to peasants
In village Z there were more than 200 people doing business in local urban areas.
These people had accumulated capital and experience and had moved their families
closer to their work. The village head visited those individuals, now very wealthy, to
invite them back to invest in their home villages to help their former neighbors.
Village officials did everything they could to smooth the way, handling permits and
resolving conflicts to make it easy for returning businessmen. Land, for example, was
in short supply and appeared early on as a stumbling block for the construction of new
enterprises. Villagers voluntarily ceded their holdings to help these businesses. More
than eighty of these businessmen returned to their home village and built more than
eighty new factories.
In 1997, the first year, the first of such factories reported total revenues of more
than ¥10 million and profits and tax contributions hit ¥1.4 million. At the same time,
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village cadres and party members were also encouraged to build private businesses.
The village head built a factory in 2002. Soon ten of the eleven members of the
village leadership had set up private enterprises. Today there are 119 private
businesses in the village. More than 85 percent of the peasants no longer farm but are
instead engaged in the factories and other businesses. The average annual income has
reached ¥8,628 in this village and villagers and leaders share a goal of reaching an
income of ¥12,000 yearly per peasant in the next five years.403
Villagers and townspeople and their leaders came to agree that this approach to
their development is the right way to eliminate poverty.
The streets of Town Z are lined with lighted poster slogans: "Whether higher or
lower cadre, as long as he can lead people to be rich he is a good cadre." "Don't
review the situation, make a real achievement." "Don't debate, have a sense of
urgency." "Speed up development to gain status." "Strengthen capability to drive
achievement." China has a history of sloganeering to motivate, but in Town Z, the
practice has been elevated to an art form. The population and its leaders are
constantly exhorted to reach higher, perform better and work harder. The choice of
slogans leaves no doubt about the culture of this particular town. The town
government encouraged people to check on five facts that would encourage them to
leave the farms and find prosperity: Check out your earnings from agriculture each
year; Check out your neighbors to see who is making a better living than you are;

403

The information was from the village head.
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Check out ways to make more money; Check out the benefits of leaving the farm, and
Check out who gains respect from society.
When villagers lack the money to start a business, the town government can
guarantee bank loans or arrange for credit to make business purchases. Peasants who
were reluctant to leave their families and lands behind were encouraged as the
government built senior homes and organized help-farm teams to help care for the
fields. Town leaders said although they could not move the town to a better place,
they could find many ways to reduce the distance to the outside world.404
Private industries in the town have increased from forty in 1997 to more than a
thousand in 2004. Annual state tax revenues have risen from ¥850,000 to ¥18.42
billion. This is a 17-fold growth from 1996 to 2001. From a loss in 1997, town
revenues have risen to more than ¥64 million in 2004. The total production value in
the town reached ¥5 billion in 2005, 7.3 times the 1996 figure. Real peasant income
has climbed to more than ¥10,000. More than 3,000 peasants now live in town
houses.405
Town Z has invested ¥400 million in town construction, while private industry
has invested ¥1.6 billion. The local policy is that any company that invests in town
facilities such as a bus station will manage that asset and benefit from it. Business
capital was encouraged to focus on third-tier industries and the town infrastructure.
As examples of improvement projects thus funded, the town center has been expanded
404
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The information was from the town party secretary.
The data came from the work report of the town government in 2005 and 2006.
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from .8 km2 to 2.8 km2. More than 100 km of roads have been constructed to link all
the villages to each other and to the outside world. Private investment was directed at
the establishment of a privately owned public transportation company with fourteen
bus routes that connect the town and villages as well as the farm lands.406
More than 98 percent of the peasant households now have clean running water.
There is a modern hospital and the town built a ¥35 million bi-lingual school.
Beginning in the fall of 2006 mandatory education was free for all children. The town
also built a park resembling the traditional Jiangnan garden with numerous rivers and
lakes and a 12,000 m2 fountain square with a music pavilion so that people can
exercise or engage in other public performances or activities.407
In order to provide a secure business environment, the large steel company whose
chairman I interviewed bought a car for the local police department and pays ¥30,000
to help fund police salaries each year. It is said that as long as local government tries
to do good job for them, businessmen are happy to contribute or participate in public
affairs. Businessmen believe that local governments should take responsibility for
integrating resources and priorities instead of trying to "light a fire in each household,
with chimneys smoking in each village" (huhu dianhuo, cuncun maoyan).408
Government, private business and peasants
From an upper balcony of a good hotel in Town Z, one can enjoy a view of a
406

The data came from the local governmental website.
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Data was from the deputy head of the town government.
Information came from my interview with the board chairman, a wise private entrepreneur.

408

292

small rural town that shatters all expectations about life in rural China. Instead of dirtfloored shacks, one sees modern homes and apartments in a park-like setting with
nearby modern schools and hospitals. At night, however, it becomes obvious that
something is missing. The town is quiet and dark. Most of the beautiful new homes
do not appear to be occupied. In response to inquiries, it is learned that few owners
live in their new homes. Many have invested in response to town leaders and took
their cue from others who are making the investment, so although they live and work
primarily at the location of their businesses, they have empty homes awaiting their
return like "falling leaves that go back to the roots." In the meantime, poorer villagers,
not wanting to be outdone, invest their life savings - sometimes to the extent that they
can afford neither heat, nor furnishings nor even paint for the walls - to move into the
new homes. Demonstrations such as this one are explainable as manifestations of
"face" in Chinese culture.
The only real incentive the town can use to attract businessmen to return is land.
As usual, the cost of land use rights is a significant part of the total cost for business
investors. Regardless of what kinds of deals a local government may want to make to
attract business, the fee to the state cannot be ignored, and neither can the
reimbursement for the peasants. Village lands are not privately owned but a collective
asset in China. But land is more than an asset, it is also a means of social security.
When peasants lost their land in Liaoning, they wanted complete compensation
based on the market value of the land. In Town Z in Jiangsu, a different mechanism
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was at work. In Town Z, the compensation per mu of arable land was ¥28,000. The
peasants were not paid that price, but were to receive instead the interest on a loan that
financed the purchase - about ¥2,300 per mu. An investor was not expected to repay
the principal, but only to make payments to cover the interest. The peasants, however,
only got about ¥1,000 of that total, plus or minus ¥100, depending upon conditions in
each village. The balance of the ¥2300 was kept by the government to finance public
expenses and improvements. In the final tally, it was evident that the towns were
financing the return of business using peasant assets.409 It is difficult to account for
the difference in attitudes between peasants in Liaoning and peasants in Town Z in
Jiangsu until several conversations on the subject took place with local peasants,
leaders and businessmen. Jiangsu peasants had found an easier way to make a living
and in the process had become indifferent to their lands. When I asked the peasants
where China would get its grain if everyone left their farms, the response was telling
and was often repeated: farming is for people in the western regions of China who
have little else they can do for income; even better, if all the Chinese have money, we
can afford to import grain.
Despite the significant economic success of this town, businessmen feared that
the quality of instruction in the new bilingual school did not match the quality of the
facility and its furnishings, and most of them sent their children to private schools in
other cities near or far.
409

It was not easy to understand land use policy and enforcement in this area, since villagers seemed to
neither understand their situation nor know where they might learn the facts. They often complained
about a ¥100 difference in payments among the villagers in different villages.
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Businessmen also expressed dissatisfaction with town and village leaders. It was
widely discussed that the cadre evaluation and reward system leads to behaviors that
are not in the best interests of the people but are manipulated to the best interests of
the leaders themselves. Like bureaucrats almost everywhere, they are blamed for
exaggerating their achievements and hiding their failures, assuring that truth and
progress are sacrificed to the benefit of inflated reports and bonuses. On the other
hand, businessmen are very aware of their own influence that multiplies with the size
of their businesses, so in the end, business and government work well together, using
each other and collaborating when it is to their mutual advantage. The ruling elite
were very much in evidence around the fringes of this little society. Businessmen and
officials met nightly for dinner and called each other "brother" (gemen).
An interview session was conducted as the town government hosted a meeting
for businessmen and higher level officials and bankers from all over the region. In the
meeting, farming was totally ignored - it had become a non-issue since much of the
arable land had been converted to development or industrialization. The current
strategy for improving the lot of the peasants revolved around education - presumably
improving the quality of local labor for the factories or making it possible for the
peasants to just leave to seek their fortunes elsewhere.
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TownS
Setting
Town S is located in the plains area of the river region of central Jiangsu. The
town has a thousand-year history as the commercial center of the region. It has rice
paddies and a plentiful supply of fish and other seafood products. Recently this town
has seen a sharp growth in breeding farms. It contains 69 km2 with 51,000 mu of
arable land, 6,100 mu of wet lands and a population of 43,900, (2005 census). Of this
population, more than 35,000 live in its fifteen rural villages. Rice and cotton are the
main crops. The subsidy for farming rice is ¥20 per mu and has been paid for the last
two years. In 2005 the government subsidized farmers who were willing to use a new
high-yield wheat hybrid at the rate of ¥10 per mu, but only 60 percent of the peasants
took advantage of the subsidy. A mechanization subsidy amounting to 30 percent of
the purchase price of farm equipment has been paid through a cooperative
arrangement between the province, city, county and town governments.
Like the people in Town Z, residents of Town S had a similar problem with
employment because of limited lands and a large rural population. During the reform
period, many villagers left their farmlands. Although Town S was ahead of Town Z in
development in the mid 1990s, thanks to better agricultural conditions and collective
rural industries, development slowed as the town attracted less private industry and
became more closely tied to farming, lagging behind Town Z in industrial
development.
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Despite its life in the shadows of Town Z, Town S still has more favorable
conditions than many in the region, is able to take advantage of the favorable policies
intended to support the less-developed northern area, and has managed to create
twenty-four township-level and fifty-four village-level factories and countless team
and household factories. These small industries produce everything from tools to
textiles to building materials, stainless steel goods and plastic toys. In addition to a
solid agricultural base, the town is also the beneficiary of newly explored oil and
natural gas reserves. In 2005, the average per peasant income in the town was ¥6,461,
which is above the average of ¥5,600 in the province. Income grew by 25 percent in
2005 over 2004, and the town ranks sixth among the twenty-three towns in the region.
Rural development ~ improving agricultural production
Learning from its neighbors, the leaders of Town S have recognized that the key
to prosperity lies in the development of private industry. The town leaders have turned
to a strategy that can link its agriculture base to industry. Traditionally local farmers
grew rice and cotton, but in its history there were almost a thousand mulberry fields in
Town S dedicated to the care and feeding of the silkworm. Local people have learned
they can earn three times as much in this industry than in rice and cotton crops. Town
leaders became aware of a large producer of silk in a neighboring town. The company
had formed its own brand and had developed its ability to produce silk as its main
product, but has also branched into other parts of the business. The leaders of Town S
coordinated peasant farmers and arranged to add their networked farms to the
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company's supply chain.
With the success of that venture behind them, town leaders set a goal of placing
10,000 mu into the production of the silkworm by 2010. In 2005, 1,200 mu were
placed into production. Among other support measures, the town negotiated a bottomline selling price and established a training program to help the participants. The
training was sponsored by the Service Center of Agricultural Technology Promotion in
the town. The technicians in the center are paid by the government, so there appears
to be no danger of the center disappearing as in times past. The feeding of silkworms
is a green environment-friendly enterprise that cannot be managed by single
households. Fields must be of an optimum size in order to be profitable, and that size
is larger than one household can tend. Village cadres are given incentives to
encourage peasants to divert their lands to the feeding of silkworms. If a cadre
achieves his quota, he can receive a reward of ¥30 per mu. He can also be penalized
¥20 per mu if he fails to achieve his quota, and can receive a bonus if he exceeds the
quota. The cost to develop a one mu mulberry field is ¥315. The villagers cover ¥115
and local government provides the balance. Town S received ¥50,000 from its county
government last year and the entire amount was spent to subsidize the farms.410
Town and village management
It was apparent in the town's development that local government in Town S is
well managed. As an example, the town developed a vegetable industry almost
410
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overnight. Whereas vegetables were once purchased from outside, the government
sponsored a training session in which villagers were taught key skills. During the
following year, 5,000 mu of land was diverted to vegetables, and there is enough not
only for local consumption but also for marketing in Shanghai. It is warm enough to
have two harvests each year, so that after harvesting their rice, peasants plant a
vegetable crop. The income for rice is about ¥1,000 per mu while the income from
vegetable crops is about ¥8,000. Local government began encouraging the raising of
pigs, sheep, and dairy cattle, and also urged the breeding of seafood products like
crabs that can be bred in the rice paddies. The government has the goal of increasing
mulberry field development at the rate of 2,000-3,000 more mu in the next year; and
they are also planning to continue supporting rice and cotton in the crop rotation. One
of the benefits of crop rotation is a demonstrated improved control over pest
infestations, which helps optimize the yields.411
Following government advice has not always been wise for China's peasants.
During the early period of economic reform, peasants received lots of bad advice.
They planted crops for which there was no demand, for example, or were given quotas
to produce grains for which the costs exceeded the income. An aftereffect of those
days is that peasants today wait for the evidence before leaping to new ideas or
technologies. This is the reason that this research repeatedly reports that a group of
peasants was taken to other villages or towns so they could see the evidence and learn

the techniques from those whose success was already visible. Often it is town and
411
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village leaders themselves who are asked to try the new programs first, becoming an
example for the peasants to follow. The success of some peasants is used to
demonstrate the means to others.
Jiangsu eliminated agricultural taxes and fees ahead of most of China's other
provinces. The tight financial condition created by that move affected Town S as it
did most Chinese towns. It is accordingly common for Jiangsu towns to carry
significant debt. The strategy for solving this problem has been to develop rural
industry first and then use the revenues as a foundation to improve the agricultural
economy. In 2004 the town had total tax revenues of ¥20 million, but because ¥25
million were returned to local companies in 2005 to encourage growth, the town saw
only ¥15 million in revenues that year. According to the revenue sharing policy, 15
percent of state taxes and 75 percent of local taxes can be retained for use by the town
government.

After paying the higher-level share of the taxes, the available financial

resources left for the town was only ¥5 million-just enough to cover public salaries
and leaving almost nothing for infrastructure and agriculture development. The town
budget was supplemented, however, by ¥3.5 million from land use revenues as a result
of land management policies similar to those seen in Town Z.413
As in Liaoning, village cadres are paid from transfer payments from higher levels.
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Notice that this is a different arrangement than in Liaoning where tax sharing isn't managed at the
local level. In Liaoning all revenues must be turned in to the counties, and the distribution of shares
is managed at the higher level. There is no set proportion for sharing in Liaoning, which allows for
special allocations, rewards, etc., but also makes the system more vulnerable to manipulation through
political guanxi.
413
Information from interviews with town leaders.
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But unlike Liaoning, salary levels are not fixed by average villager income, but by the
achievement of quotas set by the town government. After paying a basic annual salary
of ¥3,000 to ¥5,000, the balance of their income is determined by their evaluations. I
reviewed the quotas and found them to match the goals that had been explained to me
earlier. They are based on the number of mu of land repurposed to mulberry fields, on
the percentage of fields dedicated to high-yield seeds, on the vegetable crops, on the
prevention of epidemics, on the number of households turning to animal farming, on
the area and quality of reforestation, on the promotion of agricultural mechanization,
and on injury accident rates. Some of the incentives become part of the village budget,
but some money is also handed out as reward for individual achievement. In 2005, the
most a single cadre earned was ¥20,000, and the lowest amount received was ¥5,000.
In a village I visited, the head of the village earned the most money in the town. The
village had only six households that were still farming their land. The rest of the land
had been converted for rural business. At the town level, the system is the same. In
addition to regular monthly salaries, officials can earn bonuses based on their
achievement of goals set at the county level. In southern Jiangsu a town leader can
earn upwards of ¥200,000, but in town S leaders earn a tenth as much.
Government, business and peasants
Each year during the Spring Festival Holiday period Town S invites 100
businessmen to meet with local leaders. The businessmen are selected based on the
size of their investment or their potential investment. The town sells itself by
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explaining its preferential policies and at the same time seeks advice for continued
development. It seems to be like a board of directors meeting. High-ranking former
residents from all over China are also invited as are representatives from the army.
The attendees become part of the town's expanding social network. When local
leaders must travel to Beijing, for example, contacts there arrange for lodging and
introductions to facilitate the work of the town's officials. The town leader
characterized the meeting as "very useful" for building social networks.414
Town S uses land to attract businessmen just as the officials in Town Z do. In
addition to surrendering its share of compensation for the land, the town also readily
allows businesses to delay the payment of fees and taxes. The town hall was moved
from a choice downtown location to create prime business property. As a result, the
town received some extra money to attend to other public works. When I visited a
village close to the center of town there were only a few households occupying their
arable lands, but those lands had already been seized and the peasants were only
awaiting final instructions to vacate. They showed me their new homes nicely laid out
in a new development. The government controlled the external appearance and design
of the homes, but the villagers were able to make their own decisions about interior
designs and materials. There were still many poor, shabby little homes dispersed
around the village, many of which had been vacated as the peasants moved into their
new homes. During the second trip to this area, the relocation had been largely

Source wasfrommy interview with the town heads.
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completed and the lands had become available for development.

Previous village

leaders were given choice locations for their roles in communicating with villagers to
achieve their quotas. Villagers who lost land were able to get ¥900 per year, just as
other villagers could in Town S. They did not seem to know how long the annual
payments would last. The government attempts to persuade them to use part of the
money to purchase social security for their futures to avoid problems for the
government later. Peasants tend to be suspicious of any scheme that requires them to
give up money now for some future benefit. Town officials have begun thinking of
ways to subsidize those villagers to demonstrate the value of this government program.
The resources for village improvements are always dependent upon the town's
ability to create a complete "set" of sources for the project. This applies not only to
construction projects, but also to such programs as the promotion and subsidizing of
agricultural mechanization. Sometimes towns wish to pursue a goal when there is
little local money to fund it, hoping to secure special allocations from the province.
That kind of work is labeled as "dead end," which reminds local officials to stay away
from it without careful consideration. In a village in a nearby town, a decision was
made to build a road, but of the ¥1.1 million that would be needed, the village fell
short in its funding "set" by ¥450,000. In order to raise the money, the village sold
twenty five blocks of land for housing at a price of ¥25,000 per mu. Sections 15,17
and 19 of the Land Management Law prohibit the conversion of arable lands to non415

Chang Hongxiao, "Jiangsu daguimo shixing de 'nongminjizhongjuzhu'" (Peasants' Centralized
Living" Spread out in Jiangsu), dongfang caijing (East Finance, www.finance.eastday.com ), Dec.
11th 2006).
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agricultural use. In this village, however, land conversion continued as the price the
cadres were willing to pay for continued economic development.
In documents and files I was permitted to review, officials, peasants and
businessmen all use strong language when they compare their towns or villages to
others. In Town S, for example, it is common to chide people from Town Z for having
more trouble than achievements. For a local government, the comparisons become
central to the search for development strategies and directions and as opportunities to
correct past mistakes and build a good future. Village cadre elections are closely
watched as opportunities to identify new leadership talent, particularly if it is a
successful returning resident whether he/she is a CCP member or not. Those who are
selected have demonstrated the ability to generate wealth and often their willingness to
serve the public as well. Some of the leadership jobs are difficult to recruit for
because of the nature of the position, the difficulty of the tasks, and the unfamiliar
environment for people who have made their fortunes and are accustomed to doing
things their own way. They are welcome for their ability to build factories and create
jobs, but also in the hopes they can contribute directly to public works such as
infrastructure improvement or the building of schools. They are adept, not only as
leaders and donors, but also as teachers so that others may replicate their successes.
Influence of the regional economy
The area offers key advantages: it is the agricultural base of the province, leading
in the production of wheat, rice, cotton and edible oils and holding a spot as one of
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China's top 100 agriculture-producing counties (Zhongguo baiqiang nongyexian).
When local farmers voluntarily brought their products together, local governments
helped create market links. A market for goats in this area was created this way and
has become famous nationwide. The steel industry sprouted very quickly and has
become a pillar of the local economy. Although there are no mines or history of steel
production in the area, when returning peasants arrived with their capital and
technology, the steel industry developed quite naturally and very quickly. The story is
reminiscent of that told by the chairman of the large steel factory in Town Z. They
began by producing small goods and mimicking the products of others, but responded
quickly to market needs with products of their own. There are currently 1,400 steel
mills in a six km2 area of town S. They learned industrialization and urbanization
from neighboring towns where the "hens" of others produced "eggs" from which they
could raise their own hens (jieji xiadan). They joined the steelmaking club within
which they share resources and technology and have been party to the integration of
the regional economy. In April 2006 an alliance was formed between the steel
industry in Town S and a large company in a neighboring town.416

416

Source is local governmental website. (Anonymity promised).
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China. Its modern industry was
founded in 1953, when the first Five Year Plan took effect. The domestic and
international economic and political condition of those days led to industry having a
profound impact on Sichuan. That project, however, did not do much for the
agriculture economy because it was focused on defense products and was managed
directly by the state. There was little connection with local suppliers and therefore
very little opportunity for creating a rural light industry of the kind that would support
and be supported by local farming. Farming conditions are difficult in this hilly
country, and when that reality was combined with a loose population control policy,
the stage was set for a constant tension between its rapidly growing population and the
scarcity of arable land.
Sichuan has a varied terrain with extremes of nature, economy and culture. A
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report from the Sichuan Social Scientific Academy in 2005 divides the province into
six distinct regional economies: Chengdu, West Panzhihua, the south, central,
northeast and the northwest regions. As an example, the northeast region (hill area)
ranked second in GDP growth between 1997 and 2003, going from ¥45.6 billion to
¥71.8 billion- this growth rate was one fourth that of the Chengdu region (plain area),
which had the top growth rate in the province. The population of the northeast region
had the same growth rate and ranking as its GDP during that period. Because of the
population growth, the per capita GDP in this region dropped to last in the province, a
third of the per capita GDP in the Chengdu region. According to the 2005 Sichuan
Statistical Yearbook, the per capita GDP in County Y in the northeast (one of the top
hundred strong counties in western China) was ¥3,720, while per capita GDP in
County S in Chengdu (one of the top hundred counties in all of China) was ¥19, 369
417

yuan.
The income gap between urban and rural people in Sichuan has been increasing.
From 1997 to 2003 the difference grew from 185 percent to 236 percent. When we
compare the region's income levels with the national average and with the welldeveloped eastern provinces, the comparison is striking. Peasant income in Sichuan is
13.8 percent lower than the national average. (Peasant incomes in Jiangsu and
Zhejiang provinces were 84 percent and 130 percent higher than that in Sichuan

Source was from the provincial official statistics yearbook in 2006.
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respectively in 2004).418
Information from the Communist Party Committee of the province
Field visits were conducted from Chengdu to the northeast area of Sichuan
province during January and February, 2006. The first interview was conducted with
cadres from the Communist Party Provincial Central Committee. This was the only
occasion in this field research in which the itinerary was approved by the authorities,
which caused concern about the nature, accuracy and therefore the value of the
information that would be acquired. The arrangements initially dampened enthusiasm
for the visit, but the research was very productive nevertheless, yielding basic
information about local conditions that were helpful in developing a picture of the
province as a whole.
In 1994, even after Chongqing became a municipality, Sichuan reported that 77
percent of its population of 87.5 million lived in its countryside or rural areas.
Sichuan has been looking to urbanization as a solution to its rural poverty problems,
but except for some recent gains around Chengdu, most of the province has achieved
very limited progress in its urbanization efforts despite trying many different programs.
In Chengdu, progress was made using such measures as developing agriculture-related
industries, relocating residents to make additional lands available for development,
and centralized housing. The estimated cost to move each person from a rural village
to a city is about ¥15,000- too much, considering the size of the population involved.
418

Source was from the national statistics yearbook and my comparative calculation.
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Because of the tangible benefits of rural industry in other parts of China, this
approach has been a strategy for Sichuan, but one that hasn't worked well to date for
several reasons: The villages in Sichuan are situated in and around the hills and
mountains (93 percent), where not much of the land is arable. Because of the
condition of the land and the density of the population, per capita arable land is less
than one mu. Despite the elimination of agricultural taxes and fees, the cost of
farming supplies and materials is still too high for the small yields possible on their
small plots, so young, strong adults almost always leave to find outside work.
A second difficulty with farming in Sichuan is the condition of the infrastructure
and other public works. Whether considering the education system, rural credit, farm
technology or the transportation network, the peasants are virtually helpless, and the
government must shoulder the entire burden, so the improvements develop more
slowly than other parts of China. As an example, in 2005 the province increased its
investment in rural social programs such as public health by 56 percent over the
previous year, spending ¥300 million just to improve rural medical care services.
Although this spending was the equivalent of the previous twenty years, there are still
many towns and villages in the area that have little or no medical services. Beginning
in 2006, cooperative medical care has become widespread throughout much of China,
but in Sichuan, the program has its own flavor. In many regions of Sichuan Province
the peasant fees of ¥10 per year to participate in the medical insurance plan are

deducted directly from peasant subsidies for farming from the central government.
The rest of the costs are apportioned at the rate of ¥16 from the province and ¥12 each
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from the city and county levels. This cost has added financial strain to the budgets of
poor counties that are trying to develop rural industry.
A third factor that limits development in Sichuan is a bottleneck caused by
transportation limitations. The province invested ¥1.35 billion in road construction in
2005, creating 6,726 km of new roads; but there are still fifty-nine towns and 6,479
villages that have no connection to the outside world except through unimproved paths.
A recent investigation and report by the provincial party committee shows that
peasants consider road construction their highest priority.419 There's a dilemma,
however, since the government has limited resources for that construction, and
allowing private companies to build the roads means that tolls will be collected for a
long period of time, thus increasing transportation costs. So far only about 1,000 large
firms are active in agriculture in the province. Without a suitable transportation
network, there has been little incentive for other large firms to extend their networks
into the countryside, even though the province tried to help by creating toll-free "green
channels" for the movement of agricultural goods.
Development in Sichuan is further complicated by the dispersion of the rural
population. If there is a ten kilometer distance between two homes, winding and
climbing mountain roads can easily double that distance, making it very difficult to
create an infrastructure. It was hoped that people could be relocated to a central
village area, but the construction and the moving expenses are a heavy burden for
419

Source was from my interview with the assigned official from information department in the
provincial party committee.
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governments. Even if they were not, the peasants usually resist being uprooted from
homes and lands that have been in their families for generations. It's the same heartwrenching issue that has been so hotly debated occasioned by the need to move
families to accommodate the Three Gorges Dam project.
Yet another difficulty in developing this area comes from the reality that local
cadres are not motivated. They have long struggled with limited resources, low pay,
and very limited achievements for their hard work. In an attempt to meet mandated
standards and quotas, many jurisdictions incurred large debt, with which present
officials must now contend. In areas that are slightly better off, corruption and
powerful gangs seem to be the way of things. In the poorer regions, no one wants the
cadre jobs, preferring to seek work outside. Often the priorities are very clear and
specific - e.g., roads, running water, electrification and TV cable. Those cadres who
achieve some of those goals manage to get by, but in the poorer areas, being a cadre
can mean only failure: low pay and none of the respect and prestige that normally
accompanies a leadership role. The resulting tension between cadres and peasants is
an everyday fact of life.
Finally, the causes and end results of all of these other factors combine to create a
fatalistic and disheartened population. The elder locals recall that under the commune
system there were social programs that kept everyone busy and fed. The education
process was continuous, feeding them a blend of ideology and farm technology and
pulling them together for useful community projects. There were no criminal gangs,
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the mysticism associated with religion was kept at a minimum, and the people were
too busy to spend most of their time playing mahjong. Except in the wealthier areas
surrounding Chengdu, there are virtually no cultural or social activities to lift the spirit.
Local cadres are neither able to collect taxes and fees nor to provide goods and
services, so contact with the peasants is nearly nonexistent. This means that the
people lose faith in their local leaders, and the cadres lose touch with the reality of
peasant life. In the absence of resources, only ideology, spiritual inspiration or pure
charisma can marshal a community to work on collective activities such as the
maintenance or improvement of the irrigation projects. While ideology and spiritual
inspiration once motivated the peasants, those forces no longer have much influence.
County S
County S is in the center of the Sichuan Basin, about 16 km from Chengdu. It is
ranked as one of China's one hundred-strongest counties. It contains twenty-six towns
and a population of 840,000 people. Unlike most of the counties in Sichuan, S is
unique by virtue of having a very solid transportation network of airports, highways
and a railway network. Its population is overwhelmingly rural - about 500,000 people,
or 60 percent of its population. A key advantage for this county is its proximity to the
markets of Chengdu, the major urban population center in this province. The county
embarked on a program to improve a hundred villages several years ago and also
established ten exemplary villages at that time. The project began with a construction
plan, then moved to establish a supportive rural industry, all designed to provide better
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living conditions for area peasants. The project made lands available because of
displaced peasants, which began to attract industry. The project also attracted funds
from provincial and national governments as part of its experimentation in building a
"new countryside." These investments from higher levels of government and different
ministries meant that help was arriving from every direction. The county has
continued to create its model villages and by the end of 2006 expects to have about
thirty.420
TownS
Town S is forty kilometers away from both the county seat and Chengdu, but
because of its location in the hilly region in the southeast part of the county, it lacks
the advantages of its neighbors to the north that have prospered because of their
proximity to urban markets. Yet, all the villages in the town are linked by good roads.
Furthermore, it has an advanced water conservation system and is linked by good
communications networks. It contains 39.7 km that include 20,443 mu of arable land.
It has six villages containing a population of about 20,000. It is an area with a rich
tradition and local culture, and it is blessed with much natural beauty.
When the town began its development planning it was led by the county
government to build its economy around its natural environment, cultural traditions
and as an appealing tourist destination. Its industrial parks were linked to the nearby
airport and the local highway network. Local people were guided to plant peaches and
420

Source was from its county government web page.
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dates and to raise rabbits, goats and dairy cattle. As the town developed this
standardized approach to local business, it also organized and trained the peasants in
crop management for its new crops and how to handle and package the produce in a
manner that would be appealing to its urban customer base.
Village N
One of the town's villages, a previously poor and backward hilly village, has
become an experimentation site for the Ministry of Agriculture. Agriculture tourism
was advocated for the village, built around flowers and small animals in natural
settings that would attract visitors. One peasant family spoke of the rise of tourism in
the area. Because of its history and natural beauty, it is attracting more and more
visitors from Chengdu and other cities, and the trend has been encouraged by outside
investment in restaurants, entertainment and sports facilities as well as a network of
rural hotels. Some of the farmers feature "U-Pick" fruits and vegetables, which are
very popular with visitors, and others sell potted plants. These products are very
popular as gifts and have never been seen before in this region. Development
continues in the form of training programs to teach peasants how to add to their
incomes. The goal is to leave each person between the ages of eighteen and forty five
with at least one or two practical skills that will make it easier for them to find work.
In 2005, the town production value was more than ¥81 million. Its total
agricultural production was almost ¥72 million and more than half of this came from a
fast-growing poultry industry. Local investment was more than ¥17 million with an
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additional ¥20 million going to fixed assets. The average peasant income was more
than ¥4,400, compared to ¥2,800 for the province as a whole, and to the ¥4,766
reported in County S.
The success of the town and village leaders has changed the attitudes of local
peasants toward their government. After years of failure and bad luck, prosperity
finally came to the town and a partnership developed between the community and its
leaders. The progress has been sufficiently robust to attract some who left earlier to
find outside work back to their villages to participate in the newfound prosperity.
Competition between peasants and cadres has been replaced by a collaborative spirit
and marked by two-way communications in the place of ultimatums and directives. It
isn't difficult to understand that now that leaders no longer come around with their
hands out to collect, but with their hands full of benefits, they are welcome. The new
fiscal policies have made it difficult for leaders to abuse their power, thus removing
another irritant from the relationship between cadres and their communities.
After visiting the prosperous regions and villages of County S the next stop was
in County Y, an area that is lower on the development ladder, but still not poor. It is
east of the Sichuan central basin, is home to 1.15 million people, and was ranked No.
99 among the 100 strongest counties in western China. (These ratings considered
more than 900 counties in their rankings). More than 93 percent of its land is middle
and low hilly land. Eighty-nine percent of its population is rural. Although the county
has experienced a double-digit growth rate in its economy during recent years, it
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began from a lower base and still lags those regions that are now quite advanced in
their industrialization. As mentioned earlier, the County Y per capita GDP was 20
percent of County S's in 2005. The gross industrial output of the county is often less
than a well-developed town in China's east. Because it is lagging the more prosperous
areas, I considered it as providing valuable information about regions in China that are
still struggling to advance their economies and improve living conditions.
Town P — Setting
Town P is located in the southwest region of County Y. It is better situated with
respect to the highway system than other nearby towns and therefore has more wealth
and accordingly more political clout than its neighbors. An expressway is under
construction that will shorten the travel time to Chongqing from five hours to about
two hours. There are also navigable waterways on which goods and produce can
arrive and be shipped from the town to nearby villages, towns and cities. The town is
about 300 km from Chengdu (a four-hour express bus ride, followed by an additional
hour on local roads). The town contains 43.24 km2 and twenty-six villages, and has a
population approaching 40,000, including 35,000 rural residents. The climate is
humid and temperate with an average temperature of 17.6 C°. Its per capita arable
land is .84 mu, mostly on hillsides. The cash crops are rice, wheat, corn, sweet
potatoes, edible oil crops, silkworm cultivation and vegetables.
Silkworms and orange trees have been the traditional money-making sidelines for
the local peasants in this area, although the price of silk fiber dropped several years
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ago and many peasants gave up on the silk market. Although the price of silk has
recovered, it is still considered too risky a crop and many prefer to leave the land to
find other work. A similar problem occurred with the orange groves. Although there
was a brisk market where local oranges could be sold for a profit, the local fruit is not
quite as sweet and is not faring well in competition with oranges that are arriving from
southern China. After struggling with this problem for a few years, the local farmers
ended up uprooting and removing the orange trees. County leaders have been
attempting to guide the farmers to plant a new strain of good oranges, but the memory
of past failures is making it a tough sell. Orange groves produce nothing but costs for
a few years until they begin bearing real fruit. The up-front costs, the delay in
receiving any income, and the apparent risk associated with a selective market mean
the farmers have not taken to the project, even though the county is providing
subsidies to encourage the shift.
About 15,000 people have left the town to find outside work, and of the ¥2,700
average per capita income, about half of it is estimated to come from migrant earnings.
The men and women both leave their homes to the older generation and the children.
There are lands that are lying unused. A local private company processes river sand
and stone for use as building materials and highway construction. Since road
construction is expected to continue, this business is expected to grow, creating jobs
and income for the local economy.
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Rural development
In pre-reform days during the 1970s, grains had become the only means for"
peasants to earn a living on their communes. Local farmers were at a disadvantage in
this process, as their fields were hilly and the soils in poor condition. Sometimes all
there was to eat was rice and sweet potatoes, and sometimes families went hungry.
Under centralized control and procurement, the communes were required to meet a
grain production quota. If there was a shortage, communes sometimes had to buy
grains from others to make up the difference, reducing the available income.
The system was not intended to drive people to starvation, so that if families did
not have enough to eat, an allowance consisting of a grain allotment and a script that
was used in place of money were combined to allow families to purchase enough grain
for household use. Grains that came back from the higher levels were called
"returned" grains and were allocated in accordance with need. During those years,
Town P often had to depend on such returned grains. There were no acceptable
private sources of income in those days, but those who had relatives in urban areas
sometimes received used clothing or a little money they could use to buy something
like a pair of breeding pigs that might raise a little cash for other necessities.
Town P is isolated, not only by its location, but also by its lack of infrastructure.
Wherever local people want to go, they must walk. Whatever they want to bring to
market, they must carry on their shoulders. Facing such hardships, local people
regularly choose to leave for other regions for work. Many seek a place where they
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can sell their simple skills such as making cotton fiber, repairing knives and tailoring.
People tend to follow others who have left and found some success, often meeting and
marrying in their new locations and taking up permanent residency. Although this
migratory tendency has been pervasive for decades, after the 1980s a combination of
increasing freedom and improved information flow has revealed the sharp gap in
living standards, and the younger generations have turned away from the harsh lives of
their youth and their parents and responded to the lure of urban life. Some who have
no land have been forced to leave because of provisions of the land contract law that
fix property rights for long periods of time. Migration has not always been a positive
experience, however. As we have seen, migrant workers have tended to face
exploitative practices in the cities, and have not had access to basic public services.
Yet they continued to leave their peasant homes despite the hardships, and they now
have hope that things will get better, thanks to new legislation, policies and programs
to help migrant workers.421
Beginning in 1982 towns in this area began implementing the "household
responsibility system" which was linked to production quotas, and represented a step
away from communes and other collective kinds of farming. The government
encouraged a diversified economy, and in this area silkworm cultivation and pig
farming became popular. County Y was designated one of the major "lean meat" pig
421

For example, the new PRC Labor Contract Law passed by the Standing Committee of the National
People's Congress on June 29,2007, which took effect on January 1, 2008, makes detailed provisions
to protect migrant workers from employers' abuse and punish officials who ignore labor abuses with
prison time or other penalties. More and more local governments create many programs such as
housing, children education and training available for migrant workers.
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breeding areas designed to acquaint the area with its new products. It also was a major
beneficiary of the provincial government's "help poverty" programs. In 1988 the
county became a producing base for silkworms within the province. Town P had a
large collective silk factory that occupied more than 50 mu, and numerous small silk
factories also sprouted in the region. By the early 1990s, the town's rural industry was
well developed, but it was limited by primitive transportation and communications.
This was also a time for caution because the market was just beginning to find itself
and was still viewed as risky with lots of traps for the unknowing and lacking many of
the rules and standards that make a market stable. Under these conditions, everyone
was being very conservative, and investments which might have assured survival,
growth and prosperity were not being made - not by the government, not by private
investors and not by the banks. The silk industry in the town collapsed and the large
silk factory and most of the small ones closed their doors in bankruptcy. The market
price of pork never rose to match the rising costs of raising the pigs. In this town, the
people turned away from silkworms and pigs and toward vegetables and rabbits,
which have continued to show promise. By a very natural process of socialization and
affiliation, voluntary farm organizations began to form that were later to become the
kind of cooperatives that served the population well and were eventually encouraged
and supported by the town government.
Township Party

government

The local CCP organization played a leadership role in Town P through such
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means as experimenting with improved seeds and developing an agriculture support
structure. While it is difficult and often impossible for individual farmers to
experiment to develop farming improvements, party members learn of improvements
through their natural affiliations with neighboring governments and party
organizations. In 2004, for example, newly elected town leaders learned that in some
areas peasants had turned away from rice and begun cultivating green pepper, with a
substantial increase in income. In interventions of the kind Adam Smith might have
disapproved, the town government set a bottom selling price for the green peppers,
and provided additional support in the form of a ¥50 subsidy per mu for lands that
were converted to the production of green peppers. This market intervention by the
government fared better than previous attempts. Although the peasants had become
cautious about government programs and were reluctant to take this approach at first,
the party members and leaders led the way on their own farms. In the first year of this
program, more than two thirds of the green pepper crop came from the local cadres.
But with their early success, local farmers began to accept the program.
After some trial and error and progress that was limited by local conditions, many
local farmers began to achieve a small measure of prosperity, but felt they had reached
an earnings plateau. In response to this condition, the town organized an "investment
advisory group" of more than twenty of the most successful farm households. This
group was given responsibility for staying in touch with villagers and providing useful

information, technology and other advice to advance the state of farming on a more
generalized basis. They introduced superior seeds and breeding stocks, as well as soil
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treatments and other useful technologies, and gradually but convincingly improved
local access to and knowledge about markets.
The arrangements and progress resulted in very positive feedback and increased
unity on the part of local peasants. For example, fifty-four peasants came together and
invited the most successful rabbit breeder to help as their investment advisor. The
sales of rabbits for breeding purposes and as meat for the grocery store shelves was
brisk, earning each of the households ¥6,000 each year. A similar example developed
when 100 peasants were guided by a very successful farmer to rotate their crops with
seasonal and out-of-season vegetables. Many of these sold outside of the town,
bringing in combined revenues of more than ¥100,000 the first year.422
Programs such as these often demonstrated a generalized improvement in local
conditions. But there are always those who feel bypassed, and in this town there were
those who felt the advisory committee provided only the wealthiest families with
additional opportunities to gain from the work of their poor neighbors. The town
government said it supported local agrarian investment with about ¥100,000 yuan in
2004, but some of the people I interviewed were not aware of any such investment and
had not received any such assistance themselves. Here were the same forces at work
at a micro level that were creating an income gap at a macro level in China discriminatory policies and programs are always in evidence.
Another interesting program involves cadres directly in the well-being of poor
422

Source was from official introduction in the town and also was found in its official documents
copied later.
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families. The program is called lianpin bangkun zhidu which means "contact people
and help poverty." In County Y, each county leader takes responsibility for two poor
peasant households, offering financial and other support and guidance. This program
is not unique to Sichuan; it is quite popular throughout China. Obviously it matters to
the towns and those peasant families which officials have been assigned to help them,
as some guides may not be much better off than themselves, while some officials
(finance, transportation, utilities) have real power to mobilize resources that can make
a significant difference. In addition to providing small financial donations and goods
such as food and clothing, these leaders can pave the way to connect good students
with funding opportunities for higher education, for example, and are also in a position
to identify and possibly take measures to correct local problems. The help for one or
two families is not insignificant, but is further enhanced by the improved
communications links and much better information at an official level about life in the
rural areas in their communities.
Cadres and peasants
Most of the towns and villages in this area have debt, some of it very significant up to several hundred million yuan. The biggest source of this debt burden comes
from "face projects." In 1993, for example, County Y was operationally transferred to
a new city which was the home town of one of China's pioneer leaders. In order to
honor the great man, local towns were ordered to pave their roads and streets by the
end of 1994. Many of the local towns simply didn't have the funds to support that
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construction, so they had no choice but to borrow. They borrowed from local citizens,
from businesses and from local bank branches, and have never had the wherewithal to
repay those debts. There was another movement called "brightness projects" which
was intended to show prosperity. It involved such projects as erecting expensive street
lights, the creation or beautification of parks and the planting of trees. In many places
this work was expected to help attract outside investment and was reasonably expected
to show a return. In some parts of China, this gamble paid off, but in this region it was
simply another generator of debt and it consumed money that could have been spent
on the digging of wells or other more meaningful improvements.
In August 1997 the county was designated by Sichuan Province as a beneficiary
of a special program called "building financial resources for counties in poor financial
condition." After 1999, central policies began to be adjusted to reduce the peasants'
burden by reducing taxes and fees, and local sources of revenues to the government
began to dry up. Today the town government is dependent upon transfer payments
from higher levels for its operating expenses. Unlike many of the other towns I have
visited, Town P has another major source of revenues and incentives - fines that are
collected for violations of the state's one-child policy. Medical care is still poor in this
town, although cooperative medical care programs have been initiated elsewhere
within the province. Although all towns were to be covered by this program by 2006,
as of February 2006, town leaders still had no inkling when the program would reach

their town. Officials did not know where the money would come from to pay for the
government's share of the medical program costs.
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As in other provinces, Sichuan has its share of experimental programs and
"model" sites that are singled out for special attention and assistance. For the selected
locations, the benefits can be substantial. In County Y, seven villages in the two towns
that I've been discussing were selected for comprehensive agricultural development
projects. During the last few months of 2005 and the first two months of 2006 the
county invested ¥6 million, which benefited about 1,500 households. Twelve hillside
water collection basins were constructed; 25,600 meters of ditches and piping in thirty
two different drainage and irrigation systems were repaired or improved; 18 km of
new roads were constructed; 2,000 mu of local farmland received soil treatments;
141,000 improved quality fruit seedlings were planted, and 3,000 kg of improved
quality rice seeds were distributed at no cost to the farmers.423
In another program, sixteen towns were selected to implement methane gas
production and harvesting programs, using treated waste products from all sources. In
this project, the county invested ¥1.8 million in those towns resulting in 1,837 gas
systems. Since each system can reduce coal consumption by about 1,200 kg per year,
individual households can save more than ¥650 each year, and the environment also
benefits from the cleaner burning gas. In the project towns, households received
subsidies approaching ¥1,000, while in other towns each household received only
¥100. Once again, the programs are discriminatory in that they help widen the gap
between wealthier and poorer households. It is understandable that because of their

expense, programs such as these would need to be implemented in stages, and it's
423

Source wasfromthe official document in the township government.
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necessary to begin somewhere. In general, though, interviewees left a solid
impression that investment tends to find its way toward areas that already have some
advantages rather than flowing to the poorest villages and towns. It was not possible
to determine whether the selections were based on some measure of predictable
success or some degree of political influence.
After some important mistakes early in China's reform, it has become an
accepted practice that cadres take responsibility for providing peasants with very
specific advice and coaching about their crops. Cadres consider the peasants to be too
conservative and guilty of thinking small. The peasants, on the other hand, are not
convinced cadres have much interest in the well-being of the people, but are more
interested in advancing their own careers to access better jobs in the town
governments where the work and living environments are better. The people believe
this motivation affects government leaders at all levels - characterized not by a desire
to improve the lot of their communities but by the opportunity to look good and
thereby increase the probability of promotion. I asked peasants in the town to
introduce me to town leaders, and my purpose for being there was immediately
suspect. They suggested I listen to the people instead of the leaders. Leaders
exaggerate their achievements and lie about their problems, I was told.
Village B—Setting
There was no road between Town P and its Village B. I walked with the villagers
on a rise between fields and rice paddies. It was a distance of about 15 km. The
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pathway was once covered with slate paving stones which made it possible for people
and domestic animals to travel relatively easily, but with the demise of the communes,
the stones became a ready source of raw materials for private use, and gradually
disappeared. Now when it rains or snows the path turns to mud and the walking
becomes very difficult. Isolation has its advantages. The village was very quiet and
peaceful, and the scenery quite pleasant. The village was green with foliage and
surrounded by a checkerboard of fields and rice paddies. Much of the land appeared to
be very wet. There was a wide a variety of bamboo, some of which was quite unusual.
Many of the homes in the village looked quite new, contrary to expectation in this
remote corner of Sichuan.
The village was once a small brigade. It now consists of 106 households. The
brigade once owned 84 mu of arable land, 30 mu of which was seized by the
government as part of its new expressway to Chongqing. The villagers farm rice,
wheat and sweet potatoes as their major crops. There is no rural industry in the village,
nor has there ever been. About half of the population has departed to find work in
Guangzhou, Fujian and other faraway places. Those who manage to accumulate some
savings return to build or upgrade their homes, which explains their new appearance.
Many who leave do not return. One of the more successful returned peasants wants to
help build roads.
The local television station has arranged a special program to help the departed
ones stay in touch with their families, mostly seniors and children. A very bright and
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outgoing eight year old girl and a group of her friends were driven by curiosity to
come forward. During the ensuing conversation, it surfaced that none of the children
had seen their parents for several years. It was determined later that many children are
doing badly in school, and there is broad concern that without parental supervision,
these children were being deprived of a basic need that would likely adversely affect
their schooling and other aspects of their development.
Previously, the aged, the infirm and others without means of support were
provided the basic necessities by the communes: food, clothing, medical care, fuel and
burial expenses. Today each villager contributes 20 jin of rice each year to help with
those expenses.
There were many rice paddies lying idle, and that seemed unusual, given the
current incentives for farming. Planting rice also brings in ¥14-¥17 per mu annual
subsidy. Because the terrain is hilly, mechanization is not possible. The cost of seeds,
fertilizers and other supplies continues to increase, and because only the seniors and
children are left the work the land, it's also necessary to contract for labor, even for the
small plots. It no longer is worth the effort. Those who left to find work elsewhere
were unwilling to leave their land for use by others, but wish to lease the rights to
others, typically at a rate of ¥80-¥100 per mu per year - a fee that most of the villagers
were unwilling to pay for such a low yield, high-risk return.
Price paid for development
There was a controversy boiling during the interviews in this village. More than
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30 mu of arable land was seized in 2005 to become part of a highway complex now
under construction. There were two benefits in that exchange. Importantly, the
villagers have dreamed of a better access to the outside world such as would arrive
with the new highway. Secondly, the compensation for the seized lands was about
¥800,000, from which each household presumably had a share. In July 2006, the
villagers were told that ¥150,000 of the payment would be held by the village to cover
potential fines for violation of the population control policies and to cover future
burial expenses. The villagers were watching the money very closely and it seemed
all of them protested at the government's "grab" from what they viewed as their
compensation. The villagers who are present in the village really don't have the
influence to resist the government, while those who are away at work consider it too
risky to invest the time and travel expenses to return to fight for their share of the
money.
In another interesting development, the village leaders wanted to take this
opportunity to divest themselves of responsibility for some of their villagers. From a
village perspective, if a family has lost its land and accepted compensation for that
land, then the connection to the land has been severed, and those involved should
change their identity from peasant to non-peasant, or nongzhuanfei.

The effect of

this change would be to reduce the long-term care responsibility of the village and
place the citizens within the state social security system, entitling them to some
retirement benefits at the age of 60 for men and 55 for women. Since the villagers
need to pay to belong to that social security system, many of them cannot afford or do
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not want to pay. In this part of China, attraction to the land is a much more powerful
force than was seen in other parts of China, so that although the villagers want the
money for the lost lands, they are reluctant to surrender all attachment to those lands.
This issue offered an opportunity to better understand local politics. Local people
were questioned about what kind of support they were receiving from local cadres.
The villagers were quite unanimous in saying they do not trust their local cadres to
represent village interests. It turned out that the full story was more complex than that.
In local elections in 2003, two favored candidates received more votes than the
candidates nominated by the township government, but the township government
overturned the election and appointed its nominated candidate to the position. For the
people in that village the terms democracy and election hold no meaning. It has
become a useless exercise following which the high levels of government will do what
they want to do, no matter the outcome of the election. In a probe to learn what the
villagers who had lost their lands would do next, they said they did not believe anyone
in any level of government would serve as their advocate and that they could expect
nothing good as an outcome. They expected trouble if took their case to a higher
authority, so they were simply awaiting the final outcome quite passively.
Village cadres and birth control policy
As in the previous cases, payment for village cadres varies from region to region
because of differences in average rural income. In 2006, minimum cadre pay was
increased and is determined by the village living conditions in Sichuan province.
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Monthly compensation for cadres in plains areas is fixed at ¥300; in hill areas, ¥230;
¥200 in mountain areas; and ¥260 in minority nationality regions. Each village can
have up to four cadres who are compensated at these levels. Team leaders earn ¥150
in plains areas, ¥115 in hilly villages, ¥100 in the mountains and ¥130 in minority
nationality areas. These standards can be adjusted with the growth of the local
economy. Villages are allocated operating subsidies as well: ¥4,000 in plains areas;
¥3,500 in hilly regions; ¥3,000 in mountainous areas; and ¥4,000 in minority
nationality villages. The subsidies for compensation and for operating expenses are
covered by the county government, though under some circumstances, city or
provincial governments may provide some assistance; but normally cadre
compensation is dependent upon the financial health of the county.
In village B, the cadres earned ¥100-¥200 per month for time spent on village
business before the recent increases. That small remuneration really couldn't attract
people to the job, but there were often other little perquisites that made it worthwhile.
Perhaps a cadre would be allocated a little more land for farming, or perhaps a better
site on which to build a home. The prestige factor made a difference here - allowing
cadres to host and get to know higher level officials on their visits and to be seen with
them. The job created an opportunity to build a personal network and added to a
cadre's own value on the networks of others. In Village B, cadres keep 40 percent of
the fines that are levied for violations of the population control policy. The fines are

apparently "adjustable" depending on the wealth or influence of the guilty party.
Those who are not well connected may be fined ¥8,000 - ¥10,000, while those who
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are close to the cadres might pay only ¥6,000. Although the fines are established in the
regulations, cadres can influence the size of the penalty by how they choose to report
the offense. It is a less serious crime, for example, to fail to obtain a birth permit
before conceiving than it is to have a second child, and in a practical sense, it is only
the cadres who are in a position to know the reality of what is going on. The overall
level of fines is set in provincial regulations and varies in relation to the average per
capita income in each county. The birth control administration agency in each county
has the authority to determine the amount of the fines or to permit the towns or
villages to set the penalties based on the provincial regulation in 2002. In Village B,
the fine was set by the town government and the income is shared between the town
(60 percent) and the village (40 percent).
Since the elimination of the agricultural tax, there are three taxes or fees that must
still be paid by the peasants: violations of birth policy, a burial fee and a fee if a
peasant slaughters a pig for household use instead of for sale. The burial expense, like
the birth control violation fine, can be adjusted to benefit those who have a connection
with the cadres. Instead of a normal fee of ¥500 to ¥1,000, a peasant might pay only
¥100-¥200.
This kind of discrimination is obviously an unfair and corrupt practice and is a
target of occasional investigations. In 2005, a team from the provincial level came to
the town specifically to investigate how the birth control policy was being managed.
The village party secretary visited all the peasant families who had been fined to make
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sure they would avoid the investigation team if possible and to be sure they "lost" the
receipts from the town for the fines they had paid. The town would be showing the
team its own record of what was happening with birth control penalty fees. The
villagers said this was a common occurrence. Obviously this was a sensitive topic. It
threatened to derail this research project, in fact. Cadres who were charming and
gracious and eager to host a tour of their villages became uncommunicative and made
it clear the direction of that conversation was not welcome.
Village life
Before 2000, peasants paid more than ¥100 annually for taxes and fees. Later the
number went down to ¥70, and by 2005 the agricultural tax and all fees were
abolished, except for the three exceptions noted above. Raising pigs is still a common
approach to making a living, but several farmers complained that costs have been
rising while selling prices have dropped, making it increasingly difficult to make a
living in this way. Crop farming is not faring any better. One gentleman said he was
over 70 years old and too infirm to manage a farm on his own. His children have all
left the farm to seek work elsewhere, so it is only the farmer and his wife at home now.
In 2005 he harvested 2,000 kg of rice from which he made a gross income of ¥1,400.
He had to hire farm labor for the planting and harvest, and that cost him half the
revenues from his crop.
With just a little bad luck from bad weather, the situation becomes intolerable. In
the summer of 2006, the temperature rose to above 42 C°, causing a drought that
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killed most of the crops. Those who had rice paddies could not plant alternative crops
like vegetables or other cash crops to try to recover from the drought. The
government announced through a provincial TV program that peasants would receive
disaster relief of ¥90 per person, but when the relief aid finally arrived, it was in the
form of a small bag of radish seeds, worth less than one yuan.424
The peasants who planted green peppers at the encouragement of government
discovered that the selling price of their crops had dropped fifty percent, from ¥1.2 to
¥.60, despite a shortage created by the drought. The government is trying to
compensate for the reduced demand and prices by exporting, perhaps to South Korea,
but this is a project that takes more time than the storage life of the peppers. The
peasants, frustrated once again by the effects of government interference, are turning
to other crops - leading the cadres to worry about the fluctuating supply and demand
and therefore the prices when all these factors hit the market and settle down.
Because of tight finances, some towns and villages were selected to demonstrate
different types of improvement projects, such as the methane gas collection system,
electrification, water systems or communications and television networks. Those
experimental towns and villages were encouraged to open their village and party
deliberations to the local peasants. Some conducted specialized training for peasants
who were leaving to find work in other areas. In County S, which is a better
developed area in the Chengdu region, officials conducted an investigation to

424

Source from interview the farmers in Village B in the Case of Sichuan.
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determine how many adults of working age, 20-45 years old, were living in the county.
Their age, education, need for training and their planned destinations to seek work
were all recorded as part of a labor survey. Based on this data, a comprehensive
training plan was developed for 70,000 peasants. In County Y, officials have
developed more than 100 training bases for peasant migrants. These centers trained
more than 20,000 peasants each year. In Village B (in County Y), the peasant
migrants that were interviewed for this research had not received any training through
official channels. They had strong ideas about the kinds of skills for which they
believed there was a demand, such as house painting, construction work or as chefs,
but they were suspicious of the advertising on television for training in those areas.
There was a story floating through the village about peasants who had spent ¥2,200 to
attend security guard training, supposedly sponsored by the police department in a
local city. When they arrived for the training, the peasants reported the "trainers" had
left and there was no training, and no one to take responsibility for the failure of the
program and the loss of their money.
Throughout the county, the towns and the villages, people were playing
Mahjongg everywhere, usually for money. The Mahjongg parlors were busy day and
night, and there were many of them. In one of the typical parlors there were five
tables and about thirty people playing or awaiting their turn. The hosts collected ¥50
per table every four hours. If the tables were active 16 hours each day, the total daily

income would be ¥1,000. The host does nothing for that money except to make space
and furniture available. Ironically, prominently posted on the wall was a warning that
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gambling was forbidden. Presumably that is a simple precaution that hosts can use as
a defense if brought up on charges. Mahjongg and TV at home and in these public
places appear to be the chief activities for these poor people.

Gansu Province
MONGOLIA

Gansu is located in northwest
China, just east of the far west
regions and south of Inner
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population lives in rural Gansu.
The population is 8.75 percent minority nationalities, consisting of Hui, Tibetan,
Dongxiang, Yugur, Baonan, Mongolian, Kazak, Tu, Salar and Manchu. The province
is 1,655 km long from east to west, and 530 km from north to south. The area is about
twice that of Great Britain. More than 70 percent of the land is mountainous and
plateau and 15 percent is desert, part of the Gobi desert ecosystem.
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Only eight percent of the land is arable, and that part is in poor condition,
consisting of 3500 mu that are hilly and arid. Water availability is one tenth of the
world average. Long-term (eight or nine year) draughts are common, so large-scale
farming is impractical. Gansu has 17,725 villages, and as of 2003,643 of those
villages did not yet have electricity. 854 were without roads. 11,515 did not have
running water. 4,997 were without phone service. 1,439 received no radio signal, and
755 are not served by television signal or cable. In the poor regions illiteracy is higher
than 34 percent and about 1.7 million have difficulty with food and clothing. Forty
three of its eighty seven cities and counties are served by the state "help-poverty"
425

programs.
According to China's official help-poverty data, since 1983 more than one third
of the program in Gansu support has gone to the area in southeast Gansu. It is in this
region that research was conducted for this project. The area is 27,900 km in size.
More than 84 percent of the population in this area lives in the countryside, compared
to 73 percent for the province and 59 percent for the state. The area is a main
transportation hub connecting Gansu with Shaanxi and Sichuan provinces. It sits
astride the Yangtze River and is the only region in Gansu to have a sub-tropical
climate. The terrain is mountainous and contains tropical, temperate and alpine
climate zones side by side. The idiom in common use to describe the extreme
variation translates to "One mountain has four seasons and the sky looks different just
425

Wang Xiaoxia, "Dingxi duibi Shunde: Zhongguo dong xifang de chaju" (Dingxi vs. Shunde: Gap
between the East and the West in China), Zhongguo jingji shibao (China Economic Times), March 8,
2006.
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10 kilometers away" (yishanyou siji, shili bu tong tian). The temperature averages 5 15 C°, and there are 400-1,000 mm of rainfall each year. The combination of
geography, topography and geology in the presence of diverse climatic conditions has
created a region that is rich in biodiversity and also contains plenty of water and large
reserves of minerals in its mountains. An area ripe for tourism, it has been called a
"treasure belt," and yet 1.59 million of its 2.71 million people live in poverty today.
This part of Gansu has eight counties and one city, and only two of the counties
are not in the Help Poverty program. The Help Poverty funds have been used for
regional comprehensive economic development, including education programs, and
are also used for specific improvement projects such as basic sanitation facilities,
irrigation, and electrification. Roads can be easily taken out of service by flooding,
landslides and mudflows during periods of heavy rains, effectively severing
transportation networks. Part of the development strategy has been to improve roads
by tunneling through the endless mountain ranges, and a bus ride from Lanzhou to this
region that once took eight hours has been shortened to about five hours since 2000. A
railway-highway corridor is now under construction between Lanzhou in Gansu and
Chongqing in Sichuan.
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TownW
Setting
This town is located in the southeast corner of the region under study, 38 km
from the nearest urban area. It contains nineteen villages and a population of about
20,000. Eighty-five percent of the people live on the hillsides, while ten homes sit
along a road that follows the river. There are four villages that have no roads to
connect with the outside and are not served by television cable. Another four villages
have unpaved roads that are subject to closure during periods of heavy rain. Some of
the houses along the road look fairly new, but most of the villagers live in poor homes
constructed of mud bricks with a wood frame - usually two rooms with dirt floors.
With a little extra money, however, the homes are improved with clay roof tiles and
the floors may receive a thin layer of poured cement, occasionally with a linoleum
cover.
There are about 1,800 mu of arable land, but only 690 mu (one third) can be
irrigated. The major crops are wheat and potatoes. In addition to farming their land,
local people take advantage of their proximity to the county's urban area to earn from
their labor. The people tried to create a fruit industry by planting tangerine trees to
take advantage of their climate, but insects and low yields offset the good prices and
that project was abandoned. At the suggestion of the government, they next tried wild
pepper which seemed ideally suited to their climate. With support from the Help
Poverty program, they supplemented their groves with olives, walnuts and herbs. For
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the last five years the region has been a major producer of wild pepper and popular
Chinese herbs that serve markets in Southeast Asia. Although the crops run hot and
cold, dependent upon the weather for yield and upon the market for prices, in recent
years the retail price of wild pepper has risen from ¥16 to ¥20 pery'm,426 and pepper
trees can produce roughly 200 kg per mu. The per capita income in this town is low at
¥1,445 per year, but is still better than the other twelve towns in this mountainous
427

region.
Although the state is in the process of implementing a country-wide program of
medical care, when I asked residents of Town W if they were seeing the benefits of
that project, the answer was everywhere the same - no such program was yet in
evidence as of 2006 in this poor region of Gansu. I was aware that the province began
experimenting with the program as early as 2003, but evidently had not yet reached
this depressed area. Because the town was formed in the merger of two smaller towns
in 2004, there are now two township hospitals with twenty two doctors and thirty eight
beds. The facilities have a poor reputation, however, with relatively primitive
equipment and capabilities. Most of the local residents seek medical care at the
county urban medical centers, about a one-hour bus ride away.
The town has a junior high school and most of its villages have elementary
schools. Before the new mandatory free education policy took effect, some of the
village schools were built by the peasants themselves. Because even the little children
426
427

The jin is a Chinese unit of weight, approximately equal to 1.1 pounds or .5 kg.
There are 36 towns in the region after the 2004 township administrative reform.
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had long walks over mountainous terrain to get to center schools, these local schools
were warmly welcomed by the peasants. Sometimes there were several grades
working concurrently in the same room. When financial conditions became difficult,
towns stopped paying the teachers in those little schools. Instead they received
payment in the form of grain at the beginning of each school term. Some of the
schools had a good reputation and high enrollments, though the facilities were
primitive and in very poor condition. The chalk board in one such school was nothing
more than a patch of wall that had been painted black.
Facilities in the public schools were considerably better, and the teachers
typically earned ten times higher salaries than the teachers hired by the peasants for
their little local schools. There are 108 teachers in public schools in this town,
including 30 in the junior high school. The central policy abolishing tuition and fees
for rural children and book and notebook fees for children from poor rural families has
been in effect since 2005. School expenses for rural children are borne by the county,
supplemented by higher level allocations when necessary. Teacher payrolls take up
more than half the town's annual revenues. Although the program seems well
intentioned, the mountainous terrain continues to create special challenges. It is
appropriate to have local schools, especially for the younger children, but there is no
policy that requires support for them, so their very existence hangs under a cloud of
uncertainty.

The town has a cooperative credit union that can help with small loans. There is
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a fanners market twice each week where people can buy and sell their goods and
limited retail products. Those who have greater needs take a bus to the county urban
area where there are many stores and supermarkets.
Peasants here apparently feel no great attachment to the land and will readily
leave for good employment elsewhere. The land contract law that mandates no
changes for 30 years means that young people have no hope for getting farmland.
Town governments are now dependent upon transfer payments from higher levels
of government because of the elimination of agricultural taxes and fees. Other taxes
and fees, as for business commercial taxes and licenses or permits, raised only
¥90,000 in 2005. In addition to the town government payroll, the town pays salaries
for technicians, professionals and administrators who are not public officials but hold
bureaucratic positions of various types. In this category we can find technology center
and medical service employees. Some of these employees charge a fee for their
services and may therefore be partially or wholly self-funded. Others are appended to
local government payrolls and paid through higher level transfer payments. Town W
received ¥820,000 from higher level governments to cover these expenses and to
cover other expenses associated with the operation of the government and for public
works. Unlike many rural towns, this one did not accumulate any debt because of
unfunded mandates from above. When institutions such as schools and the technology
promotion centers ran out of money because of the cutback in rural taxes and fees,
they simply ceased to exist.
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The township government employs seventy one people. Per capita peasant
income in 2005 was ¥1,447, which is close to the average level of the county. That
income means peasants in the town get by with just enough food and clothing and very
little for extras. There are a few private businesses including a flour mill and a forage
plant that contribute roughly ¥100,000 to the township revenues. Before the 2006
rural tax and fee reforms, the town received about ¥500,000 in tax revenues annually
from the agriculture tax and the agricultural special production tax,428 but since 2006
those revenues have disappeared.429
Starting in 2006, the town began receiving ¥100,000 in annual operating
subsidies through transfer payments. That amount was decided by the provincial
government without consideration of the size, population or location differences
between different towns. The county government considered setting larger budgets for
the larger towns, but that idea was vetoed at the provincial level. Beginning in 2007,
an additional ¥30,000 was added for hosting visitors since they are the beneficiaries of
national "help poverty" subsidies that occasion frequent inspections and auditing.
Village cadre salaries come from transfer payments but the specific amount is
determined by the county government based on the size of the village. For example, a
large village (more than 1,000 people) can have four cadres on staff whereas a village
with less than 1,000 people is only authorized to have three paid cadres. Village heads
were paid ¥1,500 in 2006, but the salary was increased to ¥2,000 in 2007. The vice
428
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Certain categories of farm products such as tobacco upon which additional taxes are levied.
Interview with Town W Party Secretary
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heads now earn ¥1,400. Each village also receives funds for an operations account:
¥2,000 for larger villages and ¥1,000 for the smaller ones. The village operating funds
can be used to purchase office supplies and cover authorized travel expenses such as
to attend party training schools for mandatory classes. As we've seen in other towns
and villages, the actual funds are managed at the next higher level of government, in
this case by the township government.430
Officials' salaries are paid through monthly transfer payments. After years of
fighting for sufficient revenues to fund government employee salaries, the transfer
payments are a welcome change. Because of these assured payments and salary
increases, cadre jobs in Town W are once again in demand.
During the last two years, the newly elected party secretary in the city has
focused on regional advantages to develop special agriculture. The per capita arable
land is 1.2 mu in the town, but along the roads, peasants only farm 0.4 mu land per
person. The peasants of Town W no longer plant grains. In the flatland areas (below
1,400 m above sea level), the town's agriculture experts have been strongly advocating
the cultivation of olive trees. In hilly areas, they advocate the planting of such crops
as wild peppers and herbs, and in the smaller plots along the roads, they recommend
the planting of off-season vegetable plots. In each case, the goal is a yield of ¥10,000
per mu.
Peasants are also encouraged to leave their lands to find other work. Beginning
430
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in 2006, the county and city governments set up employment offices in Beijing,
Shanghai, and in Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Xinjiang. Many peasants are being trained to
do housework and are sent to these places through official organizational channels.
There are also rural recruiters who travel regularly into this area to hire young, strong
peasants for urban construction projects. There were frequent reported incidents
among those peasants who sought employment on their own of being very badly
treated in harsh or unsafe occupations and often cheated out of their earnings. These
government programs help avoid those pitfalls. After a year of hard work, peasants
can earn about ¥10,000. The town has 4,400 households; most households have at
least one person working as migrant workers, while some households have two. Of
that number, about 2,000 do not come home regularly while the rest find nearby odd
jobs and are often at home, particularly during planting and harvest seasons. The
manpower drain caused by this migration makes farming particularly onerous, leaving
older family members and sometimes women to take care of the family and the
farming work as well. Relatives and neighbors are encouraged to help, and cadres and
party members are required to "volunteer" to help.
Under the national Help-Poverty program, the town is overseeing village
improvements through subsidies of ¥500,000 - ¥600,000. The funds are used for
infrastructure improvements such as new or improved roads, water supply systems,
and electrification, as well as projects directed at improved farming and breeding

operations. There is an intent to use the funds not only to improve local conditions,
but also to hire local people to do the work. The World Bank also has funded projects
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to improve production and living conditions. Beginning in 2004, the central
government sharply increased anti-poverty investment, and city and county
governments have provided planning and leadership.
Capacity development has reportedly included human capital development, not
only in the school and public health programs, but also in training programs for young
adults several times each year. Village cadres are required to hold monthly meetings
to discuss village affairs and policy from all levels of government. All village
meetings are open to the public.
Peasants receive direct grain subsidies from the central government based on the
size of arable lands they farm. The subsidy has amounted to ¥11 per mu per year.
There are also 4,800 mu of lands that are in the process of being reforested.
Government policy compensates the farmers for such land conversions with 300 jin of
grains per mu. In terms of income, that equates to about ¥210 per mu, and adding the
subsidized medical insurance, farmers receive about ¥230 per mu each year. "Ecoforests" are subsidized for eight years, while commercial forests (periodically
harvested) are subsidized for five years. Each household is guaranteed at least one mu
for planting. There is not much money left at the town and village level for other
subsidies or incentives, so the governments do not have much influence over the
selection of crops or farming methods.431
Village cadres in Town W are selected by the villages and certified or approved
431
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by the township government. Township officials must qualify for their positions by
examination. The party secretary of Town W is a retired military man. He has been in
township government for sixteen years, and has been party secretary for six years. He
spoke about how difficult it has been to work at this level of government. The harsh
natural conditions mean that there are few resources and depleted manpower. In the
meantime, the central government's push to improve rural conditions means the
demands become more specific and the supervision becomes closer and closer. The
increased investment means there are increasing demands for visible achievements,
but the soil and climate are still harsh and many of the town's people are still leaving
to improve their own family conditions.
The party secretary has the same opinion about peasants that leaders all over
China have. He considers peasants to be very conservative in their view of change, to
seldom think beyond their personal conditions and traditions, and to be generally
easily satisfied with small gains. He attributes the town's slow progress to this lack of
enthusiasm and lack of a forward vision. He believes the peasants trust him because,
he claims, he keeps them informed about policy and because he has accomplished
worthy goals in the form of sponsored projects. As examples, he stated he was able to
obtain subsidized materials for roads and other rural projects like electrification, even
though he was unable to obtain funds because those are controlled at higher levels.
When peasants can furnish the labor, the materials he has "found" are put to good use,

and he thereby earns peasant trust. Beginning in 2007, county and township leaders
are evaluated in part based on the level of investment they are able to attract to their
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jurisdictions. He said that leaders at the county level are required to show a ¥10
million project each year. He proudly reported he had negotiated a ¥100 million
hydroelectric project for his township.
This interviewee reported a decline in the number of local specialized
departments such as the various institutions and centers of expertise {qizhan basuo).
That kind of work may be staffed by one or two employees, but the small staff limits
their capacity, so township cadres are handling that kind of work with support from the
county level.
By way of summary, the town party secretary claimed that conditions in Town L
are improving. Peasants are encouraged to see doctors in the township hospital
instead of traveling to comity facilities. The encouragement comes in the form of
reduced reimbursements. Since September 2006, compulsory education is free and
children for poor families also are given free textbooks. The township is holding its
first "Wild Pepper Festival" which he believes will attract consumers and expand the
market for a crop that seems to be well suited to the local growing conditions and is
finding a welcome in the market for specialty crops.
Village B
Village B is located five kilometers east of town W. Per capita arable land in
Village B is 1.2 mu. Most of the land is on hills and the soil is poor. The road follows
a river valley and connects the village with the town and other neighboring villages.
Because of the road, villagers easily travel to and from odd jobs in the urban areas. A
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dagong or big job can earn them ¥40 per day, while xiaogong or little jobs typically
earn ¥20-¥25. These earnings are much more than they can gain from farming their
fields. It is a common arrangement for the older residents and women to tend the
crops while the men travel to their work in nearby towns. During peak workloads on
the farms, such as planting or harvest seasons, the men stay home or return to their
farms until the work is done.
An assistant investigator in the city's statistics bureau in Village B said the only
thing he regretted about leaving his family farm was that he did not leave earlier.
Interestingly, he still feels a stigma associated with wanting more money - that he
knew how he felt about it, but felt others were looking down upon him for that
motivation. In his first work, he handled and maintained large glass bottles of the kind
used in industrial welding. He was paid ¥400 per month for that work, enough to buy
wheat for three people for six months. Like many, he was forced to settle for small
jobs at first because he had no skills or training to qualify him for positions higher up
on the ladder. The job search process is a team effort, with husbands helping wives
and men helping younger brothers. In the meantime all are willing to work hard and
are always alert to recognize new opportunities and thus finding their way to higher
paying work.
The elimination of the agricultural taxes and fees did not represent a very long
stride in making smallholder farms pay in this region. Fertilizers and other supplies
are costly because of transportation costs into these remote areas. The subsidy for
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farming is about ¥8 per year, which is insignificant, even added to the favorable swing
in cash flow that came with the tax reductions. The condition of the soil and the low
motivation of the peasants mean that many arable fields have fallen into disuse. Some
grain plots are being reforested because villagers receive ¥300 per year from the state
for this program. The peasants were not certain how long those subsidies will
continue.
As in most of the poorer villages, there is always a temptation to "adjust" official
reports in an attempt to increase grants and subsidies. In this village, peasants are told
to report higher figures for reforested area to gain higher subsidies. The extra income
does not go to the peasants, but is retained in the local treasury to help with operating
expenses. Because of their complicity, the villagers cannot report the wrong-doing.
Visitors from higher levels of government are always directed to the home of the
village leader upon arrival. Others do not wish to communicate with higher levels, in
part because they have become pessimistic that any good can come from above after
all the years of predatory behavior. In this village, it became difficult to recruit village
cadres after the onset of the household responsibility system because they no longer
received reimbursement for their expenses. Villages were still organized into teams
for special projects such as recruiting militia or repairing infrastructure facilities, so
cadres were still required to spend time in those kinds of activities, but were doing so
with no pay. When higher level leaders came for inspections or visits, they expected
to be hosted for their meals, and village cadres found themselves paying for those
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expenses out of their own pockets. Additionally, it was rare to see any return for those
investments and activities. People began refusing the job. After 2003, village leaders,
including the village head, the village party secretary and a clerical assistant began
receiving money from the town in return for the time spent managing these and other
public affairs of the village. The additional prestige also began to pay off in the form
of a small amount of additional land or higher quality lands for their homes and farms.
Beginning in the mid-1980s, and especially since 1999, this area has been the
target of state poverty alleviation programs, and projects are in evidence throughout
the region. Despite this influx of jobs and money, the peasants suspect there is guanxi
(social network) power at work behind the scenes that determines the allocation of
relief funds and projects, as opposed to any assessment of need. They pointed, for
example, to a nearby village which is even more isolated and at a higher elevation in
the mountains, but which already has electrical power, a luxury to which village B
does not yet have access. Villagers know that the completed project higher up the
mountain was more expensive and difficult, and cannot understand why it received a
higher priority. In fact they believe they do understand.
In another example, villagers reported the case of a remote village where water
was not available except from a small spring located some distance away. In addition
to the distance to carry the water over hilly country, villagers needed to wait in a queue
for the slow running spring to fill their containers. It seemed it would be relatively
inexpensive to create a small storage tank and piping system to serve the villages in
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the area, but the county has not responded to requests for this assistance and villagers
have become discouraged they will not get this assistance.
As a result of conditions like these two examples, villagers place a very high
premium on leaders who understand thepao xiangmu ("run for projects") approach to
gaining support from the government. Leaders are valued who have the kinds of
networks that can make them aware of new policies quickly and can support
aggressive efforts to capitalize on them before the funds or other resources are
allocated to others. They believe that their problems are of such significance and that
their resources are so inadequate that solutions to most problems can only come from
government, and they see their leaders' effectiveness as linked to their ability to "win
the race" for government money. This view of leadership also extends to international
governmental (IGO) sources of money such as the ADB, the World Bank and UNDP.
Leaders are also expected to set aside their own interests and work for the benefit of
the village as a whole - devoting time and leadership to the common good.
The government is taking its responsibility for successful projects seriously,
sending investigators to assure that the projects are real and serving real needs,
whether the funds come from government or from IGOs. In Village B, the county
water works bureau furnished the cement and the villagers furnished the labor to make
one or two muqinjiao or "mother pits" in each village as an improvement project.
Mother pits are basins built to catch rainfall that can be used for washing and laundry,
for example. The costs were low and the project helped many villagers. Part of the
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problem with getting utilities such as electricity and running water into these areas is
the wide dispersion of the people. It is the reason for central schools and central
facilities such as these mother pits. This is precisely the kind of project welcomed by
both the local governments and the villagers.
Unlike in many parts of China, there are no direct elections in Village B. Village
heads are appointed by the town government. The villagers can complain, but the
final resolution is invariably a series of persuasive meetings that are repeated until
there is a compromise - which means the town's appointments are accepted. The
town still must take appointments seriously because incompetent leaders cannot do a
good job of handling problems. The result is that town officials must face and take
care of issues that should be handled at the village level. It was evident in the
interviews that part of the difficulty springs from the reality that educated and talented
people leave the villages early to seek better opportunities. It's a new form of
extraction that deals in human capital.
The extent to which village leaders are personally involved in public problems is
illustrated by an incident related by the party secretary in a village that is close to
Village B.432 One of the female villagers who had already given birth began to show
signs of another pregnancy. When her condition was reported, an official from the
town government was dispatched to supervise an abortion - a procedure which the
lady resisted for days and finally ran away to escape. She was found at the home of a
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The information is from the town party secretary and local people in the village and the town.
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relative and delivered to a local hospital where she was diagnosed not as pregnant, but
as having a massive abdominal tumor. Of course the official from the town
government disappeared, leaving the party secretary to straighten out the embarrassing
mess. The lady's family moved her into the party secretary's home to be cared for
until he could arrange and pay the ¥2,000 for the surgery that could cure her condition.
This incident is illustrative of the extent to which local officials and cadres must go to
prevent reports from reaching higher levels of government.
The research trail ledfrom Town W to county C
I mentioned earlier that two of Gansu's southeast counties are not involved in the
state Help Poverty program. I went by bus from Town B to one of those two
counties - County C. More than 60 percent of the county's residents are
comparatively well off and some are closing in on real prosperity. The average
income in County C was ¥2,000 per peasant in 2005, and more than half of that
income typically came from farming. The county is characterized by good roads to
nearby cities and counties and sits on the intersection of two China's major rail lines,
so its transportation network is a key advantage for the region. County C has received
¥74 million for its reforestation efforts and industrial development from the state. The
county budget and its ability to raise additional funds through such means as
exchanging preferential policy in return for special subsidies contributed about ¥6
million that was specifically dedicated to "special" agriculture - so designated because
it is a unique capability or product line that is worth nurturing.
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TownD
Setting
Town D is 13 km east of the county urban area. It sits in the center of a relatively
fertile basin formed by surrounding hills and mountains. It encompasses 66.7 km ,
has a semi-humid and warm temperate climate, and has about 29,295 mu of arable
land. The average year-round temperature is about 12 degrees C, and the frost-free
season lasts about 212 days. There are about 720 mm of rain each year and the
relative humidity averages about 74 percent. The river that splits the area flows at an
annual rate of about 5 billion m3. The water table is at a depth of 1-2 meters
throughout the area, so drought is not a concern in this town. There are no nearby
industrial zones or mining operations, so the water and the air are very clean. There
are three graded roads that connect the town with surrounding towns and cities.433
Economic data
The town has 15 villages and a population of about 17,000 divided into 79 teams.
The per capita arable land is 1.7 mu. The climate and soil conditions permit the
rotation of three crops every two years. Garlic has been a local specialty for 1,300
years, and there are 26,000 mu dedicated to its production in this region using a well
sharpened set of practical and efficient techniques and skills to keep the garlic quality
and yield high. There is a 10,000 mu "model field." The field is an area that was
successfully farmed to produce a high yield of a quality product, bringing good
433
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revenues for the peasant farmers. The town designates the area as a model field so
that others can learn how to emulate the process. It is a way to propagate a process or
system within areas with similar conditions. The area has also turned to pig farming
and as of the time of the interviews for this project, there were about 10,000 pairs of
baby pigs as a base for developing a breeding program. Among other crops that have
been successfully farmed in this region are tobacco, corn, and mulberry fields to feed
the silkworm. The area has become a model for the comprehensive development of all
available agricultural resources in hilly regions of the province and is also an example
zone, so designated by the Ministry of Agriculture.
The town's total production value reached ¥150 million in 2005, and the "third
industry"434 revenues were close to ¥50 million. The town revenues were ¥1.1 million
that year. Per capita net income was ¥2,890, which was the highest in County C.
Agriculture production
Farmers rotate and overlap the production of corn and garlic crops in their fields.
Corn is planted in March and garlic is usually planted in July. When the garlic is
harvested in May, the corn is already more than a meter high. The corn is harvested in
September. The total production of garlic was 41 million kg in 2005 and it sold for
around ¥40 million. Garlic has been certified as a "green" food by China's green food
development center. "Green" means that the crop is sustainable and environmentfriendly.
434

Agriculture is known as the first industry, both heavy and light manufacturing are designated the
second industry, and the service and all others are collectively called the "third industry."
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The farmers in Town D began using plastic film mulch and greenhouses to plant
off-season vegetables during the early 1990s. In this manner the peasants can generate
extra income of ¥6,000 - ¥20,000 per mu. Celery, for example, can grow at the rate of
about 7,000 -10,000 jin per mu. The price of celery in the winter is about ¥1 pery'w.
Similarly, green pepper can generate about ¥3,000 - ¥5,000 per mu. In a greenhouse,
it is possible to rotate four crops each year. Skilled farmers get four crops each year
and the less capable still get at least three. They frequently "interplant," which means
new seeds are sown while the previous crop is approaching harvest, as we saw earlier
with the corn and garlic. Ten interplant models have been developed that seem to
work well under these soil and climate conditions, and the farmers can usually identify
one that they want to use.
Technology and training
Irrigation in this area is accomplished in one of two ways: sprinklers, in which
high pressure nozzles distribute water in large measure; and drip irrigation, which is
newer technology coming into favor because more of the water goes to the roots of the
plant rather than being lost to evaporation. (According to official state statistics, less
than one percent of the rural population uses these technologies in China).435 The
town is responsible for training the farmers in these methods between growing seasons
or in evening classes; and officials bring peasants and engineers from the Agriculture
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Dong Migang, "2005 Zhongguo xibu jingji fazhan" (China's West Economic Development 2005), in
Zhongguo guojia tongjiju niandu baogao (Annual Reports of the Chinese National Statistics Bureau),
China's National Statistics Bureau, 2005.
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Technology and Agricultural Animal Administration bureau for this training.
Engineers and officials bothfrequentlyvisit the farms to stay current about successes
and problems and to provide training and assistance on the spot when it is required. It
is not unusual for these people to identify themselves with a sign at the field locations
so they can be identified as responsible advisors who can be contacted either to report
problems, or because another peasant or team wishes to learn the techniques or benefit
from some training.
Through a process of diffusion, technology spreads rapidly between the local
farms. In one example, peasants discovered that leaving 20 mm of root in the ground
when an eggplant is harvested will quickly produce a new plant. The peasants call this
approach pingcha which means that the plant was cut but left in the field. The
peasants could not explain why the technique worked, but the Agricultural Technology
Center took responsibility for additional experimentation and improved the technique
and the final results. It then broadcast the results to others in the area.436
Projects and support from state agencies
Town D has benefited from higher-level government programs. The state's
Office of Agricultural Development sponsored the construction of many greenhouses
in 2003 - the first project the office offered to this area. The state Finance Ministry
financed the construction of more than 10 km of paved highway in the town, and paid
for the widening and hardening of field roads that would permit the use of farm
436

Interview with township officials.
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machinery. The town is the largest recipient of agricultural equipment in the area,
having earned more than 1,500 sets of various types of machinery. In continuing
government programs, mechanization was part of the 2006 Implementation Plan for
Subsidizing the Purchase of Agricultural Equipment and Tools, and the farmers in
Town D are scheduled to receive some of this support. This program will be funded
80 percent by the state and 20 percent from the county budget. It is specifically
directed at increasing the availability of small tractors and multi-functional tilling
machines. The state has also helped fund sprinkler irrigation for about 11,000 mu of
farmland in the town. The local hydroelectric agencies contributed to the digging of
wells and piping systems while the local people contributed their labor to the project.
The agencies also help with the supervision and maintenance of the irrigation facilities,
and the farmers who are benefiting from the projects are also taught how to properly
care for and use the system. The irrigation project has been well received, is being
well managed, and shows signs of having been a worthwhile investment for all
involved.437
Local town officials spoke to me of the politics involved in pursuing projects
sponsored by higher levels of government or IGOs such as the World Bank and the
Asian Development Bank. There are two fundamentally different ways of funding
public projects. In the first case, towns or other jurisdictions must assemble a "budget
set" that shows all of the sources of funds that will be used for the project. This

approach tends to be more formal, more complex and more difficult to manage, but it
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is the only approved and legal approach to getting larger projects funded and
completed. The second approach is one that is not legal, but is the approach of choice
because of its simplicity. In this approach, an up-front "commission" is paid, and
money from higher levels of government or even from the international development
banks is made available, with usually a little extra left over at the end for other things.
The kickback is not inexpensive - usually a jurisdiction like a town will need to
"invest" 10 percent of the total value of the project in advance. For a town that can
afford the money, it's a good investment because it is fast and easy. The process tends
to be self-prioritizing, which means that lower-level jurisdictions tend not to have the
funds for the large projects, so those are arranged and handled through higher levels of
government. This is not a bad deal for the towns, however, since the projects from
such arrangements are usually distributed, with the towns each receiving a piece of the
action. What is most startling about this second approach to funding projects is the
openness with which it is carried out and its pervasiveness, at least within this part of
China. Local governments remain enthusiastic about this way of leveraging their
limited funds.438
Markets and Associations
In the early days of market reform, dealers, distributors, and brokers came to the
area in search of farm produce in higher quantities. The market was fragmented and
undefined, and there was no way for farmers to know whether they were receiving fair
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prices or not. Later the town government helped the peasants to form different kinds
of organizations based on the kinds of products they were producing. A web page
helped improve the flow of information in both directions and brought buyers from
further and further to make their purchases, even coming from as far as other nearby
provinces of Xinjiang, Sichuan, Qinghai and Shanxi. In what has become a seller's
market, some buyers now drive their trucks right to the fields in order to assure their
supplies.
Some towns have learned how to develop complementary markets. The garlic in
Town D is planted in July and harvested a year later. In other areas in the province,
garlic is planted in March and harvested in September. Although the year-long crop
produced by Town D is considered to have better quality, the demand is vigorous year
round, so the crops that become available in other seasons are readily picked up by
eager buyers. Even the garlic seed disappears quickly from Town D's output, and it
was thought that by cooperating with other neighboring towns, the market could be
expanded even further. But the seeds from Town D's superior products have not yet
been successfully used elsewhere.
Town government - Finance and Income
Town revenues consist of industrial and commercial taxes, car and boat taxes,
and specialty taxes such as that levied on tobacco crops. Before the tax reform, the
town could legitimately collect taxes on garlic crops, but chose to forego that income
as a means of encouraging production. With tax reform, that source can no longer be
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taxed even if the town wanted to do so. There are other agencies of higher levels of
government that collect taxes and fees, but those revenues do not flow into the town
treasury, so the town is basically dependent upon transfer payments from higher levels
of government for the expenses not covered by its internal fees and non-agricultural
taxes. Salaries for town officials and compensation for village leaders all come from
such income. Village leaders and village party secretaries earn about ¥1,000 annually
as compensation for their work. Team leaders typically earn ¥400 - ¥600 for work at
their level. The reward is not substantial, but in this area the jobs are still considered
desirable for two important reasons: leaders are first to receive information about new
beneficial policies; and they often meet town and county officials, so they can extend
their personal networks. The value of a solid personal network can easily amount to
¥100,000 - ¥200,000 per year through the exploitation of the business opportunities
that filter through such networks.439 There is also a prestige factor in being appointed
or elected as a team or village leader, as well as a higher social status.
The Chinese township is an "official" government, and unlike village leaders,
town officials are expected to dedicate 100 percent of their work lives to the benefit of
their towns. So they receive a real salary. In Town D, that is about ¥10,000 each year,
but officials also have the ability to earn bonuses for completing certain projects or
reaching certain quotas, such as incoming foreign investment. As with most of these
kinds of programs, some of these quotas are easy to achieve, while others are

controlled by factors outside of their circle of influence and are quite impossible to
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predict or control. The birth control quotas are a good example of this last kind:
officials are completely dependent upon every man and woman in town, each of
whom has drives and motives (such as the desire for a son, maternal instinct, and
mating instinct) that are radically different from the leaders who are attempting to
benefit from the achievement of a low birth rate.
As a result of these conflicting interests, an entire bureaucracy has sprouted up to
enforce a draconian system designed to assert supremacy over human nature. Married
women are required to submit to pregnancy tests, and if they fail to do so, they or their
families are fined. The fine is a substantial source of income. If a married woman
seeks work in another town or city, she is required to report for testing and to return a
certificate to her home town attesting to the fact she is not pregnant. If she fails to do
so, her family will be fined. Women who find jobs in strange cities are not familiar
with their new areas and must take time off from work to find test centers and submit
to the testing. The time to do that has been known to cost women their jobs. Once
each year, women must return to their home towns for testing. Failing to do so costs
them or their families ¥1,000. The fees and fines are heavy enough to represent a
significant burden for people already so poor they must leave their homes in search of
outside work. It is a gender aspect of Chinese society that is a continuous source of
frustration and complaints from women; but the policy has become such an integral
part of the social fabric that except for the women who must subject themselves to the

indignity of being required to constantly prove they are not pregnant, it has
disappeared as an issue for the rest of government officials or others who are not
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directly involved.
The country's birth control project is the most important of the seven "high
tension lines" for the Chinese government. "High tension lines" is an idiomatic
description of critical and sensitive policy issues that must be treated very seriously.
Local farm families feel they are engaged in guerilla warfare in their attempts to
overcome this official resistance to their need for boys in the family. The policy
recognizes the high value of male children formally by providing that families whose
first born child is a daughter may have another child without penalty. One of the side
effects of the policy is an imbalance in Chinese society between males and females. It
wasn't long ago that there were persistent rumors that infant daughters were slain, and
the reports persist that female fetuses are frequently aborted even today, just to create
opportunities to bring a son to the family.
Officials understand that overpopulation is at the core of many of China's
problems, so they take population control measures seriously. "Fewer children mean
more income" is a slogan guiding rural families. Many other regulations, policies and
programs (education, development, and social programs) are connected to the
population control measures in one way or another. Those families that do not follow
the rules are penalized in several different ways, as we have seen, while those who
abide by the population control measures are rewarded in different ways. Another
project that officials take seriously is special agriculture. In this hilly region of Gansu,
for example, the town government has mobilized farmers to plant walnut trees
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throughout their farms. Ten walnut trees per mu will not affect other crops but creates
another source of income. Farmers have also been encouraged to cultivate silkworms,
and tobacco, to breed pigs and chickens and to find other sources of income based on
their local conditions. All peasants received the grain subsidy whether they grow
grains, vegetables or other economic crops. The subsidy is considered a fair incentive
to encourage peasants to farm on their lands.
A third significant task for Town D officials is the continuous monitoring of labor
for export. In fact this is a program that engages city, county and town governments,
and all have developed an agency dedicated specifically to this purpose. Their
primary goal is to make full use of all forms of communications and contacts to help
farmers find out-of-town jobs.
Town officials and farmers
Local officials get involved in town life to an extent that would amaze western
politicians. One of the long-time town officials and a current party secretary told me
of an incident in which he was called upon to investigate a domestic disturbance.
Upon arrival, he found a farmer beating his father-in-law. He used force to subdue the
individual, then lectured him about his family responsibilities. The situation was
resolved when the man wrote a letter of apology to his father-in-law. The interviewee
was an educated man who claimed to understand that different people need to be
handled in different ways; and he was supremely confident in his ability. He said that
permanent criminals who bounce in and out of the jails are treated to a display of
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power and force, while those who are straggling with poverty are personally led to
opportunities and taught and encouraged in the right way to improve their situations,
and all of this personally handled by local party or government officials.
I asked an official his opinion about what it takes to bring prosperity to a poor,
rural Chinese town. Because he was the former party secretary, because he had
worked there for ten years, and because Town D was named a "star" town and ranked
No. 1 in every scored dimension by the Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs, it was
apparent this confident man would have strong opinions to contribute to the research.
It is his opinion that nothing is as important as leadership. He stated that he
considered the economy to be very fragile. Leaders who could not arrange for a road
or an electrification project quickly lose the respect of the villagers, and public
projects will stagnate. There are other factors that create conditions for success. This
official believes, for example, that the success of Town D is due in part to the fact that
it is the home office of the county party secretary, and therefore cannot be allowed to
fail.
Another key indicator of success in a town is its education system. Town D
completed all requirements for state literacy goals and ended its campaign in 1993.
The current illiteracy rate is about 10 percent (the official report of its website shows
the rate is only four percent), much lower than other rural areas in Gansu province.
Tuition is free in the junior high schools and all peasant families who abide by the
population control regulations are also subsidized for their texts.
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Town D is also covered with cooperative medical care. Families that follow
population controls pay only half the fee, five yuan, each year to join the program.
Poor families (under 1,000 yuan per year) are identified by name in a public health
bulletin, and unless there is evidence that they are not as poor as they claim, they are
eligible for free medical care.
Town and village elections
Village cadres are chosen in a popular election supervised by the town
government. The villagers may nominate and vote; but the successful candidates are
chosen by the town government. If villagers should disagree with the selections,
persuasion sessions are held until the town recommendations are finally accepted, and
in this way there are never any surprises in the final election results. In selecting
candidates for town elections, people are chosen who not only have ability to help
farmers, but also who can identify with and support state and local collective interests.
These vetting processes are part of the requirement to build "grassroots" organizations,
one of the critical factors that mark the success or failure of local leaders.
Complications are avoided whenever possible. For example there is no attempt to "get
out the vote." Farmers who are not aware of the elections will not be reminded
because a high voter turnout can create the possibility of complications.
Elections at the town level are more complicated. Voting is not directly by the
people, but by representatives chosen from among the people. Current leaders
organize meetings to introduce the recommended slate of officials for the next
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elections. Candidates are selected on the basis of their unswerving loyalty to the party.
When decisions are made in which the party has an interest, the leadership is expected
to favor the party line.
While the government election process was exclusively in the hands of the party
representative meeting, making it relatively simple to control the outcome, the party
leadership succession process is more complicated. There is a meeting for the party
membership to mobilize for the election and to prepare recommendations. When the
results are reported to the next higher level of the party and are approved, the
recommendations will be released to the public. In the next stage, the party
representatives select the town party committee which then selects the party secretary
and vice party secretary. The head of the government is chosen by the people's
congress, which is a group of representatives selected by popular vote from a slate
approved by the next higher level party committee.
When there are election controversies in the form of voter rejections of approved
candidates, the current leadership will be thought incapable of discharging its
responsibilities, which include getting the "right people" into public office.440
Village Z
Village Z is 20 km east of Town D. It has all the natural endowments enjoyed by
the county and the town, and has become the first well-off village in southeast Gansu.
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It has been named a "civilization" village by the state Ministry of Civil Affairs. In
2005, the net income per peasant was more than ¥3,600. More than 60 percent of their
net income came from vegetables and animal farming.
Because there are many villages that appear to have good natural resources but
still struggle against poverty, I was interested to learn what other factors were at work
on the prosperity found in Village Z. It was reported that the village makes use of two
primary resources to improve conditions in this village: Today there are both poor and
well-off peasant families in Village Z. The poor are offered financial support and
training in crops and breeding technologies in an effort to improve their lot. Those
who have created a higher degree of success are recruited into the party so their abilities and resources can be harnessed to the advantage of the village and its people.
They are encouraged to help with school projects, help with infrastructure, and take
some responsibility for helping the local poor. As party members they accept
responsibility for leading and guiding others toward a better life. In other words, those
who have become successful are recruited to help their less capable or less fortunate
neighbors.
In fact, this village is an example of why land was considered the primary social
security for rural villagers: farmers can always grow enough food to keep the family
from going hungry. During the 1960s and 1970s, while people all over China were
struggling to feed themselves, the peasants in village Z never wanted for basic foods.
In fact, many urban citizens who had gone hungry moved into this area to survive.
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Officials from higher levels of government are also encouraged and in some cases
required to donate resources and service to the poor, and it is done on a personal level.
County level party members will partner with poorer party members to provide
information, technology, guidance, and an occasional network boost to help them find
pathways to a better living. This program is quite formalized, requiring written plans
and signed agreements. The goal is inspirational and lofty: to make an entire village
wealthy (zhengcun tuijin). The program has met with good success and was described
and recommended in UN studies as an approach with great promise.441
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Chapter Eight
Case Analysis

This chapter is based on the eight cases reported in chapter seven. The purpose
of this chapter is to extract general conclusions from those cases and to follow that
with a cross-case analysis in which different conditions, methods and results will be
compared to draw additional useful information from the findings. The work of others
will also be appended to this research by way of comparison or contrast to the extent
they are based on the same terms and offer alternative interpretations for consideration.
Summary of findings

The findings and conclusions presented here are drawn directly from the analysis
which follows. It is hoped they will be considered in their more extended and
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documented form, as this summary can only sketch the scope and significance of this
project.
The historical information about rural development in China during the last 60
years gives us a very detailed look at the outcome of two radically different
approaches (top-down and bottom-up) to rural development. Both periods yield
important information about both successes and failures. The new policy appears to
be centered around a mid-point between the two extremes that were previously used using elements of both top-down and bottom-up models, in other words. I also
discovered, however, that the newly-found balance is not a simple concept to define in
this case. It calls for an adjustable, synergistic approach that integrates policy goals at
several levels of government and the target population, and must be modulated by
local capacity. It is therefore not a fixed recipe but a "Swiss Army Knife" of available
tools.
The findings suggest that local capacity consists of some combination of:
•

Real assets (natural endowments, financial resources, infrastructure)

•

Leadership

•

Human Capital

•

Social Capital

•

Organization

When I found a prosperous community, I found farmers and officials both who
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were voluble with their opinions on the foundations for their success, and they were
largely in agreement. These people had a strong sense of their accomplishments and
what it took to succeed. These characteristics came out often in my comparative case
studies. They contained no surprises, but helped sharpen my definition of
development capacity.
In some cases, solutions came as a combination of market forces finding and
developing a commodity. For example, there is a village in Liaoning Province that
became a "chicken village." A buyer for a large grocery chain found a farmer with a
few chickens and inquired about eggs. Within two years everyone in the village was
producing, tending, feeding or plucking chickens, or dealing with the byproducts like
feed, egg cartons, feathers and guano.
It was not only the market that made a difference. People in this area had
migrated long ago from highly civilized regions, and they have a different culture with
an optimistic view of life and opportunity, and they did not fear change. They had
been doing sideline work in addition to tending their crops, even in the early 1970s
when they were in the communes. They have a higher literacy rate than people in hilly
villages in the same area. A spontaneous, self-organized kind of cooperative network
helped them to share information, techniques, costs, risks and market know-how.
In other successful communities, prosperity was not so easy to come by, and had
to be coaxed, experimented with, and tweaked. Sometimes local leadership and
management was enough, but sometimes expertise and leadership had to come from
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outside. In two neighboring towns in Jiangsu Province, I found very similar natural
conditions but very different levels of prosperity. In the better-off town, leadership
made good use of two local resources: developed lands and local talented leaders who
had left the area to manage urban enterprises. These capable individuals were invited
to return to help their home town. The invitation was approached as a kind of patriotic
appeal. This approach worked exceptionally well, and brought financial capital,
human capital and social capital to the town so a good socio-economic cycle could be
generated. Later, the expanding economy spread to nearby towns.
In remote towns and villages located in mountainous areas, there was not much
basis for rural industry, and market development depended more on specialized rural
goods and resources. People with educated and open minds and with good social
networks created the conditions for a market, but when there are bad roads and
infrastructure, the costs were too high to attract a market. There is one western town
that made use of national funds to build roads and telecommunications and then
geared its output to a specialized little niche - a delicious species of garlic that
quickly became a regional favorite and commanded premium prices. It became one of
very few towns in this area not designated as a help-poverty town. The leadership
created the conditions for its specialized production. Communications between local
leaders and farmers were continuous. Evening farmer training classes sponsored by
town and county governments helped farmers learn techniques and technologies and
allowed them to learn from each other. A cohesive local social culture was cultivated
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to complement local development.
In every successful town and village I visited, social networks were making an
obvious difference in facilitating access to information, finances, technical expertise,
leadership and other resources. Organizations like the government or party, or farmbusiness cooperatives or farmer self-organizations all served vital roles in helping to
identify and locate resources and to create channels to gain access to those resources.
Figure 8-1 summarizes the constituents of
capacity as grounded upon a combination of real
and human assets. Capacity is a very practical
way to account for the differences
between communities with similar
circumstances but different
outcomes. Capacity comes in
Figure 8-1 The makeup of capacity
many forms, and the quality
and availability of social capital depends largely on the condition of tangible assets.
When real assets are marginal, more and higher quality human assets are required to
make best use of what is available, but it becomes decidedly more difficult to keep or
attract top human resources to China's rural wastelands. When real assets are nonexistent, the first order of business is deciding whether to create capacity or declare the
area uninhabitable.
Here are additional conclusions that came out of the site cases:
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•

There is no one recipe for success; and there is enough regional variation in
China to squelch any attempt at generalization.

•

There didn't seem to be much point in beginning a revitalization project
unless the starting point was well defined. "Just do it!" may work for
tennis shoes, but is not a good formula for rural development.

•

There are almost always more than one combination of real and human
assets that can lead to success, if success is possible.

•

Because of favorable real and/or human assets, there are some areas in
rural China that have needed little or no outside help.

China's party and central government have initiated a wave of rural reforms that
match in scope and degree even the radical changes that inaugurated the era of the
collectives and then presided over their demise in favor of the household responsibility
system. Current rural development policymaking builds on years of piecemeal
successes and it attempts to correct many wrongs all at once. Previous initiatives were
thwarted, sometimes by incomplete policy and unanticipated effects, and sometimes in
the implementation process, but always visible were breakthrough levels of isolated
success, enough to feed China's development theory, to encourage continued
experimentation and investment, and sufficient to create visible signs of rural vitality.
What is also clear from the research is that when one or more natural endowments
are missing, the development task is significantly more difficult, and when all those
endowments are lacking, the task has often appeared to be utterly impossible. If the
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government surveyed some of these areas today, some may well be declared
uninhabitable. This condition is evident, for example, in those communities where
government has trained the farmers for other work and encouraged migration. In
those cases, farmers and governments have agreed that the capacity for sustainable
development does not exist and cannot be created with existing resources.
In the past, opportunities for the use of capital were confined to conspicuous
consumption, usury, and investment in land. There were few realistic alternatives to
the use of family labor in farming. Today, however, industrialization provides rich and
poor alike with available alternatives. Those with capital can consider investment in
their children's higher education to enhance urban job prospects, or investment in
urban-based family enterprises that can provide a good living for family members.
Even those without skills may well make a better return on their labor in an urban
factory than in agriculture. These alternatives have been taken up by countless
villagers from the length and breadth of China. Since the amount of land owned by a
household is an important determinant of the rate of return on household labor
(Jiangsu and Sichuan cases), the size of the family farm is a prime factor that
conditions both family and government strategies that affect village social
organization and is a critical factor that peasants must consider in their choices of
crops or animal breeding, regardless of the market condition.
There are two streams of capital associated with off-farm work: in the east capital
flows out due to scarcity of land, and also flows in as some return to their home towns
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to invest. In the west, capital flows only one way - out. The conditions have not
existed to attract investment capital, while human capital continues to migrate to
eastern and urban areas. Another factor that affects this cycle is an unpleasant side
effect of land tenure policy. Land use deals remain valid for 30 years. This means
that when young people become old enough to want to start families of their own, they
are unable to find land and must settle for sharing the family farm with the previous
generation. Subsistence farming does not generate sufficient income for two families,
and so the young people are literally driven away. In the past, migration away from
the hardest hit areas occurred when peasants simply gave up farming. The luckier
ones were able to rent the property to others or leave them with friends or families
they could trust, but many others just walked away. In areas of good land, those left in
possession of larger tracts of land suddenly found themselves in a good position when
agriculture taxes were eliminated and the different subsidies began flowing. Thus, the
land-tenure patterns in rural villages are the result of numerous long-term decisions
about the allocation of family labor and capital that have resulted in the departure of
households with certain characteristics and the retention in the villages of households
with different characteristics. The end result is a changing of social patterns, the
creation of new elites, and an outflow of the young.
When conditions for development are challenging but possible, there is one thread
which unites the successes that have been visible in this research: that human
resources were invariably integrated in planning and effort; and in their collaborative
efforts they were able to identify available resources, tease out innovative ideas worth
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trying, and create conditions that compensated for the realities of local weaknesses, to
build upon a foundation of locally available strengths.
Integration extends to every dimension of the success stories that have been
visible during this research. Among the difficulties which had to be overcome were
myopic views of the development project as being about farm productivity and
peasant income. Solutions became possible when the issues were viewed as a social,
economic, political and cultural whole, because this broad view opened new paths to
ideas, more complete preparation of foundational conditions (e.g. education, health
services), important channels for temporary or permanent relief (support for labor
migration), and influence that could make a difference (infrastructure development,
poverty relief, agriculture technology).
It was also evident that integrating forces had shed their regional isolationism,
extending information, markets, and infrastructures in every direction of the compass.
Although these extensions of rural policy tested the abilities of party, government and
business, successful linkages were visible and were cited by governments and farmers
alike as having developed into a valuable source of resources and a powerful
coordinating mechanism.
Visible in the more prosperous towns and villages was an integrated approach to
government. While local officials were complaining about unfair distribution of tax

revenues at the beginning of this research, it was evident during the latter stages that
successful communities had developed an integrating partnership involving all levels
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of government and all responsible agencies. Policy from the top was being assembled
with more appropriate levels of discretion for local governments and the environments
in which they operate. There are still communities where relations between local and
higher levels of government can best be characterized as contentious and each tends to
complain about the other; but in the successful communities, the tone and frequency of
the complaints was consistently milder and underscored always with visible respect
for the jobs they have to do and the complexities they must face. It has become
apparent, in other words, in those communities that have achieved or are beginning to
show signs of development success that there was little room for heroics, that no one
government or agency could have succeeded alone, and that it took coordinated effort
to create the conditions for prosperity. Success has not been spreading over China's
huge population like a quilt, it has been showing up in widely separated small projects,
first in communities where conditions are best, and later among towns and villages
with more challenges than resources, but where coalitions have improved in the
collaboration between policy-makers, administrators, business persons and farmers.
Always in evidence among the successful communities has been an integrated set
of assets and human capital that combined to become development capacity which had
previously been dormant. In the absence of nearby markets, there were transportation
improvements; in the absence of flat terrain, there were crops (walnuts and mulberry
bushes) and animals (goats and rabbits) that do well on hillsides. The key to
discovering, developing and maintaining capacity came from an integrated social
capital. Leadership talent and approaches varied greatly between the case sites. When
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development was easy, good leadership was optional and came from different
directions, sometimes from government, but also from business persons and from the
peasants themselves. When development was not easy because of gaps in local real
assets, leadership became critical, and in those towns that succeeded, government
leadership was consistently in evidence, not in the traditional form of bureaucratic
authority but in its ability to organize and coordinate.
In most of the case sites, peasants played very limited organizational roles. This
was true because peasant organizations (e.g. collectives, cooperatives) are still in the
early stages of development in rural China. This sector of human capital was
consistently weak for reasons discussed below. But human capital and social capital
are both context-dependent variables. With the right policy environment and in the
presence of real assets, human capital was everywhere being improved. With this
development, social capital, including trust, cooperation and a spirit of public service
were near the surface in successful communities. Successful communities had largely
set aside sectarianism, isolationism and corruption. An attempt to trace causes and
effects in this mechanism have been fruitless. The most likely scenario is that
prosperity and social capital develop in parallel. Where peasants remained isolated,
other attempts to assemble assets and develop social capital remained stalled. In
successful towns and villages, the peasants and the state had come to grips with the
reality of their interdependence.
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Factor analysis
Real assets in case study communities
Among the eight case study towns, in 2005 the highest township level
government tax revenue was nearly ¥70 million (south-central Jiangsu), whereas the
lowest was only about ¥90,000 (the hill town in Gansu). The highest average per
peasant income in the Jiangsu Town was ¥7,000, whereas in the Gansu town, peasants
only earned ¥1,447, about 20 percent of the more prosperous town. Per capita income
in the eight studied towns varied from below ¥2,000 in the hill town in Gansu, to
¥2,000- ¥3,000 in the basin town in Gansu and the hill town in Liaoning, to ¥4,000¥5,000 in the plain town in Liaoning and the suburban town in Sichuan, and to
¥6,000- ¥7,000 in the two
towns in central Jiangsu, 442
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Figure 8-2 Economic models found in the case towns

(Figure 8-2) In the plains town of central Liaoning and the two towns in central
Jiangsu, rural industry contributes more than 80 percent of the total production value,
and more than 80 percent of the local population works in both industry and small442

The data come from the cases in Chapter seven.
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time fanning. For those towns, proximity to industrial areas and large cities creates
opportunities, not only as a part of industrial expansion but also as suppliers to the
large market for farm produce. Convenient, advanced transportation connects these
towns to the fast growing industrial and residential developments. Traditional
entrepreneurial thinking among the people includes an apparent receptivity to change.
The natural endowments in the soil, water and a benign climate, all very important for
agriculture, don't seem to mean too much for peasants in these towns. Many peasants
left their farms in the 1980s because there wasn't enough land to support a family
under the system of grain quotas and taxation then in force. It was relatively easy for
them to find work in nearby cities. When taxes and fees began to drop, and farmers
were granted increased autonomy about cropping decisions, they returned to their
lands with their labor and also with newly-gained management and sales experience as
well as a little capital and the motivation and courage to try a little farming again.
The other five case towns are agriculture-oriented, of which there are two types:
crop-farming, and animal husbandry or breeding of poultry, cattle, dairy, fish and pork.
The poorer of these five towns also rely on returns from their migrant work and some
have begun seeing success related to tourism. The two case towns in Sichuan are in
this category. The suburban town in Sichuan has a growing rural tourism that
accounts for one-third of its economy, while most of the balance comes from its
poultry industry. The plains town in Liaoning has, besides its prosperous rural
industry, a well developed poultry industry, which has grown to the extent it can
support a well developed processing industry. In the hill town of northeast Sichuan,
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almost all the young, strong farmers left to find work in cities and mines; and more
than half of the peasant income comes from migrant work. Unlike migrants from
Jiangsu who had developed skills and a jump on the market, migrants from Sichuan
struggle to survive in urban jobs. Most sell their labor in difficult or dangerous work
and for low pay. Staying in their homes is not an option because of poor conditions
and an undeveloped infrastructure, so they continue to leave, and they continue to send
or bring money home, but life for these people and their families is a terrible struggle.
Non-crop farming needs transportation, technology, labor skills, market and more
capital than crop-farming agriculture.
The two Gansu towns and the hill town in Liaoning are engaged in crop farming
agriculture. That type of agriculture can be divided into two sub-categories: the first is
the production of higher value agriculture products such as fruits and vegetables and
also rotation and simultaneous farming of various cash crops by using local unique
natural conditions. The town in a small basin in Gansu has found its niche in its garlic
fields but also grows other vegetables. The Jiangsu towns also have a well-developed
rotation cropping agriculture in addition to their booming rural industry. The suburban
town near Chengdu in Sichuan, besides its poultry industry, has its "green" fruits and
vegetables which support its growing rural tourism and agrarian economy. The hill
town of southeast Gansu recently has changed its crops from staple crops to an
excellent wild pepper, Chinese herbs and olive trees which are better suited to its
unique environment. The second kind of crop farming is found in the staple grain
crops. The hill town in central Liaoning is in this category, although some of its
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villages have a growing poultry industry, the major crops are still corn and wheat.
Crop farming is more risky than other foundations for rural economies. Its
strength is limited by many factors such as land size, soil, climate, water, technology,
infrastructure and the markets. Rotation and simultaneous crop farming are good
ways to reduce agricultural risk and multiply income, but technology related to
compatible crops, timetables and treatments is more demanding. In Sichuan in 2006,
for example, there was a serious drought. In the hill town, crop rotation enabled some
farmers to have very profitable years, thanks to multiple harvests and market shortages,
while those engaged in grain farming lost more than 60 percent of their harvests.443 In
another research project conducted by twenty seven people's representatives of the
National People's Congress (NPC) and committee members of the Chinese People's
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) from Xinye County in Henan, a central
agricultural province in more than 10 villages of the four towns, almost all the
villagers there have learned that the key to increasing agricultural output is to optimize
agricultural structure - maximizing gains by linking agriculture to local employment
and the relative domination of commercial agriculture in the landscape, the
distribution of farm sizes and the distribution of farm family incomes.444 For staple
crops there is less demand elasticity (the consumption of grains remains fairly stable
regardless of normal price fluctuations), making it an unattractive source of income for
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Source is from the case of Sichuan mountainous town.
Wang Dongan and Qi Guoqiang, "xin nongcunjianshe bannianduo, nongmin sha xiangfa? tingling
nongmin shayijian" (Six Month Later after Building a New Socialist Countryside, What Are the
Peasants Thinking?), Farmer Daily, August 26th 2006.
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both the farmers and local officials because good harvest years simply translate to
more work and lower prices. This translates into a disincentive which creates a
conflict with national grain security policy. In the plains town of central Liaoning,
peasants turned from crop farming to more profitable breeding, household crafts and
rural industry to make their living. They leased their lands to investors who combined
fields to create economies of scale for efficient grain farming. The suburban town of
Sichuan shows a similar approach. Here peasants lease their land to private investors
who have developed an orchard industry. The peasants earn from the leases and also
became workers in that industry.
In Gansu, local economies are predetermined along natural divisions.
Underground water in the basin town makes irrigation agriculture possible, whereas in
the hill town, only one-third of the arable land can be irrigated. The different
transportation conditions in the two towns also lead to different approaches. In the
basin town, there is a public bus that has linked the town and all of its villages since
2003. Beyond the county, there is a railway link connecting Gansu and Sichuan. In
the hill town, more than 20 percent of the villages have no roads and another 20
percent have only dirt roads, and therefore there is no link between most villages and
the outside world. Under these circumstances, the opportunities for getting farm
output to market are very limited, although farm families are always seen on the
connecting paths, shouldering large bundles, baskets or bags that carry the full sum of
their livelihood capacity.
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Another constraint on farming in the west comes from the previously mentioned
labor drain caused by the need for migrant work. This effect is removing the strongest
young people from the farms and also has an indirect influence in terms of the ability
to organize, to find and develop leadership talent, and to spread fanning technology
among the most capable. Migrant labor from the west is readily hired in wealthy
provinces like Guangdong because it is cheaper than local - thus adding to problems
in the wealthy provinces by making it difficult for local peasants to find alternative
work.445 Because of China's huge population, labor is sold in a buyers' market,
adversely affecting the poorest segment of China's population.
As we have seen in the eastern provinces, rural industry creates robust
development opportunities. However the growth of rural industry is predicated on
essential preconditions. As an example, rural industry tends to "cluster" in areas close
to urban or industrial markets. It is less expensive to move raw materials from the
farms and mines of Gansu to a factory on the east coast than it would be to move
finished goods along the same route, and the distance would adversely influence
marketing. Clustered manufacturers and service companies tend to feed on each other,
creating a self-sufficient commercial community that needs metal working, marking,
molding, milling, assembly and joining equipments, for example, as well as a host of
services including restaurants, print shops and shipping agencies. Isolated rural
communities lack all the essentials except land.
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Zhou Yingjin and Liang Jingweng, "ershi xiangcun xingzoujilu"(Record of Walking into 20
Villages), (Nanjing: Nanjing University, 2006).
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Figure 8-3 Real and human assets

Figure 8-3 summarizes the findings from my research which indicated a set of
conditions that seemed to align with these results. This is not prescriptive, it is
descriptive. It shows what had happened or was happening in the successful
communities I visited, and in towns and villages that remain depressed, either the real
assets or the human assets or both were inadequate to sever the chains of subsistence
farming.
One of the limitations of this research that is described later is that it was not possible
for me to measure development capacity. And yet Figure 8-4 represents an irresistible
impulse to do just that.
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Figure 8-4 Relative status of case towns

Figure 8-4 is the author's impression of the current state of development capacity
in the eight case towns. As the matrix was constructed, the original intent was to
simply place each case site within one of the quadrants, but there was a very insistent
scale in operation - clearly at work on a comparison between each of the locations. It
was obvious, for example, that social capital was operating at different levels in
different towns, even though there is no social "capital thermometer." There were
variations in human assets and degrees and gradations in the natural conditions all
lined up awaiting comparison. Industry has found a practical solution to the
measurement of intangibles (quality, tastiness, etc.) by using the scaled opinions of
panels of customers and experts. That approach and the experience of this research
project suggests a direction for future regional evaluation. Another interesting
observation is that there are no real extremes among the case towns, providing a
degree of validation for the case selection process that was intended to assess
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conditions in average towns in the four selected provinces. There is also a visible
central tendency in the arrangement in this matrix, a tantalizing hint of an ability to
quantify conditions in future research.
The grid is also useful because it suggests a priority for those seeking to initiate
capacity-building. A town or village in quadrant III, for example, is not likely to
benefit from a grain subsidy because endowments are not the problem. It supports one
of the assumptions of this research that the mass programs of the past would benefit
farmers who didn't need it and never reach farmers who were most in need of
assistance. Grain subsidies provide meaningful assistance only to a segment of the
rural population. A town that is in quadrant I would seemingly benefit either from the
construction of real assets such as roads or irrigation systems, but this research
suggests capacity building should begin first with human resources, providing
leadership and expertise, conducting leadership and technology training and
developing communications networks. That direction comes from the belief that
capacity building is best undertaken as a joint effort between capable local leaders and
organizations and their higher level sponsors. It is capable people who can best
identify, develop and take advantage of local comparative advantages.
Benefits and limitations of central policy
Since 2006, Chinese peasants no longer pay agriculture taxes and fees. They were

also relieved from most of the fees they'd been paying for public goods such as rural
education and health care. Many government agencies are no longer managed (and
390

paid for) by local government but are sponsored by higher levels of government.
Moreover, peasants have begun receiving subsidies, grants and training from all levels
of government. The combination of reduced taxes and increased benefits led many
peasants to hope they were seeing the most favorable policy conditions in all of
Chinese history. That attitude was visible in all eight research towns and their villages.
While the small case size in this research leads to caution about broad generalizations,
it was certainly universally visible within the visited towns and villages that current
policy is stimulating excitement and hope among many of China's poorest citizens.
Also visible were significant changes in bureaucratic behavior and in a
burgeoning civic engagement. Gone are the predatory taxes and fees that were a
constant source of resentment and hostility and escalating draconian collection tactics
and peasant demonstrations. Gone are the frustrations occasioned by unpaid wages
since government employees are now paid by the higher levels of government.
During the period of this research, which spanned two years and four months,
complaints about corruption in local government went from nearly universal to almost
nonexistent. The most frequently cited reasons were that local officials no longer were
required to collect their own revenues in order to get paid, and most forms of rural
taxes and fees were prohibited. No one in the interviews used the words public trust,
but the clear perception in the eight case towns and villages in this research was that
local officials had gradually become public servants. Both the motivation and the
opportunity for corrupt behavior had seemingly evaporated in some of the cases
studied.
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Illustrative of this changing policy environment was a case in village M in the
plains township in Liaoning province. The peasants refused to vote for a party
secretary because public finances were in disarray and no one could offer a
satisfactory explanation. A new candidate for office invited villagers to a meeting in
which the proper handling of village affairs could be discussed, and priorities could be
established in a transparent way in full consideration of villagers' real needs. In
another example, villagers in a hill town in Liaoning rejected a village head for
evidence of his previous corruption. A recurring theme in all of the provinces was a
visible ostracism in the case of officials who were not doing their jobs, or doing them
badly.
By way of contrast, in both of the visited Jiangsu towns villagers get only a
fraction of the compensation due for land conversion, and are kept in the dark about
all aspects of the land seizure process. As previously discussed, the generalized
prosperity in those case towns means that land may not be a key issue for many, and
aside from occasional mild grumbling, there has been little expression of
dissatisfaction, verbal or otherwise. The situation is reminiscent of Japan and Korea
where corruption is rampant, but prosperity keeps the voters relatively quiet. And in
Gansu, party officials very openly reported that they do not need or want citizen
participation. The party leaders manipulate information to assure they keep citizen
involvement (seen as interference) at a minimum. In spite of these examples, the net
effect of current policy is a set of conditions under which the opportunities for abuse
have diminished, the oversight and management have improved, and the motivation
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has therefore lessened. These cases do not address the very high visibility of
corruption and abuse cases that have occurred at higher levels of government during
recent years, but have produced some evidence of change at the local level of
government in the cases under review, even where traces of the "old ways" remain as
irritants.446
In a related policy direction, the National Peoples' Congress recently promulgated
a new Labor Contract Law that took effect in January, 2008, over the loud objections
of business, both domestic and foreign. The law protects migrant workers from unfair,
abusive and dangerous labor conditions. This is a first in all of China's long history.
It is noteworthy that the law passed despite very aggressive business interests which
have prevailed until now against all such measures. Business persons have threatened
to move their operations into places like Bangladesh and other developing states
where, presumably, abusive slave-like conditions remain not only legal, but the norm
in a policy environment that is still locked into economic growth as the highest priority.
The new law represents a shift away from China's directive of "economic growth at
any price," and toward an accounting of the costs of such runaway growth and
consideration of who must pay those costs. It also reflects growing Chinese
confidence that the economy and its blossoming market provide sufficient incentives
for both domestic and foreign investors that officials can be more selective about what
446 A year and a half into this program, the elimination of taxes, the funding of social programs like
education and public health, and the fiscal practices that are affecting the way local governments do
their work have spread to the far corners of rural China. The changes were occurring during the
research for this study, and have represented a serious challenge and a continuous source of delays for
this research.
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kind of working conditions they will tolerate. At the same time, enforcement is
currently sporadic, so the full benefits are yet to be realized.
During the last three decades, 200 million peasants have moved into urban areas
to find work. The necessary social shifting that accompanies a migration of this
magnitude has already been reviewed in early chapters, but clearly it was once again
China's peasants who were forced into harsh and unhealthy living and working
conditions. The labor contract law may have been written about industry, but the
beneficiaries are the lost segment of Chinese society, the peasant farmers.
In the four case towns in Gansu and Sichuan, peasants have been encouraged to
leave their lands in search of better work. In the hill town of Sichuan, more than half
of local household income comes from migrant work, on average. Even in relatively
prosperous Liaoning Province where per capita arable land is higher than in most of
China, two out of every three rural laborers are excess to the demands of farming and
needed to find off-farm work during 2005.447 Even in the wealthy towns of Jiangsu
the peasants are encouraged to do business instead of farming. The sum of all the
evidence thus far reviewed tells us that China's limited arable land, its huge population
that requires feeding, the increasing productivity of rural farming, and the pressures of
industrialization and urbanization are continuing to make life choices complicated and
to create tensions for both rural and urban workers and families, a universal constant
in the lives of China's people for the last two hundred years.
447

The source is the Liaoning Provincial Statistic Bureau, "Retrospect and thinking of construction of
countryside and peasant income in Liaoning."
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As already seen, the holistic policy approaches and effects of current rural policy
are having a calming effect in many Chinese communities, but the country is in
constant motion, and the limited cases of this study do not yet permit a forecast of
success. Indeed the evidence from the study draws attention to gaps or limitations in
current policy.
Financial gaps remain
In an attempt to curtail local corruption, abuses of power and lavish spending, the
Chinese Ministry of Finance promulgated a new policy that makes the county level of
government responsible for managing the finances of the township tier. The policy
has been implemented on a trial basis in many areas of China, beginning in 2006, and
is planned to reach every corner of China by the end of 2008. The system has already
affected government in several of the cases in this research. Budget planning is tightly
regulated and supervised as are all contracting and spending. The remaining problem
is that wealthy towns like the two that were visited in Jiangsu and the plains town in
Liaoning retain very solid financial advantages because of their ready sources of
industrial taxes. The relief that all rural towns will experience as a result of state
funding of social programs will result in extra "disposable income" for those wealthy
towns, enhancing the already advantaged condition of their infrastructure. All three of
those towns realized returned taxes of more than ¥60 million in 2005.
It is not yet clear how the state funding of local expenditures can be prevented
from worsening the gap between poor and wealthy communities. Counties with towns
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that have rural industry and other sources of business income will have a greater
capacity to meet their revenue-sharing obligations to higher levels and still have
resources to address the public good, while farming community governments will
receive no taxes from their citizens, have little or no rural industry taxes, and are
wholly dependent upon transfer payments and grants from such programs as "help
poverty." An example of the resulting imbalance is evident in the fact that cooperative
medical care began in Jiangsu in 2003, but only appeared in Gansu in 2007, when the
central government assumed responsibility for its funding.
From another viewpoint, it seems the new approach to financial management may
provide benefits in the reduction of abuses, but has not removed budget restrictions
from poor areas. It has only shifted them to higher levels of government. Since it has
not been unusual for transfer payments to the counties to be up to six months late, the
tension remains and items that are not directly funded by the central government won't
be seeing significant improvements any time soon. The net outcome is hoped to
include a reduction of the income gap (or at least a slowing of the gap's expansion),
and a lessening of the fiscal malfeasance and mismanagement in rural communities..
Current development theory calls for putting social capital to work to help
rebuild poorer farm communities, but the absence of business means these farm
communities are lacking in business leadership and resources, in addition to the drain
caused by labor migration. There isn't much for cooperatives to build upon, either,
and leadership cannot operate upon or within a social vacuum within which can be
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found neither resources, nor influence nor much hope.
Limitations on direct subsidies.
During 2004 to 2006, the government paid direct subsidies at a cost of ¥39 billion
to hundreds of millions of peasants to support the farming of grain crops and to help
pay for tools and machinery. In 2006 new subsidies were added to help defray the
rising costs of such things as diesel oil and fertilizers. In 2006 direct subsidies reached
¥26.2 billion.448 Each of the eight case towns has been the recipient of larger or
smaller subsidies under this program, depending upon farm size and subject to local
distribution standards. In addition to the subsidies for growing grain crops, some
farmers in Jiangsu and the basin town of Gansu also received subsidies to purchase
upgraded equipment. In Liaoning, villagers in the plains town were subsidized for
growing wheat, rice and corn as well as to help with their machinery expenses.
Because the per capita available farmland was larger than average, so were their
subsidies Meanwhile in the hill towns of Sichuan, farms are much smaller and not
well suited for mechanized farming, so the subsidies were much smaller. The net
outcome of the subsidies, then, works to the benefit of those with the best farming
conditions and does little to improve conditions for the poorest peasants with the worst
growing conditions and with roads and terrain conditions that work against
mechanization.

Zhu Juan, "Zhongguo nongmin butiewang zaijian guifan guanli zhongliang nongmin zhibu zijin"
(the Website to Display Direct Subsidies for the Chinese Peasants in the Construction to Standardize
Management of the Subsidies), People's Daily, April, 19th 2007.
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Although the direct subsidies reach peasants' hands without local siphoning or
skimming as was the previous common practice,449 the policy is limited not only by
farm size in different areas, but also by supply-demand trends caused by the market
prices, cost of supplies and irrigation and other expenses. The direct subsidy for using
agriculture machinery and tools is limited by local roads and land size too. The basin
town in southeast Gansu has good field roads so peasants line up for those subsidies;
whereas in the hilly town of Sichuan peasants have no use for that subsidy because
their paddy field is called "wan tian tian," (a field like a mirror that can allow people
to watch the sky through it) which means they are deep and wet and small as a
handkerchief where machinery is essentially unusable.
Market challenges
The grain subsidies are intended to encourage peasants to farm grains. However
the price of grains has not kept up with the costs of supplies and materials, and the
subsidies encouraging the farming of grains have not made enough difference to create
real incentives. Despite government spending, therefore, the market has exerted its
own power and farmers have turned in great numbers, especially in the poorest areas,
to cash crops in an attempt to improve their incomes.
Additionally, the centralized management of rural finances has increased the
transaction costs of government. This was a major topic of discussion in interviews
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with officials in the Liaoning case towns. The policy goal is a valid one: to curb
corruption, abuse of power, lavish spending and the accumulation of debt. The
problem, however, is that all spending now must run an obstacle course with delays
and added administrative overhead. Perhaps local spending is better controlled, but
the benefits are eroded by reduced transparency and additional opportunities for abuse
at higher levels, and with new inefficiencies occasioned by the bureaucratic overhead.
The interviewee echoed an old refrain from Pressman and Wildavsky, saying it has
become more and more difficult to get anything done.450 Tight, centralized controls
over the larger portion of local government revenues that come in the form of transfer
payments are earmarked for specific budget items so that local discretion has been
seriously eroded.451
The most popular leaders in Gansu are those who successfully "run for projects"
by being attentive to trends and opportunities through their personal and professional
networks. Traditionally those networks come at a price: a payoff is expected in return
for useful information. At the same time, the allocation of funds for those special
projects is still being accomplished in the shadows, and it is common knowledge that
"commissions" (haochufei) are being paid for the "right" decisions.
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Who Seek to Build Morals on a Foundation of Ruined Hopes, 3rd ed., The Oakland Project Series.
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
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Whether the central controls are necessary or not, they are sure to be unpopular
with those who must manage local conditions, and their argument that they are in the
best position to understand local needs makes sense. Since the policies and controls
were tightened because of audacious abuses in recent history, the core problem is a
lack of trust, and therefore will not be easy to correct. It is clear that local
governments brought these policies into their own lives through a long tradition of
abuse, and it is not clear what conditions will permit a relaxation of their provisions.
In the meantime, it is difficult to know whether the less frequent but much more costly
examples of abuses at higher levels are more or less expensive than the previous
chronic, continuous lower level abuses.
The mix of market forces and centralized controls is also creating unintended
consequences associated with tax relief policy. As earlier reported, despite very good
growing conditions in Liaoning, farmers have found it more profitable to engage in
various kinds of business. The motivation springs from a combination of the harsh
working conditions on the farms, and the economic fallout from the taxes and
subsidies. Since local governments cannot tax farmers, farms do not add to local
government revenues, and local governments therefore have no incentive to encourage
farming as a way of life - indeed quite the opposite is true. Local governments gain
from industries and businesses, and from the rural industries that spring up in
association with breeding farms where soil and climate conditions do not matter.
In several of the case towns, people have turned away from agriculture and
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towards rural industry. Consequently, the preferential policies (such as tax holidays,
and low priced lands) have become important predictors of progress. Where they exist,
they are popular not only with outside investors, but also with local farmers and even
with many cadres. Furthermore, attracting business is tied to promotions and bonuses
for officials, so the pressure is constant and significant.
Another consequence of current policy is that money, while always an important
factor in Chinese life, now conditions all activities. Corvee labor once was a key
mechanism for many types of infrastructure projects, for example - effecting such
improvements as road construction and maintenance and irrigation projects. Today the
villagers as well as their leaders only show up if there's to be a paycheck. Even militia
training, formerly very easy to handle, now requires enforcement, which cadres are
reluctant to do even though the training is a citizen's duty. Villagers forego the
training for any opportunity to earn money in other activities. In the case town in
north-central Jiangsu Province, village and team leader salaries are tied directly to
township work projects, and the villagers are given an allowance to participate. These
conditions all help explain why tax revenues are so urgently sought, which raises the
motivation to encourage business growth, which further discriminates against those
small, remote villages where conditions have not favored rural industry.
Investment in public health has improved conditions for many of China's peasants,
but costs are still burdensome for many. Peasants complained that the health policies
and medical care procedures are complicated, and have been changing so frequently
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and so dramatically that the peasants are confused about what is available to them. In
some areas, participation has actually declined. This condition was visible in this
research project and also in the work of others.452
Land Use Issues
Yet another area that has been caught up in the pinch between the desire for
modernization and the limited funds available to rural townships is land use
management. We have already seen how new policies are affecting eastern provinces
differently from their western counterparts, but this is not the whole story. As
townships work on the five objectives of the policy, many focus on appearance
projects, which are more visible symbols of their achievements. But these things cost
money, and since there is less discretionary money available, officials have had to find
ways to fund their progress. As we have seen, land seizures became a common source
of plenty when township governments were required to be self-supporting. The new
policies prohibit seizures, and other policies have placed tight controls on the
conversion of arable land to industrial use. There is a loophole, however, that is being
used once again to displace peasants from their homes with little or no compensation.
By building centralized residence communities, townships can improve the
appearance of their regions; and they also free up the lands upon which the old
housing was built, and can make it available for commercial use or for development,
thus raising badly needed discretionary income. Since the property was commune

Zhou and Liang.
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property and only made available to households, replacing it with nice new homes is
not a violation of the seizure laws. And since the land was not previously farmed, the
re-purposing doesn't fall under the restrictions that regulate arable land conversion.
The process rests comfortably (from the standpoint of township government)
within the official Beijing exhortation of finding resources locally to build a new
socialist countryside. Regardless of whether anyone favors or would argue against
such seizures, there are two issues that must be managed to the benefit of the people of
China in general, and to China's farmers specifically: the big picture of property rights,
and sustainable development, which refers to assuring that the decisions being made
today will not diminish the quality of life of China's future generations.
Transparency remains a problem in many areas. In almost all of the selected case
towns and villages, local officials are selective about the policies they enforce or about
which they choose to inform the villagers. Surprisingly, many farmers were not even
well aware of the new socialist countryside policies or how they would be affected.
Some even worried this was a shadow of the type of mass movement that was
common in Mao's administration. Their concerns are very basic: How will this affect
me? And, what will I have to pay for it? It is a suspicious attitude born of many
previous false promises and dashed hopes. What came through from village leader
and township cadre interviews was the same suspicion, but tinged with more hope.
These people also want two things - to be consulted when priorities are being planned,
and to be involved in the development and financial management of new countryside
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projects. When asked if they support the new socialist countryside program, they
answered the question with a question: How do we know how our money is going to
be spent? 5 The new rural development policy has been highly publicized and though
most interviewees appeared familiar with the concept, it was surprising how few
people acknowledged knowing anything about it. This curious phenomenon has been
called a "collective aphasic" in other research, and has been reported as a difficulty
associated with bringing peasants into the decision-making process.454
In practice it is not unusual for policy to turn out to be a double-edged sword,
with unintended consequences and unforeseen obstacles; and the body of policies that
have been combined to created China's new socialist countryside is no exception.
Those who know little about the policy beyond the propaganda from on high are ready
to believe in the good intentions and wisdom of the policy makers, but many have
seen little of real substance and therefore still harbor reservations and doubts, which is
to be expected after six decades of trampled promises and steadily worsening rural
conditions. In addition to the issues listed thus far in this chapter, there is not yet
much evidence that assistance is being matched to real need, but still appears largely
to be constructed around the one-recipe principle - thus policies can be expected to
continue helping people who do not need help, and failing to make conditions better
for those who are among the poorest. That has been the effect of past programs and
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the early returns from current policy impact shows the same kind of gap. What
matters in each rural community is its development capacity. Policy does not yet
appear to respond very well to this limitation.
The Role of organizations
As discussed in Chapter Six, China's current rural development is a multiplepurpose integrated rural development project. In addition to aiming at agricultural
productivity and farm income, it aims at a holistic view of rural well-being. During
the early stages of implementation, limitations have already become visible. It was
clear from the very beginning that neither local governments nor Beijing can fund a
complete makeover of all of rural China. What makes matters worse is that the policy
does not go far enough in rectifying the uneven distribution of endowments and other
resources. As already described, some policies have the undesirable effect of adding
the most help where it is least needed, and vice versa. What was visible in the eight
case towns was the important role of organizations in helping to bridge the gap
between rural communities, government resources and the markets. Interviewees
claimed that it is important not to rely on just one set of links, but to develop multiple
channels through which local leaders can become engaged to meet their needs. This
was reinforced in the findings of Uphoff et al. in several other Asian regions.455
Peasants in the case towns had proven themselves very adept at identifying different
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channels through which to approach needed resources, and recognized that different
agencies bring different kinds of resources, expertise, programs, technology and
information, so it is important to maintain contact with all of them. The multiple
contacts were also reported by one official as opening possibilities for sidestepping
bureaucratic delays and abuse, for stimulating policy adjustment and for prodding
those who control resources to assure a fair share. We see, for example, how the hilly
town in Liaoning has been working to gain approval to open their iron mines by
supporting the private sector to use its influence.
In three non-agriculture oriented case towns, the organizations that had become
active and were becoming increasingly effective included local government, the local
communist party, private business associations, and cooperatives. These organizations
had extended their tentacles both horizontally and vertically to the benefit of their
members.
Obviously the central government and its ministries are the most dynamic and
resource-rich of the institutions pushing rural development. Between 2004 and 2006,
rural development funding jumped more than 30 percent to ¥34 billion. Sixteen
ministries and agencies have responsibilities for different aspects of the program, and
these funds are distributed to provincial departments, bureaus and offices and from
there are made available to local branches.456
What follows are some examples of projects that have reached case study towns
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and villages: The Ministry of Agriculture sponsored an advanced irrigation system in
the basin town of Gansu, and the Ministry of Finance funded improved roads in the
same area. Two case towns in Liaoning Province were chosen for an experimental
project in which the Ministry of Commerce aims to build standardized rural
supermarkets to improve the quality of available consumer goods. A fertile soil
project (Wotu gongcheng) sponsored by Ministry of Agriculture was also in progress
in Liaoning, where large amounts of marginal lands were made suitable for some types
of farming.
The real give and take of governance in China, however, does not arrive in the
form of central government projects, but takes place at local levels of government
where officials balance their perceptions of the political will of provincial and central
governments against local needs. In that role they are constantly prioritizing their
work in "must do," "can wait," and "forget" categories, a set of priorities any manager
in the world would recognize.
The urgent business of China's central government has long been called "high
tension" work and includes such things as family planning, petitions and conscription
work. The high tension list has now been amended to add the new rural education
standards, public health, and direct subsidies for the peasants, among other things.
Fortunately the responsibility for the collection of agricultural taxes and fees has
disappeared, and officials appear to be managing their work quite well, except that
they still struggle, as nearly all local governments do, with unfunded initiatives from
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higher levels. These officials spend time exercising their networks in attempts to get
pieces of funded projects, as earlier discussed. When unfunded projects are passed
down the hierarchy, officials handle the easy ones and try to forget the rest.
The role of the party organization at the grassroots level
The party's role in China's governance is quite unique. The CCP draws its
legitimacy from the Chinese constitution, and is widely recognized as holding a
monopoly on power, although the government has been showing small signs of
independence. During the days of the commune, the party dominated every aspect of
rural life. After the economic reform that began in 1979, the household responsibility
system created much freedom for China's farmers. During the 1990s, peasants left
their farms in great numbers for all the reasons cited earlier, leaving a mess in their
wake. Among the case towns and villages, those with high development capacity have
recovered or are well on their way, while in poorer, more remote locations, the party
has a challenge on its hands. Some have chosen to cling to the top-down approach to
local government, such as the Gansu township where party officials try to keep the
farmers out of government business, but the central party line has encouraged
grassroots village elections and grassroots party organizations.457
In some of the case towns, both party consolidation efforts and government
influence have been complicated by past problems and a resulting reluctance on the
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part of farmers to take new risks. In the hilly town in Sichuan Province, local cadres
tried to improve productivity by encouraging, with subsidies, the growing of a popular
and profitable Korean green pepper. Under the new policies, farmers have been
emboldened to act more independently and conservatively towards proposals from
above. Since past attempts proved risky, and since the burden of risk was all theirs,
they are no longer docile about following programs such as this one, and in fact some
peasants took policy advantage against local cadres to stop their intervention. This
situation means that even well-conceived and helpful programs have become a
difficult sell.
It is the party that is attempting to remove these barriers. By mobilizing party
members, new projects can be experimented with and demonstrated. This appears to
be working, because in the better off towns in Sichuan and Gansu Provinces, farmers
who are party members have been helped to higher levels of prosperity. At the same
time, independent farmers who have succeeded in finding their own path to success
are heavily recruited into party ranks so they can be mobilized to help others. There is
no doubt party members are much more easily influenced toward the political will
expressed from higher levels. This means of deploying political will, as well as its use
in technology diffusion are both part of the operating credo of the party, and exemplify
the party's legitimacy as a not only a source of policy but as its own policy instrument.
The role of the private sector
Rural industry in China really began as town-village enterprises (TVEs) during
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the era of the communes. As we have seen, with the demise of the communes, TVEs
were taken over or sold, often to their managers and often to town and village cadres.
There was also a large influx during the 1990s of local peasants who had left their
farms and who came back to create private businesses. Where this happened,
development progress was especially rapid, as we can see in the works of Jean Oi.
This was the condition found in the case towns in Jiangsu Province where local
officials persuaded business persons to return to their home towns to give local
businesses a boost and to help others. Since businesses tend to "flock," a growing
presence of private business creates a spontaneous pattern of accelerating development
that benefits everyone. Business taxes fuel local government initiatives, and
commerce creates jobs and taxable income. In the plains town of Liaoning, in
addition to the boost in taxes and jobs, some local businesses have been persuaded to
sponsor school construction through their donations. In Jiangsu, businesses have
sponsored schools, parks and public transportation. Businesses were often tapped by
cadres to help with welfare projects and other public goods, and we saw the case in
Jiangsu where a local company donated a police car to the township. This kind of
behavior wins the hearts and loyalty of local governments, which obviously helps
when policies are developed and administered that affect business. It also gains favor
with local people, who develop a sense of loyalty that can easily carry important
influence when higher levels of government are planning actions that are contrary to
business interests. We saw an example of this in Liaoning Province when citizen
intervention halted an attempt to force a steel mill to relocate.
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In the modern town in Jiangsu, sponsoring companies were even asked to
participate in the management of the projects they helped to fund. In this way, public
administration becomes the beneficiary of business savvy with respect to competition
and efficiency. In sum, it is clear that the development of a rural industry has proven
far more significant than simply a source of tax revenues.
The example of the poultry/egg industry that developed in Liaoning provides an
excellent case study of the interaction between local business and the market and how
it helped a town. The chain of suppliers and customers related to egg farming created
another "flock" of profitable businesses for that village, and it was impressive how
quickly the chain was assembled. By the time of the research visits, this small
Liaoning village had extended its business all over southern China and into Hong
Kong. The seemingly bottomless demand required business and peasants to respond
in a coordinated and technically appropriate way. The government very quickly
leaped into the situation to partner with businesses to spread the technology and
encourage wider participation. It was inevitable in this environment that farmer
associations would develop, and although those were still quite loose during the
research visits, they were active in many important ways, as we saw in Chapter Seven.
Even China's developing banking industry became involved as more customers sought
to transition from cash to business accounts. The tendency to "flock" or "herd" to
which this research has alluded several times is another aspect of rural development
that should be studied. It is a phenomenon with which marketing science is very
familiar, but has not been examined for its effects on rural development. The central
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decision to experiment with rural supermarkets, for example, may well be impacted by
the effects of this predisposition.
The scene for private business participation in economic development is very
different in remote Sichuan and Gansu provinces, depending on the degree of isolation.
Proximity to large urban areas is a significant capacity indicator, and the suburban
town in Sichuan has been developing under conditions quite similar to the more
prosperous towns along the east coast, though it began later, and in suburban towns in
Gansu, the private sector has introduced simple agriculture processing industrial
centers. In both of these examples, many jobs were created for peasants who were not
successful on their farms. In the hill towns of Sichuan, and even in Liaoning where
poverty is surrounded by affluence, local governments live a constant struggle to find
the means to improve. Conditions are such that it is difficult to attract incoming
investment, and without taxes, the resources do not exist to create improvements.
Peasants struggle in subsistence farming and are under too much pressure surviving to
provide volunteer labor that might help. Natural endowments are lacking, people have
left in large numbers, leaving a leadership vacuum, financial capital is not available,
and government programs are attuned to reward accomplishment, not to ameliorate
backwardness. In sum, development capacity in these towns is very low and the
development programs that are now taking root all over China are not finding their
way into these impoverished areas.
This is the condition that created the present environment. What was done during
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the 1980s and 1990s to improve rural conditions really only worked where capacity
was high - the low hanging fruit has already been harvested. There has been a
tendency on the part of government and its agencies to believe that the lack of
progress in these poor areas is due to local leadership problems or to shortcomings
among the farmers themselves. What was really needed was an evaluation of capacity
so that appropriate capacity-building could be undertaken in these isolated areas. It is
a continuation of the policies that led to the closing of schools and health centers
which have further exacerbated the loss of social capital in these poorest areas.
China's Rural Cooperatives
Although the CCP was initially suspicious of all organizations outside of the party,
there is now a generalized respect for the work that farm cooperatives can accomplish.
In one of the case towns in Jiangsu, a model has been developed called a "company
and peasants households." In one case in Jiangsu, the model is constructed around the
silkworm cultivation and silk production and the cooperative has helped organize local
markets which it then connected to global markets for silk. A similar process is at
work in a plains town in Liaoning, where cattle breeding has been developed as a
complement to a thriving dairy industry and dairy processing. Although the model is
very effective, in this case the chicken must come before the egg. In the western case
towns there is no sustainable core around which cooperatives can develop.
In Liaoning, a slightly different mechanism is at work in the town that is
developing around eggs and chicken production and processing. In this case it is
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purely a peasant organization that began very informally and gradually evolved to take
on some of the characteristics of the cooperatives. The ones that were at work in the
case villages are still quite loose and informal, but in their ability to help with market
information, technology diffusion, and problem-solving, they have become quite
valuable to their members having sprung spontaneously from practical needs. During
the interview process, leading members barely seem to recognize they are organized,
treating the process as just a logical extension of social processes that happen to be
quite focused in orientation.
Local governments and party organizations in several of the case towns
acknowledged they have received information and training in these kinds of peasant
organizations because of Beijing's advocacy; and although the idea has not yet taken
root everywhere, the visits uncovered a watermelon association, a grape cultivation
association and a pumpkin association, among others. The rapid growth of all these
organizations makes it apparent that their members had been awaiting a go-ahead
signal from the watchful party and government. Though this phenomenon is still in its
early stages, officials have learned that in addition to the good these organizations can
do for the peasants, they also lighten the workload for local government. This is an
example of participant engagement that constitutes social capital in an inventory of
local development capacity.
The principal value of social capital lies in its voluntariness, its fostering of selflearning, self improvement and self reliance. In addition to requiring a crop or
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industry around which it can grow, perhaps the most important ingredient that
separates success from failure is the leadership. Much of the work of these
organizations requires activities that are voluntary, organized, and tailored to support
new technologies and types of knowledge, such as market development, soil treatment,
breeding technology, available agency resources and funds. The leadership that
emerges as these organizations attempt to find a place in their societies was
represented during interviews as the best kind of leadership, often coming from the
ranks of its members and always representing talent instead of the product of some
kind of spoils system that characterized past government-run programs. Since the
beginning of economic reform, the government focused on the economy writ large and
on peasant income. What is surfacing these days is individual courage and acceptance
of risk, an acknowledgment of the critical nature of knowledge about financing,
markets, and agrarian technology, tools and production supplies and materials.
Leaders have been emerging who have the ability to identify and harness local talent
or enlist and coordinate the aid of available government offices and agencies. In the
case towns, this leadership most often came from local government or party
organizations, but successful private business owners and successful farmers are also
prominent in the rural organization leadership core.
One interviewee expressed the belief that government and party leaders are more
likely to have their own ambition and self interest at the top of the agenda than
politically neutral leadership that comes from either business or within the farm
community. But officials are also more likely to possess leadership ability, networks
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and technical know-how. For this individual, there is no best formula for identifying
good leaders, but is perhaps best left to natural evolution. In his organization, there
were several abortive attempts to seize control by people not properly motivated or
possessing the necessary knowledge, but normal group dynamics corrected the
situation soon enough.
In the case towns, there was no better formula for smoothing farm-government
relations than economic prosperity. Progress eases tensions and helps create an
atmosphere in which mutual respect and collaboration become the norm. Prosperity in
the Jiangsu case towns meant that local bureaucrats could turn away from economic
intervention or interference and focus on those kinds of activities that stimulate further
progress. In Sichuan, township officials formally designated a dozen successful
peasant experts as advisors for others in the community. In the basin town of Gansu,
teams consisting of successful peasants and agriculture experts from county agencies
were formed to guide other farm households. In some programs participant advisers
received modest payment, but most often the work was accomplished on a voluntary
basis by peasants designated as paraprofessionals. The mentoring relationships were
formalized and became semi-permanent social organizations as well. In many fields
in which these organizations did their work, the names and contact information were
prominently displayed to indicate a continuing responsibility. This was welcomed as a
significant change from the days when outside experts blew in, made speeches and
conducted a few training sessions and then went back to their comfortable offices.
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The paradox that makes all of this work is that locally grown leaders and experts
speak with full knowledge of local conditions, problems and needs, but also carry with
them the full backing and access to resources from county and township governments
and party organizations. They communicate more naturally, use local language and
examples and are thus better equipped to persuade and lead. They are also far more
likely to become permanent fixtures in their regions, greatly enhancing the
sustainability of local economic progress.
The evidence supports the belief that there is a widespread understanding of how
to stimulate rural economic progress, but progress is shadowed by the realization that
those who most need support are not finding it. In other words, local leadership has
been adept at identifying and building upon existing capacity, but has not yet
identified or found the resources to create development capacity where it does not
exist. It may turn out that the solution often seen in the poorest areas such in Liaoning,
Sichuan and Gansu is the best one - qualify people to leave.
Interviewees made use of the term facilitator as previously discussed, but in
successful communities in Sichuan, perhaps a better term for the type of leadership
that has been successful is that of catalyst. As used here, the catalyst role is
distinguished from the facilitator role by being more subtle. Whereas facilitators take
responsibility for assuring the requisite skills and knowledge among a group in the
early stages of development, and for personally forging links between local output and
the market and between local organizations and government agencies that can furnish
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resources, a catalyst demonstrates respect for what people already know, and spends
more time encouraging self-management, self awareness, self reliance and
independence. Uphoff, Esman and Krishna described how the catalyst kind of leader
can stimulate action among members of a group who are sufficiently advanced to
respond well to this kind of infusion of energy and passion. The concept of leadership
expands from one centered on the most visible individual to a more collective vision
of leadership.458
What has been seen in this research is that rural development progresses in stages
and the kind of leadership that is best suited for any given stage is an important factor
to include in development planning. If social capacity or innovation are most
important, catalysts have an important role. If diffusion of technology is critical,
paraprofessional facilitators are best suited to the task. In the early stages of rural
agriculture development, farm technology and resource connections are paramount. In
the next stage, market know-how dominates. When conditions permit, as they did in
Jiangsu and in those case towns close to large markets, rural industry has been the best
choice, and in those cases, leadership came from business persons.
The lack of capacity in remote towns of Gansu and Sichuan has an insidious
problem related to leadership, as was seen in Chapter Seven. The drain of resources,
as the brightest and most ambitious (or most desperate) young men have abandoned
their villages to the wives, the elderly and the children, leaves a significant gap in
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qualified leadership. This condition of relentless poverty thus reproduces itself. A
broader range of investigation reveals that it is a national situation that the quality of
peasants who become migrant workers is higher than the average level of rural
labors.459 In Jiangsu and Liaoning, there has been a generalized outflow from the
farms and into industry, but there has also been an inflow of capital and migrant labor
as well as larger farmers who have been able to consolidate small farms into large
agricultural concerns, spawning additional new processing and handling businesses.
In the remote villages of Sichuan and Gansu, there is only an outflow of human capital
with no incoming resources to balance the losses. What little capital finds its way into
these poor areas is mostly in the form of subsidized housing, which is intended to
improve living conditions, but which does little to improve human capital.
When there is even a faint glimmer of hope, human capital in China generally
responds well and quickly to improvement initiatives. As has been seen in the more
successful areas of Gansu and Sichuan, even where development capacity was low
because of remoteness, poor transportation and marginal growing conditions, the spirit
of a well-led citizenry was able to create capacity and get on a path to prosperity. This
was visible, for example, in towns that created the beginnings of a tourist industry
around its flower cultivation, and in the town where experimentation led to a very high
quality garlic that has been selling for premium prices. A similar success occurred in
Liaoning where it was discovered that Kashmir goats could thrive on hillsides that had
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previously produced only meager crops under the harshest of working conditions. By
way of contrast, the hill town of Sichuan faced a serious drought in 2006 and in some
places a large proportion of the harvest was lost. Officials cited three reasons related
to human capital: farm families had not learned how to manage their crops properly;
even those who had been trained were reluctant to make changes; and most of the men
and even many of the women had departed, leaving the crops in the hands of a few
young women, seniors and children.
The distance between Jiangsu and the western case towns is most visible in terms
of human capital. In Jiangsu, returning workers brought back working capital and
helped create a prosperous network of small steel rural industries. They also brought
with them technical and managerial skills. Migrant workers from Sichuan and Gansu
seldom return, even when their land-use rights are threatened.
The value of human capital is sharply differentiated between east and west. When
the central government snagged most of the local tax revenues during the 1990s so
that even the schools and medical facilities were abandoned, towns in Liaoning and
Jiangsu were still reaping enough of a harvest from local industries to support basic
public programs. The results of those two different conditions are revealing. The
national illiteracy rate in China was reported as 11.04 percent at the end of 2005.
Liaoning's rate was 4.77 percent, Jiangsu was 10.02 percent, Sichuan was 16.61
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percent, and Gansu was 20.83 percent.

(The actual illiteracy rate may be higher than

official estimates).461 Illiteracy rates also showed a regional component. For example,
Liaoning had a low 4.77 percent illiteracy rate, but in the hill town that was visited for
this research, the rate was actually 10 percent. In Gansu, the provincial rate was 20.83
percent, but in the basin town of the province, illiteracy was reported as less than 10
percent.
Another example of development support that is disproportionately higher in the
already prosperous areas is the implementation of Beijing's policy of funding nine
years of compulsory education. In Sichuan, the government actually funded only half
the tuition in the hill town in 2006, but in both towns in Jiangsu, all rural children
were the beneficiaries of free education in 2006.462 A similar condition was seen with
respect to public health. Cooperative medical care and social security services did not
reach Gansu and Sichuan until 2007, but was already fully funded in Jiangsu cases by
2004.
With respect to the development of human capital, there was some degree of
training for peasants in all the case towns. In the agriculture-centered towns, the
training consists mostly of agriculture technology, while in other areas the training is
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mostly focused on helping people qualify for outside work, such as in industry or
construction, and in housekeeping for young women. Although there was no evidence
the training programs had reached the hill towns of Gansu and Sichuan as of the date
of the field research, job training was scheduled for both. Most such training was
conducted by government agencies, but there were also large firms getting involved in
the training project. An additional measure was the establishment of placement
agencies in China's major cities to help connect hiring companies with migrant labor
from the poorest regions.
Government-Citizen Synergy
Another dimension of this research into what is currently happening in China's
current development initiative was shaped by the work of Peter Evans as he described
the structure of development synergy. It is a perspective that retreats from the actions
of people, governments and other organizations to look at their interaction, which
Evans calls complementarity and embeddedness. Complementarity refers to the
degree to which the work of officials and an energized citizenry complement each
other as opposed to being tugged in different directions by different interests.
Embeddedness refers to the extent to which the actions of each group cross the
boundaries between them, working from within to further the shared interests of
both.463
As we have seen in our three advanced towns in the east where the farmers have
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turned their attention to occupations other than farming, there was a market
opportunity due to nearby urban and industrialized communities, as well as an
agreeable display of attitudes by both the local government and the people. All that
was lacking to unlock a powerful synergy was the government's acceptance of
privately owned business. The condition of the social capital was right, as was the
condition of the economy, and though self-interest was everywhere visible, the
combined forces of the market and social capital quickly combined in a productive,
complementary way.
In the successful towns in the western provinces, embedded leadership and
expertise helped overcome generations of traditional farming crops and methods to
build a comparative advantage and successfully market it. It is interesting to note that
none of these phenomena were planned, but appeared spontaneously as a result of
what people learned, what they all perceived as their own self interests, as a response
to local capacity environments, and as a result of persistent calls to action. In other
words, given some pushing in the form of both exhortation and financial incentives,
leaders and farmers gradually shaped a response to market forces that appears to be a
logical and natural outcome, rather than a preplanned one. Despite the superior
visibility of hindsight, there was always a little bit of surprise on the part of both the
leaders and the farmers at the success of their collaboration. There were important and
visible consequences beyond the increasing prosperity, consequences that further
strengthened social capital. A growing mutual trust and a collaborative spirit were
evident that had displaced some or most of the hostility that had been engendered in
423

previous policy environments. These observations support the old maxim that success
breeds success.
Conservatism had evolved into a readiness to experiment. Apathy had gradually
been replaced with confidence and optimism and open hostility towards government
had been supplanted by a grudging respect. These observations call attention to the
need for early successes, even if they are small ones, specifically for the effect of
success upon individuals and organizations.
The importance of networks is another rural development factor that has been
learned by China's farmers. In the poorest towns, there was a visible pattern of
discussion on this topic. Leaders are rejected for their lack of ability to wrest funds
from higher levels of government or from IGO projects or business sources; while new
leaders and officials are valued for their abilities in these areas. This impulse comes
from a very solid belief, especially on the part of the farm families, that they simply do
not have the resources, natural or financial, to effect meaningful development progress
and thus need to find a higher roost on the central government's development agenda.
These are not unfounded or shallow perceptions on the part of those families, but a
fatalism born of generations of subsistence farming, one bad season following another.
The end of the great famine that followed Mao's Great Leap Forward did not mean the
end of sorrow for them, just a sense that the next famine is just around the corner.
They have listened to empty promises and come to believe there is no other kind of
promise. These villages are difficult to research for the overwhelming sense of
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sadness and despair that is never far from the surface of every conversation. The
discouragement would be enough of a burden for them to carry, but thanks to
improving communications and the travels of their young men, these people also know
what is going on in the rest of China - that prosperity has arrived for hundreds of
millions - so that their despair is tinged with anger.
Although they know that China's most powerful leaders are continually working
on their behalf, they are conscious that this is not a substitute for representation in all
the intermediate levels of government and all the agencies that control China's
resources. Because the communist party considers itself the representative of the
people, the peasants have not been permitted to form unions that could exert political
influence on their behalf, so the cycle continues - their poverty means they are
excluded from the halls of government which means they are powerless to affect the
decisions that continue to extend the inequality that is their lot in life. It is a
management system that is strongly entrenched in the structure of China's institutions,
and the source of the argument in this thesis that for many of China's farmers, their
poverty is institutionalized. For China's poorest farm households, the very legitimacy
of the communist party is called into question by the extended reality of their plight.
The CCP is still firmly in control of China's institutions, but it also became
evident during this research that farm organizations, the market, local governments
and other institutions are becoming more active and influential. The party is no longer
able to resist this tendency, but its members appear to agree the evolution is one that is
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good for farmers, and good for China, and they therefore have shown a willingness to
bend with those forces instead of fighting them. Those in power expressed some
discomfort about this trend, but most expressed a willingness to share some of the
control as long as the responsibility and the work are also shared. One interviewee
said this willingness to surrender control became easier as the positive results became
visible.464
Current policy is making redistribution efforts to close the gap between developed
and less developed regions through transfer payments to fund local government and
cover other programs. But as of the time of this research, interviews disclosed that in
the hill town in Sichuan, payments were still too low to cover local cadre salaries, and
it should also be noted that salaries in this town are 10 to 20 percent of the salaries for
similar government positions in Jiangsu. There is an additional problem with money
not getting to its intended function. In Sichuan, officials reported that old projects and
old debts are still getting a large measure of any money that is placed within reach of
township officials. We can say that past problems have been left far behind in Jiangsu
Province and are being handled in the more prosperous towns in Liaoning, and even in
some western regions; but the past is still an anchor for those who started their
recovery at the same time, but without the capacity to effect significant progress.
By way of summary, the new socialist countryside is not a single policy or project
but is best viewed as a strategic direction for China. Since it must accompanied by
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significant institutional change, it appears self evident that the authoritative
approaches of the past would not succeed, and neither would the mass movements that
benefited some but ignored many. The new policy must also be treated as a system
that is characterized by rules and norms that are new to many Chinese but that must
become habit. The system that has worked best in the research towns includes the
benefit of emerging technologies, a learning approach and applied creativity to the
task of development, and a synergy between government, the people, business and the
market. In much of rural China that has not yet been touched by China's rapid
economic advance, the system must include support from above to increase
development capacity, village by village.
Comparative Asian Development Approaches:
Important lessons from the cases in Japan and Korea
China's latest approach to rural development was planned with the full intent to
learn not only from its own experiences, but also from the good and not-so-good
experiences of two of its close neighbors, Japan and Korea. This section compares the
research findings from this thesis to those two states to identify whether the
experiences of others can help China sharpen its predictions about the eventual
outcome of its development strategy. There are important differences between the
case in China and the cases in Japan and Korea, but they were chosen because of
similarities in their Asian cultures, because of the similarity of their objectives to
improve rural society, and because of how far they have advanced in their own
development efforts. Despite the presence of lingering problems, both states have
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become fully industrialized, modern, developed countries, a status that China still sees
as a goal.
The case in Japan
Seventy percent of Japanese lands are forested and/or mountainous, and most
agriculture takes place in the lowlands. The average family farm is barely a hectare in
size (one tenth of a square kilometer). Despite their small size, Japan's farms are
managed as a family business. In other words, Japanese farmers have left subsistence
farming behind.
Japan's rural development strategy was called the "rural life improvement
movement" and consisted of a broad variety of different approaches going back to the
end of the Edo period and through the Meiji Restoration, (mid 1800s through the first
decade of the 1900s). The post WWII rural life improvement has continued for the
last five decades.
After World War II, beginning in 1945, the Japanese experienced twenty very
difficult years of extreme poverty and near starvation. What surprised the world was
how quickly the Japanese economy recovered after that slow beginning, and to what
extent the country succeeded in bringing a large percentage of its people
unprecedented economic benefits. The recovery was made possible by a combination
of cumulative and progressive economic and social programs in which rural society
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was a foil partner.
There were three programs that were initiated by the occupying U.S. army that
laid the foundation for rural reform in Japan: rural democratization, the establishment
of agricultural cooperatives: and introduction of the agricultural extension system.
The agricultural extension services were formed as part of the Agricultural
Improvement Law of 1948. It was designed to tap into a community spirit
characterized in rural Japan by volunteerism and mutual support, and it brought
government resources in the form of designed experiments and research.466 In
addition to rural life improvement and technology advancement, the extension services
fostered rural youth organizations. Rural life improvement consisted of basic lessons
related to sanitation, food safety, child care and other basic household skills. This kind
of organized effort was new to Japan, replacing a pure productivity oriented approach
that had focused only on agriculture technology. This approach was based on the
belief that quality of life had to follow prosperity while the new approach was
conditioned to address quality of life in parallel with agriculture as a business. It was
undertaken in the belief that high productivity is not only a function of technology, but
also the result of healthy and happy farm families.467
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It was recognized early in the rural democratization program that ancient social
structures and cultural habits would make progress difficult and slow. Ingeniously, the
program was narrowed to Japanese women who had long been severely repressed, and
the democratization energy was focused on social reform. Female extension workers
were directed to use every opportunity to visit rural household in their districts to
convey in a one on one setting the knowledge and skills necessary to improve living
conditions and rural health. The program was a manifestation of a change in thinking
from top-down government subsidy and training mechanisms to a system in which
help and guidance came from an independent and community approach.468
The female extension leaders were not expected to become leaders, and were not
treated as such. They were instructed and encouraged to help other women become
aware of the numerous problems that existed in daily rural life, and to recognize them
as problems. Discrimination in education opportunities, for example, is not seen as a
problem in some societies because that's just how things are. What the extension
workers were bringing to Japan's farms is that those kinds of conditions come from
mistakes about life and living and do not necessarily have to be perpetuated.
The workers quickly gained the appreciation of the households upon which they
called because of the very practical and helpful nature of their contribution. They
introduced a new stove, for example, that was inexpensive but more effective in
providing heat for cooking and warming, while being safer, less wasteful and less
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harmful to the air in the home. They introduced improved work clothes and sources
and varieties of nutritious food. The approach of these workers was not to foist
advances and change into farm households, but to identify the problems with the old
techniques and offer a chance to try new ways. The workers could not be trained in all
of the areas they might encounter, so they were also taught to be observant, to be good
listeners, and to facilitate the diffusion of good ideas, wherever they were found. This
approach served Japan well, since the archipelago has a wide variety of local
conditions, and it was not practical for the central government to attempt to identify
and make use of technology that could vary greatly from one island to the next.469
Initial contact between these female extension workers and a male-dominated
Japanese village was expected to be difficult, so that contact was carefully
orchestrated. The extension workers would be introduced by a familiar face from the
next higher level of government. The workers participated in male-and agricultural
technology dominated meetings to familiarize the men with the goals of the program
and its official status. With this approach, village and township leaders were largely
cooperative and helpful, and the nature of the initial contacts with farm households
quickly dispelled any suspicions of undue government interference in anyone's home
life.
As it evolved in practice, the Japanese concept of improvement was constructed
around several important principles: minimize the need for money; put available
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resources to best use; and put groups to work on the problems.
The approach was therefore easy to deliver and easy to accept, which increased
the chances of success. It was a grand experiment in comprehensive rural
development and early use of a participatory approach that helped build social capital
on a foundation of small successes.
In contrast to developing countries where group leaders monopolize information
and knowledge and direct citizens in their work, it is interesting to note that this group
approach fukuden was part of the job description of extension workers in rural Japan.
Even when the opportunity for travel and for study tours was made available,
members easily selected participants, not on the basis of rank or connections, but with
the expectation that the person selected would be the best at learning from the
experience and returning with useful information.
Two other talents were noteworthy in Japan's approach to development. Those
involved were good listeners and learners, and thus made good use of external aid, and
of incoming external resources. As an example, there was not enough milk to go
around, and under similar circumstances, the resource is routinely hoarded by
powerful elites and later turns up on the black market. The Japanese entrusted
delivery to their resident groups who met and discussed the situation and distributed
the milk according to need.

The process of organizational development of rural life improvement in post-war
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Japan can be divided into three periods based on phases of system consolidation: the
small district period (1951-57), the intermediate district period (1958-64), and the
broad district period (1965-68). During the first period, livelihood extension workers
themselves were exploring the definition of rural life improvement in their process of
probing in the dark and they struggled as they formulated their plans and actions. The
main activities that characterized this period included the improvement of cooking
stoves, kitchens, water supply facilities and baths, food preservation, promotion of
wheat flour use and consumption, insect control and the raising of small livestock to
increase protein intake.
During the second period, and following the revision of the Agricultural
Improvement Promotion Law in 1958 and overlapping with the launching of the socalled Agricultural Basic Law Administration, there was a trend toward part-time
farming. A higher percentage of women and the elderly joined the farm labor force,
and there was an outflow of rural youth to urban areas resulting in a reduction in
available farm labor and an increase of the income gap between industry and
agriculture. In this environment, harsh working conditions, health disorders and a
declining quality of life became the norm, and the focus of problem-solving activity
was quickly re-directed to the securing of good nutrition and dissemination of good
work practices and healthy habits. The program was also expanded during this period
to include special programs for the management of forests and fisheries.
In the beginning, group members did not come to meetings with a purpose, but
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only considered them a social obligation. Many were hoping for outright gifts and
technology, whether they really needed them or not. They were lazy about using their
new skills, but in some cases treated them as an opportunity to demonstrate their
superiority. They were constrained by the presence of leaders, and were mostly silent,
keeping their information and opinions to themselves. As the successes began to pile
up, however, these attitudes gradually changed to the opposite, in which they enjoyed
working and learning together and helping each other. Meaningful dialog replaced
rumors and gossip, and their position in society faded in importance.471
The case in South Korea
Development programs in Korea did not so much evolve, as in Japan, but shifted
with changing administrations. The 1960s was characterized by social development in
which a specialist or councilor lived among rural villagers training and assisting them
in identifying their own problems and developing solutions. This was a participatory
approach that really signaled the very beginnings of the bottom-up approach to rural
development.472
During the 1970s, rural development was termed the New Village Movement, or
nongchon saemaul undong. In 1970, then President Chung-Hee Park instructed a
national conference of governors and ministers to study ways and means of promoting
rural self-help efforts based on cooperation among fanners, government agencies, and
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farm leaders. Based on this instruction, the central government drew up an
experimental project, named the Saemaul Undong. This well studied approach was
characterized as top down and bottom up. It emphasized villagers' initiatives and
provided meager but welcome support in the form of materials and financial assistance
from the central government. The programs focused mainly on roads and other
infrastructure improvements, and on the upgrading of housing units. The end result
was a spirit of self reliance in the solving of problems and managing of their own
affairs. As a result of the successful implementation of the Saemaul Undong, Korea
was recognized as one of the leading developing countries during the 1970s.
The development of the Saemaul Undong approach occurred in four consecutive
stages.474 The first was characterized as a foundation building stage that lasted from
1971 to 1973. It focused on the living environment including the replacement of
thatched roofs, the widening and improvement of roads, the improvements of fencing
and the construction of more bridges. These projects did not increase income, but they
benefited the villagers and helped foster an attitude of sacrifice, cooperation and self
sufficiency. During this period, per capita income in Korea increased from $289 to
$396 (U.S. dollars).
Having successfully completed the improvement projects, villagers were then
encouraged to take up income-generating projects such as joint or cooperative farming,
common seedbeds, off-season vegetable cultivation, pasture development, community
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re-forestation, and the raising of pigs. This stage lasted from 1974 to 1977 and during
that period per capita GNP rose to U.S. $802 by 1976.
The third stage of saemaul undong lasted until 1979 and was focused on spiritual
enlightenment. This stage was aimed at inducing and internalizing a spirit of diligence,
self-sufficiency and cooperation and with a dedication to innovation. In 1979, South
Korea's GNP reached U.S. $1,647.
The final stage of the development of the saemaul undong began in 1980,
following the assassination of President Park. One of the first moves of the new
administration was the transfer of the saemaul undong program from the Ministry of
Home Affairs to a government-affiliated private administrative body. From this point
on, responsibility for planning and administering the program was gradually
transferred to private organizations and people. It is widely acknowledged that the
vitality of the movement quickly eroded following the third stage. Industrialization,
meanwhile, continued to improve the income of the average Korean which climbed to
U.S $2,568 during this final period.
The good news was not to last, however. Dissatisfied with the overall results and
facing continued rural complaints with political and social fall-out, the government
took matters into its own hands during the 1980s and launched a top down approach in
which specific areas were targeted for modernization and a generalized improvement
of public services.
The 1990s are best characterized as a top-down modernization effort focused
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upon industrialization. The government developed and executed development plans,
rural industrialization, the development of industrial complexes and the creation of
non-agricultural earning opportunities. The 1994 Rural Environment Rearrangement
Act led to more rural infrastructure improvements and tourism development. The topdown approach to develop became solidly institutionalized, which meant that villagers
stopped demonstrating their own initiative and have since looked to the government
for plans and directions.
Since this thesis involves a search for successful rural development techniques,
and since Korea's saemaul undong program was highly regarded by scholars and
practitioners alike, it is appropriate to include a more detailed description of its
provisions. To begin, it is significant that the program began without a formal or
theoretical framework. Government officials planned and implemented the project
entirely on their own. Second, their approach was uniquely Korean, making use of
mottoes, slogans and terminology that came from the heart of Korean culture and
tradition. Third, it is important that the project was initiated as a consequence of the
political will of Korea's president, and as the rural component of a national
industrialization program. One of the critical forms of input into the saemaul undong
program was the basket of government interventions and support. Fourth, the most
important motivation to launch this program was to lead Korea out of poverty. When
this program began, many Koreans experienced frequent cycles of near famine
conditions. One of the first goals of implementation was to increase rice production in
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Korea's farms. Fifth, the saemaul undong program achieved much in the way of a
spiritual awakening of rural Korea. The average farm family moved from despair to
diligence, from dependence to self-reliance, and from self-interest to public
476

cooperation.
An important lesson arises from the realization that such programs as the saemaul
undong are destined to peter out eventually. One of the reasons for a mutual lowering
of interest in the Korean program was that people had come to enjoy an acceptable
level of wealth and well-being.477
Attention to the spiritual dimension of rural development turned out also to be
very important. Farmers gained not only new technologies but also a higher level of
motivation and a higher degree of self-confidence which led to permanent and
sustainable changes in basic attitudes, values and behaviors. This improved approach
to farm life also included a feature that was seen in Japan, the value of group activities,
joint projects, integrated planning and development projects and an important social
component that replaced "I" with "We" in development activities. This closely
resembles what is today recognized as community engagement and an enhanced
capacity for development. The one step at a time approach is also considered
important when compared with other assisted development projects which failed
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because villagers were asked to do too much too quickly.
Comparing Notes
Rondinelli argues that successful rural development requires a strong national
political commitment and substantial administrative and resource support.479 As we
have seen in both Japan and Korea, those two factors were in play from the beginning,
focusing first on filling the stomachs, secondly on filling the homes with consumer
goods, and thirdly in filling peoples' minds with spiritual satisfaction. Despite these
commonalities, it is evident that the mechanisms and leadership operated from
different viewpoints, each taking advantage of national cultural and traditional mores
and values to engage the population in the work.
In relating the Japanese and Korean precedents to the China case, we see several
strong parallels. First, the commitment from the highest levels of China's leadership is
always and everywhere in evidence. We are not dependent upon speeches to support
this contention, but see it in a constantly increasing level of financial support and other
programs such as the elimination of taxes and fees that could only come from the
highest level of the party and government.
We can also see a community engagement function at work, and while we cannot
say whether this is part of a plan or the natural offshoot of institutional change
management, we can see its benefits in the more successful case villages, including
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those that have seen only modest success to this point. Rule changes such as the
management of government finances by the next higher level of government has
increased the risks associated with corruption, and when combined with financial
incentives for cadres and officials based on achievements, rural leadership appears to
be operating at a significantly more wholesome and transparent level than just a few
years ago. In the more prosperous eastern rural communities, it was everywhere
evident that prosperity is being spent on the right things, such as infrastructure projects,
beautification, poverty alleviation, education, public health and social security
programs. The spirit of self reliance and the satisfaction that comes with achievement
has infected businesses that are now participating in and even leading development
projects and footing the bill for improvements that are still difficult to fund officially.
The donated police car is an example of this.
Peasants are no longer being displaced to second-rate accommodations, but
relocated to attractive housing near shops and schools. The fruits of prosperity are
thus standing in sharp contrast to post-war Japan, when resources were so poor that the
entire program was fabricated around making do.
As in both Korea and Japan, rural China is the scene of a huge migration to the
cities and industrial zones in search of work. Unlike the situation in either of those
countries, some Chinese rural villages are so lacking in capacity that the government
and in some cases industry and construction companies are cooperating to train
farmers for better jobs elsewhere. Unlike the cases in Japan and Korea, China's
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government is now assisting farmers with direct subsidies and with technology and
equipment grants.
Unlike the situation in Japan, China's rural development has yet to extend its
tentacles into many of its most remote and poorest areas, and in fact we have seen that
many policies and programs appear to deliberately favor and reward areas that have
reached higher levels of prosperity. Because much of the party's deliberations are held
behind closed doors, it is not known whether skewing grants and programs to the
better off is an intentional part of the improvement process, similar to the urbanization
and industrialization that characterized much of China's early economic reform. By
improving conditions where the task is easiest, the tax base continues to increase,
making it possible to fund the much more difficult projects in China's poorest rural
areas. Whatever the reason, cadres and officials in the poorest towns struggle just to
solve basic problems such as the availability of good water, the construction of roads,
electrification and sanitation.
China's development approach is comparable to Korea's plan to the extent that
except for a few broad objectives there is no specific blueprint for what happens in the
country. What is visible is a huge budget for the construction of highways and
railroads to improve rural transportation in a big way, but the details appear to have
been left to those doing the actual work in rural towns and villages. Again, it is not
known whether it was part of the plan or a natural evolution, but Chinese rural
communities are beginning to show signs of organization and cooperation comparable
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to those seen in Korea and Japan. As the work progresses, villagers appear to be
gaining more freedom: to choose what crops to plan, to organize, and even to leave
their farms. Since they no longer owe agricultural taxes, their mobility is of less
concern to local officials who once deplored the loss of tax revenues as the villages
emptied. As rural villagers begin to succeed, they sometimes turn to the government
for assistance, sometimes to business, and often take matters into their own hands.
The lapse in education programs during the 1990s means there is a larger proportion
of the population that is illiterate, however, so self-reliance takes on a different
meaning depending upon the circumstances.480
We can see that the Chinese path is closer to the Korean than the Japanese in
several ways. The program originated at the highest levels of government and was
carried along with higher levels of financial and other kinds of support. In
conversations with Chinese officials, there appears to have been a lack of respect for
peasant skills and motives and an underlying assumption that any initiative would
need to come from the top. As the fallacy of that proposition became evident in those
areas that developed more quickly, it became more evident that the trust problem was
actually worse in the other direction. The history of corruption and abuse meant that
farmers had even less respect for their leaders than the leaders for them. Both of these
attitudes are still visible in the poorer case towns. As work began in earnest, however,
a more rational and pragmatic view, fueled by self-interest and meaningful assistance
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led to an improved atmosphere for the work of development.
There is much appeal in the Japanese post-war extension service approach that
combined just a little government support and guidance with the natural abilities of
neighborhood workers, and there is nothing similar in China. There are conditions
even in the more successful towns that would be greatly helped by such lifestyle
coaching. The state of public sanitation in the Liaoning village that has become a
center for egg production, comes immediately to mind, but basic sanitation practices,
water quality, food preparation and preservation, and cooking practices and
implements are still in primitive condition in many rural households, as are the raising
and care of children, home construction and maintenance, the maintenance of common
areas and facilities, and the condition of roads, schools, irrigation facilities, and there
are many other similar opportunities. A little paint would go a long way in rural
Chinese villages. This difference between the Japanese and Chinese programs has left
even many prosperous Jiangsu villagers just waiting to see what the government will
do for them next.481 This is the same experience seen in Korea during the last decade
of their saemaul undong when rural villagers became " . . . passive recipients of the
government programs and policies rather than active participants in their own affairs
and decision-making"482 This is a powerful lesson about sustainability that the
Chinese should learn.
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A more subtle but important lesson the Chinese could learn from the Japanese
experience is the set of very valuable communications links that were forged by the
personal approach used by the extension services. The opportunity for mutual
learning, for the dissemination of policy, the diffusion of technology and the real-time
feedback from the people stands in stark contrast to the very impersonal governmentpeople Chinese communications. The Chinese way is characterized by slogans and
exhortation from the government, and only street demonstrations can stimulate
communications in the other direction so that government understands the mood and
needs of their citizens.
From Uphoff et al., we learn that if China's rural development is to be sustainable,
the communities that are transformed must remain flexible and open to new
information, ideas, and instructions. Economic, social, environmental and political
dimensions of rural life are always evolving, sometimes for the better, but often not.
For transformations to remain relevant and effective, they must be continually checked
against new realities and updated appropriately. This makes learning both an essential
short term goal as well as a long-term strategy.483 In the Japanese experience,
extension workers as facilitators learned from local farmers; as teachers, they spread
useful knowledge where it was needed most, and as intermediaries they were able to
facilitate two-way communications between Japan's farmers and their government.
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If anything, the need for this kind of collaborative and communicative
environment is more critical in today's China than it was in post war Japan. China's
reality is part of a global picture in which farm households continue to be the basic
unit of agricultural production in most areas, facing the economic and social
conditions imposed through WTO, global competition, international standards and
sources of financial policy that can easily boost their abilities or submerge them in a
sea of bureaucratic red tape. China's bureaucracy has often been characterized,
including in the background chapters in this thesis, as bloated. From the perspective
of a rural household, this translates to a government with a bewildering array of
agencies, policies, practices and representatives, all of whom see their work as of the
highest priority and some of whom are still known to not be trustworthy. Subsistence
farming may have been a terrible way to live, but at least it was uncomplicated. Rural
cooperatives and peasant organizations are in their early development stage, just now
becoming useful in helping their members negotiate the new global setting in which
they find themselves, and there is a great deal yet to be learned, and there are no
experts to help. Under these conditions it is apparent that farm-government synergy
can become a significant catalyst for progress.
In both the post-war Japanese rural life improvement project and the Korean
Saemaul Undong, cooperative joint development projects and attitudes were supported
and nurtured by their traditional culture. In both cases administrative and voluntary
organizations were encouraged and developed rapidly to create a medium in which
farmer-government collaboration could take root. From the government's perspective,
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such groups are highly efficient, permitting agents to reach a greater range of people
with the same effort. At the same time, group dynamics is known to foster personal
growth among its members, and the program in Japan helped heal gender
discrimination wounds of very long standing as a bonus.484 Both the Japanese and
Korean experiences offer much that is useful in learning about communications,
coordination and cooperation among and between engaged farm households and their
local governments who share responsibility for the betterment of their communities
and lifestyle.
In post-war Japan, agricultural coops were called NOKYO, an abbreviation of
Nogyo Kyodo Kumniai. They were a reorganized version of a semi-governmental
system for control of war time provisions during and preceding WWII. Those were
disbanded by occupying forces at the end of the war, but re-established as general
agricultural cooperatives with responsibility for marketing, farm insurance, technology
diffusion, credit management and other helpful services. They were organized into
prefectural and national federations. At the top of the federation was a loose
governing body that included the National Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives,
whose primary mission was marketing; the Central Bank of Agriculture and Forestry
to handle credit; the National Insurance Agricultural Cooperative Federation that
handled life and casualty insurance; and the Central Union of Agricultural
Cooperatives which handled representation and lobbying on behalf of farm
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interests.
Because of severe problems approaching famines immediately following WWII,
NOKYO was used by the government to monopolize the distribution of food products
- especially rice to government food industries, and also to handle the distribution of
seeds and fertilizers and other government rationed farming supplies. The basic
feature of Japanese agriculture today in terms of a large number of small-scale ownerfarmers, organized by the NOKYO, was thus framed through the postwar-reforms.486
The NOKYO has become one of the most politically powerful organizations in
Japanese politics. It is a mammoth economic entity that provides almost every kind of
service to rural areas. Although there are no legal requirements for farmers to join the
NOKYO, all Japanese farmers belong to the organization. The NOKYO has a
hierarchical, nationwide network. It has strong ties with the Liberal Democratic Party,
which has run Japan's government for most of the postwar period. For its support of
the LDP at election time, the NOKYO has been able to ensure that farmers' interests
are protected.487
The Republic of Korea National Agricultural Cooperative Federation (NACF)
The following section devoted to Korean farm cooperatives is revealing in its
description of all the activities and services a strong cooperative organization can
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deliver. In 1961 after the military coup that seated President Park, the government of
the Republic of Korea first organized the National Agricultural Cooperative
Federation (NACF) from the personnel and facilities belonging to the former
Agricultural Cooperative and Agricultural Bank established during the 1950s.488
Starting in 1971, primary cooperatives like NACF developed into multipurpose
cooperatives by taking over some of the key business areas of the city and county
cooperatives, including farm credit lending services, supply of fertilizers, chemicals,
and cooperative insurance services. In the late 1970s, efforts were also made to
promote joint marketing groups and to expand product distribution facilities, including
collection points, warehouses and processing facilities. Retail outlets were also
strengthened to expand marketing opportunities such as supermarkets. Beginning in
1981, agricultural cooperatives streamlined their three-tier organization (primary
cooperatives, city/county cooperatives, and the federation) into a two-tier system, by
placing the city/county cooperatives as branch offices of the federation. The
agricultural Cooperative Law was revised to provide the legal ground for the present
two-tier system and for the transfer of the livestock-related services to the National
Livestock Cooperative Federation.
After the declaration of national democracy in 1987, member farmers wanted to
democratize agricultural cooperatives. Opinions from member farmers, staff members,
scholars and specialists were sought. As a result, member farmers could elect the
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presidents of the primary cooperative directly under the new law. In addition, the
president of the NACF, formerly appointed by Korea's President in accordance with
the recommendation of the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF), now was to
elected by the presidents of the primary cooperatives. Under the revised law, the
agricultural cooperatives gained more autonomy eliminating clauses restricting their
self-control. The revised law greatly expanded the business scope of the agricultural
cooperatives to include the brokerage business related to the sales of farm land, the
transportation business utilizing trucks owned by the cooperatives, the banking
business of the special cooperatives, the direct investment in related corporations, the
diversification of the investment of the NACF's surplus funds and the abolition of the
limit on credit guarantee as well as bill discounting. The agricultural cooperatives
tried to affect government policy by lobbying on behalf of member farmers,
particularly after the Uruguay Round Negotiations at the end of 1980. During the
1990s, the NACF continued to expand its cooperative services. To prepare for the
anticipated influx of foreign competitors and to strengthen its own cooperative
marketing, the NACF focused its retailing marketing efforts on the "Agricultural
Marketing Complex" and engaged in both wholesale and retail marketing. In 2000,
the market share of the cooperatives was about 40 percent of the entire food sector.
The NACF had become the second largest commercial bank in terms of the deposit
volume in Korea as of the end of 2000. The cooperatives also work on the
improvement of rural welfare services, such as medical services, legal services and
funeral services for member farmers and participate in activities for environmental
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protection.
Implications for the Chinese case
A half century ago, as the Japanese and South Koreans were at work on their rural
development projects, we have seen that communist China had just completed a land
reform which was expected to end privation by giving China's farmers the productive
assets that would enable the peasantry to sustain itself, finally free of the bonds of the
landed-gentry class.489 In the following two decades, the state took ownership of all
rural property and organized the farmers into communes that took responsibility for all
aspects of life and farming in "expanding organs of economic cooperation, slowly
increasing in size, complexity, responsibility and degree of socialization."490 After
decades of mixed successes and failures and a generalized weariness about the high
degree of regimentation, Chinese peasants rejected the communes in favor of
household farming. For 200 million smallholder farms, traditional patterns of
agricultural production and marketing had become less and less viable. Carting small
quantities of vegetables to a local market for a little cash was replaced by a battery of
wholesalers, distributors, storage and transportation companies, specialized cleaning
and packaging specifications, tighter control over the use of chemicals, complex legal
requirements and a host of WTO and other global forces. Smallholder farms are at a
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considerable disadvantage in this new agrarian model.
The most important basket of solutions to this kind of farming problem is likely to
be found in the farm coop models seen in Japan and Korea. It is estimated that about 3
percent of all Chinese farmers were at least nominally members of some type of farm
association by 2003. It is known that membership in such organizations has increased
since that time. For example, by the middle of 2006, there were 6,260 different
professional farm associations with a membership of 1.94 million peasants, accounting
for nearly 20 percent of the total farmer households.491 It is apparent that in this trend,
Jiangsu is ahead of most Chinese provinces, so that total membership nationwide
remains quite low. Additionally, we have seen that many Chinese farm associations
are in their early stages of development and not yet functioning to the full benefit of
their members. Many, such as the informal association that has sprouted to help
Liaoning's chicken breeders, are doing little more than market networking.492 These
statistics suggest substantial potential for the future of Chinese farming, and the list of
services that we have seen in Korean and Japanese associations aligns very well with
what China's farmers need most. While China's communist party presents itself as
representing all workers and peasants, it is difficult to estimate how long it would take
to develop the expertise and resources to do for China's rural communities what
dedicated farm organizations can provide.
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While farmer organizations are visible at the local level in nearly every case town
in this research, and while such organizations have been formally sanctioned by both
the party and the government, there is as yet no peasant association that is operating at
the national level. There is certainly no organization in China that can compete on a
level playing field with the Japanese NOKYO or the Korean NACF.
Whether China's peasants need a national organization is a matter of opinion, two
of which are expressed as follows: there are Chinese scholars on record as having said
that grassroots farm organizations are inadequate. Local organizations need external
resources, and only when they arrive from higher levels of government can they
operate at all. They are limited in their ability to maintain a competitive marketing
presence at the national and global level, and they lack the kind of networking and
financial resources that can support high level marketing effort. They are extremely
limited in the services they can provide, and none can equal the menu of services
available to Korean and Japanese farmers. These same scholars acknowledge that the
prohibition of a national farm organization stems from the old party view of
competing organizations and interests and antagonistic tendencies that can upset the
political order.493 It is clear from the Japanese case that farm organizations have the
potential to create a powerful political movement, fully capable of competing with the
communist party in a meaningful way. It does not take a long memory to recall that
there are 800 million peasants, and it is that peasant population that has repeatedly
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unseated emperors and governments throughout Chinese history. On the other hand,
the Korean NACF is an example of how such an organization can work cooperatively
with a national government, can remain professionally apolitical, and can become an
important channel for communications between a large segment of the population and
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its government.
A second view of national farmer organizations is well represented in a World
Bank report. The report expresses the opinion that organizations aimed at promoting
the interests of farmers will be most effective when all members share common
interests and aspirations, and if they come together to solve problems faced in
common. When organizations are made up of members with widely disparate or even
conflicting interests the purpose and focus of the organizations becomes blurred, the
weaker members of the organization fail to gain their equitable share of the benefits,
and the organizations become unsustainable. Therefore, the development of farmerowned and controlled organizations are best when they begin within small areas but
can eventually lead to federations of organizations to promote the interests of
members on a larger scale and at higher levels. The main point, however, is that such
federations should be allowed to develop bottom-up, in response to the needs of the
organizations and members themselves, rather than be imposed from the top down.
Due to the nature of the contemporary rural society in China, the strong intervention of
local government is inseparable from economic development. It is believed that one
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of the key issues, and a matter of considerable debate in China, is the nature and extent
of the role of government in the formation, development and operation of farm
495

organizations.
The research that supports this thesis has reported evidence that local farm
organizations are performing important services for their members, at least on a local
scale. They have provided research and links to higher-level markets, have created
bridges to rural financing, and are showing signs of political influence. The
manifestations of that growing power are better characterized as cooperative and
collaborative rather than threatening to either party or government leadership.
Whether higher level organizations or federations can sprout from the existing local
organizations is a matter of conjecture. In contrast to the Korean and Japanese
democratic societies, China still has a strongly centralized, hierarchical political
system. Democracy is a difficult topic for the Chinese, and particularly difficult for
Chinese peasants. In rural China, democracy means elections for village leader and
sometimes opening of the accounting books for villager inspection. Even this limited
exposure to democratic principles has left China's farmers with mixed feelings about
the results, and uncertainty, or at times indifferent to the long term effects of an
expanding democratic system. They simply do not have the kind of experience that
would have prepared them for forming and managing their own independent
organizations. In comparison with the democratic institutions in Korea and Japan,
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such as compulsory education and open media networks, Chinese society is in the very
beginning stages of citizen involvement in government and is being led by a party still
uncertain about whether it wants more, and often expressing the sentiment that it
already has enough.
From their beginnings after WWII, young Koreans and Japanese were educated
and encouraged to follow the advice of their government, but were also encouraged to
think for themselves, and the open dissent often seen in both these countries provides
strong evidence that it has become acceptable to criticize government and actively
work for improvement. Young people in both countries are extremely conscious of
their own autonomy, their distinctiveness, and their ability to make big changes. In
Japan "Most of the opinions . . . expressed in speeches or in newsletters were broadly
in accord with official policy, but the potential for a more critical stance toward the
government of the day and toward village politics was being created and, with it, one
of the bases for the up-welling of 'rice roots' democracy in rural Japan in the
1920s."496
The case of the Republic of Korea provides another useful historical experience.
The Republic of Korea experienced substantial economic growth without widespread
sharing of its benefits among the rural populace and without decentralization of power
to local government. Before Saemaul Undong, the NACF was just a bureaucratic
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institution under highly centralized political regime. Its policy-making and
organizational operation had almost no voice in local and grassroots farmer
associations. Although the NACF aimed at increasing agricultural productivity,
improving farmer households' socioeconomic situation and improving farmers'
education and scientific knowhow, it often performed as a governmental agent and
served primarily the interests of government. Its bureaucratic way, especially official
corruption and abuse of power, upset the farmers. With the emplacement of the
Saemaul Undong, the NACF administration was greatly improved, and official
corruption was quickly curtailed. The reason for success is obvious; because the
Saemaul Undong was a mass movement, farmers all over Korea helped to supervise
the operation.497
Turning back to the case in China, in this field research, the party and government
intervention is everywhere, and the results are often positive. Under such a highly
centralized political system, even if an independent farmer association were to develop
at the national level, it is difficult to imagine it could work unless it becomes
integrated into the government. Whether it emerges from the top-down or the bottomup will not matter unless the political culture changes to accept a greater flow of
bottom up information. Just as is true for the rest of China's civil society, education
and information are keys to creating a readiness to participate, and also key to
transforming a government that no longer considers itself to be the fount of all useful
knowledge and ideas. In the meantime, local farm organizations have been learning
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how to link themselves with other operations, agencies and institutions from which
they can seek help for their membership. This is a need that exists in China, as we
have seen, and a need that cannot likely be well managed by the party or the
government.
Both the post-war Japanese rural life improvement program and the Korean new
village movement have provided solid evidence that the Chinese new socialist
countryside can become a reality but cannot be built overnight.
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Chapter Nine
Conclusions
This last chapter summarizes the analyses and arguments that have emerged from
this research project. The binding theme of this project was a search for the specifics
of how China's rural transformation is being managed - today. China's farmers have
been essential to all of the regime changes in its long recorded history, and the
communist takeover in 1949 was no exception. The promises of that revolution were
a just and egalitarian society, an equitably shared prosperity, and an end to the
oppression of China's vast worker and peasant classes. The promise is yet unfulfilled.
It's not that China's Communist Party has not been trying to deliver - it's that in a land
with such an enormous population and an overwhelming backlog of work to be done,
there have been missteps, new external and internal challenges and priorities, and
changes in strategies and plans along the way.
The Peoples' Republic of China is now nearly six decades old. After the first
three decades of mass programs, a fixation on ideological inundation and a mix of
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progress and stumbling, a second revolution took place in the form of a major
economic shift. Accomplished without bloodshed, this reform has nevertheless cast
the nation and its people in an entirely new mold - the Chinese Communist Party took
the historical step of leading the way to a market economy. Part of the plan was a very
conventional policy of extraction from hundreds of millions of farmers to drive the
industrialization essential to China's progress. Contemporary China is a product of
that strategy. Industrialization has created an economic miracle of unprecedented
proportions. China has a large and growing middle class that has achieved moderate
prosperity. And 800 million Chinese farmers have been left in the dust on the side of
the road.
For nearly six decades, China's party and government have tried to lessen the
burden for the rural sector, and there have been significant victories along the way.
The problem is that for hundreds of millions conditions have never been worse than
they were at the end of 2003. The only good thing that could be said of that
disadvantaged class is that they were not dying in large numbers due to either internal
strife or international war. They were otherwise an oppressed group in every sense of
the word, and with little no or social services, including public health and welfare,
with the costs of farming increasing faster than the market prices of their produce,
there was little reason for optimism. Their station had been institutionalized, and
institutions are notoriously difficult to change. To add to their misery, China's farmers
had been subjected to increasingly aggressive tax collections, to land seizures, and to
the corruption of their local officials as a result of mismanagement out of Beijing. The
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misbehavior of local officials can probably be said to have been an important step
toward change, because it finally became so bad that rural Chinese began taking to the
streets in large numbers to protest. Public protests led the party and the government to
address the need for change, and it was not difficult to identify the root causes of the
problem. The combined effects of decades of extraction stood naked in the light of
new studies. Impoverished farmers led by impoverished local governments were
behaving exactly as could have been anticipated. New policies were needed and new
programs to counter the effects of previous policy and to rebuild a healthy rural society.
China's new leaders took the reins of government in the spring of 2003,
determined to accomplish what had been impossible up to that time. This
determination and all the commotion it generated in both Chinese and world media
became the central issue of this research project with the question that all Chinese and
many in the rest of the world were asking: Could the party and the government
succeed in creating a fair, balanced society? It was not only a matter of justice - Hu
and Wen recognized it was an issue of overarching importance to the future of the
country. If China could wrest economic prosperity with only 30 percent of its
population being productive, what could be accomplished by 1.3 billion productive
Chinese?
With this background in mind, this research project emerged in a series of
explorations. The picture necessarily had to include an understanding of new policy.
Policy development in China is not easy to study as it takes place behind closed doors
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and is revealed only in sound bites. What was really going on behind the rhetoric
about harmonious societies and a new socialist countryside? What is the grand
strategy, and how will it be deployed? Since mass programs had not worked, will the
new programs acknowledge and work with individual community environments to
create prosperity? Would the inequities of past incentives be altered so that the
farmers who had been shouldering the burden for all of Chinese society could now
become net recipients of development resources? Could the policies that led to
rampant government abuse be altered to stimulate an attitude of public service? Taken
together, these and other variables would enhance or diminish the probability that this
time the government could effect real change - the final chapter which cannot be
written for years or even decades to come.
Policymaking in China
Our look at China's recent history showed that for our purposes, we can separate
the last 60 years into two roughly equal periods, the first of which was characterized
by the ill-fated communes, and the second of which began with the farmer household
responsibility system. Both periods represented massive economic, social, and
political adjustments from previous periods; and both had their successes and
difficulties. Whatever happened in both periods was not an accident, they were the
product of careful planning and a very strong display of centralized power from
China's communist party and government. Both periods were also woven into the
fabric of Chinese society, so that at least in the early stages, there wasn't plenty, but
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what was available was equitably distributed. Both periods also had in common a
strong policy of extraction to support urbanization and especially industrialization, an
approach to modernization that was entirely conventional and undertaken in the full
knowledge that China's farm households would face difficult circumstances until
industrialization created sufficient wealth to reverse the flow of revenues to the farms
instead of away from them. From those examples of success and also from the
failures, China's first sixty years provided important lessons for China's leaders and
scholars as they readied their newest plan for its unveiling.
After sixty years of aggressive extraction, China's latest Five Year Plan (2006 2010) was developed in an environment where the Beijing coffers are comfortably full
and there is widespread agreement that this time the government can approach an
integrated view of Chinese society - adjusting practices to begin balancing the wealth.
The goal is to guide China to the achievement of a harmonious society. Because of
past policy, this new direction necessarily must improve conditions in rural China - in
the Government parlance, that's building a new socialist countryside.
In order to achieve these lofty goals, we have seen that the government is willing
to spend real money and dedicate its considerable resources to the task. We have also
seen that the new policies have been reaching rural communities where the range of
results include the full spectrum from little change and little hope for change all the
way to significant improvements in reducing the income gap, in improving living
conditions, and in the availability of important public goods. These changes have
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come at the hands of many different actors, and the players are different in every town,
but have variously included local party members and leaders, local governments,
government agencies, businesses, new farm organizations and the farmers themselves.
Although progress seems terribly slow in many of China's poorest rural communities,
it has seemed a blur in those with greater development capacity, whatever the nature of
that capacity.
This round of policy changes has been seen to follow different trajectories in
different areas during the implementation process, which is indicative of a
decentralization of sorts, and an integrating interaction between what is happening at
the street level with what is being written at the policy level. Because they are
interactive and integrated, we did not find much of the policy-implementation
dichotomy of which Las well writes.498 Although the process is not instantaneous
policy adjustments are made as a part of the implementation process indicating some
functioning level of collaboration and coordination during the implementation
process.499 The reason implementation works this way in China is because the
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government and party are cautious about major changes, and therefore experiment in
some areas and gradually expand programs to the extent they appear to be working.
This is how the household responsibility system came about, and it is how the zero
burden tax policy was implemented. By the time Beijing was ready to drop the
agriculture tax altogether, decision-makers had the benefit of opinions from scholars,
think tanks, local governments and grass-roots party organizations in addition to the
street marches that called attention to the problem to begin with.
Although improvement has yet to reach into rural China's poorest corners, we
must acknowledge that something good must be said for a program of policies and
actions that is having such profound positive effects in places it has touched. That the
matrix of policy provisions permits the growth of the kind of community engagement
and collaboration that is visible in some places is either good evidence of a sound
program or a testimony to the abilities and will of the people it has touched. In either
case, the effects are heartening.
Implementation process
Another example of policy adjustment on the run is the poverty relief program in
which China's poorest receive subsidies. The early versions of that policy had the
money descending through the hierarchy, with everyone handling it siphoning off a
little. In the current version, the money goes directly to the peasants in a process that

is quite transparent and easy to manage. To assure the correct outcome of policies
such as this one, the government publicizes them on every available media, assuring
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that policy targets are aware of their rights and benefits and knowledgeable about
where to complain if the results do not match the promises. As a result of measures
like this one, many policies have dropped out of public consciousness and are now
simply taken for granted.
This doesn't mean that all programs are fair and equitable. The dark side of the
picture is visible in the program allocation process, where vestiges of the days of
rampant corruption are still in the picture. Programs arrive on the scene in China from
many different sources - many from different Chinese government agencies, but also
from international development aid agencies. In order to influence the allocation of
resources, many jurisdictions have offices in the capital to compete, and often the
decisions are based not only on the grant qualifications but also on "contributions." In
fact the decisions still take place in a "black box" and no one is quite sure where the
money really ends up. The Chinese have a saying to describe the situation:
"shangbian xiayu huahua de, xiabian yishan gangan de" which means it's raining hard
at the top but here at the bottom our clothes are still dry.500
On the other hand, observations in the case towns reveal that assisted selfreliance is working. Peasants have shown the initiative and aptitude to organize
themselves to identify opportunities for the improvement of livelihoods, homes and
villages, and are able to open discussions with governments and businesses that have
the resources to help. Local governments have learned where to look for resources
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Source is an interview with a farmer in Gansu, but there were similar stories in other locations.
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and how to use their contacts to best advantage. It is a good sign that local
governments defer to the capable management of business persons in many cases.
In the poorest case towns, there is an air of abject dependency. They lack the
resources upon which to build: they lack the support and encouragement, of the
government: and they lack the vision and initiative to identify their own opportunities.
These are the ones who leave for the cities, factories and mines where they can forget
about their farms. In all fairness, the impression one gets in some of these areas is that
no amount of creativity could make a difference, and it's a wonder people still occupy
that space. Visible everywhere is the detritus of wasted lives - homes built of scrap
materials, no water or sanitation facilities, no public health services and because there
are still no schools, there are no prospects for their progeny. It's possible there are
formulas to transform that landscape, but the inescapable conclusion that comes from
a first hand look at some of these places is that they are simply not habitable. There is
nothing upon which to build a civic society, and even if one sprouted unbidden, there
wouldn't be much for it to do. It is clear that without government investment nothing
will change. What we are left to ponder is whether a top-down intervention, the only
feasible kind, can make a difference among a population in this condition - illiterate,
unhealthy, and demoralized. The evidence tells us that among the indicators of
capacity, human capital is one of the essential ingredients. What the research does not
reveal is under what conditions it is possible to develop human capital. There is
another Chinese saying that even if the roast duck flies in front of you, you will still
need to reach out and bite it.
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Another factor with which this research cannot help is how much of rural China
is in such desperate condition. For China's most remote rural villages, the day of mass
programs is over. Each will need to be evaluated for capacity, village by village, and
decisions will need to be whether and how capacity can be enhanced.
Development capacity
China's current rural policy appears to work in integrating top-down and bottom
up efforts in some towns but not in others. What is argued in this concluding chapter
is that we can account for the difference through an assessment of development
capacity. Towns and villages such as those in Jiangsu that were on the road to
prosperity just a short time following the unleashing of market forces were
characterized by a high development capacity. There was a combination of good soils,
nearby markets, industrial complexes, and transportation facilities that made progress
virtually spontaneous. We have seen that farmers could organize, could work with
governments and businesses and could make full use of their endowments to attract
investment, find alternative work, consolidate their lands, develop alternative farming
techniques and crops and very quickly create a comfortable environment in which to
live and work. There is work to be done in caring for the environment, reducing
energy dependency, managing water resources and controlling air and water pollution,
but in this kind of prosperous environment, the combined forces of government,
business and a civic society can make progress and has been doing so.
Obviously development capacity is variable, and when it became evident that a
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bottom up approach to rural development had stagnated after improving the lives of a
small percentage of China's farmers, the government became involved to work on an
integrated approach. With additional guidance and resources, towns and villages were
able to pull themselves out of poverty. The task was not as easy in these cases, but the
programs carried sufficient resources to permit real progress. The successful case
towns in Liaoning, Gansu, and Sichuan are examples of that, as they responded well to
technological improvements and some creative experiments with crops and/or farm
animals. Once again, however, the starting point was a level of capacity that could
sustain an improvement drive, as long as it was well led and supported. This second
wave was driven by new links - between peasants and their local governments,
businesses and both domestic and international aid sources. At this level of capacity,
the case towns demonstrated organization as being of great importance. It is
organization that provided a foundation upon which leaders can act, linked the actors,
disseminated technological advances, learned and spread market information and
lobbied banks, agencies, international aid groups and anyone else who would listen to
the benefit of their membership. Where development progress was more difficult,
organization made it possible.
What was not seen in the case towns and villages was a deliberate attempt to
evaluate and improve capacity. There were attempts to improve motivation, for
example with grain subsidies, but those subsidies did nothing for those attempting to
farm on arid hillsides. There were attempts to improve productivity by supporting
equipment purchases and developing new and inexpensive machinery, but those
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initiatives, while well intended, did nothing to improve capacity in small rice paddies
where the machinery doesn't work. If you ask farmers in those kinds of areas what
they need, they are at a loss to answer. Things are today the way they always have
been - why would anyone decide now to call that a problem? It is very clear that for
several hundred million farm families, their situation requires careful examination and
expert diagnostics. It is also clear that only government and a very few international
aid agencies possess the resources to make a significant difference. Even if there were
talented leaders still available in the hill towns of Sichuan and Gansu, whom would
they lead, and what would they lead the people to do?
Ups and downs in Chinese government
We have seen that administrative reform at the local level appears to be helping
local leaders to become public servants, and the government has been attempting to
deal with its top-heavy structure with reductions and consolidations. Unfortunately,
the CCP still has a robust hierarchy within which communications flow out and down
but where feedback is very strongly filtered. China's poorest farmers are well
represented at the top of the pyramid, but largely disenfranchised within all the other
layers and agencies within which decisions are still made inside of black boxes.
For better or worse, peasants who want to be heard have only public
demonstrations as a reliable channel through the ranks and to the top. This approach
often has tragic consequences for the demonstrators, but works as a communications
tool because the CCP government prizes stability above nearly all other national
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values. Since the cadre evaluation system places a high premium upon the ability to
prevent public unrest, and also attaches strong disincentives to cadres who lose control,
the mere threat of demonstrations has a measure of power with local governments.
This source of power can be very effective to deal with local issues; and if problems
continue and the unrest reaches the streets and captures media attention
demonstrations also become a wedge into higher levels by seemingly calling into
question the legitimacy of the partyThere was enough history of self-serving cadre behavior in the case villages to
have left a residue of mistrust among the farmers; but it was also the case that peasants
knew how to manipulate and milk the system to their own advantage, also in full
disregard of the law. There is the example of peasants signing away their lands in
frustrated surrender to poor farming conditions and high taxes, and then returning to
reclaim the property when taxes went down. The intent and meaning of contract law
certainly resides in the heart of the contracting parties in China. The returning farmers
created legal chaos when their former farms had already been leased to commercial
farming enterprises or developers. This kind of clash meant that mistrust continues to
work in both directions within farming communities. Several officials expressed the
opinion that things will only get better when peasants change their ways to become
more cooperative and understanding. Interviews also made it evident in many cases
that when farmers become cadres they cross a line that affects their attitudes and
loyalties toward the people who were formerly neighbors but have become adversaries.
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In the mid 1980s, the CCP organizations in the countryside were strengthened to
provide direction and control over a population that sometimes seemed restive. The
strengthened rural party had an inhibiting effect on peasant self-organization. While
party members played an important, positive role in promoting rural change, the
results varied greatly from one location to the other, as we have seen, and there is no
denying that the party's heavy-handedness during the era of the communes and mass
movements left a trail of cynicism and sometimes fatalism in its wake. When coupled
with the reality that there is no tradition of participation among China's farmers,
(chapter five), and since the party still wields a great deal of power, the social capital
dimension of development capacity remains a difficult challenge in many parts of
rural China. Even where leadership and organization have a chance to emerge in a
rural town or village, the patriarchal style of the party-government often stifles or
ignores them. The end product of this collection of forces has led peasants in many
areas to become very passive, simply awaiting the government's next programs.
China's experiences with public participation and dependency are not unique, as we
have seen in the literature that describes rural development in Korea. What we saw in
Korea, however, was that even in areas where public spirit emerged and did well, a
renewed top-down paternalism quickly smothered it. It seems as though social capital
is as easily repressed as it is difficult to engender.
A key difference between China's rural development experience to date and the
experiences of Korea and Japan is the very powerful role of farm organizations. In
both of China's neighbors, farm cooperatives have played a vital role in every aspect
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of farm life, including political representation, marketing, finance, insurance, and
other important contributors to rural success. They represent their members in
international organizations like the WTO in addition to speaking for farmers and
farming at all levels of government. These coops are a part of the picture of integrated
top-down and bottom-up communications and collaboration that is still missing in
China where the party still claims it can represent everyone.
The question that still looms is whether and to what extent Chinese farmers can
push for national level organization. The need is apparent, but in the spirit of choosing
one's battles, it is perhaps prudent to stick to local issues for the present. Even if
farmers succeeded in creating a national farmers' cooperative organization any time
soon, under the current political climate, such an organization would quickly become a
branch of government, badly compromising its ability to serve, as we have seen in
Korea.
Much of what is essential to real progress in China must await a shift in political
culture. Without change, we have seen that Chinese administrators will continue to
face difficult and sometimes impossible conditions that affect their ability to serve the
people. Without change at the top layers of government, change in the lowest levels
will not mean much. Without change, the voice of the farmers is not effective in
collaborative communications, neither through the hierarchy, nor through the media.
Without change, China's officials who continue to manifest a negative bias against the
rural population will not have the opportunity to open their eyes to new realities.
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Without political change, there is little chance that officials will be held accountable,
both to their upper levels of government and to the Chinese farm communities. These
are conclusions that are wearying for anyone hoping for a good outcome. With
enough might and sufficient resources to throw at the problem, China's government
may create a veneer of prosperity, but we must still question its sustainability if it
remains as strongly paternalistic as it seems today. The rigid control and triggerhappy suppression of criticism is a constant reminder to Chinese scholars not to
become too optimistic about China's development prospects.
Contribution of the research
Although it was hoped at the outset that the wide variations in local conditions in
China would provide cases of international value, what is evident from the case
studies is the overriding importance of the unique characteristics of China as a nation,
and of those towns and villages being studied in particular. An important variable
affecting generalizeability is the structure of political institutions, which are unique to
China.501 According to Putnam, institutions shape politics "The rules and SOPs that
make up institutions leave their imprint on political outcomes by structuring political
behavior."502 In the same context Ashford asserted that governments will neither enact
nor implement policies contrary to the interests of their "political constitutions."
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China is ruled by a unitary party in a stoutly centralized authoritarian regime. The
party's paramount role in leading the Chinese in overall political, economic, and social
change is confirmed by the Chinese constitution. This tradition goes beyond the
Wilsonian Policy-implementation dichotomy, because party and government constitute
one governing body. Today the Chinese are holding well-publicized public hearings
on some topics, though with the party's lack of transparency it isn't clear to what extent
participation is affecting policy development. Lack of transparency at the legislative
end of the process also denies us the ability to determine whether the discretion left in
policies and regulations are a genuine attempt to become less rigid, or are simply
points upon which legislators could not reach agreement. This is not a fine point intentions matter in policy implementation.
In China's system which contains virtually none of the Madisonian defenses504
against the centralization of power, the forces of localization still strain the bonds of
authoritarianism. There is a long history of policy manipulation at the local level, and
the peasants have also demonstrated the ability to push, pull, and twist policy to their
own ends. That's the problem with top-down implementation as Pressman and
Wildavsky reported it,505 and also demonstrates the chaos that exists in the Lipsky
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view of the street level bureaucrat.

Out of all the vectors at work on policy

implementation in general, both the literature and this research reinforce the idea that
end results remain difficult to predict, and can be expected to vary wildly from place
to place.
Beyond politics, market economic reforms have led to some areas of significant
decentralization, (such as land management, local tax structures, and business
investment regulation), but always cautiously and always following localized
experimentation accompanied by continuous adaptation and adjustment.507 In this
implementation process, where our case studies turned up evidence of citizen
participation, the studies affirmed the importance of such engagement to the
possibility of significantly improving living conditions. As we have seen, however, it
was not clear whether prosperity was a cause or an effect of such engagement. While
local actors may not have had a great deal of initiating power, they demonstrated
considerable input as adjustors and coordinators in these more prosperous
communities.
The effect of public engagement on policy implementation calls into question the
divide articulated by Pressman and Wildavsky and others between policy formulation

Lipsky.
Lazin.
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and policy implementation.508 Their model accepted a paradigm that came from
Harold Lasswell509 that described a gap between policymaking and implementation
that does not necessarily occur in the real world.510 Yanow511 rejects the idea that
there is one best way to study implementation, and Elmore also said "it is less
important to agree on a single framework for analyzing implementation problems than
it is to be clear about the consequences of adopting one framework over another."512
This research into China's development policy adds several important dimensions to
the views of those authors. The top-down and bottom-up models and problems513 may
work to describe some policies, but they do not provide adequate explanations for
development policy in China; so the question is not: should China's government and
party employ its authoritarian regime to impose policy, as they did from 1949 until
508
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1978 (top-down approach), or should they rely on bottom-up forces, as they did from
1978 until 1999. The right question is: what does current capacity in each community
tell us about what needs to be done? In our cross region case studies, there is
substantial evidence that in some communities, top-down guidance and resources were
necessary; while in other places development was virtually spontaneous, and all the
government needed to do was get out of the way. The real question is "What is
needed?" The best answer is capacity. If a community has substantial capacity,
bottom-up development will work; and if a community has little or no capacity, topdown intervention, including capacity building, will be critical to success.
Capacity is an integration lens that helps us capture all of the vectors that
influence development, from all directions. Capacity helps us to understand
•

The need for and role of flexibility in policy and implementation

•

The flow and effectiveness of authority

•

The systems view of development (e.g. social programs improve human
capital which improves social capital)

•

The need to work with and not on the market

•

Political, social and economic factors affecting policy deployment

•

The conditions that foster developmental synergies — dynamic professional

alliances and relationships between and within state bureaucracies and
various actors in civil society
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With the "capacity" approach to policy study, Elmore's focus on issues
surrounding how best to study implementation takes on new meaning.514 This was the
primary motivation that led this project into rural communities to watch implementers
and implementation in action. Studying implementation after the fact serves a
different purpose, revealing the combined effects of all the forces at work in a rural
community. This project was undertaken to witness those forces as they were
interacting with a view to observing what is working and what is not.
Under conditions of ambiguous policy goals (e.g. a new socialist countryside),
examining capacity serves pragmatic purposes. We discover there is no fixed
universal actor who is destined to serve a pivotal role, that leadership and ideas are apt
to come from any direction. States, companies and communities alone rarely possess
the resources to promote and manage broad-based, sustainable development, and
partnerships within and between different actors are required.
Most top-down implementation studies pay very little attention to the targetgroup behavior. Bottom-up scholars naturally watch the target population, but they
tend to focus on the behavior of clients as it is affected by many other factors in
addition to those of a particular program. To demonstrate the pitfalls of this approach,
Mazmanian and Sabatier argued that the probability of implementation success
decreases as a consequence of the amount of behavior modification required.
Behavior modification is dependent upon the number of people in the target group and

Elmore.
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the degree of change required. This convinced Sabatier that things need to be shaken
up in order for people to get excited enough to get things done.515 Studying capacity
freed us from the need to meander through the swamps of behavioral uncertainty as
Sabatier did. Capacity assessment identifies those major dimensions that are working
for and against policy success in any given area, including social capital. As an
example, the primary advantage of a history of civil participation is its contribution to
social capital formation.51 China is a land without such a tradition, which reveals an
important policy and implementation direction.
Future Research
The rural development issue is too big to be ignored, and the results address
important aspects of many concerns. The policy shift towards integrated rural
development reflects the complex linkages and interactions within the system of
overall rural development. This research represents only an early stage of exploration
r

that merits further attention.
Out of the case studies came many issues awaiting scholarly attention, including
such tantalizing prospects as
•

An impulse to measure capacity
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•

Ethics and public management and performance measurement

•

Environmental concerns for sustainable development

•

Human resource development - especially the role of rural women and
youth

•

Future of the party and grass-roots democracy linking to local capacitybuilding

Unlike most third world countries, China's modernization is not only challenged
by the migration of rural human capital to the cities, factories and mines, but also by a
shortage of qualified workers for the well-developed coastal region and urban areas.
In other words, China has its own internal "world system." Current policy seems on
the right path as it proceeds with an integrated development approach: on the one hand,
building a better legal and fair urban world for people who move in; and on the other
hand, building better living conditions for those who choose to stay on the family
farms. However two-thirds of the rural population consists of women and young
people, and the incomplete development of these human resources represents a drag
on social and economic progress instead of representing a potential doubling of
Chinese productivity. The problems are evident today in the mass migration that is
hollowing rural China. The predictable consequence is an enduring, institutionalized
poverty - one that may well remain the natural end point of rural development in
many areas. Even if the government injects money and management into that system,
the loss of human capital will make sustainability very difficult.
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We have seen that in some of China's more remote regions, development
capacity is so low that continued migration, even to the point of abandonment, may be
the best answer. In other areas, however, migration is more of a problem than a
solution. Many of China's urban areas are always close to the limits in available
housing, jobs, energy and water supplies, and many of China's rural villages have the
resource capacity to grow needed produce and breeding industries, but are losing
human capital that would make it possible to develop agriculture or rural industry
along with badly needed jobs. It would appear prudent to study programs from other
developing countries and also from China's own recent history that included training
and sponsored internships for women and young people to develop leadership and
technical skills that matter greatly in rural transformation programs.
In one of the Gansu case sites, a friend took a picture of a group of farmers
working together in a large field. It wasn't noticed until later that out of the
approximately twenty five people at work, all were women except for one. The men
were away trying to earn enough to support their families, and the women were doing
the farming.
In a visit with farmers in the hill town in Sichuan, seven very curious and
friendly elementary school children surrounded the author, full of questions and also
brimming with answers about their home lives. Most of these eight year olds had not
seen their fathers for years, and several had not seen either parent for more than a year.
These children are being raised by their grandparents who are also doing their best on
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the farms. It seems a formula for serious problems as these children become young
adults on the loose in China's cities. It is self-evident that the tearful messages from
absentee parents that are played for the children on national television are not a
substitute for parental love and supervision.
Rural women are paying the highest social price for this period of economic
growth in China, choosing between their husbands and their farms and children. The
Japanese model that employed women in rural extension work should be studied for
its applicability to the Chinese situation. Importantly, programs from the Mao era also
attempted to reverse centuries of gender discrimination and are worth further study. In
the early days of the communist regime, Chairman Mao's administration liberated
Chinese women, ending old traditions like foot binding and promulgating images of
"iron girls" and a world in which "women carry half of the sky." Unfortunately there
hasn't been much progress since those days, and interviews with rural women
disclosed a continuing pattern of gender discrimination.
With respect to the youth issue, rural conditions mean that in most of the western
towns and villages, large numbers of China's rural youth leave their homes with only a
junior high school education or less. They are repelled by the harsh life on the farms
and drawn to China's cities, blindly searching for something better; but they will only
find themselves competing without qualifications for scarce jobs. Most will end up in
arduous, low paying and dangerous work in construction or industry, and too many
will end up in gangs or in prison. Even those who find good work will find
482

themselves discriminated against, separated from their wives or husbands, and out of
touch with their children.
The case studies repeatedly demonstrated the importance of social capital,
including human resources and leadership, and the forces that are bleeding rural
villages and depriving them of their capable women and young people merit further
study with an eye to reversing them. Success stories from today, from China's past,
and from successful outside programs like that found in Japan following WWII offer
promises that cannot be ignored by a developing state and its scholars.
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